Journal of Global Peace and Security Studies

Journal of Global Peace and Security Studies (JGPSS)

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Globalization: The Rise of the Middle Classes from Athens to Beijing

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Abstract

Although its detractors deny it, Globalization, like free markets more generally, entails virtues, at a minimum in the Aristotelian sense of functional effectiveness: fair exchanges, self-discipline, respect for consequences of individual choices, keeping promises, a necessity for law and order, protection of private property, the value of individual autonomy, and the reward for risk-taking, according to a cost/benefit analysis, defined as applied reason, defined as informed choices. Notice what is absent from this catalogue of prudence: moral virtue, justice, equality, self-sacrifice, devotion to divine or any other transcendental values. Now my materialistically tilted understanding of Globalization can be unmasked: it ignores the 'higher' virtues. Or, rather, it leaves them to be assessed and applied by the non-economic sectors of the social and political arenas.

Keywords: Globalization, middle classes, individual, responsibility, fair dealing, populism, imperialism, American civil war, Hellenism, cosmopolitanism, Industrial Revolution.

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Introduction

The elemental truth must be stressed that the characteristics of any country before its industrial revolution and modernization is poverty. Life on the margin of subsistence is an inevitable condition for the masses of any nation. Doubtless, there will be a ruling class, based on economic surplus produced from the land, trade and office, living in extreme luxury…. But with low productivity, low output per head, in traditional agriculture, any economy which has agriculture as the main constituent of its national income…does not produce much of a surplus above the immediate requirements of consumption (Mathias, 1969: 05).

There is no consensus regarding the concept of Globalization. While not denying its political and cultural effects, this presentation focuses on some of Globalization's most important economic properties: trade and its associated elements. Keeping these factors in mind, David Held's conception of globalization is useful:

Globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon, lying on a continuum with 'the local' at one end and' the global' at the other. It denotes a shift in the spatial form of human activity to transcontinental or interregional institutions across space and time such that, on the one hand, day to day activities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and, on the other hand, the practices and decisions of local groups can have significant global reverberations (Held, 1997: 253).

Globalization's economic properties have precipitated an intense debate regarding its effects, traversing the moral, social and political arenas, with the predictable continuum from radical Marxist critiques through liberal and neo-liberal rationales to conservative dismay. Space precludes entry into these thickets, although my analysis inevitably suggests my value orientation based on my understanding of what Globalization can and cannot accomplish. Although its detractors deny it, Globalization, like free markets more generally, entails virtues, at a minimum in the Aristotelian sense of functional effectiveness: fair exchanges, self-discipline, respect for consequences of individual choices, keeping promises, necessity for law and order, protection of private property, the value of individual autonomy, and the reward for risk-taking, according to a cost/benefit analysis, defined as applied reason, defined as informed choices. Notice what is absent from this catalogue of prudence: moral virtue, justice, equality, self-sacrifice, devotion to divine or any other transcendental values. Now my materialistically tilted understanding of Globalization can be unmasked: it ignores the 'higher' virtues. Or, rather, it leaves them to be assessed and applied by the non-economic sectors of the social and political arenas.

The Significance of Athens

While the influence of trade and commerce on the development of the Athenian polis remains controversial, I believe it was decisive. No one disputes that most Athenians engaged in agricultural or herding activities, however, relative to the societies to the East, trade and commerce played a much greater part in Athenian life and had a profound effect on 6th and 5th Century Athens, for good and ill. The empires of the Near East had long engaged in complex and long-distance trade, from India to Egypt and beyond. None of these societies, however, were as dependent upon commerce as Athens and none transformed itself so rapidly and profoundly. Upon initiating trade

with its eastern neighbors, bringing them olives and pottery among other goods, and providing them with a sound currency, Athens received a multitude of products like silk and grain, but especially ideas. Becoming rich, Athens became a magnet for the ambitious, talented and enterprising, a Greek version of New York and Paris. Becoming increasingly democratic, a consequence of hoplite soldiers and sailors, as well as its burgeoning middle classes, Athens became imperialistic, suggesting that democracies are as liable to catastrophic excess as authoritarian states.

Although Athens cannot be considered the precursor to Globalization, it did establish important conditions for a global political economy. Most fundamentally, the commercial activity, which accelerated in Athens after Solonian and Cleisthenic reforms, was an alternative to traditional social structures. Always on the margins of subsistence, Athenian agriculture forced its sons to find alternative ways of making a living. Even the relatively rich family of Solon could not keep the great statesman from a career in commerce. When these sons settled in Athens, they found themselves in need of an alternative authority structure, a way of settling disputes among strangers who were no longer under patriarchal authority. The critical element of Solonian due process is that disputants would be treated as individuals with claims based on facts, not as family or tribal members. '[He] saw that the strength of Athens lay in the number and the potentialities of her citizens, and that at all costs their individual rights must be restored and preserved' (Snodgrass, 1980: 94). This transformation from privilege to Meritor, in later terms, from status to contract, or from the community to society, was completed by the Calisthenics reforms which essentially established a democratic form of government, although the groundwork was laid before the institutions were established:

It is the distinguishing characteristic of Greek culture that, long before the notion of democracy had been conceived, there was an established sense of rights of the individual citizen; one of these rights was that of a degree of free communication and…of criticism. It is this 'openness' of Greek society which is its most precious single legacy…. (Snodgrass, 1980: 161).

While there was no written constitutional protection of speech, assembly or property rights, neither was there any systematic infringement on these concepts. The positive implications of these implicit protections were that the elements of commercial transactions would be allowed to flourish as a result of individual decisions regarding what might be profitable and that these activities would be supported by the legal and democratic structures of an increasingly prosperous middle class Athens. As the Athenian economy became more complex, the old agrarian divisions between the Few and the Many became less significant. At the same time ideals changed:

The time-honored and individualistic desire to give man the distinctive attributes of the warrior, in death as in life, had given way to something more practical and broadly based: the realization that the self-esteem of the dead is less important than the needs of the living, especially when costly materials and long hours of craftsmanship have gone into the products in question (Snodgrass, 1980: 99).

By these processes, as well as the more obvious opportunities that trade and commerce presented, the Athenian middle classes took control of Athenian democracy. They were able to protect themselves from the temptations of both aristocratic privilege and underclass resentment. In 18[th]and 19[th]Century England the same process was duplicated, culminating in a liberal representative polity.

Alexander: Cultural Hellenism and Cosmopolitanism

It seems undeniable that Alexander's policies or, at least his attitudes, spread from Greece to the Indus River, set conditions for Globalization. First was Alexander's openness to the other, other people, other customs, other gods and other civilizations. Despite his problematic relations with Athenians and other Greeks, he clearly admired them, particularly Athenians. As he encountered the peoples of the East, he treated them with respect, often making a competent opposing general a provincial governor. Not only did he not impose Greek culture on his new subjects, but he also embodied deference for the norms and practices of the East, often to the consternation of Macedonians and Greeks. While his motivations remain conjectural, the effects of his approach seem to confirm a delight in blending East and West, making him a legitimate ruler of a polyglot global empire. This has often been dismissed yet another instance of the megalomania of yet another tyrant. There can be little doubt that Alexander created the Hellenistic World, which must be conceived as not a simple infusion of Hellenism into alien cultures, but as a complex interpenetrated set of phenomena more profound than the exchange of goods. Just as English would become the indispensable language of Globalization, Greek became the indispensable language of the culture of Alexander's world.

Renaissance Venice: The Necessity of Community

The opening of the Mediterranean to the East all the way to China by Venice and other Italian city-states is essentially a story of the adventure and the opportunities of international commerce. Here I wish to sketch an essential condition for the success of commerce in general: a community of law, especially of contract law, as it pertains to the protection of property. Before any prudent man can contemplate long distance trade, often requiring months or years to come to fruition, he must be reasonably assured of the risks involved. Perhaps the most important concerns the reliability of commercial agreements, hence the cardinal importance of having enforceable contracts, adjudicated under 'Solonian' due process. The most brilliant expression of this notion is the theme of *the Merchant of Venice*.

Shakespeare, no less than his immediate predecessors, Luther and Machiavelli, ushered in the modern world and its principle political expression: the territorial nation-state. While all political regimes require revenue, the modern state is especially dependent on the revenue derived from commerce and trade, for this is where the money is. To pay for its key institutions, the army and the bureaucracy, much more revenue than was extractable from European agriculture was essential, but only with greater difficulty. Unlike peasants, the commercial middle classes were not so easily exploited. Authoritarian rule is facilitated by agrarian economies, especially those dependent on state institutions like irrigation systems. Such regimes, typified by the great Asiatic

civilizations, had life and death control of its subjects. They were intrinsically exploitive because even small extractions or restrictions meant the difference between living and dying. Moreover, agrarian subjects are easily replicated and dispensed with, their contributions minimal and easily replaced.

The contrast with the modern European state cannot be overstated. Increasingly dependent on trade-driven revenues, rulers, often reluctantly, needed to accommodate the middle classes that produced their wealth. These classes, however, had more means of resistance than their peasant forbears. They were not only more needed, they were less replicable, less dispensable, and more mobile. Thus, an almost paradoxical relationship developed between the ruling and middle classes. The more the state needed revenue, the more it needed to control the producers of wealth. However, the more it encroached upon the economy, the more the wealth producers resisted; and the more political interference, the less efficient and less productive the economy became, diminishing the revenue pool. In brief, the producers and the rulers had to accommodate each other.

European Jewry illustrates the dilemma of the modern state most dramatically and tragically. The 'Wandering Jews' became increasingly important as international trade accelerated. They became a metaphor for commerce. Independent, resented, prosperous, estranged: the ultimate outsider who could not be dispensed with. The tragedy of the Jews was that as commerce expanded among the Gentiles, Jews became less important and more vulnerable because they remained outside the new political orders that were developing in Europe. They had little political influence that did not depend upon placating and bribing rulers and exploiting Gentiles. This was Shylock's dilemma. To enforce his contract with the citizen Antonio, he would forfeit his life as a Jew, as an incarnate outsider no matter how important otherwise. He had to convert to Christianity if the laws of Venice were to be applied without fear or favor. *The Merchant of Venice* further advances the conditions for Globalization. First, the law, especially dealing with property and its contracts must be enforced, regardless of the desirability of the outcome. Second, for the law to be applied wisely, a certain leeway of outcomes must be allowed, a leeway that can only work if it is following other societal rules and values. This important point is often overlooked or denied by critics of free-market capitalism. Their claim that capitalism is simply about wealth production independent of other values is false. Even a simple contract, like the one which bound Antonio and Shylock, cannot be understood, much less enforced in its own terms. Shylock could not have his bond, as he demanded because the contract was embedded in many other values of Venetian society, which contradicted a literal interpretation of the contract. *The Merchant of Venice,* at least in my interpretation, indicates that the rules governing commerce are inextricably intertwined with a series of social and political rules, which when taken together can be said to constitute a just regime, one based on a complex and interactive set of rules, not predictable outcomes, no matter how desirable they might seem (Hayek, 1976).

The Industrial Revolution and the Rise of the Middle Classes

The Industrial Revolution mechanized commerce, making its products less expensive and more reliable. It had a gargantuan appetite for four things: raw materials, capital, urban workers, and

customers. The long-term transformation from agriculturally based economies to commercial ones was given steroids by industrialization. The first industrial nation was Great Britain.

To be given identity, the concept implies the onset of a fundamental change in the structure of an economy, a fundamental redeployment of resources away from agriculture. This does not necessarily mean that investment in agriculture or the labor force in agriculture goes down. Indeed, all these things may need to increase in absolute terms. But growth in production, investment, and labor force grows more rapidly in other sectors of the economy and therefore becomes more differentiated (Mathias, 1969: 02).

By this definition, Athens can be understood to have achieved many of the attributes of the Industrial Revolution, but not quite all. 'Economic growth in this sense of differentiation— structural change, deepening investment, technical change involving a change in production functions—has to be distinguished from economic expansion… (Mathias, 1969: 03). There needed to be profound structural changes in the economic infrastructure for the Industrial Revolution to come to fruition. Long-distance communication and transportation technologies were only developed in the 18th and 19th centuries. Much more sophisticated financial instruments and practices had to become widespread. Above all, as Adam Smith demonstrated, the concepts of division of labor and comparative advantage were indispensable to national and international prosperity.

Before all these processes could emerge, several conditions were met in Britain to a far greater extent than any other nation-state. '[In Arthur Lewis's words, there needed to be a] "will industrialize." He meant by this that there must be a social system and a government that has not got its face set against economic change, or at least has not got effective power and influence to prevent spontaneous forces for change from acting.' Perhaps the key idea here along with 'will' is 'spontaneous forces,' for industrialization was largely brought about by what we now call 'middle classes.' Mathias expands on Lewis's third condition, 'inventiveness:'

By and large, innovations were the result of the formal application of applied science, nor a product of the formal educational system of the country. Great determination, intense curiosity, quick wits, clever fingers, luck, capital, or employment and a backer to survive the period of experimenting, testing, improving were more important in almost all fields than a scientific training (Mathias, 1969: 137).

It would be difficult to conceive of a better definition of the middle-class attributes. Lewis's second and fourth conditions, sufficient resources and capital, require little comment (Mathias, 1969: 10-12). These processes made Britain the world's most powerful economic entity. Its effects at the social level may well prove more profound: 'Industrialization, coupled with urbanization, became the greatest creator of the need for capital; the greatest creator of employment the world had known' (Mathias, 1969: 144)

Of course, as the source of wealth change, the wealth producers wished to protect their gains, economic and social, from those above and below them, engaged in a classic two front struggle. With considerable difficulty, and at the cost of several revolutions, they [the middle classes] were

about to achieve their political ambitions—the destruction of the old, conservative monarchies, the proclamation of freedom of enterprise and control of as much public administration as [their wealth] needed to be preserved. Notably, this shift in political power took place in Britain with far less social convulsion than other European nations.

By the end of the 19th century the Industrial Revolution and its concomitant rise of the middle classes prevailed in Western Europe, with Britain the dominant power, with a newly unified Germany closing the gap and in many basic industries taking the lead, and with revolutionary France more slowly evolving economically than politically.

Yet even before this European process was completed, the middle classes of Europe had harnessed their commercial, financial and industrial skills to conquer the world. They thrust their ruthless way across every continent, bringing wars in their train, inciting revolts, but everywhere triumphant. (Moraze, 1996: xi)

I cite these perhaps overheated words to indicate that even those who recognized the benefits of industrialization could not mask their qualms that change on such a scale was bound to foster violence. Moraze (1996: 7) appreciates that 'the age of the enlightenment was essentially and primarily the age of trade, and trade so profitable that it was able to make many and varied demands on politics as well.' Moreover, he appreciated the liberal implications of these changes, yet his ambivalence remains, especially when he eyes developments east of the Rhine (Moraze, 1996: 10) In the aftermath of two world wars, his ambivalence is easy to understand, yet his suggestion that industrial change is inevitably violent or is somehow caused by middle class assumption so some political influence is not warranted. The French revolution predated industrialization in France. Moreover, war is but one of the responses to structural change. And even when social dislocation leads to violence, as abhorrent as it is, it must be measured against a status quo that for virtually the entire expanse of history has meant poverty for 90% of human beings.

Still, these developments could not be properly labeled Globalization, for they were essentially exploitive, reaching its obscene expression in Nazi Germany. Western Europe had conquered most of Asia and Africa but did not export its modern techniques, except insofar it was necessary to strip their possessions of their natural assets. This was economic expansion because of imperialism, not Globalization. To this degree Lenin was correct. World War I was at least partially caused by the European struggle to exploit Asian and African resources to achieve European dominance.

The imperial pattern of British exploitation was demonstrated as early as the 18th century in the American colonies. After a century of neglect, Britain became aware of the potential wealth America implied for Britain and began to exercise more economic control under a mercantilist regime, which attempted to restrict the American economy to providing primary commodities to Britain. American resistance resulted in independence with portentous implications for Globalization.

The American Century: The Promise of Globalization and its Discontents

With the end of World War Two, the United States was the dominant economic force in the world. Although in some senses a superpower, the Soviet Union could never rival the U.S., eventually succumbing to its inability to create and sustain a dynamic economy. Before we discuss Globalization, let us sum up the attributes of Globalization which led up to its fulfillment under the leadership of the U.S.

With Athens, we saw the transformation of a traditional social order based on an agrarian economy give way to a commercial trading economy and a democratic political regime designed to accommodate it. Widespread literacy, rule of law, including protections of communication, travel, and property, and a sound currency, which served as the medium of exchange throughout the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Above all, Athens fostered individualism, in ideas, behavior and responsibility.

With Venice and the other Italian city states, we understood the necessity of fulfilling contractual obligations without fear or favor and, equally important, we appreciated that a complex economy required a complex political system if it were to work with sufficient resilience to sustain itself. This implied that legal rules had to work in concert with other social norms, that is, a modern system of justice, essentially procedural and alterable, was necessary to sustain a complex economy, even as economic rules became more important.

With Britain and the rest of Europe in varying degrees, the Industrial Revolution manifested its capacity to create an avalanche of goods and services at lower and lower prices, enabling more and more people to live middle class lives by earning incomes far above subsistence, thereby able to consume the products they produced directly and indirectly. Equally important was the recognition by the wealth producing classes that to protect their property and their capacity to earn, they had to secure political influence, a process that was well underway in Britain by the middle of the 19th century and that had been accomplished in the 18th century by the American Constitution. The Industrial Revolution, the rise of the middle classes and the development of liberal government are the three facets of the same jewel: the modern industrial state. All that was necessary to create the infrastructure of Globalization was a way to expand all these processes around the world without imperialist exploitation.

America was never aristocratic, except in its pretensions, especially among the planters of the South, so there was no need to wrest political power from a class of people who measured their worth by their leisured decadence. Yet rapid changes were hardly avoided. Although few people believed Jefferson's election was revolutionary, it accelerated, if not created, profound changes in American life. It signaled the rise of the Common Man and the demise of the Gentleman. The election legitimated working for a living, a process held in contempt by Gentlemen, even when forced by circumstances to earn money, rather than live off their property and the labor of others. Aristocratic birth, landed property, and liberal education became suspect. Now, it became desirable for office-seekers to have occupations and humble origins. Now, it became acceptable, if not laudable, for officeholders to exploit their office for private gain. The Founders' ideal of disinterested, unremunerated public service vanished, apart from occasional rhetorical flourishes. The deference these attributes compelled in the 18th century evaporated. Success, increasingly

measured by earned wealth, was admired and rewarded by voters. All forms of authority—familial, clerical, social—were under siege and would succumb as the 19th century unfolded. As Americans took control of their own lives, as they prospered by their own efforts, they became less willing to submit to authorities, who would subordinate their interests to something called, the Common Good.

Just as Hamilton envisioned, by becoming a commercial, trading, and industrial nation, the United States was becoming the Great American Empire, ready and eager to enter the world stage. Ironically, Jefferson's presidency, despite its overt hostility to these developments, inadvertently accelerated the process. Overcoming his scruples regarding independent executive prerogatives, he doubled the size of the Nation with the Louisiana Purchase. His objective was to guarantee the agrarian nature of America for generations. However, rather than providing farmers with fertile and cheap land beyond their imaginings, rather than providing more opportunities than they could exploit, the new lands, which spread from New Orleans to the North and West, catapulted the American economy to new heights. Far from guaranteeing the Jeffersonian Vision of a stable agrarian society, the Purchase enhanced the American penchant for treating land as another commodity, to be bought, improved, sold, and purchased anew, in short, just another item of commerce, not the sign of a way of life. With farmers profiting from entrepreneurial opportunity, the Jeffersonian Vision was compromised in its central premise.

By the mid-19th century, every element of this socio-economic-political order was revolutionized. It was the most profound and rapid set of transformations since 5th century Athens. Consider values. The ideal of Gentlemen, who were born with Republican Virtue and, therefore, endowed with the right to rule, dissolved. Instead of a liberally educated, aristocrat, the new model of officials, elected and appointed, was comprised of the common qualities of ordinary men, who worked for a living and whose family also worked. Their lack of distinction was their claim to rule, for only they could represent people just like them. By the same reasoning, well-born elites could not in principle represent the People. Both views would later be the basis of identity politics. With the ideal of the Gentleman, the economic ideal of Mercantilism declined. Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, demolished the wisdom of privileged and monopolistic access to economic opportunity, which the government would bestow upon its favorites. Wealth was created by free markets and free competition, administered not by mercantilists, but with an 'invisible hand.' The nature of goods produced, their prices, and their quality would be determined by supply and demand, not by officials deciding what was good for the People or the State. The nature of workers, presumed to be lazy, fit only to produce under threat of starvation, was denied by the facts and reevaluated. It seemed that ordinary people would work for goods, previously considered luxuries. Not only was a demand for an ever-increasing variety of goods stimulated, but the production of these goods also became more efficient. And due to economic laws of comparative advantage and specialization, they became affordable and prevalent. Middle class prosperity increased and spread.

In the United States, this new conception of wealth creation built upon practices well established in virtually every community in the North and West. Free market proto capitalism became

capitalism, as manufacturing spread from farm cottages to factories. Efficiencies would soon dramatically increase by the introduction of machines in more industries. Increasing prosperity put money in the hands of workers, including women and children, to an extent unimaginable before. It became more difficult to impose traditional, paternalistic authority on those who so obviously contributed to the quality of life of their families and communities and who could assert their independence with cash in their hands. Middle class workers begot middle class political and social values. Pluralist economies begot pluralist polities.

For all its horror and grievous suffering, the American Civil War settled the most important outstanding economic issues of the 19th century. The industrializing North and Midwest would continue to develop without the impediments of a Senate controlled by Planter interests. Their ways would spread across the land with unprecedented scope, scale and rapidity. America became a magnet for those Europeans and Asians who would risk their lives to achieve freedom and prosperity. The archetypal middle-class society was now the world's most prolific generator of new middle-class persons. Based on the wealth and prosperity these middle-class Americans produced, America was ready to take its place in the world.

The Spread of Free Markets: China

For all its flaws, continuing rapid economic development only slightly stained by imperialism has been a major achievement of the U.S. after World War Two. Unlike virtually all the other great powers, the U.S. did not exploit its victories with territorial acquisitions. The first indication was the Marshall Plan, which extended American aid to all European nations, including the Soviet Union, which declined, and which forced its satellites to decline. Although the promise of the Marshall Plan was partially deferred due to the Cold War, the underlying structures of Globalization were developing. These included a near universal commercial and scientific language: English and a currency: the dollar, and perhaps above all, an unprecedented pattern of success, which increasingly became a near universal ideal. Besides, there were the examples of Japan and Germany, the defeated and ravaged nations, which rapidly restored their economies and established representative governments.

When the Soviet Union imploded, largely as a result of its failure to modernize its economy, Globalization took off. No longer was a command economy, regardless of its professed ideals of equality and the reality of a police state, a viable alternative to free market economies, even in those nations that continued to profess Marxism, like China and Vietnam. In consequence, middle class development accelerated and nowhere more spectacularly than in China and India. Prosperity and its consequences metastasized. Middle class expansion will continue to have profound positive effects on all the measures of standard of living: increasing life expectancy, infant mortality, nutrition, expansion of compulsory education, greater higher education opportunities, increasing scientific research, less sectarian violence, less probability of large scale war, and greater capacity to care for the poor (Pinker, 2011). Moreover, the political implications of Globalization seem to mirror the liberalization of political regimes that took place in Western Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, especially after World War Two and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The implosion of the Soviet Union was predated by the market reforms begun in China after Mao's death in the 1970s. Yet there is little doubt that reformist Chinese officials were aware of the economic catastrophe that was the Soviet Union. Behind this awareness and adding urgency to reform was the humiliation of China at the hands of imperialists. Difficulties arose in the modern era in the form of aggressive, wealthy, and technologically advanced European nation-states. The essentially static Chinese state and its cardinal economic objective of agrarian self-sufficiency had no way to resist the intrusions of the West. Perceiving little need to change, China became prey to those states that were profoundly changing and who wished to prosper at China's expense. From the perspective of the West, Chinese stability was considered backward and weak, and ripe for exploitation.

The most pernicious exploitation took the form of flooding China with opium. The most sophisticated and refined civilization in Asia, if not the world, became a hotbed of White Man's greed and arrogance. Worse was to come. As Europeans were engaged in mutual destruction, an upstart Asian nation took their place oppressing China. Not content with stripping China of its wealth, an all-conquering Japan wanted to destroy its sovereignty.

With the defeat of Japan in World War Two, China was free to reorganize itself. The profound revolutionary change resulted. For all its faults and many errors, the Maoist Revolution asserted in the most undeniable terms that China was for the Chinese. But what path would Chinese modernization take? From an economic perspective, the Maoist regime made its most profound error when it imposed a command economic model. It compounded its mistake with political repression. And yet, and yet, out of the depths of failure and despair, under the leadership of an official who had served the Maoist regime well, China confronted its failed economy and began to see modernization and a market economy as two sides of the same coin. To remain free, China had to engage the world economy. This of course was no revelation to Westerners. What did astonish them was the rapidity and pervasiveness of China's successful approach to the necessities of a market economy. Perhaps six hundred million people rose out of poverty. This remarkable achievement becomes all but miraculous when it is remembered that about fifty million Chinese died of starvation in the 1960s. With a unique combination of government partnerships and incentives, the inherent commercial talents of the Chinese were released. While its development radically differed from the relatively spontaneous development that characterized Britain and the U.S., it nevertheless adopted many of their techniques, calling it 'capitalism or free markets with Chinese characteristics,' a phrase I heard many officials speak when I visited China in the Fall of 2019. However, it is characterized, within fifty years, China developed from an economy whose output was almost too primitive to measure, to the world's second largest economy, rivaling the U.S.

Globalization and its Discontents

And yet, and yet, there remains a fierce globalization debate. Every process I have discussed has been contradicted, minimized or denied. Even when the processes have been accepted as undeniable, and some of its benefits acknowledged, they have been condemned as Western imperialism or worse. Let us try to understand why.

First, change: nearly everyone hates and fears it. One of the conditions of change has therefore been suspect: freedom. Its frequent antidote: community enforced equality, sometimes called 'political correctness'. Capitalism, a force that accelerates change, has been condemned, and not only by the Marxists, but because it abandons the outworn, the obsolete, the inefficient, and the unproductive to the dustbin of history. This critique emphasizes Schumpeter's destructive side of capitalism, without appreciating its creative side. It emphasizes the unevenness of progress and undervalues the lifting of billions of people from poverty with the promise of lifting another billion into the middle classes. Globalization is pervasive worldwide change, a change far more profound than the exploitation of backward economies by the advanced. Globalization transforms all the societies it impacts and continues to do so, often at alarming rates. Even those who have contributed to and benefitted from these profound transformations often become anxious. Sometimes they support policies that damage the most dynamic elements of Globalization, chief of which is technological innovation and its associated social disruptions. This reaction reflects much more than nostalgic regard for obsolete and bygone products, ideas and social structures. Much of the resistance to Globalization's consequences originates in the fear of unpredictability and in an unwillingness to recognize the limits of our knowledge and the unavoidable pluralistic and inevitably contradictory nature of human values, individually, culturally or nationally conceived (Hayek, 1976).

Second, inequality: nearly everyone professes at least a belief in equality, especially absent precise definitions. There is no question that Globalization differentially impacts classes of populations, disproportionately benefits the middle classes, defined as those who can contribute to the free market economies that Globalization entails. Given the enormous variation in human abilities, which even Rousseau, the apostle of equality, acknowledged, how could it be otherwise? Freedom, if it means anything, involves the individual's choice to make decisions regarding how his or her life is to be lived, especially to defer gratification or, in other words, to make investments of time, talent, or energy, betting on a better future. When applied to an economy, these decisions are likely to produce results proportionate to the talents of the individual and the effort he or she exerts. Of course, this produces income and other inequalities. Income inequality has become a mantra in political discourse. Even conservative politicians regret or condemn it as unjust or at least politically unacceptable.

Few, if any, point out the fallacy the concept of income inequality reveals when used as an isolated, self-evident, self-justifying statistic. Like virtually all economic statistics, income inequality, if it is to have meaning beyond campaign rhetoric, needs to be combined with other statistics. It needs to be put in context and perspective. For example, suppose income inequality is correlated with a higher standard of living, not just for the few but the many. Would it remain a self-condemned statistic or part of a larger analysis? Of course, income inequality might be correlated with a lower standard of living for the many, and that would be a different story. It should be remembered pre-industrial, pre-capitalistic economies, while manifesting less income inequality, at least among those below the favored ruling class, were notoriously poor, ill-housed, badly clothed, ill-nourished and otherwise oppressed. Is income inequality worth this price?

And the remedy is what? Stalinism? Maoism? Subsistence economies operating under police states? Or, at best, medieval stasis under the authority of a universal church and barbaric local lords of the manor? Many states have failed and continue to fail because they employ policies based on the knowledge they cannot have and on values that seem absolute to the point of being justly coerced. They fail and will continue to fail, because their conviction that they can create a prosperous, egalitarian economy by planning and central control is simply and necessarily false, as has been demonstrated time and time again.

Third, American and European values. It is not an exaggeration to say that Globalization is the political economic expression of Western values and that it threatens non-Western values, especially those closely tied to traditional agrarian societies. Moreover, these values are fundamentally materialist, and in the minds of Globalization's critics, shallow and anti-humanistic, if not anti-religious. Is this not the current Pope's condemnation of free markets? Is this not radical Islam's condemnation of the West? Was this not Hitler's condemnation of 'Jew dominated' America? Of course, these expressions of Western values were not imposed. They were simply adopted by those who wished to participate in global prosperity and political stability.

Fourth, the populism of the Left and ultra-nationalism of the Right. The Left's opposition to Globalization stems from its conviction that communal equality, not individual freedom, is the cardinal value. The Right's opposition stems from its fear that national sovereignty and cultural differentiation will be eroded. Both Left and Right seem concerned that Globalization, defined (incorrectly) as autonomous laissez-faire markets, will benefit only the capitalist rich, leading to global chaos and worldwide depression. This fear of course ignores the reality of the explosion of transnational organizations which constrain the actions of individual states as well as multinational corporations (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999: 44-45).

  The Left believes that these organizations are too weak to protect the masses or the unproductive; the Right that they will undermine national sovereignty and cultural identity. Populism further ignores the incipient political power of an increasingly prosperous middle class. In the West, the rise of the middle classes destroyed absolutist monarchies. There is every reason to believe those authoritarian regimes like China will have to accommodate the reality of their dependence on the economic power of their middle classes if they are to survive the changes entailed in Globalization. This near inevitable accommodation does not imply the advent of a liberal representative in China. In the West, the middle classes struggled for a political power to protect their property and their capacity to create more wealth from predatory governments. Recognizing their increasing dependence on the wealth producing classes, prudent governments, like those of 19th century Britain, gradually allowed their middle classes a place at the ruling table. The lesson is plain and certainly not lost by the Chinese ruling class. Don't alienate the classes ever more desperately needed to maintain your position in the world, to say nothing of national security. So far, a kind of Confucian accommodation seems viable. Insofar as a meritocratic elite can rule allowing a fair redistribution of the earnings of the middle classes to meet public needs, the middle classes with grant the regime legitimacy without demanding political participation at the national level.

The Need for Humility

Space precludes a systematic more elaborate discussion of these points. Instead, I should like to propose a more philosophical response. I believe two fundamental ideas are underlying all the alternatives to free market capitalism and its global implications. The first is that the future is knowable and that policies can be implemented to bring about virtually any desirable result. The second is that human beings are not necessarily biologically and psychologically individualistic but are malleable members of a community to which they should willingly conform, subordinating their interests and values (Pinker, 2002). If they don't, they can be justly coerced to serve the greater good. Virtually all utopian literature and Idealistic philosophies support coercion, because an individual's defiance is necessarily criminal, as Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, brilliantly explains. Or, more insidiously, individual defiance is genetically preempted, as elaborated in Huxley's *Brave New World*.

Freedom, individualism, including its implications for both the economy and the polity, deny these two propositions on two grounds. First, naturalistic: everyone is profoundly unique, each possessing a trillion neural connections that make identity with any other human statistically impossible. This uniqueness results in unique personalities, each valuing him or herself above others, which can be made to conform only under a variety of socialization techniques, often with great difficulty. Ask any parent. Second, epistemological: we simply cannot know enough to predict the outcomes of any policy with enough confidence to justify coercion, except in very narrowly construed circumstances. The best we can do is abide by procedural rules of behavior which have evolved and endured in conformity with human nature, as best we can understand it, and with experience, as best as we can internalize it. The difficulty implied by the ignorance of ends and by the inevitable contradictions which beset pluralistic human values is compounded by the human inability to agree sufficiently on the value of particular ends to justify coercion. Does anyone believe that absolutists, whether Marxist, Stalinist, Maoist, Hitlerite, Islamic, Christian, Jewish or whatever, will agree sufficiently on what is Good and what can justly be coerced by the State? Absent such consensus, only some ends, provisionally considered, are sufficiently well conceived and generally accepted to be cautiously endowed with the coercive properties of the State. Even then, they should be kept to a minimum and be subject to review concerning efficacy and conformity to other social values and rules.

Globalization's success in virtually every corner of the globe is due to its respect for these propositions, summed up as the freedom of individuals, endowed with plural values, operating according to procedural rules, which given the ignorance of outcomes, must be evaluated in terms of fair process, not ends, no matter how desirable they might seem before or after the fact. These rules have been increasingly embedded in transnational organizations, making it more difficult for any nation-state to operate without considering the consequences of its actions. Of course, this does not mean that Globalization should proceed without criticism. It is not an ideology, much less a divine Truth. It is a human practice that should be judged in human terms and above all in a spirit of humility and adventure. The future belongs to the free and the brave. **Concluding Remarks**

Despite all the controversy surrounding the concept of Globalization and its effects, there can be little doubt that it has raised hundreds of millions out of poverty and promises to create a billion more middle class people by the end of the century. Although these improvements have not been equally spread across the board, it must be remembered that virtually all the new middle classes emerged from poverty. It is also important to remember that their willingness to be taxed to support the less productive has improved their lot. For example, the chances of a recurrence of a 1960's Chinese famine seem remote.

While it seems likely that the global economy will continue to expand, its very dynamism will continue to cause anxiety, not only among the lower classes but among academics. Making the perfect the enemy of the good has been a classic academic gambit. In a globalizing age that depends upon confidence in the future, academic malaise and bitterness represent more than a failure of nerve. This betrayal of the intellectuals ushered in the totalitarian regimes of the last century. At the least, it threatens to erode the faith of hardworking people that their lives and the lives of their children will be better. Any lack of confidence among the productive classes may be more dangerous than a pandemic.

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A Liberal Approach towards Managing Plurality

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Abstract

Modern communication and globalization have brought the issues of minorities to the forefront of national and international concern. The notion of "Nation-State" is no longer a feasible criterion for stability in modern societies where states are composed of a variety of groups, nations, and minorities having different and sometimes contradictory conceptions of a good life. Scholarly exploration of the concepts of recognition and diversity of cultural groups proposes that a multicultural scheme must tackle histories of domination and exclusion. Now a question arises "what theoretical orientation is most hospitable to the ideals of multiculturalism?" and again "is liberalism an answer to the problems of multicultural societies and if 'yes' which version?" In this study, I will try to investigate the effectiveness of marriage between multiculturalism and political liberalism. The paper shows that it is the Kukathasian model of liberal society and toleration that is more hospitable with diversity.

Keywords: Multiculturalism, toleration, comprehensive liberalism, political liberalism, benign neglect, state neutrality.

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Introduction

"The human world is marked by such a diversity of cultures, traditions, and ways of life of moralities as to prompt one to wonder whether there is anything constant in human nature or human moral experience" (Chandran Kukathas, 2003: 74).

The politics of differences seem to give importance to at least three elements of liberalism: first, recognizing the significance of culture for the enjoyment of individual rights; second, defense of a variety of different perceptions of a good life for both the individuals and groups; and third, the idea of benign neglect. The modern liberal theory tries to address these elements by assuming a neutral public realm for the resolution of demands of justice, basic human rights that consider the significance of cultural attachment, and essential requirements for the assessment and search of different cultural goods.

The recent works of John Rawls Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas address some of the loopholes within contemporary liberal theories which are of crucial concern to multiculturalism. While Rawls's theory gives an understanding of the relation between 'diversity' and the 'public sphere', Kymlicka's theory establishes a firm relation between the individual and his/her cultural environment and Kukathas founds his theory on the essential individual's right of association and disassociation based on toleration which is the result of the freedom of conscience.

The line of demarcation between private and public domain, between issues related to social welfare and policy, on one hand, and individual's cultural loyalty, on the other, has always been an issue (Waldron, 2005: 89). Some cultures, religions, and languages in a plural society may seek to dominate. Some cultures or religions might have their own basic principles with distinct effects on the issues of social life and might compel its members to observe its particular obligations which might not be compatible with the broader societal arrangements or core principles. Law and policymaking for a plural society is, therefore, a bigger challenge than for a culturally homogeneous society. The members of the former are strongly devoted to diverse, sometimes divergent answers while the latter only works on one set of solutions and enforces them. How these problems could be solved? We have a great legacy of reflection on the ideals, principles and values that can be applied to describe a fair political and social order under conditions of diversity and freedom. Lockean defense of religious toleration has been constructed on a religious basis. Locke argues "The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light" (stated in Waldron, 2004: 90). This sort of argument has a Christian foundation, and there is no reason why people having different religions and perceptions of good for whom Locke sought toleration to be convinced to follow them. This raises the question of the compatibility of the version of liberalism (comprehensive or political) for a modern pluralist society for which liberal scholars envisage toleration.

Now, what is liberal toleration based on? One justification founds the defense of toleration on the pluralist character of human value, the belief that the sphere of value is irreducibly heterogeneous and pluralistic. According to this perception, different practices and ways should be tolerated as they are ways and means to the attainment of various human goods. Another justification founds the defense for toleration on a general cynicism about value. This means that we are unable to reach objective values or the perception of a good life, so we should tolerate different ways of life because we cannot for sure say that some practices or perceptions of good are superior to others, and consequently, there is no justifiable base for intolerance. An important case for defending liberal tolerance, according to Scheffler (1994) is Modus Vivendi, a planned and calculated compromise among competing and opposing cultural groups, none of which will enforce its chosen practices and lifestyles on others without unbearable cost, and where each accepts a strategy of mutual toleration that can best be achieved under the circumstances. In this situation, it is vital to agree on a clear understanding of the meaning and basis of liberal tolerance. Thus, liberal tradition needs to understand how to establish its relations with varied perceptions of a good life and a variety of cultures that describe modern societies.

Now "how to establish a just and stable society of equal and free citizens who remain deeply divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?" Different scholars give different answers. One of the answers to this question, according to Rawls (1993), is that the fundamental structure of such a stable society should be governed by a political concept of justice which the 'overlapping consensus' of reasonable comprehensive (ethical) doctrines of citizens must keep in mind; Kymlicka seeks the answer in providing groups rights to minorities and Kukathas says that the answer lies in toleration, freedom of conscience and association and disassociation. In Kukathas's case, the liberal and illiberal groups will live together. His is the policy of live and let live.

To present a full picture of the argument the next section discusses the two versions of liberalism (Comprehensive and Political). Section third focuses on the work of the three prominent scholars i.e. John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, and Chandran Kukathas, and their remedies for the problems of multiculturality. Section fourth gives my estimation of whose work can do justice with the problems of pluralist society while section fifth concludes the paper.

Political and Comprehensive Liberalism

According to Waldron (2005: 91) "Political liberalism insists that the articulation and defense of a given set of liberal commitments for society should not depend on any particular theory of what gives value or meaning to a human life. Political liberalism refuses to take sides in the moral and religious controversies that arise from comprehensive doctrines." According to Şahin (2010: 85) "A political liberal argues that the general principles and ideals that shape a liberal social order's political framework should not be based on a commitment to deeper values that give meaning to the lives of human beings who reside within that framework".

Political liberal doctrine should be free-standing and capable of stable statements which must be independent of any individual comprehensive doctrine. If liberal doctrine is not free-standing, then it is presented as an integral part of a particular comprehensive viewpoint and other groups could not be expected to accept a doctrine offered in such a sectarian way. Political liberals might disagree about the justificatory plans and strategies which they adopt as political liberals. For example, one group may stress the concept of 'overlapping consensuses', a range of justificatory ways from different philosophical foundations to a point of liberal principles (for example, Rawls). Another may choose a "lowest common denominator" approach, stressing justificatory premises that are presumed to be recognized by all the members of a pluralistic society (for example, Kukathas).

As against political liberalism, comprehensive liberalism founds liberal political arrangements on particular ethical ideals, such as individuality or autonomy or self-reliance. According to Şahin (2010: 86) "A comprehensive liberal opines that we cannot possibly build a liberal social order without a commitment to deeper values that give meaning to the lives of human beings who reside within a liberal social order's political framework". The liberal visions of John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant are examples of comprehensive liberalism. The form of liberalism adopted in Rawls in his book *A Theory of Justice* (1971) is also comprehensive. Comprehensive liberalism is based on the premise that liberal commitments cannot be defended except by appealing to deeper values and commitments linked with some comprehensive doctrine. Comprehensive liberals also differ among themselves. Some comprehensive liberals may be left liberals while other libertarians. They may also differ about the contents and fundamentals of the comprehensive understanding on which they base their liberal views and commitments. John Locke's (1983) Christian based liberalism is different from Kant's autonomy based liberalism (1991), which is again different from Jeremy Bentham's (1982) hedonistic basis of utilitarianism. However, as Waldron (2005: 91) says "They all have this in common: they relate liberal commitments in political philosophy to some vision or conception of what matters in life and of the human person and its place in the world."

Thus, comprehensive liberalism presumes that there is only one main view of a good life. Groups and individuals may be different from each other but in the end, they all must believe in one basic principle. This basic principle is different from scholar to scholar. For example, Kant's (1991: 56) theory is based on "right" which stipulates that an act is right if it reconciles with everyone's liberty according to universal law. Mill emphasizes the individuality and autonomy of the individual. He (2009: 18) says that power can only be lawfully exercised against a member of a civilized society, against his consent, if it avoids harm to others. Mill (2009: 101) very nicely agues "A person whose desires and impulses are his own, is the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture, is said to have a character while one whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character." Whether an act is right or wrong, for Mill, depends on how much it increases or decreases the individuality (autonomy) of the individual. Gaus (2004) argues that much of liberal philosophy, after Mill, has

been founded on a specific notion of human distinction and excellence. Mill closely links individuality to the progress of human nature which is a perfectionist theory of the good life.

This image of a good life is too particular and contentious to serve as a foundation of liberal politics. Many in liberal communities are not committed to the promotion of individual excellence. Although Mill supported a strong anti-paternalistic principle, his principle seems to be as specific and challenging as to open door to interventions in liberty. So, a person's decision to develop her capacities is not important, what is vital is his/her decision whether to develop and promote her capacities and how to lead her life. Even Locke's arguments that "All the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master'–God–sent into the world by his order, and about his business, and that they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure is based on one principle 'the belief in God" (stated in Waldron, 2005: 92) has a clear comprehensive disposition because what about those who do not believe in the individuality or autonomy of the individual or in God or in freedom.

Kantian liberalism which says that a society comprised of a variety of individuals, each with his own interests, objectives, and perception of good, is arranged best when governed by principles and rules that do not follow any particular perception of good and that each person chooses her own aims in life, and respect for others requires that we abstain from enforcing our concept of a good life on them (stated in Sandel, 1982: 1-7) also seems to be a comprehensive one because it is based on the fundamental principle of right (Kant, 1991: 56). However, Gaus (2004) argues that the tag 'comprehensive' liberalism is ambiguous because it incorporates everything from proper comprehensive liberalism as a variety of secular doctrines to Kantian theories of political justice which are thought as consistent with varied notions about social knowledge, value, and selfhood. In what follows I will elaborate on the work of Rawls, Kymlicka and Kukathas and will assess whose work is more hospitable with plurality.

The Political Liberalism of John Rawls

John Rawls in his earlier book the "*Theory of Justice*" (1971) suggested two main principles of justice and said that the political structure should be based on them. The first principle says that "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others" and the second says that "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all" (Rawls, 1971: 60). This theorizing shows that Rawls was originally supporting comprehensive liberalism because he reduced all the interactions and working relationships to one principle-principle of justice. However, he distanced himself from this position in his later work and supported the concept of political liberalism in order to make his theory tolerable to diversity and to accommodate diverse perceptions. While supporting political liberalism, Rawls argues that in the political sphere the idea of justice must be independent of the conflicting religious and philosophical doctrines of the citizens. Comprehensive religious, moral and philosophical doctrines may not be recognized and

supported generally by all the citizens and may not function as the accepted foundation of society. For Rawls, political liberalism seeks a political concept of justice which may get the espousal of an "overlapping consensus" of reasonable philosophical, moral and religious doctrines of a society governed by the principle of justice. This is an answer to the question "How citizens deeply divided on the religious, philosophical and moral basis can sustain a just and stable democratic society?" However, the political realm and its notion of justice should be so spelled out that its institutions and structure may achieve the support of an "overlapping consensus". In this case, the citizen, exercising their freedom of thought and conscience and pursuing their comprehensive doctrines, view the political concept of justice as compatible with or derived from, or not in conflict with their other values and ideals (Rawls, 1993: 9-11).

This shows that all differences are not thought of as reasonable. Some differences are fanatical, irrational or unreasonable and cannot be reasonably accommodated. So, according to Rawls, a society may prohibit beliefs and practices that are considered irrational and unreasonable. They should be controlled and restricted so that they may not jeopardize the stability and justice of society. His move towards political liberalism, according to Waldron (2005), was suggested by some liberal scholars that social existence and arrangements must be justifiable to each person who lives under those arrangements. This suggestion is based on the fundamental liberal view that the government must be based on the will of the ruled, i.e. the use of power will be justifiable only when accepted and consented by the ruled. These are the principles that everyone accepts. However, if political justifications are based on principles derived from moral or religious beliefs practiced by some citizens but rejected by others, then they will not meet even the thin version of this condition of justifiability to all. This was the premise in Rawls's mind when he presented his theory of political liberalism. Rawls presents the following three major ideas of political liberalism.

1. The Concept of Overlapping Consensus: In overlapping consensus the reasonable comprehensive doctrines, from their own standpoint, back the political conceptions. The notion of "overlapping consensus" of reasonable comprehensive (ethical) doctrines is essential for the integrity and stability of a "well-ordered society". Social unity results from an agreement on the political conception while stability results when the doctrines forming the agreement are acknowledged by the politically active members of the society and the requirements of justice do not clash with citizens' essential interests as shaped and supported by their social arrangements (Rawls, 1993: 134). The consensus arrived at by the comprehensive doctrines is likely to remain over time within a just structure. The use of political power is justifiable only when exercised according to the constitution the fundamentals of which all the citizens may logically support according to the principles acceptable to their universal human reason. Thus, only a political notion of justice which all citizens may sensibly support can serve the foundation of justification and public reason (Rawls, 1993: 137). Overlapping consensus is different from *modus vivendi* as it is not simply an agreement on accepting some authorities or some constitutional arrangement established or found by a convergence of group or self interests. Those who support the political conception begin from their own comprehensive (ethical) doctrine and draw on the philosophical, moral and religious grounds it provides. And those who support a variety of views affirming the

political conception will support it even if their view in society eventually becomes dominant. This stability in society due to overlapping consensus distinguishes it from *modus vivendi* where a party may violate the terms of a treaty if it becomes dominant. Overlapping consensus does not repudiate any of the comprehensive doctrines. It appeals to the political concept of justice to differentiate between the issues that can be rationally removed from the political program and those that cannot be. The depth of overlapping consensus is based on the fact that its political ideals are founded on a political concept of justice using the basic ideas of person and society illustrated by justice as fairness. Its width goes beyond political ideals and standards establishing democratic procedure to include ideals and principles covering the essential structure as a whole. Its ideals also establish certain substantive rights such as freedom of thought and conscience, equal opportunities and principles covering some essential needs (Rawls, 1993: 164). Rawls argues that ethical doctrines of majority of people are not completely comprehensive and this gives room for the development of an independent obedience and adherence to the political conception which results in consensus (Rawls, 1993: 168).

2. The Concept of the Priority of Right and Good: Priority of right means that the rules of political justice put limits on tolerable ways of life. This means that citizens' practices and ends which transgress those limits have no value. As political liberalism has a political notion of justice for the key institutions of social and political life, not of the whole life, it should have the contents we associate with liberalism. For example, it must affirm some basic rights and liberties and give them a certain priority. As right is related to good, a political conception must describe different ideas of the good. The ideas of good must be political i.e. they must relate to a reasonable political notion of justice so that we may presume that **(a)** they are shared by free and equal citizens; and **(b)** they do not support fully or partially any particular comprehensive doctrine (Rawls, 1993: 176). This constraint is expressed by the priority of right which means that permissible ideas of good must honor the limits of the political notion of justice. We have five ideas of goods.

   (i) Goodness as Rationality: It means that the citizens of a democratic state have a rational plan of life. They schedule their more important business in the light of that plan and allocate their different resources (of body, mind, time and energy) in order to pursue their perceptions of good throughout their life, if not in a completely rational way, then at least in a satisfactory and sensible way. So 'political' must consider human life and basic human needs and take rationality as an essential principle of political and social organization;

   (ii) The Idea of Primary Goods: A political concept of justice also incorporates a political understanding of publicly recognized citizens' needs considered as advantageous for all;

   (iii) The Idea of Permissible Comprehensive Conception of Good: Though political liberalism looks for common grounds and is neutral in aims, it may still assert the supremacy of certain form of moral values and support certain moral virtues;

   (iv) The Idea of Political Virtue: Justice as fairness incorporates certain political virtues, for example, the virtues of fair social co-operation, of civility and tolerance, and the sense of

fairness and reasonableness. The important point is that permitting these virtues into a political conception does not result in a perfectionist state of a comprehensive doctrine; and

(v) The Idea of the Good of Well-ordered Society: The political society is not a good in itself, but a means to an individual or associational good.

3. The Concept of Public Reason: Public reason means the reason for the equal members of society as such, the reason for the public. Its focus is the good of the public and issues of basic justice; and its contents and nature are public, given by principles articulated by society's concept of political justice (Rawls, 1993: 213). Public reason is applied only to the questions of basic justice. However, it does not incorporate our deliberations and reflections about political questions. It is applied when someone acts in his public capacity. It has moral and discursive imperatives, for besides incorporating a political concept of justice, it is controlled by rules of inquiry that indicate forms of reasoning and framework for the types of information suitable for political questions. The public reason must be consistent with the pre-established rules of inference, evidence and reason (Rawls, 1993. 223-26).

Thus, the political liberalism of Rawls is like a firmly sealed condition of discussion and deliberation that permits only rationality to rule and excludes historical grievances and various languages of complaints from public councils. Rawlsian reason cannot make sense and can function less within a situation of serious conflicts, whether political, economic, or doctrinal, and even sharp cultural and religious plurality. Rawls suggests a 'reasonable pluralism'. According to Wolin (1996) "Reasonable pluralism changes differences from a threat to an accomplice of stability, co-opting them so that in the end they are removed or absorbed into a consensus that requires smoothing off the rough, possibly irrational edges of differences". The critical point is where Rawls positions differences and how he deals with them. He says that if there are irrational and unreasonable doctrines, the recommended answer is to restrain them so that they do not jeopardize the unity, integrity and justice of society. His 'well-ordered society' also recommends that "The most divisive issues, serious contention which must undermine the basis of social co-operation will not be included in the public agenda" (Rawls, 1993: 157).

Here, contra Kukathas, his theory cannot appeal to the accommodation of illiberal groups which must be assimilated into the Rawlsian rationality. This does not consider the demands and issues related to multiculturality too seriously. His consensus rests on ethical beliefs (comprehensive philosophical and religious doctrines) and not based on a civic or political ideology**.** Similarly, according to the ideal of public reason, members of the society may not legally discuss basic constitutional and political questions from their religious and moral point of view. But this is a severe limitation which may weaken the political discourse and exclude important aspects of public discussion and deliberation.

Will Kymlicka's Treatment of Plurality

Kymlicka's theory is also depicting a comprehensive version of liberalism. He (1995: 52) argues that individual liberty is linked in a significant way to membership in one's cultural group and bases his theory on "Societal Culture" which he defines as a "Culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated and based on a shared language" (Kymlicka, 1995: 76). The societal culture, for Kymlicka, not only gives full autonomy to us but also perfection and complete perception of a good life. It provides its adherents with meaningful ways of life across a variety of human actions from the economic to the educational and religious.

According to Kymlicka (1995: 152), liberalism affirms an individual's liberty and his/her capacity to question, criticize and possibly revise the customary practices of their communities if they find them not worthy of their allegiance. Now if certain groups of the community do not grant such types of rights to their members, then those groups should be liberalized. If this interpretation is taken, then the larger society will impose its vision of good life on the illiberal groups which will be equivalent to the imposing of a comprehensive view on the minorities. Kymlicka says that the minorities can put forward two types of demands (a) Internal restrictions which will allow the group to curb internal dissents thus, will violate the freedom its members, and (b) External protections which will defend minorities from the adverse decisions of the larger society. However, this must not be a means for a group to dominate, oppress and exploit other groups. Thus, a liberal view supports *freedom within* the minority groups and *equality* between the minority groups. Liberal principles, according to Kymlicka (1995: 166), support the second demand but not the first one. Though his version is comprehensive; he supports group rights for minorities in the form of self-government, poly-ethnic and representation rights to his defined national and ethnic minorities. But his theory is inhospitable to illiberal groups within the state and says that the liberals must do something to liberalize the illiberal societies. However, he is against the coercive methods used for the liberalization of those groups (Kymlicka, 1995: 167)

Thus, Kymlicka's theory also cannot reasonably eradicate the problems facing the modern pluralist society. His version is comprehensive and is quite incompatible with the requirements of multiculturalism as Şahin (2010: 90-91) has also pointed out that "The stance of Kymlicka stems from his belief that individual happiness can be attained only in an environment…fostering individual autonomy. A liberal state is one that fosters such a cultural environment. Such a state should be neutral toward different understandings of good life all of which endorse the value of autonomy. However, it cannot remain neutral in the face of non-autonomous lifestyles…The particular societies within the broader society must also be liberal ones that respect the principle of autonomy...in this sense, Kymlicka defends orthodoxy, albeit a liberal one".

Chandran Kukathas's Treatment of Plurality

Kukathas gives an idea of a free society as an open society with the principles admitting not fixed but a variability of human arrangements; the freedom of association (dissociation) and mutual

toleration of associations. The principles of a free society depict not a hierarchy of superior and subordinate authorities but an archipelago of opposing, competing and overlapping jurisdictions. In such a society there will be a multiplicity of authorities, each independent of the others, which are maintained by the consent of its members. A liberal society, according to him, respects the independence of other authorities and is reluctant to interfere in their affairs. His theory repudiates two things: first, that any group, class or community should be given special recognition; and second, that there is an authoritative position from which such recognition may finally be granted. He depicts a model of a free society having many authorities and many associations, but in which none is privileged (Kukathas, 2003: 4). The theory of free society shows that different ways *coexist* rather than *cohere* (Kukathas, 2003: 5).

As against Kymlicka who says that liberal society should encourage the incorporation of groups into the mainstream culture (through policies on education, language and citizenship), and stipulate the principles guiding policy-making, Kukathas rejects cultural integration as a policy of the state and does not support the plan of making the symbols, the boundaries, and the cultural characters of the state as elements of justice. He advocates the principle of "Benign Neglect". A free society is not a stable social union of shared doctrine. It is a group of communities, societies and authorities (all authority resting on the consent of their members rather than on justice) associated under laws which accept individuals' freedom to join with whom they wish (Kukathas, 2003: 19). Against the work of John Rawls, it is the idea which does not give much importance to social unity.

For Kukathas (2003: 24) the fundamental value of liberalism is toleration. The more a group tolerates differences, the more liberal the group is and vice versa. Toleration, for Kukathas, guarantees the freedom of conscience which is at the heart of his theory as he says (2003: 25) "It is the value of liberty of conscience which lies at the core of the liberal ideal of toleration…A society is a liberal one if individuals are at liberty to reject the authority of one association [even of the larger society] in order to place themselves under the authority of another."

The essential principle of a free society, for Kukathas, is the freedom of association. The first product of this principle is the freedom of dissociation which upholds liberty of conscience. This is a society in which differences and dissents are tolerated. Thus, what is important is that people should not be compelled to live in a way they think wrong, or to take part in practices which they cannot morally abide. People should be free to live according to their conscience (Kukathas, 2003: 94). The second result of the principle is mutual toleration of associations. In fact, society is free if it tolerates its internal groups which dissent from its practices and standards (Kukathas, 2003: 75).

Kukathas criticizes Rawls's political liberalism for it does not quite renounce its dependence on comprehensive moral ideals which might conflict with the values and practices of some groups in society. In case of conflict, his comprehensive moral position is simply to be asserted and enforced. For example, in case of imparting liberal education which promotes critical thinking, the children

of unwilling parents can be subjected to the requirements of the comprehensive view of good life which some groups within the heterogeneous society might reject.

Kukathas is also strongly opposed to Kymlicka's recognition of special rights for minority groups against the larger society to guarantee equality of circumstances among them. However, his liberalism does not provide (except under intense circumstances) special rights to a group against its own members to restrict their autonomy. Liberalism provides the individuals the freedom and capacity to question, criticize and revise the established practices of their groups if they are no more worthy of their allegiance. Restricting freedom of religion or denying education to women is against these liberal principles.

Which Version addresses the Issues of Plurality Well?

Now all the preceding theories except that of Kukathas assume the existence of a common established moral standpoint. Here toleration emerges as an issue, because of the likelihood of dissents from values contained in the common standpoint. Tolerance is not accorded when minority practices go against the values inherent in the public realm. Minority practices are tolerated only if they abide by the basic ethical principles of the larger society; otherwise, minority cultures are restructured following majority practices. However, for Kukathas, toleration is not based on any particular perception. It is valued independently and is afforded to minorities (liberal or illiberal) on equal footings. It guarantees the freedom of conscience which is the basic individual right (all other rights derive from it). Rawls presents his theory of "free-floating, overlapping consensus" which describes what and how should be talked about, and the level of understanding that should be achieved in liberal public discourse. He provides some grounds for unity among the various cultures of society. Rawls's overlapping consensus narrows the range of differences among different cultures that support different visions of the good. But he does not abolish or reduce differences by identifying some deeper commonalties which may reduce the negative effects of differences. The problem with Rawls and Kymlicka is that they assume that there is a commonly established standpoint which becomes a standard for treating differing views as dissenting or non-dissenting. Here toleration is impracticable since relations with dissenters are regulated based on the principles contained in the established comprehensive doctrine.

Thus, comprehensive liberalism fails because it advances its own doctrine as a source of political legitimacy under the conditions of modern pluralism. No such doctrine, even if true and powerful arguments available in its defense, can receive the assent of all reasonable citizens in a diverse society. Therefore, once the public justification of state actions invokes such doctrine, those who hold opposing views are compelled to obey political authority on grounds they reasonably reject. This will violate the freedom of conscience (a fundamental right of the individual) and will keep him/her in a very depressed position. This outcome undermines liberalism which appeals to reasons that citizens can share, rather than reasons that divide some against others and permits the oppression of those who differ. Thus, as Şahin (2010: 88) mentions "Autonomy-based (comprehensive) liberalism does not seem to meet its promise of providing a plural and tolerant

environment. This stance involves requiring all individuals and groups to respect individual autonomy…The liberal state that takes autonomy to be the liberal value and builds its political framework on it cannot tolerate individuals and groups who do not respect individual autonomy".

Political authority exercised in the name of comprehensive moral doctrine not merely violates the dignity of the citizens who differ reasonably but also jeopardize the unity and stability of the polity. According to Callan (1996), the threat of disintegration in societies that cannot be forced into unity around a shared religious doctrine has obsessed liberalism since its inception, and ethical liberalism may exacerbate the danger where it attempts to position legitimacy in a divisive secular analogue to religious doctrine. Kukathasian version of political liberalism intends to avoid the apparent liabilities of its ethical counterpart. A deliberative framework is constructed that intends to endorse the traditional verities of liberal politics which enables the formation of rational consensus on new and contentious political problems. But unlike comprehensive liberalism, the perception marked out does not articulate any single comprehensive doctrine because it is compatible with a variety of values that citizens reasonably support. That is to say, the viewpoint is freestanding in that it can be expounded apart from the various doctrines, citizens embrace as moral agents outside their civic roles.

Thus, it is the Kukathasian version of political liberalism which is a panacea to the problems of the pluralist society. It is the society which has multiple groups and communities which differ on the basic conception of a good life even on virtues such as justice, equality and morality. If the society is homogeneous, the optimum option might be a version of comprehensive liberalism but not for a pluralistic society for which the solution lies in adopting political liberalism. For a multicultural society, the state must be neutral among the different perceptions of a good life and according to Kukathas must adopt the notion of benign neglect. What the idea of benign neglect suggests is that, in the process of searching for a compromise, special weight should not be given to the idea of securing an outcome that honors the ideal of equality for groups. What is important, however, is how to make the potential for conflict over issues such as language less troubling and damaging. One important way of doing this is by permitting those who use minority language to exit from the dominant structure if they so wish and to establish their own newspapers and broadcast media, run their own schools, and conduct their affairs generally in their own languages. Public holidays, uniforms, and state symbols should be redesigned to accommodate minority claims. But it is unjust to think that solution can be found that treats all groups equally. Benign neglect suggests that when decisions are made about such matters, it may be better to present these things as the result of accident and history, and not policy and justice. The difference should not be suppressed, but neither should it be elevated. The state should be neutral and dedicated to the maintenance of peace. It should neither favor nor disfavor any group and should not adopt any substantive view of a good life. Thus, state must not take any position on issues like abortion. Let each woman decides what is best for herself. Political liberalism insists that views about the morality of abortion or the wearing of a scarp or bearing a beard should not play a role in public debates about rights and justice. The state should be impartial to them. This means that those who dislike abortion or wearing a beard should not try to incorporate their vision and opinion in law.

From the perspective of political liberalism, imposing one's view on others would incorrectly base the right on some perception of good and would fail to respect the pluralism about comprehensive doctrines.

The liberal model of neutral treatment permits the toleration of different perceptions of a good life. Liberals admit that modern states are composed of diverse groups with different perceptions of good life, which are competing, sometimes conflicting and incomparable. Hence, a public agreement concerning the good is not required. Instead, liberal theorists try to provide foundation legitimating state power in mediating conflicting and incompatible interests. The project of legitimization is understood in terms of rules for participation in public discussions where legitimate and justifiable political decisions are taken.

The liberal society, as Kukathas supports, should adopt the policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the illiberal groups and should not compel them to give various forms of rights as supported by Kymlicka (the right of the members of a group to question and revise the traditional procedures of the community) to the members of that group. Similarly, unlike Kymlicka (external protection), support, or protection should not be given to the groups. It is not the group which has the right but the individual which is of paramount importance. The group, as Kukathas mentions, is not a permanent entity but a changing one which shapes itself in compliance with the political and economic circumstances.

Now the common arrangement of various groups in a state will be somewhat like a *modus vivendi* which is not merely a balance of power. It describes something much more like the rules of the commons which have arisen and developed over time to deal with interaction among communities in areas where property rights do not exist and there may be conflicts over the use of common resources. The public realm is the product of a convergence which produces a type of stability and social unity that falls short of the permanence or durability many thinkers seek. What we have here is a form of a social order whose underlying characteristic is toleration.

However, regarding religion, a question the political liberals need to answer is "Can any exclusion of religion from the public square be defended by showing that it is neither unreasonable nor unfair?" In this case, Audi's two principles can provide help. The weaker principle of secular rationale (1993) says that "One should not advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer, the adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support. The stronger principle of secular motivation says that "One should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one not only has and is willing to offer but is also motivated by, adequate secular reason, where this reason is motivationally sufficient for the conduct in question". According to Audi, these principles are counsels of prudence for religious believers if they hope to persuade or form alliances with their non-religious fellow citizens. Audi's principles resemble those of Bhikkhu Parekh (2000: 176-77) when he says that a culture should be respected and supported only when the members of culture justify the practices and beliefs of the culture otherwise every culture is not entitled to equal

respect. These are the arguments that cannot be authentic for the resolution of the deep diversity prevailing in a society where the perceptions of good life are not only different but also contradictory, where there are different definitions of such virtues as justice or morality. In such a case the solution lies in Kukathasian toleration which is independent of any other scheme or virtue.

Conclusion

The severity of the rising demands of the various cultural, linguistic and religious groups in pluralist societies have compelled social scientists to find viable solutions to the issues of multiculturality. In a pluralist society, the minorities resist the attempt of the dominant groups to assimilate them which have triggered varieties of problems. Much of the nationalist conflicts around the world are the result of attempts by majority nations coercively to assimilate national minorities. To adequately cope with the issues of minorities in pluralist societies the theories offered by such prominent figures as Rawls, Kymlicka, Kukathas, Nathan Glazer, Walzer and several others have presented some solutions. But they are deficient in rationally dealing with the issues of diversity. In most cases, the remedy is sought in some substantive and comprehensive view like justice, autonomy, right and cultural adherence. The concept that each state is regarded as a self-contained system of like-thinking persons, whose institutions should preserve an order based on the agreed values of a more or less stable population must be rejected for a pluralist society.

The solution to the issues of multiculturality then lies in a Kukathasian version of political liberalism. His is the theory which questions the notion of justice, rejects social unity and equality as governing ideals and solutions for a pluralist society. As he says that in a social order in which diversity is to prevail rather than be suppressed, the most important thing that rules or institutions that govern it do is permit people to go their separate ways. Those institutions serve not to bind people together but to make it acceptable for them to unbind themselves if they so wish or, indeed, never to join with others at all. The crucial freedom is the freedom to dissent; and this requires freedom of exit if the dissenting party cannot persuade those who are unable to abide by the dissenting ideas or practices to find them less harmful or offensive. If reconciliation of differences is not possible the answer is that the differing parties must have a way out and the notion "the will of the stronger should prevail" must be rejected. Here lies the solution to the issues of multiculturality (a Kukathasian version of Political Liberalism).

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Regional Significance of Chabahar Port for the Middle East & Pakistan

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Abstract

The Chabahar port has the potential to benefit Iran economically and geo-politically. With India and Afghanistan, being associates of Iran on Chabahar, Iran would be able to increase its regional influence and affect the Middle Eastern conflicts substantially. The geopolitical and geo-economic consequences of Chabahar will be enormous. It would be one of the significant advances in the broader province of Iran after a considerable time. With its ideal location, energy resources, and a relatively strong state and military muscle, Iran has the potential to play a leading or even pivotal role in Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). If the original plan and associated agreements are fulfilled, a new trade route extending from Central Asia to the Middle East and Europe would be materialized. Iran strategically aims at becoming a significant oil-exporting country and a preferred transit route for international oil shipments. The paper aims to ascertain the possible implications of the Chabahar port on Pakistan and the Middle East.

Keywords: Middle East, Chabahar Port, Persian Gulf, sanctions, energy resources, proxy wars, OPEC.

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Introduction

Seaports have considerable worth, aggregating the tactical prominence of states that have them, in addition to boosting their financial status by amplifying their capacity to multiply their trade volumes. The Islamic Republic of Iran is developing Chabahar Port on the Makran Coast and trade routes from this port pass through Afghanistan and into Central Asia. It was called Tees (Teez) port in the past and it was considered as one of the important port towns in the Persian Gulf along the Makran coast (Mufti, Amirahmadian , & Sachedva, 2018). Iran's regional partners including India are actively participating in this project to facilitate the trade amongst them and also to increase their political leverage in the region. With India and Afghanistan, being associates of Iran on Chabahar, Iran would be able to increase its regional influence and affect the Middle Eastern conflicts considerably. The geopolitical and geo-economic consequences of Chabahar will be enormous. It would be one of the significant advances in the broader province of Iran after a considerable time. If the original plan and associated agreements are fulfilled, a new trade route extending from Central Asia to the Middle East and Europe would be materialized. Iran strategically aims at becoming a significant oil-exporting country and a preferred transit route for international oil shipments. The paper aims to ascertain the significance of Chabahar port for Iran and its implications for Pakistan and the Middle East.

Iran is bordered by Armenia and Azerbaijan to its north, to the east by Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, Turkey, and Iraq to its west. Iran forms a geographical "corridor" between Europe, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (Morady, Iran Ambitious for Regional Supremacy: The Great Powers, Geopolitics and Energy Resources, 2013). Iran's geography makes the country vital for regional and international politics.

Among the world's energy reserves more than sixty-three percent of the world's crude oil and forty percent of gas resources are in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The region holds nine out of the ten big world oilfields, as well as twenty-eight out of thirty-three super-giant fields (Morady, 2011). Iran is a major exporter of energy resources as it harbors the fourth leading oil assets and the second major gas assets in the world. Rendering to Oil & Gas Journal, Iran has nine percent of the world's overall reserves and over twelve percent of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) resources (2013). The oil incomes create more than twenty-four percent of Iran's gross domestic product and constitute approximately eighty percent of its export incomes and up to seventy-six percent of its revenues (2013).

Enormous energy resources in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf further dictate the need for secure and financial lines of sea transportation. Nearly 17 million barrels of crude oil (including 88 percent of Saudi, 99 percent of Iranian, 98 percent of Iraqi, 99 percent of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the whole of Kuwait's oil) is carried through the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, along with 70 percent of the world's transportation in petroleum globally. Equally important is the Caspian Sea basin, as the five states around it have approximately 15 percent of the world's entire recognized oil assets and nearly fifty percent of the world's overall established natural gas reserves (2013). Iran with support from India embarked upon an ambitious plan to develop its deep seaport of Chabahar.

Analysis of sea-lanes and seaports in the context of Iran reveals its vulnerabilities. Iran lacks deep-water ports. The southern port of Bandar Abbas can merely house 100,000-ton ships, implicating that, ships beyond that size have to berth in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ports like Fajirah and Jabal Ali, because of which the cargo is loaded onto smaller ships and brought to Iran (Javedanfar, 2010). Apart from millions of dollars paid to the UAE, strategically Iran is open to a cessation of its seaborne trade in the occurrence of conflict with UAE or its Gulf Countries Cooperation (GCC) allies (Javedanfar, 2010). Given the strategic and financial cost Iran has to pay for its lack of deep seaports, the Chabhar port has great significance, not only for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) but also for the Middle East and Central Asian countries. Chabahar Port carries its significance in Iran's trade because it is located outside the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, and can ensure continuity of operations reducing Iran's vulnerability to foreign pressures.

The Chabahar port and associated road networks are anticipated to act as a trade corridor between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Afghanistan and India are providing help to Iran in developing the Chabahar port to facilitate Indian trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia (Nader, Scotten, Rahmani, & Stewa, 2014). Chabahar is anticipated to connect Afghanistan by roads and railways being built by Iran and India. The Iranian-Indian effort is inspired by geopolitics: India desires to bypass Pakistan and build enhanced relations with Afghanistan, and Kabul wants to expand the country's trade routes and become less reliant on Pakistan (Nader, Scotten, Rahmani, & Stewa, 2014). Chabahar can draw business away from Karachi, on which Afghanistan is greatly dependent.

Iran has a conviction to extract full advantage of its geostrategic location by playing a central role in the revived commercial route that connects East with West. Iran not only wants to be the strategic connection but also the trade center between South Asia, Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Construction of the Chabahar port is part of a strategy to create a strong financial zone. Tehran has stated that they prefer the Port of Bandar Abbas to remain as a port for Russian and European trade and have Chabahar become the port for trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Significance of Chabahar Port

The port of Chabahar is located south of the provinces of Sistan and Baluchistan, on the coast of Makran, 300 km east of the Strait of Hormuz, and is the only Iranian port with direct access to the Indian Ocean, as well as the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. A broad-spectrum proposal for Chabahar port was anticipated in 1974. Deals associated with the port's development were contracted consequently. The 1979 Islamic revolution impacted negatively on Chabahar's development. Only limited development measures were conceded owing to financial limitations. Only the wharf and breakwater could be developed (1985).

Shahid Kalantary Port: Assembly of Shahid Kalantary port, one of the two central ports of Chabahar was commenced in 1983 and was made functional in the same year after the completion of four wharves.

Shahid Beheshti Port: Building of the second port, Shahid Beheshti, started in 1982 in Chabahar because of the precarious circumstance of the region owing to the Iraq-Iran war and determination of the Iranian government to construct a port away from Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. The ports obtained a central character during the war as they helped Iran's exports(1985). Positioned on the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean, ports of Sistan and Baluchistan are significant for Iran's oil exports and seaborne trade.

India-Iran Efforts to Develop Chabahar

The covenant for India to help Iran develop Chabahar port can be accredited to the promising relations that define the Indo-Iranian strategic relationship. The Tehran Declaration was announced between India and Iran on April 10th, 2001. The declaration called for, "The sides affirm the importance of preservation of peace, security, and stability in the region. Mutually beneficial trade and transportation links, as well as regional financial co-operation among the countries of the region, are essential factors for the progress and development of the entire region. The sides note in particular the importance of a secure and peaceful environment to the development of commerce and the promotion of financial growth in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean regions. The sides also consider security and stability in Central Asia of vital importance to them,"(Text of Tehran Declaration, 2001). Successively The New Delhi Declaration was announced on January, 25th, 2003. The New Delhi Declaration was announced during Iranian President Ayatullah Mohammed Khatami's visit to India. The announcement of these declarations helped establish a strategic partnership between India and Iran(Behuria, 2010).

In 2003, India and Iran agreed to cooperate on developing Chabahar Port (Ezdi, 2015). Until 2012, India ceased construction of the Chabahar Port because of the United Nations (UN) and western sanctions on Iran and questions about its commercial viability. The Chabahar port gained renewed significance after India and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) worth one hundred and ninety-five million dollars on May 6, 2015 (2016). The project was reactivated by India after Pakistan and China agreed to develop a financial corridor linking the Gwadar Port with China's Xinjiang province, however, the development of the Chabahar Port was fast-tracked after November 24, 2013, Interim Nuclear Agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (Borger & Dehghan, 2013). The Nuclear Agreement's implementation resulted at the end of the US and the European Union's financial and trade sanctions on Iran (Melvin & Martinez, 2016). Iran witnessed a significant boost in the trade of items like petrochemicals, aircraft parts, and precious metals. For Iran, it translated into an important destination, in the emerging trade arrangement, between Europe and Asia (2014).

India's strategy could be to undermine the financial prospects of Gwadar port by assisting Iran in upgrading its Chabahar port at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. Chabahar would present the shortest route for the Central Asian States to the sea. If the US isolationist policies towards Iran subside, it could out-shadow Gwadar to some extent (John Garofano & Dew, 2013). India's involvement in the port of Chabahar is motivated by the aspiration to one-day base Indian naval vessels there; however, Indian officials maintain that the port is strictly for commercial purposes (Kemp, 2010).

Iran has been pushing India for the perseverance of the commitments made on Chabahar. The concern figured at numerous mutual consultations. Tehran has also proposed Delhi to assist in building over 500 kilometers of the rail link from the Chabahar to Zahedan, the capital of Sistan-Baluchistan. Zahedan is connected with the core Iranian railway system and the suggested rail link once established will connect Chabahar with International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and arrange for access to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and elsewhere. INSTC is designed to link South and Central Asia to North Europe via Russia. Iran is a partner nation in INSTC along with Russia, India, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Oman, Syria, and Bulgaria (Bhatnagar & John, 2013).

India requires the Chabahar Port to dominate Iran's crude oil and gas assets. Moreover, it is also motivated to access and fully exploit three trillion dollars' worth natural resources of Afghanistan while hindering China there. Furthermore, Delhi aims to import energy resources from Central Asia where Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan possess three and a half billion barrels of oil and six hundred and 64 trillion cubic feet gas reserves. In return, India wants to export cars, computers, and information technology associated products to Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Over and above, India can utilize the Chabahar Port for military purposes given its proximity to Pakistan's Gwadar Port (Ayaz Ahmed, 2015).

The Inclusion of Afghanistan

Afghanistan also has high stakes in Chabahar and the ensuing transportation passage. Afghanistan regards the Chabahar route as a more dependable substitute that would decrease dependency on Pakistan—the only state providing Afghanistan with access to seaborne trade. Iran by this time has already built the route from Chabahar to Milak on the Iran-Afghanistan border. From Milak, this road is linked to the Zaranj-Delaram route that India constructed for Afghanistan for about one hundred million dollars, which further links with the central Kandahar–Herat highway from where goods are further carried to other parts of Afghanistan. Numerous other projects have been declared or are near a conclusion. These comprise the Chabahar-Faranj-Bam railway, the rail link between Hajigak and Chabahar, and the Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad rail link, which will be stretched to Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif and conclude at Termez in Uzbekistan (Bhatnagar & John, 2013).

The Iranian Ambassador to Afghanistan in April 2013 announced that Afghanistan will be linked to the fourteen Central Asian countries by concluding the Chabahar route. On April 27-29, 2015, Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani made a trip to India and emphasized the significance of the Chabahar port. President Ashraf Ghani and Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed to work meticulously with Iran to materialize the Chabahar port into a reality, and advance it as sustainable access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. It was concluded that the roads other to the prevailing ones will offer a major stimulus to Afghanistan's financial restoration struggles (Behuria & Rizvi, 2015).

Although India by now has not been able to make considerable development on the Chabahar Port as part of its strategy to circumvent Pakistan and access Afghanistan and Central Asia through

Iran, it did construct the Zaranj-Delaram highway in 2009 to link with the 2200 km road network, branded as the Garland road, circulating inside Afghanistan and linking key cities in the country. India invested approximately six hundred crore Indian rupees to construct this linking highway. The venture was accomplished in almost four years (2005-2009) by the Border Roads Organization (BRO). In addition to this circular road, Iran is committed to growing its railway network in its eastern provinces to create access among Chabahar and western Afghanistan (Rooden & Dicks-Mirauex, 2005).

Strategic Importance of Chabahar Port

The route concluded through Chabahar will be strategically advantageous for India since it would offer access to Afghanistan without interloping Pakistan. Almost all of Afghanistan's sea trade routes go through Pakistan's seaport in Karachi. Pakistan charges an estimated five hundred million US dollars for Afghanistan's usage of Karachi Port a year (Nader, Scotten, Rahmani, & Stewa, 2014). A new trade itinerary from Chabahar to western Afghanistan would offer India I to Afghanistan's developing market and available assets without intervention from Pakistan.

A succession of agreements and investments were completed from 2003 and 2014 to make the Chabahar pact more profitable. Iran lifted numerous trading limitations on the port of Chabahar intended for Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been allowed complete entrée to Chabahar's storage facilities, along with approval for complete scrutiny of the site for Afghan officials. Port fees were slashed by ninety percent whereas warehousing was lowered by fifty percent for Afghanistan.

India concluded further contracts for investments in Afghanistan and Iran's natural reserve sectors. The Indian nationalized steel company, engaged in an agreement with the Afghan government in 2011 to form iron mining tasks, along with steel manufacturing mills in Afghanistan's western provinces, Hajigak and Bamiyan. In 2014, India vowed a loan of One hundred million US dollars for additional up-gradation of the Chabahar port.

India has comprehensively financed prospective energy sources in Eastern Iran also. During 2010, India was the third major market for Iranian crude oil and natural gas, with Iran catering approximately eleven percent of India's crude oil by 2010. Mutual arrangements permitted Indian companies to make investments in discovering and initiating oil and gas fields in Iran's South Pars region. The agreements are projected to possibly generate revenues of around ten billion U.S dollars equaling six million tons of natural gas (Winand, Vicziany, & Datar, 2015).

In 2010, Iran invested in a nine and a half billion US dollar upgrading and reformation project for its railway structure, which would make Chabahar the end route for two new rail lines that are scheduled for North-South Corridor venture (Ziyadov, 2012). When concluded, this scheme would open all of Europe directly to China, Central Asia, and South East Asia overland routes. A linking of Chabahar to this venture may provide a short and proficient trade route from Southern Russia and Eastern Europe straight to Mumbai, India (Ziyadov, 2012).

The Chabahar port is anticipated to receive and ship a variety of products, however, the preliminary emphasis appears to be on energy products, and specifically crude oil. Chabahar will be a way

station for energy imports approaching from the Persian Gulf intended for Afghanistan and Central Asia. It will be an opening to the Middle East, and conceivably Europe, for exports initiating from Afghanistan and Central Asia. The geopolitical and geo-financial consequences of Chabahar will be enormous. It would be one of the significant advances in the broader province of Iran after a considerable time. If the original plan and associated agreements are fulfilled, a new trade route extending from Central Asia to the Middle East and Europe would be materialized. The consequent development of Chabahar will pave the way for Middle Eastern exports to reach new markets in Asia, and Central Asia and vice versa.

Chabahar port will lead to a competitive environment with Pakistan's Gwadar port. As India desires to construct Chabahar to open up new trade routes through Iran and northward, China, on the contrary, is building up Gwadar to open up trade routes and financial exchanges through Pakistan and northward back to China (Domínguez, 2015). New Delhi's determination to build a deep-sea port at the Iranian city of Chabahar along with transportation corridors northward has been motivated by New Delhi's financial rivalry with Beijing.

Positioned on the same shoreline and separated by less than 200 km, the two seaports, Gwadar and Chabahar, are not at a comforting distance as contending seaports. The competition is enhanced by the circumstances that they are situated at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz through which travels approximately thirty-five percent of the world's sea-borne oil shipments and twenty percent of the oil internationally. Almost 85 percent of the crude oil exports are bound for the Asian markets of India, China, Japan, and South Korea.

Considering the significance of Chabahar for regional countries, the port would prove essential to Afghanistan. It could bring in great financial benefits for Afghanistan in a time when the "war economy" is scaling down. Afghanistan's trade can soar exponentially, as Afghanistan will also be able to connect better with markets in the Middle East and Europe by circumventing Pakistan. It would also be easy for Afghanistan to convey key goods back to its markets (Cordesman, 2015).

Iran's Endeavor for a Multipolar World

Post-revolutionary Iran rhetorically argued for self-reliance and exclusion of extra-regional powers from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf politics, rejecting to admit the advent of a global system influenced by the US and has been endeavoring for a multipolar order. The US supremacy of the region and the segregation of Iran required the Islamic Republic to counterbalance the peril by looking for allies amid other major powers such as India, China, and Russia as well as Muslim countries. The US policy of containing Iran by presenting it as a rogue state could not force countries like India, China, or Russia to terminate their relationships with Iran.

Tehran pursued to use regional and international organizations that were not entirely imperiled by Western supremacy. These included the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), OPEC, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building

Measures in Asia (CICA) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) (Morady, 2011).

The enormous oil and gas resources in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and Central Asia have turned the region vital in the world economy. China's fuel consumption in 2030 will be equal to that of the US today, and any disruption in oil supplies will have a major effect on China's financial growth. Any substitute for petroleum has so far to be celebrated and oil is anticipated to play an essential role in the conceivable future (International Energy Agency, Flagship Report, 2017).

With the appearance of new financial powers such as China and India along with the US, Europe, and Japan, the demand for oil has amplified to about 87 million barrels per day (bpd). Likewise, the energy demand in the global South has amplified to about thirty-five percent of the world's energy supply. It is predicted that by 2025, the South will surpass the North as the principal buyer of energy, and by 2030, China alone will devour more energy than all of Europe and Japan combined. Equally important is India, in terms of energy imports. India is an emerging power whose consumption of oil, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), reached approximately three million bpd in 2009. In the same year, India was the fourth largest consumer and the sixth largest net importer of oil in the world, importing nearly seventy percent of its oil requirements. The EIA predicts India will become the fourth largest net importer of oil in the world by 2025, behind the US, China, and Japan. India imports seventy percent of its crude oil from the Middle East, primarily from Saudi Arabia and Iran (International Energy Outlook 2013: With Projections to 2040", 2013).

Rising energy demands, especially from China and India, have caused great anxiety amongst the developed and developing countries. There is little confidence that the world's energy industry will be able to respond to the demand of consumer states in the future. It is possible to anticipate that there may be significant political conflicts over remaining future supplies. According to one estimate, the US has spent one trillion dollars over the past two decades to defend energy supply. Therefore, for the US, the security of the energy supply will be crucial for both domestic consumption and global domination.

China and India are aware of this, and as a result, have increased their active geopolitical role in the region, as they do not wish to become hostage to the US oil diplomacy. They have increased their operations in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia by investing in different oil fields. India and China have been busy providing military assistance, intelligence sharing, and military training to gain a geopolitical advantage in areas of interest in Iran, Africa, and Central Asia.

The importance of the countries in the Middle East in exporting oil will rise by each passing day. Iran strategically aims at becoming a significant oil-exporting country and a preferred transit route for international oil shipments. Because of its strategic position, Iran has been able to play India, China and Russia off against the US, by leveraging both rising powers and Russia. With its position between Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the IOR, the Islamic Republic sees itself in an ideal position to play a significant role globally.

Geopolitical Implications of Chabahar Port

The geopolitical implications of Chabahar project are considered enormous, as it seems to be one of the most consequential developments in the region. One can also see the creation of new trade routes stretching from the northern reaches of Central Asia down to southern Iran. Oil exports from the Middle East would be able to reach new markets in Asia and the Central Asian states. More importantly, Afghanistan will be able to better connect with markets in the Middle East and Europe. Additionally, the Chabahar project is expected to set up a notable regional competitive dynamic with Gwadar Port in Pakistan. India knows, however, that if it is serious about acquiring energy resources in Central Asian, it needs to find a direct way to access the region. It cannot do so through Pakistan, so it has decided to go through Iran, which may be long-drawn and indirect to an extent, but feasible, nonetheless.

Chabahar is anticipated to help build Afghanistan's economy. The Afghan economy is anticipated to grow many folds with the development of Chabahar at a time when Afghanistan's economy is suffering and will continue to suffer even more after the dollars that have been bucketing into Afghanistan to sustain the US war machine, reduces to a trickle when the US troops leave the country. In effect, Afghan trade volumes are expected to soar exponentially, as Afghanistan would be able to ship goods more easily to key markets in Europe and the Middle East. It would also be able to import key goods more easily as well (2015). At 135 miles, the Chabahar road to the Afghan border is far shorter than the nearly eleven hundred miles trip from Karachi to the Torkham border in northeastern Pakistan and even shorter than the five hundred miles from Karachi to the Chaman border in northwest Pakistan. Thomas Barfield, author of comprehensive *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History,* puts it succinctly: the new transport corridor through Chabahar "ends Pakistan's monopoly on seaborne transit trade to Afghanistan…[making] Iran the most efficient transit route into Central Asia.

Anticipated Increase in Iran's Regional Influence

Added to its financial dimensions, strategically the development of the Chabahar port is considered to outmaneuver Pakistan's Gwadar port. China's contribution to the Gwadar Port and Indian contribution in the Chabahar port can fuel severe Sino-Indian struggle for influence in the Persian Gulf and the IOR region. Iran also agrees to the Indian concern of safeguarding the post-2014 Afghanistan by ensuring that the country does not return to Pakistan's fold and to stop the re-emergence of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. It is quite likely that once the financial sanctions are lifted and tensions ease between Iran and the US the latter may move closer to the former on Afghanistan, which will be beneficial for India.

The conflicting interests of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the broader Middle East can also witness significant intensification. The proxy wars from Yemen to Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two regional powers, explain the vastness of geopolitical and security issues in the Middle East.

A strong and vibrant Iran in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the IOR region will increase Saudi Arabia's apprehensions alongside with other Sunni Arab states. Enormous financial and

strategic benefits can be achieved by Iran through the development of the Chabahar port. Iran's increased influence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region can force Saudi Arabia to revamp its strategic preferences regarding Pakistan for help against Iran.

Saudi Arabia and other Sunni dominated Arab states will try to limit Iranian influence in the Middle East and the Muslim world in general. Saudi Arabia has already formed a coalition of the willing, a 34 nation anti-terror coalition of Islamic countries and sought security cooperation from Pakistan (Siddiqi, 2016). Pakistan can find it difficult to estrange itself from Saudi Arabia which has been a long-term ally and financial partner. At the same time, Pakistan will find it difficult to antagonize Iran. It is quite likely that once the financial sanctions are lifted and tensions ease between Iran and the US the latter may move closer to the former on Afghanistan, which will be beneficial for India (Implications of the Deal, 2015).

The Syrian conflict can intensify. The conflict there has already killed around 250,000 people and displaced nine million. Russia and Iran are Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's key supporters; the US, Europe, and Gulf states support his adversaries. A Syrian peace deal seems unviable without Iran's participation. Despite the US attempts to isolate Tehran, countries like India, China, Turkey, and Russia are banking on Iran for the long haul, precisely because it is a relatively stable, energy-rich geographic lynchpin. With emerging projects like an Iran-Pakistan-China gas pipeline, and financial cooperation for establishing railway line from Istanbul to Tehran and Islamabad, and the North-South Trade Corridor, Iran's regional impact is inevitable. The US may as well adapt itself to that fact while it is still engaged in the region (Padukone, 2012).

Regional rivalries can be predicted to surge in the conceivable future. Structural factors such as volatility in the Arab world and the subsequent power voids left by weak states will make competition probable as regional states like Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia could endeavor to exploit the conditions. Consequently, intensifying inter-state conflicts across the Middle East will continue to embark because little is being done to resolve the grave security challenges triggered by state erosion throughout much of the region.

A Turkish-Saudi partnership in the region to counter Iran can also be an outcome of an emerging Iran. A possible Turkish-Saudi coalition could be used to limit advances made by Iran and restrain Iran's capability to project power in the region. A more active and potentially militant Turkish policy in the Middle East may thus be one of the significant and lesser expected, geopolitical and financial consequences of Iran's rise (Mohseni, 2015).

A lesser possibility of Chabahar's development can also positively impact the Middle Eastern politics. Iran's financial growth would moderate its commitment to inexpensive and high-risk conflicts in the region; enhanced financial affairs with the Arab world can enhance Iran's regional reintegration. Iran's successful financial progress would build up the middle class and strengthen the moderates in Iran.

Conclusion

With its ideal location, energy resources, and a relatively strong state and military muscle, Iran has the potential to play a leading or even pivotal role in Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the IOR. The development of Chabahar port will amplify Iran's capacity to be an efficient trade route for most of the trade between Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. The ensuing financial benefits will subsequently encourage Iran to be more assertive in Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf region, resulting in possible escalation of conflicts with Saudi Arabia and Arab states.

India also sees the potential for Iran to serve as a crucial transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India's renewed concern in recent months for the development of Chabahar port, with the political and financial obstacles being removed, point towards its strategic goal to challenge China's influence in the region. The completion of the Chabahar port will also lead to greater interest in developing the transit corridor through Iran to Europe and Russia.

The drawdown of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan has made the Iran transit route even more vital for India. The two countries have worked together in Afghanistan, where they have had a common interest in limiting the Taliban's role. The ongoing Pakistan-brokered talks between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban have increased concern in India about greater Taliban influence in Afghanistan. This will augment the motivations to collaborate with Iran. The financial benefits of Chabahar port will see a resurgent Iran in regional politics, asserting its influence from Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon to Afghanistan.

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Regional Connectivity and Pakistan-Iran Trade Corridors

Author

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Abstract

The phenomenon of economic integration is hugely dependent on the density and quality of connectivity, known as regional infrastructure. The Eurasian territory is categorized as a supercontinent contributing about 60 percent of global gross product. With the market economy receiving broader acceptance, infrastructure development is becoming vital for reducing Eurasia's trade costs and improving regional trade. The South-West Asian rim land, which predominantly symbolizes the Pakistan-Iran coastal belt along the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, is ideally placed to enhance Eurasian trade and transit activities. While multiple regional connectivity initiatives are being developed in Eurasia, two such projects have been envisaged through the territories of Pakistan and Iran as well. Although, the trans-regional infrastructure development facilitates economic integration, however, it can fuel strategic rivalry in the region also. In the case of Pakistan and Iran, the trade corridors planned through both countries appears to be rivaling each other.

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Introduction

The Eurasian rim land states of Pakistan and Iran jointly occupy a vital geographical landmass on the resource rich continent and offer southward access to warm water seaports. Both the geographically proximate states have shared borders but form part of different regions: Pakistan is a South Asian state while Iran is part of the Middle East in West Asia. Notwithstanding their location in diverse regions, the geographical proximity of both the neighbors puts them in an inextricable bilateral connection. According to the definition, a region is a combination of geographical proximity, the density of interactions, shared institutional frameworks, and common cultural identities (Griffiths, O'Callaghan & Roach, 2008, p. 280). Thus, in the hindsight, Pakistan and Iran together can be assumed as part of one region for numerous plausible reasons. It is, therefore, presumable that the policies of Islamabad and Tehran would be shaped with the strategic environments influencing the region, which affects both the states almost equally.

The Eurasian continent has traditionally been the center of great power politics during all periods of the recorded history, owing to its immense geographical, political and economic significance. Pakistan and Iran have been in the middle of most of the strategic contests ensuing between the regional as well as trans-regional players and found it hard to formulate truly independent policies, which could benefit both the neighbors. Paradoxically, the bilateral relations and potential cooperation for shared economic, political and strategic gains have mostly been shaped by the external environments influencing the two states. Geller & Singer (1998, p. 78) are of the view that at the dyadic level, proximate states were more inclined to engage in conflict and war, than remote states and that, furthermore, conflict and war were more probable between states whose territories were contiguous. Consequently, Islamabad and Tehran being the geographically proximate nations continue to face the challenges impacting their mutual relationship.

Grieco (1990, p. 4) opines that the nation-states are predominantly anxious about their security and power, and being typically predisposed toward conflict and competition, are less keen for cooperation. Glaser (2010, p. 59) has been of the view that competition is the norm and tends to be intense while cooperation is rare and limited to areas of secondary importance. Notwithstanding more inclination toward conflict and competition as suggested by Grieco (1990), sustaining the persistent clash, especially when located in a geographically contiguous region is always demanding. According to Milner (1992, p. 467), cooperation between the nation-states is attained when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination. Cooperation between the states can, thus, help in seeking shared economic gains, leading eventually to the regionalism. Regionalism aims at the reconfiguration of a specific regional space along distinct economic and political lines for mutual gains, mainly in the economic domain (Gamble & Payne, 1996, p. 17).

With notions such as self-help and maximizations of gains through all conceivable means appearing as standard norms in the global arena, the actors are expected to pursue rationalistic policies for preserving respective national interests. Thus, nation-states resort to cooperation with other players when a mutual quest for acquiring shared gains seems viable as well as potentially rewarding. Pakistan and Iran both currently seem predisposed towards maintaining conflicting

policies with each other, being under the influence of diverging strategic predilections. The regional and global strategic rivalry in and around the region has substantially influenced the policies of Tehran and Islamabad as both the states pursue conflicting objectives. Resultantly, the major trade connectivity initiatives planned through the region, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and International North-South Trade Corridor (INSTC) appear to be rivaling each other. As Islamabad seeks to reap the financial benefits of the CPEC while Tehran aspires to promote INSTC, the competition between the two neighbors is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.

Connectivity Projects: Impact on Regionalism

Importance of Economic Integration

The quest towards economic integration interdependence through regionalism for shared gains has been one of the most sought-after objectives among the nation-states of the contemporary world. Regionalism emerges as the political tool for the active steering and intensification of interdependencies between the states of a region (Brook, 1998, p. 231). The mutual cooperation of the states through regionalism promises each member adequate financial share by facilitating regional economic integration. Integrating regionally for economic rewards in the simplest of explanation implies ease of mutual trade, minimum restrictions on movement across the borders, and functional transit connectivity between the partners. At a systematic level, integration essentially refers to a process whereby states transfer some degree of political, economic, and legal decision-making power to supranational institutions (Griffiths et al., 2008, p. 155). According to Dent (2002), regional integration refers to the convergence or at least congruence of common foreign policies of states in the same geographic region that requires respective management initiatives (as quoted by Loewen & Zorob, 2018, p. 3).

Regional Connectivity and Trade Corridors

The trade corridors help initiate economic activities along the intended routes and may include energy pipelines, industrial estates, telecommunication and electricity transmission cables, and tourism activities (Ishida, 2009, p. 4). The development of economic corridors envisages connectivity between the economic agents located in a specific geography, and function through a well-defined system, while connecting various economic nodes (Brunner, 2013, p. 1). Constructing and upgrading infrastructure is regarded as a tool of regional geopolitics since by developing roads, railways, pipelines, and ports, states aim at breaking out of their prescribed geography while pursuing respective national interests (Daniels, 2013, p. 94). The economic process initiated through the development of regional infrastructure cannot be limited to one odd participant; it rather promotes larger interdependence among the involved states, benefitting all in the process. In a way, connectivity initiatives reject the notion of absolute gains and encourage cooperation among the nation-states for seeking shared rewards while mitigating the prospects of conflict.

The economic integration of a region is largely dependent on the density and quality of connectivity, known as regional infrastructure; and operationally viable connectivity not only

supports the trade but also yields better income and prosperity (De, 2013, p. 2). With post-Cold War focus shifting towards regional economic integration and mutual interdependence, the development of complementing infrastructure assumes greater importance. Hence, the realization of the dream of reaping the economic potential of a region through integration of the national economies is linked with the regional transport infrastructure, which transpires as one of the major determinants of the entire process (Vickerman, 2002). The infrastructure development in the form of transit and trade corridors is not limited to the construction of roads alone; it essentially entails regional connectivity with a network of roads, railway lines, sea routes, air links and the energy pipelines. The development of connectivity through construction as well as maintenance of the infrastructure in itself is a major economic activity, which may involve the entire region in the process.

Importance of Infrastructure Development for Economic Integration

The infrastructure development enhances the regional connectivity and facilitates trade activities in the region and beyond, thus improving the commercial potential of the participating states. An operationally functioning and cost-effective transport mechanism enhances the regional connectivity, supports the market forces and thereby plays a vital role in the growth of the national economies. At times, few states prefer to undertake the development of bilateral connectivity initiatives, however, all-inclusive infrastructure projects in a geographically contiguous region appear most viable as well as a rewarding option. The rising intra-regional trade after the Cold War era has introduced increasing proclivity for opening additional border crossings as well as domestic routes for international transport, while the bilateral and multilateral agreements on transport facilitation are used for improving the infrastructure (De, 2013, p. 20). There is a growing awareness about the potential economic gains through integration, which is facilitated by developing better regional connectivity despite longstanding political issues, especially among the states of the global South.

The existence of an operationally functional infrastructure has a pivotal role in the commercial activities of a region as it facilitates mutual trade among the participating nations and resultantly enhances their financial standing. As the economic growth gets intimately dependent upon connectivity, the officials of developing countries are not surprised when investment climate surveys tell them that they should rank infrastructure as a top priority (Estache, 2006, p. 47). With paramount significance in the inter-regional trade and transit activities, connectivity through the infrastructural services assumes the status of the complementary factor. The development of infrastructure essentially promotes regional economic integration by the mutual trade and investment expansion and inspires regional cooperation, with collective efforts for the infrastructure development, generating a virtuous cycle (Brooks & Stone, 2010, p. 4). Moreover, the countries offering the transit facilities for global and regional commercial activities through trade corridors are promised huge financial incentives for their services.

A sustainable infrastructure system improves connectivity with transnational supply chains and distribution networks for producers, and facilitates in decreasing transaction costs, raising value added and increasing potential profitability (Brooks et al., 2010, p. 2). It is largely accepted that

the development of infrastructure leads to better connectivity, helps minimize unwanted interruptions in the ports, border crossing procedures, or transit times, and projects a country's propensity to trade (Brooks & Stone, 2010, p. 8). A well-maintained infrastructure is not only inevitable for the economy, but it strengthens inclusiveness and reduces poverty, hence contributing towards the growth and poverty reduction through intra-regional trade (Brooks & Stone, 2010, p.1). The expansion or improvement in the quality of infrastructure is essential since it lowers marginal costs, raising the minimum efficient scale of production, transportation, or marketing (Brooks & Stone, 2010, p. 1). With better connectivity, the growing regional trade relations increase mutual interdependence, promise economic prosperity, and ultimately, reduce political friction among the participating states.

Infrastructure Development through Pakistan-Iran Territories

The Eurasian territory is a massive and diverse supercontinent, accommodating nearly two-thirds of the world's population and contributing about 60 percent of its gross product (Vinokurov, 2014, p. 69). After the Cold War, the market economy received global acceptance, with infrastructure development contributing to reducing Asia's trade costs, and improving regional trade (Brooks & Hummels, 2009). As the globalization encourages and accelerates international exchanges of products and services in both extensive and intensive margins, it also necessitates the corresponding development of Asia's transportation networks (Brooks, 2008; Hummels, 2009). Eurasia and its rimland territories can potentially have substantial economic gains from higher trade owing to region's geographical contiguity, provided the infrastructure and trade costs are improved (De, 2008; Brooks, 2008 and Hummels, 2009).

The land routes offer an alternative to maritime options from the Indian Ocean and can be preferable mode if properly developed and managed through the Eurasian continent, where the rail distance linking Europe and Asia is almost half (Vinokurov, 2014, p. 82). The rim land regions of Eurasia in South and West Asia, where Pakistan and Iran are both located, assume a pivotal role in the development of land-based trade and transit connectivity. However, virtually the huge continental landmass of Eurasia is confronted with the underdeveloped infrastructure networks, and inevitably requires the development of trans-border and transcontinental infrastructure for operationalizing the international economic linkages (Vinokurov, 2014, p. 81). With almost non-functional regional land connectivity between the Eurasian mainland and the coastline along with South-West Asian territories, the mutual trade activities are well below the true potential. Notwithstanding the essence of cooperation on developing the regional infrastructure, political expediencies are limiting the prospects of consensual progress in this regard.

The South-West Asian rim land, which predominantly denotes the Pakistani and Iranian coastal belt along the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf respectively, is geographically ideal to enhance trade and transit connectivity in Eurasia. However, like most parts of Asia, this region also lacks an elaborate land infrastructure and allied transit facilities, which could facilitate the trans-border trade movement. Presently, multiple regional connectivity initiatives are being developed in Eurasia, with two such projects under construction through the territories of Pakistan and Iran both. These two trade and transit infrastructure projects are linked with the Gwadar (Pakistan) and

Chabahar (Iran)seaports, involving China and India; Beijing is financing Gwadar with its trade corridor while New Delhi has been sponsoring the competing port at Chabahar along with a linked land route (Daniels, 2013, p. 95). While the development of transit corridors essentially removes the longstanding barriers impeding mutual trade and interdependence, it also sets in motion a new strategic rivalry in the region.

Pakistan-China cooperation in the construction of a land corridor, which allows Beijing land access from its central Asian hinterland, has apparent strategic implications in the region as it circumvents India on the western land approaches (Scott, 2008, p. 6).In regional geopolitical milieu, Beijing and New Delhi are apprehensive of the connection of others with the infrastructure development, viewing it as a plan of strategic encirclement through containment to suppress opponent's economic and otherwise (Daniels, 2013, p. 94). Chinese access to strategically vital Gwadar through Pakistani soil is enormously significant in the face of two Indian deep-sea port facilities on the southwest coast at Kawar and on the southeast coast some 50 kilometers south of Visakhapatnam, which may threaten Beijing's crucial sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) between the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Malacca (Scott, 2008, p. 9). Thus, the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry has been permeated into the under-construction trade corridors as well, undermining regional connectivity, at least for the time being.

Regional Implications of Connectivity Projects Involving Pakistan and Iran

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

After the end of the Cold War and the consequent breakup of the once-mighty Soviet empire, there was a triumph of the capitalist world with attributes of a free-market economy achieving global receptivity. China's economic reorientation through Deng Xiaoping's reforms and amenability towards a market-based economy massively enhanced the trade potential of entire Eurasia. Beijing thus quickly reckoned the essence of developing land connectivity and embarked on the creation of major infrastructure projects named "One Belt One Road (OBOR)". China envisioned the development of the OBOR initiative in September 2013 by reviving the historical silk route, with a tri-corridor venture, which sought to connect it with Russia, Europe, and Pakistan (Mahmood, 2015, p. 58).

OBOR initiative envisaged the development of an infrastructure with several railway lines, highways, and maritime trade arteries, connecting the Chinese mainland with the neighboring states. According to Liping (2015), Chinese financed OBOR plan with CPEC being one of the communication channels, aims at incorporating an area with a population of 4.4 billion and a total economic volume of US $ 21 trillion, which is 29 percent of the world's total (Javaid. U & Javaid. R, 2016, p. 129). Winter (2016) quotes the incumbent Chinese President Mr. Xi Jinping while stating that the OBOR would promote inter-civilization exchanges to build bridges of friendship for people, drive human development and safeguard the peace of the world (as cited by Afridi & Khalid, 2016, p. 663).

The post-Soviet era with the emergence of American dominated unipolar world witnessed a strategic transformation where the economic interests secured precedence over security concerns. The newfound strategic realities shifted the focus towards economic interdependence and restructured the regional alignments according to the emerging dynamics. Consequently, Islamabad-Beijing collaboration, which has been intended at balancing Indian strategic ambitions, has been transforming into a commercial alignment with the infrastructure development in the region (Javaid. U & Javaid. R, 2016, p. 127). With rising economic as well as political standing of China, resurging Russia, and the Indo-US thaw, the development of CPEC can be viewed as a strategic game-changer in the region.

Beijing-Islamabad agreement on the CPEC was reached in May 2013 during the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang to Pakistan, where the Gwadar Port was formally handed over to China for further development and operations (Afridi & Khalid, 2016, pp. 659-660). Pakistan's decision of handing over Gwadar port to China led towards evolving a consensus on the construction of an all-encompassing transit-trade link between the two. During President Xi Jinping's visit to Islamabad on 20-21 April 2015, aspects such as economic linkages, communication, infrastructure development, and energy cooperation were agreed (Afridi & Khalid, 2016, p. 663).While the CPEC offered financial gains to all regional stakeholders; project was opposed by India due to strategic concerns.

CPEC can be regarded as an extension of the OBOR initiative, which aims at linking Europe and Africa going through the Asian continent by connecting about 66 countries through cooperation in infrastructure development, energy, telecommunications, logistics, and transportation sectors (Afridi & Khalid, 2016, p. 663). While the CPEC project has the potential to serve commercial interests of the entire region, both the founding partners attain maximum with China gaining access to Southern coastline while Pakistan's fragile economy receiving much needed relief. Furthermore, Pakistan through CPEC acts as a regional prop of China and Central Asia and can benefit from the expanding regional trade, transport, and energy links (Javaid. U & Javaid. R, 2016, p. 127).

The infrastructure development through CPEC plans to construct serval land routes with roads, railways and even pipelines for energy supply. The project is anticipated to spread over 3000 km, linking the Gwadar port with China's Xinjiang province and initiating a large economic activity in the entire region (Khan, Farooq & Gul, 2016, p. 234). The geographically located seaports along the South-West Asian coastal belt offer Eurasian mainland, especially the landlocked but energy-rich Central Asian and Caucasian regions an outlet to the strategically vital Indian Ocean. From the commercial perspective, the Pakistani as well as Iranian seaports are ideally placed for regional trade and transit if supported by the functionally sustainable infrastructural facilities.

The CPEC assumes the outlook of a regional project as it plans to link territories of South Asia, Middle East, and Central Asia and further to Africa and Europe, and provides landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asian republics access to the southern coastline (Afridi & Khalid, 2016, p. 662).Notwithstanding the negative projection of the CPEC from the players opposing the

initiative, the under construction trade and transit initiative envisages facilitating regional economic cooperation. However, the operationalization of the CPEC and Gwadar Port also proffers China an uninterrupted access to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, thus reducing its strategically intricate reliance on the South China Sea (Ali, 2015, p. 3).

Pakistan's decision to re-assign operational control of the Gwadar Seaport to China in 2013has reinforced Beijing-Islamabad bilateral relations in all domains, ranging from strategic harmony to economic cooperation. Consequently, the CPEC is not only a trade route between the two neighbors, but it contemplates the development of several associated facilities, which includes various road links, railway tracks, pipelines, industrial parks, and economic zones (Afridi & Khalid, 2016, p. 662). Notwithstanding many incentives on offer, opponents of CPEC link it with China's ambition of enhancing maritime presence in the Indian Ocean/ Arabian Sea, particularly for dealing with piracy threats and vulnerability of its SLOCs in any future conflict (Perveen & Khalil, 2015, p. 352).

The economically rising China has been desperately looking at the options of securing viable, secure, and sustainable energy supply routes to maintain its impressive financial growth. Towards this end, Beijing focused on the multi-pronged strategy, which seeks to develop the required infrastructure and pursuing political relationships with energy-producing countries, as well as those located astride the transit routes (Mahmood, 2015, p. 59). Presently, China depends on the shipping of 80 percent of its oil and energy needs through the Malacca Strait, but anticipates that its economic and energy security interests are vulnerable due to the ongoing power struggle in the South and the East China Sea (Ali, 2015, p. 4).

With the vulnerability of the energy supply chain through strategically contested the Indian Ocean, CPEC emerges not only as of the short and comparatively secure transit facility for the Chinese but, the easiest extension and most economical route of the OBOR project (Afridi & Khalid, 2016, p. 669). Hence, the operationalization of the Gwadar port assumes greater significance in Beijing's energy security calculus as it helps reducing its current maritime transportation distance from 12000 km to 3000 km (Ali, 2015, p. 3). China's access to the Indian Ocean from the Gwadar Port minimizes its susceptibility of 'Malacca Dilemma,' and provides economic security when the Strait of Malacca is increasing transforming into a contested territory (as cited by Ali, 2015, p. 3).

In the contemporary world, with geo-economics gaining precedence over other considerations, the rising economies like China and India are looking for access to the maintainable, secure, and uninterrupted trade routes. With the persistent strategic rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi, both the Asian giants are seeking control over the potential regional trade and transit routes and undertaking alignments with the countries astride such territories. According to Holmes (2013), Chinese access to the Indian Ocean through Gwadar is viewed apprehensively by the Indians, who consider the CPEC as a strategic initiative of China that can potentially allow Beijing the naval power projection in the India Ocean to contain India and successfully implement the String of Pearls strategy (as cited by Ali, 2015, p. 2).

India's apprehensions over growing Chinese influence in South Asia and a secure reach to energy hubs of the Middle East through Pakistani territory are essentially shaping the response of New Delhi. Up till now, the conception and development of the CPEC have been portrayed as a challenge to China-India relations due to Pakistan being a major beneficiary, hence prompting New Delhi's regional collusion with Tehran and Kabul (Hussain, 2017, p. 9). Saunders (2014)outlines the trans-regional influence by indicating the revival of American interest in the Asia-Pacific region and growing military, economic and strategic focus through forming regional strategic alignments with countries like India, who are opposing rising Chinese global clout (as cited by Ali, 2015, p. 4).

While Pakistan-China collaboration on the development of the CPEC may cause anxieties for countries like India in the prevailing strategic milieu, nonetheless, the viability of the initiative for the regional financial interests cannot be ignored. The Sino-Pakistan trade route providing access to the landlocked energy-rich states of Central Asia with the Indian Ocean through Gwadar port can assume vital strategic significance as the energy corridor of the world (Perveen & Khalil, 2015, p. 352). From a regional perspective, the CPEC can assure enormous economic rewards for perpetually unstable countries like Afghanistan, while Iran may also be tempted to join the initiative due to the prospects of linking with the energy starved markets of South Asia as well as China.

The trade route crisscrossing Pakistani landmass before reaching at the Arabian Sea coast at Gwadar is the shortest possible route for Afghanistan and the Central Asian states and projected to attract 25 percent of the national and international chain by 2020 (Hussain, 2017, p. 7). Ranjan (2015)has noted that almost every regional country backs the transit corridor barring India, which resists the Chinese attempt to expand its direct influence in the region and deems the project against its strategic interests (as cited by Makhdoom, Shah & Sami, 2018, p. 39). New Delhi thus considers the operationalization of the CPEC as one of the major projects of the OBOR strategically detrimental to its longstanding ambition of achieving hegemonic influence over South Asia.

Pakistan has long been recognized as the geographically vital territory for providing a gateway to Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia, and West Asia and any significant trade and transit project involving these regions (Ali, 2015, p. 4). Pakistan's landmass has the distinction of connecting the energy-starved countries of South Asia and China, with the energy rich territories of Western as well as Central Asian regions. Hence, the functionalization of CPEC through Pakistan transpires as an alternative energy route to states like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, owing to their heavy reliance on Russia for oil and gas exports through the Black Sea pipeline network (Hussain, 2017, p. 7).

Syed (2013) has suggested that the operationalization of the Gwadar seaport and CPEC, can make Pakistan the pivot of commercial activities among the energy-rich Gulf and Central Asian states, Afghanistan, and China, thus offering Pakistan Navy strategic depth, besides its coast as a marine base (as cited by Javaid. U & Javaid. R, 2016, p. 131). Islamabad's potential strategic gains by assuming the status of a regional commercial hub may not be a pleasing development for other players like Iran who has been pursuing similar eminence through its own transit project.

Nonetheless, linking Gwadar and Chabahar ports can enhance and facilitate regional and cross-regional trade among the countries of South, Central, West, and East Asia (Ali, 2015, p. 9).

The present regional geostrategic environments around Pakistan and Iran appear least conducive for potential regional economic interdependence. However, presumably, the connectivity between the Chabahar Port of Iran and the Gwadar Port and CPEC, and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) can expedite the prospects of regional economic integration (Ali, 2015, p. 8). Apparently, the regional consensus, especially between China and India holds the key for achieving economic gains through the connectivity initiatives planned from Pakistani and Iranian territories. Such a development is largely reliant on the political harmony in the region and the amicable resolution of the longstanding as well as contentious issues between some of the regional players.

International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

INSTC has been conceived as a communication infrastructure, spanned over an area of approximately 7,200 kilometers and comprising of roads, sea routes and railroads that aims at enabling trade between India, Iran, Russia, the Central Asian Republics (CARs), Azerbaijan and Europe (Ullah & Brohi, 2018, p. 101). The original treaty on the INSTC had been agreed between Iran, India and Russia in the beginning of September 2000, which was later ratified by the three participants in 2002. INSTC contemplates linking the land transit corridor with the Chabahar port, on the Makran Coast of the Sistan, which may develop as an international commercial port for the regions of South Asia, South-East Asia, West Asia, and Central Asia, while also providing India access to energy resources (Khan, 2013, p. 79).

Chabahar port has huge strategic importance and economic value, owing to its vicinity next to the Gulf of Oman, and at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz (Amirthan, 2017, p. 87). Iranian revolutionary regime intended to develop the Chabahar seaport soon after the end of the war with Iraq and has been looking for the foreign investment for initiating the project. However, Tehran's Chabahar port development plan coincided with its post-revolution animosity with the US, resulting in nearly insurmountable political as well as financial barriers. With foreign investment on Chabahar hard to come by, India also could not manage to bypass the sanctions to invest in this strategic route, deemed vital by New Delhi for evading Pakistani territory (Rizvi & Behuria, 2016, p. 358).

The commercial significance of the energy-rich Central Asian and Caucasian regions surfaced after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the independence of these states. Owing to its geographical proximity and being one of the littoral states of the Caspian Sea, Iran braced itself for a prominent role in the regional connectivity. While the INSTC preserves its commercial value and potential as the most feasible access to the Indian Ocean for Central Asia and the Caucasus, the global strategic dynamics have been limiting its prospects. Despite economic sanctions on Iran, India justified the development of Chabahar as a strategic port for keeping Chinese maritime activities under surveillance, besides gaining access to Afghanistan and Central Asia (Rizvi & Behuria, 2016, p. 361).

Indo-Iran cooperation for developing Chabahar port and the INSTC was influenced by their shared strategic interests and the regional geopolitical dynamics in the backdrop of Soviet disintegration. While post-revolutionary Iran had distanced itself from its Cold War allies in the region, India was also getting increasingly anxious with rising Pakistani clout in the region after the Afghan war. Pakistan-Iran discord over post-war Afghanistan and growing animosity with the US has led Tehran to strengthen ties with New Delhi. The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, departure of the Soviet forces from Afghan soil, the disintegration of the Soviet Union which ended the Cold War and Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990-1991, intensified Indo-Iran ties, resulting in the convergence of security interests (Singh & Lele, 2010, p. 91).

The regional dynamics in the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US and Tehran's support of the American military invasion of Afghanistan facilitated Indo-Iran strategic collaboration in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea (Khan, 2013, p. 79). Indo-Iran strategic nexus was expedited during the visit of Iranian President Syed Mohammad Khatami in January 2003 and the signing of vital New Delhi Declaration (Singh & Lele, 2010, p. 91). The growing warmth in Iran-India relations was taking place when the regional strategic dynamics had transformed due to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Consequently, the signing of the New Delhi Declaration and Iran's visible inclination towards strategic alignment with India posed a serious dilemma for Pakistan.

Indian commercial and strategic ambitions to reach Afghanistan and beyond were hampered due to antagonistic relations with Pakistan and prompted New Delhi to seek some alternative. Iran's geographical location appeared as the most viable route for the Indians to link up with the West and Central Asia while evading Pakistani territory. Hence, serving the mutual interests of both, the New Delhi declaration, accentuated the urgency of enabling legislation for Indo-Iran bilateral trade and economic exchanges and enhancing the business confidence between the entrepreneurs of the two countries (Singh & Lele, 2010, p. 91). For cash-starved Iran, the potential Indian financial investment in the development of Chabahar port and INSTC promised vital economic gains.

Indian analysts have been cognizant of the essence of reaching Central Asia and underlined the need for a proactive and meaningful policy for the region with the 'Look North' policy (Dar & Firdous, 2014, p. 42). New Delhi's eagerness for Iranian connectivity projects transpired with the funding of US$136 million for developing 218 km-long link road from Delaram to Zaranj in Afghanistan in 2009, and the investment of US$85 million to build two berths at Chabahar in 2014 (Rizvi & Behuria, 2016, p. 359).According to Dikshit (2013), New Delhi regarded 'Look North' policy vital for trade, transit, energy and communication routes, traversing the entire region from Turkey to India and between Eurasia and the Arabian Sea, with Afghanistan at its heart (Dar & Firdous, 2014, p. 42).

Indian Connect Central Asia policy, which was launched in 2012, affirmed the significance of geographical connectivity, transportation and trade networks for establishing a wide-ranging relationship with the Central Asian region and Afghanistan (Dave, 2016, p. 5). The functionalization of Chabahar port, as well as completion of the North-South transit corridor, was regarded as inevitable for Indian access in Central Asia, which would enable New Delhi to transport its goods at a cheaper cost to European markets (Singh & Lele, 2010, p. 91). In the

hindsight, Indian backing of the INSTC and the Chabahar Seaport not only aims at commercial gains, but it is viewed by New Delhi as a vital maneuver for realizing its strategic ambitions in the region.

The development of the INSTC appeared game-changer for the Indo-Russia mutual trade, which has to traverse a long route through the Red Sea, Suez Canal, the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea (Sarma, 2010, p. 81). In terms of railways, the vital 677-kilometer-long Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran link, designated as North-South Transnational Corridor, commenced operations in the early part of 2014 and connected CARs with the Persian Gulf for international trade (Ullah & Brohi, 2018, p. 107). One more key rail link termed as the North-South Railway Corridor is projected to offer a link between the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf of INSTC (Ullah & Brohi, 2018, p. 107).

The INSTC aims at connecting Astrakhan, Moscow, and Baku located in north and Mumbai in the south with an infrastructure network comprising of land, railways and maritime routes while assuming potential transportation of roughly 20 million tons of cargo (Ullah & Brohi, 2018, p. 101). INSTC is planned to offer connectivity from Mashhad to Russian territory leading up to Baltic as well as Europe thus decreasing transportation time by 60 percent and transportation cost by 50 percent, for India's exports (Amirthan, 2017, p. 90). Mahapatra (2012) claims that the transit of goods through the INSTC is envisaged to cut the transportation distance from Mumbai to the Chabahar port and subsequently to the European countries by two thirds, compared to the present Red Sea route.

INSTC promises enough commercial incentives to all the participating nations besides serving Indian ambitions of reaching to the north. In addition to being the hub for Iran's energy supplies to India, Chabahar port is also projected as an initiative to minimize the reliance of Central Asian nations on Russia, China and Pakistan, thereby allowing them some degree of economic and strategic autonomy (Kumar, 2016, p. 3). Indian interest in the completion of the INSTC is complemented with the prospects of evading Pakistani territory while executing its 'Look North' policy. New Delhi considers the success of 'Look North' initiative without resolving its longstanding issues with Pakistan as a huge strategic accomplishment and is, therefore, frustrated with the persistent snags impeding the project.

Notwithstanding sluggish progress of the INSTC, the project has been favorably received in the region with eleven more countries including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Syria, Bulgaria and Ukraine, joining the initiative (Ullah & Brohi, 2018, p. 101). A major success for INSTC has been the Agreement on the Establishment of International Transport and Transit Corridors, with the inclusion of Afghanistan at the second trilateral meeting of Experts on April 11, 2016, in New Delhi (Rizvi & Behuria, 2016, p. 358). In Indian calculus, Chabahar seaport gains strategic significance for being located 72 nautical miles west of Gwadar port and providing connectivity with Afghanistan at Zaranj overland through Zahedan (Rizvi & Behuria, 2016, p. 359).

Conclusion

There is no denying that connectivity initiatives usually contribute significantly to promoting regional economic integration by facilitating commercial activities, which offer financial incentives to all the participants. In most parts of the contemporary world, connectivity projects have played a vital role in promoting trade between the nations and helped achieve regionalism for economic gains. Moreover, regionalism thrives with regional awareness that can be termed as the shared perception of belonging to a particular community, achieved by internal factors, often defined in terms of a common culture, history, and religious traditions (Hurrell, 1995, p. 335). Hence, regionalism as well as greater connectivity helps in alleviating political rivalries among the participating states, persuading them to develop consensus for share good.

The states participating in the CPEC and INSTC projects have requisite attributes to mutually pursue shared economic gains in the region and promote regionalism, for the collective good. The commercial potential of the region is so enormous that both the transit corridor projects can easily complement each other instead of getting into a rivalry. It can be fairly assumed that from a purely commercial perspective, both the connectivity initiatives traversing Pakistani and Iranian territories can lead towards greater economic integration and mutual interdependence of the region. However, in the hindsight, Pakistan-Iran connectivity initiatives have fueled a fresh contest in the region, resulting in further polarization and divergences among the key players. With the involvement of trans-regional actors, the strategic dynamics have gone even more complicated, thus eluding the prospects of immediate consensus among the participating states of both the transit projects.

While INSTC as well as CPEC enhance connectivity and both the initiatives can play a significant part in the regional economic integration, however, the strategic conflicts between key players undermine such prospects. Indian rivalry with Pakistan in particular and China in general mitigates the probability of New Delhi participating in the CPEC in the foreseeable future, thus compelling it to focus on Chabahar port and the INSTC for staying relevant in the region. India's strategic interests are well served with Pakistan-Iran rivalry on transit corridors and projection of both the initiatives as competitors. On the other hand, the Chinese desire to play a part in Chabahar and the related transport network leading up to Central Asia, through Iranian territory despite India's proactive role can expand Beijing's regional clout compared to New Delhi and even Moscow (Kumar, 2016, p. 4).

While the connectivity is perceived to be a doable recipe for promoting regionalism, however, prevailing strategic rivalries in the region have resulted in the trust deficit and competition. Notwithstanding the immense potential of both the transit corridors to complement each other, the regional environments are far from being conducive to any such possibility. With Iran under economic sanctions, the prospects of the operationalization of the INSTC and Chabahar port appear slim in the near future, virtually putting Tehran out of competition and getting irrelevant in the regional commercial activities. Thus, the prospects of the successful completion and functionalization of the CPEC and Gwadar port may not be very pleasing for the countries involved in the development of the INSTC, especially India.

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Turkey under AKP: Foreign Policy towards the Middle East

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the important transformation that took place in Turkish foreign policy during the era of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkey maintained a non-aligned and non-intervention foreign policy in most of the republican era. The activism in the regional and global affairs started with the indulgence and rise of Islamic political parties in the Turkish political system. Initially, these political parties were far from gaining affirmative control over the domestic, regional, and global affairs but their influence arose with the emergence of AKP in Turkey. AKP persuaded the traditional "Pro-Western" foreign policy during the early days of its government but abandoned its pursuit by acclaiming that West is not serious in including Turkey in its bloc. It then looked towards the other alternatives by establishing close ties with the Middle Eastern neighbours. This paper analyses the transformation of Turkish foreign policy and the reasons and factors that brought this change.

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Introduction

Turkey has a troubled history both at domestic and international levels. Economic crises, political uncertainties, the emergence of several threats and challenges are some of the most important reasons which kept Turkey in complete uncertainty regarding its future vis-à-vis external policies. These challenges further posed severe threats to the Turkish domestic, external, and security policies due to an increase in the number of factors at the beginning of the 21st century. Therefore, the assessment and study of the Turkish role in international affairs become more complicated and multifaceted (F. Stephen Larrabee, 2003) Turkey achieved notable results in its foreign policy since the AKP came into power in 2002 (Giannotta, 2012). Turkey is bestowed with a unique geographical and geopolitical position which also helped in reevaluating and reshaping its foreign policy.

The study of Turkish foreign policy before the AKP revealed that it was inclined towards the West and its foreign policy was rest upon the idea of the secularization of the country. Moreover, security imperative during most of the Cold War era bound Turkey to make its foreign policy following the security environment of the region (Dalay, 2016). However, the post-Cold War period led Turkey to rethink its foreign policy. In the earlier years of its power, AKP brought a shift in the country's foreign policy. This shift or change in the foreign policy was based on the new understanding of regional politics and the security environment. Interdependence and minimization of mistrusts among the neighbors were at the core of the new foreign policy (Dalay, 2016).

Ahmet Davutoglu, a professor of International Relations and advisor to the Prime Minister on foreign affairs in the first term of AKP, is considered the architect of new Turkish foreign policy. He presented the concept of 'zero problems with neighbours'. This concept, initially, was introduced by keeping the economic objectives in front but it was also hoped that the same may be converted for the political objectives in the future (Dalay, 2016).

AKP emerged as a strong political party and Turkey appeared as a strong state with the credentials to play an active and determinative role during the Arab Spring. Turkey preferred to play an active and affirmative role in the Arab's upheavals instead of remaining inactive and handicapped. It was the result of Turkish proactive policies that Turkey showed its support for the democratic uprising in Tunisia and Egypt. The Turkish support for democracy can be seen in the case of Egypt when the Turkish prime minister has shown sympathy for Muslim brotherhood by leading an anti-Mubarak protest (Demirag, 2014). On the other hand, when the waves of Arab Spring knocked Syria, another layer of transformation was observed in Turkish foreign policy. Turkish foreign policy which was strict to the non-militarization of the region changed into the military interventions for solutions to the problems. The military intervention was the result of the killing of Turkish citizens in the war between the Assad forces and the Syrian revolutionary forces. Turkey requested NATO for the military intervention in the Syrian crisis and asked for the provision of Patriot missiles as defence against the Syrian forces.

Iran strongly reacted towards the counter measures of the Turkish republic by stating these steps as aggression and steps towards the deterioration of regional peace and stability. Iran's Chief of staff condemned Turkey and said that the operationalization of Patriot missiles will trigger the

chances of third world war (Demirag, 2014). Syrian crisis also strained the relations between Russia and Turkey. The relations between Russia and Turkey became tense when the Turkish military shot down a Russian fighter jet over the violation of its territory in November 2015. The pilot of the jet lost his life in this incident. Russian government expressed great concern over this incident and broke its diplomatic and bilateral ties with Turkey. Later, Turkey, after realizing the intensity of the issue, shared condolences with Russia. It happened through a letter that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wrote to his counterpart, Vladimir Putin. The relations, afterward, restored between the two countries as the act of Turkish president deescalated the tense environment (Yesiltas, 2013).

Davutoglu has an important status in the formation of Turkish foreign policy; he remained the advisor of Turkish prime minister on the external affairs in 2003, acted as foreign minister of Turkish Republic in 2009, and remained the prime minister of Turkey from 2014 to 2016. He performed an active role in the formation and transformation of Turkish foreign policy. His era is regarded as both success and failure because he, at one point, worked for the end of Turkish isolationism from the regional politics by maintaining that Turkey should play an active role in the regional affairs by keeping Ottoman legacy before and, on the other hand, a decline had also been seen in the Turkish standing in the global level during the Davutoglu era (Nafi, 2016).

Many observers marked Davutoglu's era in the Turkish foreign policy as a period of missed opportunities because the policies laid down by Davutoglu was aimed to make Turkey as a strong actor in the regional affairs but Turkey's internal political atmosphere started towards destabilizing as a result of these policies (Dalay, 2016). Binali Yildirim became the next Prime Minister of Turkey after Davutoglu and announced during his first address to the parliament that the focus of his government will be on the minimization of the enemies and increase in the friends (Dalay, 2016).

The following questions will be addressed while discussing the transformation of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East. It is, however, pertinent to mention here that the Turkish economy had boosted during the AKP era by the transformed foreign policy. Interdependence, soft power, and mutual interest among the neighboring countries are also some indicators of Turkish economic developments. Besides above, Turkey still needs to implement its transformed foreign policy in the regional and global environment. The following questions are, thus, to be part of this study:

1.   What are the historical trends in Turkish foreign policy?

2.   What are the major changes in Turkish Foreign Policy during the AKP period?

3.   What caused these changes?

Historical Background of Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkish foreign policy constantly transformed during different periods. Turkey, after the abolition of the Ottoman Empire, maintained a distance from the Muslim world and persuaded West for the sake of protection of its sovereignty and the economic, social and political development. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, transforms Turkish foreign policy for the first time. His era is recalled as the Kemalist era of Turkish Foreign Policy which prevailed from 1923 to

1949. The second phase of Turkish foreign policy started in 1950 with the emergence of the Cold War between the then superpowers and the winner of WWII. Western countries wanted Turkey to be on their side to contain communism to prevail. The third phase of Turkish foreign policy started with the end Cold War and the bipolar struggle between the US and USSR. This period is, significantly, considered an important phase of Turkish foreign policy in which Turkey again started to shape its relations with the neighbouring countries and the Muslim world. This era lasted until the 9/11 attack and with an end to the unipolarity of the United States. However, the transformation of Turkish foreign policy during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) will be focused to be explained here.

Turkish Foreign Policy During the AKP Era (2002-2018)

The AKP after becoming in power in 2002 brought various changes in its foreign policy. Until now, The AKP has enjoyed five consecutive periods in power. The AKP formed its government for the first time in 2002 and remained in power since 2007. The AKP established its government for the second time in 2007 which ended in 2011. The reforms introduced and implemented by the AKP in its previous tenures made him enough popular to win the elections for the third time. In 2011, AKP again come into power and governed Turkey till 2015. The AKP took the office for the fourth time in 2015 and remain in power till the announcements of the next elections in 2018. And remained in power till date after winning the 2018 election.

The analysis of the first two periods of the Turkish foreign policy under the reign of AKP shows that Turkey entirely changed its foreign policy from Western orientation to the enhancement of good relations with the neighbours. Europeanization and the sustainability of democracy were at the core of the Turkish foreign policy objective in the first term of the AKP government. Moreover, AKP was further committed to struggle for the durable and long-term relations with the European Union (Zhinioglue, 2015). The objective of Turkish foreign policy i.e. membership of the European Union, laid down the foundations to introduce multi-faceted foreign policy (Yilmaz, 2009). A short history of Turkish foreign policy during the different phases of the AKP government is as below.

Turkish Foreign Policy during the First Term of AKP (2002-2007)

AKP, being holding an Islamic character, had to face the challenge of secularized society in its first term of power which started in 2002. It was because the elders of AKP formed a coalition government in the 1990s in which they advocated for the creation and the importance of Muslim 5-8. Turkish quest for the membership of the EU was regarded as slavery of the West. It was rather emphasized that Turkey would lose the true essence of its identity if it joined the EU (Bozdaglioglu, 2008).

Therefore, the foremost challenge for the AKP leadership was to gain the trust of the people of the state by proving AKP as a reformed party. AKP, however, adopted the opposite policies towards the formation of foreign policy which were totally in contradiction to its ancestors and proclaimed "the Copenhagen Criteria the Ankara Criteria" (Idiz, 2012). To attain the membership in EU, AKP brought multiple reforms in its foreign policy. These reforms were implemented in Turkish politics at a speed that was never experienced in any era of Turkish political history.

Two significant developments were observed with the implementation of these reforms in Turkish politics. First, AKP departed itself from the policies of its Islamists predecessors, and secondly, Turkey successfully drives its foreign policy towards the West following the concepts of secular values. These reforms put Turkey in the way of the "ideological moderation process" by emphasizing the importance of democratic society and integration into the European Union (Schwedler, 2011).

The policies carried by AKP in its first tenure of government built trust in the public as it was believed that the democratic order and drift towards the membership of the EU will strengthen the economic and structural values in Turkey (Cem Baslevent, 2009). To have fruitful outcomes of the new reforms Turkey appointed Ali Babacan as the Minister of Economy and the Chief of Negotiator for the EU membership. Abdullah Gul, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, when asked about the appointment of Babacan at two different positions replied that his appointment is beneficial as the global financial affairs and Turkish-EU relations are going parallel to each other. (Milliyet, May 24, 2005)

Turkish Foreign Policy in the Second Term of AKP Government (2007-2011)

AKP emerged as the largest party as a result of the 2007 elections and was in a position to govern Turkey without any coalition. However, it has to face challenges on the foreign policy issues as its efforts for the annexation of Turkey with the EU were slowing down. The then foreign minister of Turkey presented a new methodology for the Turkish foreign policy which was based on the idea of activism and political stability (Cagapaty, 2007). Turkey moved away from its traditional foreign policy and laid new foundations for the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy by enchanting the idea of "zero problems with the neighbors" (Davutoglu, 2010).

Turkey was perceived to play a central role in regional and global affairs according to this new concept. Precisely, Turkey was supposed to be in good relations with its Western partners on the one hand, and on the other hand, efforts were made to maintain brotherly relations with the Middle Eastern neighbors and the Caucasian region. "Identity" also played an important role in the formation of Turkish foreign policy in the second tenure of AKP as it was emphasized that Turkey is the only country of the Muslim world where the democracy is present with its true spirit which allows Turkey to play an active role in the regional and global affairs. Furthermore, active engagements in its neighbourhood allowed Turkey to move away from the traditional parameters of defensive and passive foreign policy.

Turkey, by enchanting the concept of "leadership" role in the regional affairs, wants to become a representative of the weak states of the region both at the domestic and global levels. Such an example can be seen in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The relations between Turkey and Israel came to the brink when in 2009 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened Israel to be intervened in one minute (New York Times, January 29, 2009). A common perception of the Turkish citizens about the Turkish foreign policy was as the Turkish leadership is unable to play an independent role under the influence of Western powers. By advocating the Palestinian issue Turkey engineers an independent foreign policy by turning away from the dependencies created by the international powers.

Moreover, the new shift in Turkish foreign policy during the second term of AKP allowed Turkey to raise the voice for the rights of the majority states of the region. Turkish stance on the Palestinian issue brought two unprecedented changes at domestic and global levels. Conservatives leadership, which was kept at a distance by the former secular elites, was given the right to participate in the political affairs of Turkey at domestic level and, Turkey by advocating and supporting the Palestinian in Palestine issue gave a message to the global community that Turkey would raise the voice for the oppressed majority of the region (Onis, 2015).

Turkish Foreign Policy in the Third Term of AKP (2011-2015)

AKP formed the government in Turkey as a result of the July 2011 elections in which the party got 326 out of 550 seats of the Turkish parliament. Moreover, the AKP secured 49.9 percent of the total votes cast in the Turkish general elections that made it the strongest party of the parliament (Hoffmann, 2012). Identity remained the dominant factor of Turkish foreign policy in the third term of government. AKP revived the importance of Turkish traditions, emphasized the importance of religious values, Ottoman history, and geography in foreign policy. By advocating these factors Turkey wanted to become the central player in regional affairs (Zachariades, 2018). As mentioned earlier, Turkey wanted to become the leader of the oppressed which is also visible in the victory speech of the Erdogan after the elections of 2011. Erdogan said in the victory speech that the victory of his party is the victory of the "oppressed". He further stated that the achievement of his party is "much of a victory for Istanbul as it is in Sarajevo, as much of a victory for Izmir as it is for Beirut, as much of a victory for Diyarbakir as it is for the West Bank and Gaza" and further argued that it is not only Turkey who won the election of 2011 but the Middle Eastern, Caucasian, and the Balkan regions are also the winner of these elections (Seibert, 2011). In 2012, Turkey came in the support of protestors during the Arab Spring by representing itself as a model for the regional countries. According to Ahmet Davutoglu, "when you compared them years ago with Turkey today, you could see the change of democratic spirit and institutionalization" (Dal, 2012).

By introducing identity in its foreign policy Turkey intended to give a message to the protestors that AKP is looking to work for a common community based on the culture, values, and traditions and AKP aims to establish relations with the regional countries based on emotions instead of building relations on political and strategically grounds. Such an example can be seen during the rallies of municipal elections in Turkey in 2014 when Turkey supported the Mohamed Morsi, the President of Egypt, who was overthrown by the military establishment and presented a symbolism between the AKP and Muslim Brotherhood.

Turkish Foreign Policy in the Fourth Term of AKP (2015-2018)

The fourth term of AKP was started in 2015 and faced severe threats to its political dominance. The general elections held in June 2015 were dreadful for the AKP as it lost its majority in the parliament. However, the general elections held in November 2015 enabled AKP to maintain its majority in the parliament. AKP posed threats to the dominance of the military which can be seen in the shape of a coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016. Beside above some external factors also

brought threats to the AKP and Turkey. The external threats were the result of the developments occurring in the neighbourhood of Turkey. These threats, according to NumanKurtulmus, The Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, were the result of Turkish foreign policy towards Syria (Hurriyet, August 19, 2016).

AKP carried the efforts for the public opinion regarding the foreign policy in its fourth term by realizing the sensitivity of the issues. In doing so, AKP again turned away from the identity based foreign policy and started to base its foreign policy instead of the national interests. A nationalist foreign policy was the need of the time that was aimed to unite the nation against the emerging external threats. The AKP was uniting the nation against the eminent external threats on the one hand and on the other hand, it was complaining the international community as Turkey was left alone its friends in front of the emerging threats and, that too, after the failure of the military coup in Turkey.

Turkey was specifically complaining to the United States and the European Union who were not supporting Turkey during crucial times. Turkey perceived that the attitude of its allies during the time of need was awful as they were not ready to see democracy to be flourished and prevailed in Turkey. One of the reasons brought up by the media houses which describe the negative role of the US regarding the non-prevalent of democracy was the incident took place during the 1980 military coup in Turkey in which US President Carter praised the military establishment in these words that "our boys have done it". In August 2016 while announcing Turkey's military involvement in Syria, Erdogan stated that "you cannot divide our nation, you cannot lower our flag, you cannot smash up our homeland, our state, you cannot silence our call to prayers, you cannot bring this country to your knees, you cannot bring to heel these people" (Kesgin, 2016).

Transformation in Turkish Foreign Policy during The AKP Era

The Justice and Development Party was formed by a group of Islamic activists in 2001. It was aimed by the founders of the party to modernize the party in accordance with the Islamic and liberal values to attract many people towards it. It can further be understood that the Islamic thoughts as represented by the National View Movement were replaced with democratic norms. The AKP as a result of these changes appeared as the strongest party which was, at the same time, acceptable to all walks of people (Oktem, 2011). Moreover, the AKP succeeded in making a connection between Islamism, democracy and nationalism by having these reforms in the party (Bilici, 2006). Justice and Development Party have been in power in Turkey since 2002.

The study of Turkish foreign policy shows that AKP persuaded a westward policy during the first three years of its power and later, Middle East became of the focus of Turkish foreign policy as the hopes for Turkey's accession in the European Union were shattered. The second term of AKP began in 2007 and lasted in 2011, during this period Turkey started to play an influential and active role in the Middle East while keeping its Ottoman identity before. Turkey triggered the way for the economic integration between the regional countries from 2002-2010. AKP used the identity discourse, historical and geographical legacies, and framed its foreign policy to deal with the Middle Eastern neighbors during the third term of its government from 2011 to 2015. Another

shift took place in the Turkish foreign policy from 2015 to 2018 as a result of the Kurdish issue where the Turkish government under the banner of AKP enchanted the need for nationalism for the survival of its territorial integrity. The study shows that AKP before coming into power promised for the moderated reforms in political and economic sectors which appealed to the business sectors, the poor, and were acceptable to the Kurds as well (Mandaville,2014). In the following lines, an overview of the important transformation in Turkish foreign policy during the AKP era will be analyzed.

A Shift from Kemalist Isolationism to Neo-Ottoman Engagement

The AKP tried to maintain friendly relations with Turkish neighbouring countries in the first decade of its government. The government policies during that time revolved around the concept of peaceful and harmonious relations with the neighbouring countries by maintaining the policy of zero problems with them. The government also carried the efforts for the development of cultural and historical relations with all those states which were once considered to be a part of the Ottoman Empire.

The AKP, as discussed earlier, promised for the economic development of the country's poor people and wanted to attract the business community of the country by introducing the concept of liberal economy, therefore, it maintained good relations with the authoritative regimes of the Middle Eastern States. The idea behind the maintenance of friendly relations with these states was to improve and increase the trade with these states which was important for the Turkish economy. Turkey, during the reign of AKP, struggled for the achievement of the role of central states by having active participation in the regional affairs. Such an instance can be seen in the face of the Palestinian conflict in which Turkey offered to be given the role of mediator between Israel and Palestine (Barkey, 2011). This change in the foreign policy is recalled as a shift from the "Kemalist isolationism" to "Neo-Ottoman Engagement" in the Middle East" (Kandil, 2016).

Turkish Foreign Policy during the Arab Spring 2011

In 2011, another shift came in the Turkish foreign policy as a result of the Arab Spring. Turkey went into economic relations with the Arab monarchs before the Arab Spring hit the Middle East that forced Turkey to reshape its foreign policy following the new wave. It is pertinent to mention that Turkey was in a close connection, on the ideological grounds, with the Muslim Brotherhood, therefore, Turkey sided the revolutionaries at that time. The idea behind the support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was to convince the governments about the reshaping of Islamic values in accordance with the moderate of democratic values.

Another objective that Turkey intended to gain at that moment to prove itself an influential actor at a regional level and to acquire the regional balance of power in its favor (Kandil, 2016). Such an example can be seen when Muhammad Morsi, the President of Egypt, and Khaled Mashal of Hamas participated in the AKP party meeting in 2012. The participation of these leaders in the meeting represented a sign of mutual understanding and cooperation among the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood. The relations between AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood triggered the

waves of revolution in some other parts of the Middle East (Aydin, 2014). It is, however, important to note that Turkey extended its support for revolutionary groups in the Middle East after the Arab Spring, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria are few among those states who were benefitted by Turkey after the Arab Spring (Lynch, 2016).

Turkey assessed that the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia as evidence of its foreign policy approach towards the Middle Eastern neighbours. Keeping in view the uprising of Egypt and Tunisia before Turkey started to support the anti-Assad forces in Syria in order to fulfill its unaccomplished desires against Syria (Tezcur, 2016). Unluckily, all that Turkey planned towards the Middle Eastern neighbours diminished as the Tunisian movement which was raised against the government ended in a compromise between the rebellion and government. The Morsi's rule in Egypt come to an end as a result of coup d'état, and finally, Bashaarul Assad remained successful in securing its government in Syria with the help of Iran. Besides the above failures, however, Turkey developed its relations with Qatar, who was also a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2017 (Lynch, op.cit). The developments during the Arab Spring shows that Turkey failed to implement its policies of zero problems and friendly relations with the neighbouring countries.

Turkish foreign policy struck in the hands of sectarian and ideological limitations during the Arab Spring, as a result, various domestic challenges appeared for the AKP. These challenges appeared as a result of emerging differences with the Gulenists movement in 2012, protest against the government in 2013 at Gezi Park, an effort carried by the Turk military against Erdogan in 2016 and the constitutional reforms as a result of the presidential referendum conducted in 2017. The domestic developments led AKP to revisits the foreign policy towards nationalism to keep itself in power. The new policies forced the AKP to start anti-Kurd foreign policy after 2015. The external elements are one of the most important reasons which compel the government to carry out anti-Kurd policies because the Kurd inhabitants in Syria were becoming the US ally in the Syrian civil war which, Turkey, seemed like a threat for its territorial integrity (Tanrisever, 2018). Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East can be summarized as an attempt to become an influential regional actor by playing an assertive role in regional affairs. It strengthened its relations with the neighboring countries through the promotion of trade and cooperation till 2010 until the breakout of the Arab Spring in 2011. The emergence of the Arab Spring led Turkey in the support of Sunni dominated parties in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, and by extending its support in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt during the years 2011 to 2015. However, Turkey failed to achieve its desired objective from the Arab Spring and again revisited its foreign policy by adopting a more securitized and defensive foreign policy against the Kurds. The Turkish policymaker started to divert the foreign policy towards Russia and China with the end of the Arab Spring (Tanrisever, op. cit).

Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Arab Spring

Political demands were the important reason that triggered the Arab uprisings in the Middle East as the people demanding political freedom from the authoritative regimes of the region. Turkey, in this situation, was the only democratic state in the region. Although, Turkish political history shows that the democratic process was derailed at several occasion but still it had a history with a functional parliamentary democratic system of the region. In this context, Turkey intended to support the Arab people to attain democratic goals. Religion played an important role in Turkey's inclination towards the protestors of the Arab springs because it was assumed that mutual cooperation and harmony among the regional states can easily be achieved with the common identities and political interests. Turkey, adopting a regional view of the events, backed the happenings of Arab spring in two ways i.e. a new regional and democratic order in the region where Turkey would have to play a leading role (Yuksel, 2018).

There are, at least, four important developments of the Arab Spring which forced Turkey to reprioritize its foreign policy towards the Middle East. Syrian crises are on the top of these developments which turned into violent conflict and paved the way for civil war in Syria in 2012-2013. The second important development of the Arab spring was the removal of Morsi from the office of the President in Egypt by the military. These two incidents were thought to be an obstacle to the change in the Arab world. The third important development was the emergence of the Islamic State during 2013-14.

The international community, in response to the rise of ISIS, revised their policies towards the Middle East by giving preferences to the security of the region instead of favoring the democratic transformations. Turkey under these circumstances had to face two different fronts at the regional and global levels. At the regional level Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran propagate the rise of ISIS which further intensified the sectarian divide in the region. At the global level, liberal secularists in the West stood against the democratic transformation in the Middle East, as a result, the supporters of Arab uprisings did not get the support from the West. Supporters of Arab spring in general and Syrian opposition forces, in particular, suffered a lot after the West keep itself out of the prevailed situation in the region (Yuksel, op. cit).

The last, perhaps, most drastic development of the Arab spring was the Kurdish movements. Kurds living in Iraq and Syria had started to expand their territory with the support of ISIS and with the financial and military assistance of the international community. In 2014, ISIS with the help of the United States and Iraqi Kurdish militia occupied Kobani, a Syrian town inhabited by Kurds. However, YPG after its victory proved to be legitimized and capable of fighting force to fight against ISIS. It is pertinent to mention that the occupation of Kobane provoked nationalist sentiments among the Kurds of the region.

These sentiments were further aimed towards the creation of an independent Kurdish entity. Keeping before these developments in the region, the PKK becomes an influential bargaining force for Turkey. PKK, by taking advantage of its position against Turkey and with the breakdown of the peace deal with Turkey, started warfare against Turkey in 2015. The aggressive postures

carried by the PKK compel Turkey to reframe its foreign policy by giving importance to the national security over the political initiatives.

This further led Turkey to reshape its foreign policy towards the Middle East in accordance with the new circumstances. ISIS extended its activities within the territories of Turkey by launching attacks on the Kurdish and leftist groups residing in Turkey and carried out a series of attacks in Suruc, Diyarbakir, and Ankara. Another series of suicide attack were conducted in the Sultanahmet area, Istiklal Street, and Ataturk airport by hitting the soft targets like tourists and foreigners. The latter series of attacks are presumed as a reaction from the ISIS against the joining of Turkey's global anti-ISIS coalition. These attacks intensified Turkish domestic security and posed further ramifications for Turkey's policies towards regional affairs.

Pragmatic Approach

Several internal factors like losing majority in the parliament, coup d'état, and the rise of the Gulenist movement led AKP to go for a pragmatic approach towards Syria in 2016. The application of this approach was to step back from the demand of the regime change in Syria and to intriguer fight against the ISIS and Kurds. Turkey further signaled to go into cooperation with Russia and Syria to find an appropriate solution to the crises. Turkish move from interference to cooperation developed its relations with the major regional players e.g. Russia, Iran, and Israel on the one hand but on the other hand, its relations with the EU and the West come to the brink.

The cooperation with the earlier players was meant to reduce the tensions and to find a solution to terrorism. Turkey started an all-out operation against the ISIS and Kurds with the earlier consent of Russia and Iran in 2016 as the policy of regime change was no more at the top of the Turkish foreign policy agenda. Although, Turkey has tried to develop relations with Syria but Syria still dubious about Turkey as it might carry the policy of Assad's removal after some time.

Conclusion

The study of Turkish foreign policy during the AKP era revealed that Turkey had followed different foreign policy pattern from 2002 to 2018. AKP took his flight by pursuing the West in 2002 to have the membership of the European Union, however, the efforts to pursue the West was abandoned as the European Community refused to grant the membership of the European Union to Turkey. Turkey, as a result of the failure of the attainment of European Union membership, started to transform its foreign policy by looking for other alternatives. The first kind of such transformations can be seen through the initiation of friendly and mutual relations between Turkey and its neighbours.

Ahmet Davutoglu, an academician turned politician, crafted the new Turkish foreign policy. The new concepts of Turkish foreign policy were presented in Davutoglu's famous 'Strategic Depth Doctrine'. 'Strategic Depth'; theorizes the Turkish foreign policy and laid the foundations of a transformed Turkish foreign policy. Following Strategic Depth Turkey could transform its foreign policy instead of the one traditionally followed by Turkey. Furthermore, Davutoglu presented and introduced the ideas of "Multitrack Diplomacy" and "Multidimensional Foreign Policy" and emphasized upon the importance and maintenance of good relations between Turkey and its

neighbours. Turkey successfully followed such a foreign policy until the rise of the Arab Spring in 2011.

Another important transformation can be seen during and in the post Arab Spring. Turkey showed its commitments to the revolutionaries during the Arab Spring who were annoyed by their governments and protesting about it. Turkey appeared and stood in their support by advocating the democratic transition in the countries affected by the waves of Arab Uprising. Such an example can be seen in the case of Egypt where the democratically elected government of Dr. Morsi was overthrown by the military dictator. The relations between Turkey and Syria also fell prey to the Arab Spring because the earlier was in support of the protestors who were demanding regime change in Syria while the latter had accused and criticized Turkey for providing undue favor and support to the anti-regime forces. The unstable relations between the two countries also brought Russia and Iran in the center who stood side by side with the Syrian government to respond to any possible Turkish aggression.

AKP, with an Islamic background, earned a great reputation in the Muslim World in general and within the Arab countries in particular until the rise of the Arab Spring in 2011. Turkey's relations with the Arab States suffered in the post Arab Spring era. Political developments in Egypt enforced Turkey to enchant the importance of democracy which was not acceptable for many of the strong Arab states. These Arab states, except Qatar, were agreed and determent to work with a military government in Egypt instead of the democratically elected government of Dr. Morsi. Turkey favored the Morsi's government and lead a huge public procession in his support but could not alter the situation hence failed to accomplish its desire.

Turkey had carried different foreign policy options during the AKP era but, unfortunately, it had both successes and failures in its credentials. Turkey: where new friends were made it also lost the previous ones or at least the earlier allies of Turkey kept themselves on a distance from Turkey. Their action was the result of the underpinning fear of suffering of their interests if they join Turkey in its journey. Turkey had failed to balance its internal and external policies while applying different foreign policy options. This imbalance was the result of the uncalculated diplomatic, strategic and political management.

The former allies of Turkey were not taken into confidence while persuading the new allies. This was drastic for Turkey, as moving away from the previous partners put Turkey on a difficult diplomatic and political path. Thus, the study shows that Turkey needs to keep a balance between its internal and external policies as the external policies have both a direct and indirect effect on the internal ones. There is a need to have equilibrium between the old and new friends. Finally, it is needed to have such foreign policy initiatives in which the states' interests can be preserved or can be safeguarded easily.

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Post COVID-19: Projections on Social, Medical, Globalization, and Defense based Parameters

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Abstract

The world is experiencing a novel and deadly pandemic of COVID-19. The disease primarily manifested in Wuhan, China but has now spread all across the globe. This study is aimed at giving viable deductions regarding the Post COVID-19 changes that will occur in various aspects of global life. It highlights probable changes in post-Covid 19 world. Authors claim that it will produce inevitable long-lasting changes e.g. joblessness, social distancing and avoiding large scale social gatherings. This pandemic has made all countries realize their vulnerability due to the fragile state of their health sectors. Pandemic evinces that governments will introduce massive reforms in the health sector. It entails short as well as long term reforms. The present crisis of health will leave a mark on how we access and interact with the environment. It is premature to assume as to what the pandemic will entail unequivocally for defense sector, but the effect will be there.

Keywords: Defense, pandemic, COVID 19, social distancing, health, globalization, regionalization.

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Introduction

Many pandemics have occurred during human history on this earth. Each century brings with it a new and far deadlier strain for which we are not ready, both socially and economically. It is equally true that the time required for overcoming this pandemic both financially and socially will take a long time as well as diligent exertion. At present, the world is experiencing a novel and deadly ailment called COVID-19, or Coronavirus Disease as it is more colloquially known. The symptoms that this disease evinces include cough, shortness of breath, and fever with some more severely afflicted cases experiencing more grievous symptoms as well. These include diarrhea, loss of sensation of smell, and pain in the abdominal region (Coronavirus, 2020).

The disease primarily manifested within China in December of 2019. From there, it has spread all across the globe. The number of countries across which this virus has spread ranges into about 185 and it has afflicted more than 2.34 million subjects (Pandemic, 2020).The death toll is also staggering and more than 161,000 people have fallen victim to this disease to the date of writing this paper. However, many have recovered as well, and they are more than 602,000 in number. At present, the pandemic is still deadly and the number of affected is rising with each passing day. The death toll is also elevating at an alarming rate and there is a substantial need for practicing stringent and meticulous methods of caution to circumvent infection.

COVID-19: A Global Impediment

COVID-19 has created an atmosphere of emergency and unrest. It has coerced many of the affected countries to adopt a policy of isolationism. This policy, unfortunately, extends to encompass the export of supplies and materials of medical treatment. While it may seem like a workable solution: isolating one's nation from the rest of the world to deter proliferation, this should not be the case. According to Chicago Booth's Raghuram G. Rajan, Coronavirus is a global predicament. Ultimately, its resolution rests in cooperation on an international level (Rajan, 2020). COVID-19 will undoubtedly have a profound and irremovable effect on the various strata and dimensions of the World. There will be palpable transitions inset trends and inclinations which will be noted across integral fields and components of life. This will range from socio-cultural parameters to more nuanced ones like national policymaking and so on.

This study is aimed at giving viable deductions regarding the Post COVID-19 changes that will occur in various aspects of Global life.

Societal Changes

COVID-19 is quite like a tsunami due to its parallels in destruction and deterioration-based potential. That is why it has obscured foresight in a way that has made it impossible for a prediction to be made as to what the world will be like after a few weeks, let alone years. Still, deductions can be made about how COVID-19 will affect the world and the social lives of us humans. Society will be changed after the whole trend of COVID-19 concludes and these changes will be long-lasting indeed.

Social and Behavioral specialists are especially concerned with the post-COVID-19 scenario that this disease will entail. There is a consensus amongst them that there will most certainly be a change in the hygiene techniques and focuses amongst people due to COvID-19. There are many changes that the society will experience and is experiencing at present in this COVID-19 infested world. These changes started once the number of coronavirus cases started to increase. According to a study conducted by the University of Southern California, this pandemic has already created prominent changes in the lives and behavior of people all across the world (Svoboda, 2020).

Some of the major findings made can be enumerated as follows

- o 85 percent of people reported that they were washing hands more frequently;

- o 85 percent reported increased usage of hand sanitizers and using the latter more than once;

- o 61 percent of respondents reported that they were stringently following the protocols of social distancing;

- o 22 percent reported that they became prone to stockpiling essential goods like water and food.

These are just some of the many changes that started brewing as soon as the count of corona patients started to escalate. Some of these changes, that are still ongoing, are fathomable while some are not.

According to Valeria Martinez Kaigi, a Psychologist at Yale School of Medicine Health, many people have also started bracing themselves for possible unemployment as they might lose their jobs (Svoboda, 2020). They also face consternation over probable contraction of the virus. However, according to specialists and social scientists, these fears are borne from the current atmosphere of corona-based phobia. This type of fear-based modification can be sustained, however. That is why newly formed habits including an enhanced tendency towards hygiene, isolation, and hoarding of goods may mitigate in potency in a post-COVID-19 society. Still, these propensities will not disappear entirely since survivors of such a traumatic experience will most certainly develop a heightened level of vigilance. The latter will be embedded within them as a reflexive response which will be effective at dealing with any future viruses. However, the number of such subjects in a society will be considerably lower. Another shift will most certainly occur in the fabric of society post-COVID-19. This is the one about changing the trend of hygiene for the whole society irrevocably. For one, the common etiquette of covering one's mouth while coughing or sneezing is likely to stick. This is a manner that will be reinforced as a common courtesy in the post-COVID-19 world, which is a positive development indeed.

Many other habits that were adapted during COVID-19 are likable to continue as well. For instance, people will become more focused and vigilant in regard to disinfecting and cleaning

surfaces. This fact has been supported by many behavioral scientists such as Dr. Kate White, a Behavioral scientist affiliated with the University of British Columbia(Svoboda, 2020). While initially people will develop a more gregarious approach towards life and start meeting friends and family, it is a strong possibility that new modes of communication like video chats and conference room chats will continue to some degree. That is because this mode of communication has become a part of our professional and occupational structure. So, it is highly probable that the resulting society will be more reliant upon digital means of communication for official and academic purposes. That is because currently these means of video call communication are being utilized by universities, colleges, and faculty members from wide and diverse fields of specialization for teaching purposes. This is a trend that might just survive in a post-COVID-19 world, albeit in a considerably moderated manner. Still, the most pervasive and certain effect that will linger on after the world has moved on from COVID-19 is a realization that the world is utterly capricious.

The societal structure will also acclimate itself to the truth that life is fragile and fleeting. The Prospect Theory states that we tend to give more weightage to prospective losses than gains when trying to reach a decision/verdict. It also states that we tend to overestimate the chances of an adverse incident from occurring e.g. dying from a disease. In a post-COVID-19 society, this propensity to perceive a threat as being imminent is bound to be enhanced in certain individuals. There is also a possibility that some people might become more reclusive and introverted in post-COVID-19 society. They may resort to extreme measures to avoid social engagement to be safe in their bubble. This will also manifest in other forms as well such as refraining or ignoring social events and giving up on communal means of transportation such as a bus.

Religious tendencies will probably either increase or decrease in society. Many consider COVID-19 to be a test from God. They also consider a workable and potent countermeasure to be a staunch and unwavering belief in God. In some ways, this is responsible for them being so nonchalant about the potential dangers that this disease evinces. On the other hand, some of the more scientific individuals of the society are convinced of the virus's lethal capacity. They have emancipated themselves from the concept of this being a test of divine proportions. In a post-COVID-19 society, those who face and survive this disease will either become more religious while some might even lose their faith. This might be in large part due to the loss of a dear one to COVID-19 or deterioration inflicted upon their business or occupation as a ramification of the virus. Either way, there will be a transition in the rate of religiosity which will be attributed to COVID-19 (Svoboda, 2020).

Global Health Development in a Post COVID-19 World

The COVID-19 Pandemic has brought about disruption in the worldwide health network in a way that was never seen before. The organizations responsible for combating diseases, health workers, social service providers and other ones that are responsible for public welfare have acquired distinction and prominence. This limelight comes at a terrible cost however, as the risk to their health and wellbeing has increased many folds as well. It does not help that matters like obstacles in supply chain logistics, financial duress, safety, etc. also complicates matters further for them.

This is the condition when viewed through the lens of short-term repercussions. The long-term effects of this pandemic and how they will reshape the health, medical, and developmental sectors is something that remains to be seen. However, deductions that are inundated with a degree of plausibility can still be made. The most prevalent one is that there will be a shift in priority amongst the global community in pertinence to public health and medical facilities. According to Jean Van Wetter, the Director-General at Belgium's Development Agency Enable, this pandemic will bring about an end to the paradigm of North and South (2020). It means that this paradigm will end and the 40 years domination of the conventional "Actors of Development" will deteriorate rapidly. He further elaborates by recounting that it wasn't that long ago that South Korea and China were the recipients of medical aid. At present, they are the ones helping countries like Italy and others from Europe to counter and oppose the abhorrent pandemic.

China is providing protective masks to the governments of European countries. This is quite similar to how European governments and the United States had been providing support to developing countries for so long. Also, we can see that the larger and well-equipped hospitals in Europe are soliciting donations from the public. It can also be seen that the MSF, or Doctors without Borders, is dispensing its operations in the middle of Brussels. This is incredible since this organization originally operated in countries overrun by conflict or suffering from poverty. *Viwanou Gnassounou is Assistant Secretary-General for Sustainable Economic Development and Trade at Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States. He believes that the world will be driven onto a movement that will culminate in self-determination (Igoe & Chadwick, 2020).*

The present crisis of health will leave a mark on how we access and interact with the environment. It will also affect how we socialize and mingle with each other as well. Viwanou believes that there won't be a significant change in the level of formation and management of policies about cooperation in development (Igoe & Chadwick, 2020). The resulting economic derailment, temporary may it be, will do little to change the perspective of the development partners. This will extend to include the health sector as well and it is pertinent to mention here that this opinion was based on his earlier impressions from numerous regions. But this pandemic will certainly add to the drivers that are causing developing countries to more effectively and meticulously assess their determination in regard to their development track. It will also affect how the policies and partners responsible for the aforementioned development are chosen. It will not be sudden, but more exactly a gradual and progressive change.

This pandemic has made all countries realize their vulnerability, the fragile state of their health. This is further corroborated by the dependence that each country has had to accept on the world for satiating the upkeep of the common life standard. It has also made the role of international cooperation apparent in responding properly to a profound shock of exogenous proportions (Michael Igoe, 2020). Pre COVID-19, we saw that most hospitals didn't impart much emphasis when it came to tend to patients or increasing the number of beds. Some hospitals pushed for bringing about a reduction in the number of beds that they had on-site. The reasoning for this was the perception that with a shift in focus from acute to chronic care, there was a lesser need for

hospitals. The chance to provide care outside of the hospitals to patients in settings that they considered convenient was the main stimulus for this decision.

Itis observed that the pandemic has demolished these earlier perceptions. Hospitals are becoming increasingly significant and people are clamoring for the addition of more beds. This pandemic has laid bare the realization that hospitals and pertinent capacity are integral for effectual public health maintenance. It is entirely possible that in a post-COVID-19 world, the health sector will receive the attention and focus that it so rightfully deserves. It is also possible that this current, egregious situation might sensitize governments and authorities to the gravity of the situation. However, it is also entirely possible that this might not be sustainable over the long-term period. The main stakeholders might grow complacent and fall back into the policy patterns of pre-COVID 19 world.

Telehealth, the deliverance of medical care on a remote level through technological means, wasn't a particularly hot topic. This program has received an influx of popularity and enhancement in the rate of usage during the present pandemic. The data shared by Obama's IT Coordinator shows that the rate of telemedicine usage increased tremendously in the period of Mid-March. While this may be a consequence of the current pandemic trepidation, the chances of this method of health care sticking around in a post-COVID-19 world are entirely possible as well. It will be dwindled in potency but will subsist to some level (David Shaywitz, 2020).

Globalization and Post COVID-19 World

The era of Globalization is under tremendous duress. This can be mainly attributed to open borders and value chains of the global sort. Protectionism change in climate, and populism are factors that are opposing globalization to quite an extent. The latest challenge to Globalization is this current COVID-19 Pandemic. Many are therefore inquiring whether if this pandemic is going to prove profoundly detrimental to economic globalization.

Localization in place of Globalization

There is a possibility that this pandemic will culminate in the collapse of global value chains. That is because the governments will start to take up policies of protectionism and will coerce companies to have their production factories moved closer to their indigenous region. This will be done to mitigate dependence on foreign suppliers. There will be a notable reduction in the rate at which companies take part in inter and intra-regional value chains. This outbreak of COVID-19 might potentially entail a negative impact that is parallel to the one brought about the Financial Crisis of 2008. The latter showed that a grievous crisis can hurt the structure of Globalization. COVID-19 might evince a similar effect as well.

Before the financial crisis of 2008, globalization was flourishing. Global Value Chains' (GVCs) value-added activities of production were thriving at a much stronger level in contrast to the value-added production activities of the localized type. This showed that Globalization was certainly bourgeoning but after the financial crisis, the growth of GVCs became considerably slower. It never managed to restore itself to the state that it was in before the crisis in question. There is a

chance that participation in value chains within inter-regional settings will decrease. That is because COVID-19 will hasten the process of decoupling at a far greater rate than the trade war. This will happen as businesses and countries ruminate about their chain of supply in the long run(Tan, 2020). It is also possible that the value chains of the intra-regional level will also be affected detrimentally. This may be the case in the European Union. According to Time Magazine, the free movement of people and commodities that acted as the supporting base for the European Union has been crushed. This is because the borders closed up and governments started accumulating medical commodities without any concern for their neighboring countries (Mcdonald-Gibson, 2020).

An example of this fact is that of Hungary's. The latter banned the export of hydroxychloroquine sulfate on the 25th of March, a component that is utilized in the production of drugs for treating coronavirus (Gergely Szakacs, 2020).

Regionalization in place of Globalization

This pandemic may exert an impact on the intricate inter-regional value chains that will be stronger in intensity as compared to the one it exerts on value chains of the intra-regional sort. This pandemic will probably entail in a potent process of Regionalization instead of bringing about the destruction of Economic Globalization. Phillippe Legrain is a senior fellow are the London School of Economics. He posits that COVID-19 could be the decisive point that stimulates businesses to shorten and reorganize their supply chains. This can be corroborated by the fact that US-based companies are moving their production units to Mexico and European countries to Turkey and Eastern Europe (Legrain, 2020).

The process of regionalization had already probably commenced about 2 decades ago. That is because there has been a spike in the number of agreements of new regional trade over the last 2 decades. The USMCA agreement between the US, Mexico, and Canada is a good example of this. The COVID-19 pandemic might enhance this process of trade regionalization. It is also possible that this pandemic ends up strengthening the European Union's economic independence related ambitions. It has already started undertaking endeavors for mitigating dependence on third countries in sectors of security, health, public order, etc. Von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, voiced concern about protecting their economic and security sovereignty amidst the stressful conditions of corporate and industrial assets is something that supports this fact (Union, 2020). Therefore, it is possible that COVID-19 would irrevocably alter economic globalization as regionalization and shorting of supply chains will occur as a ramification of the pandemic.

Defense and COVID-19

The COVID-19 Pandemic most certainly entails an influence for ministries of defense around the globe. Still, is it possible for Defence ministries of this world to locate a viable and effective solution for reallocating military expenditures and resources? This is a question that only time will answer. The effect of Coronavirus is being felt tremendously all around the world. Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, etc. are facing this pandemic and many

predicaments have arisen as a ramification. They have also started facing immense delays in delivering a viable and effective solution for delivering plans in various sectors. These include defense, security, and foreign policy amongst others. National governments and Ministries of Defence will have to contend with the urgent and far-reaching ramifications that this pandemic will have. This especially includes the effect imparted upon their countries' expenditures on military and pertinent resources.

Changing Times

It is a definite and openly apparent fact that this Pandemic has affected the entire world's plans about Defense-related spending. Growth projections suffer from cutbacks and large portions of government finances are being utilized to contain and mitigate the spread of COVID-19. According to Angel Gurria, the General Secretary of OCED (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) said that the scenario of slashing growth on a global scale by 1.5% for 2020 appears quite positive. He warned that there was no swift recovery of world recovery after this current pandemic (2020).

The true effects and economic repercussions of this pandemic will appear and be felt consummately in the years following 2020. This will happen when the expenditures of the crisis will be shown in the spending policy of the Government. Global GDP wasn't able to recover till 2009 after the Financial Crisis of 2007-08. It is pertinent to mention here that the largest cutbacks on defense budgets weren't brought into force until 2012 and 2013. The United States Defence expenditures equaled to about 1.55 Trillion Dollars in 2011. It took the US 5 years to recover and it was in 2016 that the country was able to regain this level of spending (1.56 Trillion Dollars)(Khattak, 2020).

The increases in the US budget for Defence in the form of core expenditures were the main driving force behind the growth that the country experienced in 2011. This increase was further strengthened by Overseas Contingency Operations funding. The latter was decreased after this peak because the level of commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq lowered considerably. It was only through the emerging trade in markets like China, India, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and India that facilitated the recovery in spending by 2016(Khattak, 2020). The holistic expenses of NATO states began to elevate after 2016. Each member of the NATO states from Europe is reeling from the initial onslaught of COVID-19. Italy has so far weathered the worst of this impact and the fatality rate is very high there. Spain and France are also suffering and are being counted amongst the top five affected countries in the world. The Netherlands and United Kingdom look like prime candidates for the next five countries profoundly affected by COVID-19.

Long-term Effects

The effects of COVID-19 will be felt by defense ministries across the world for many years to come indeed. The trajectory that these effects will take shall be following several themes. The holding of present lines in defense budgets will become increasingly difficult even if NATO states go for 2% of GDP target for this purpose. That is because the GDP will be affected by the fiscal effect that this pandemic entails. This fall in GDP could also result in the majority of the NATO

member states ending up spending less on defense despite attaining the 2% target. Programs for the acquisition will also be affected due to coerced change inside industries of defense as the latter evince their challenges from the pandemic. There are other consequences to consider as well and their implications will be felt across the medium- and long-term periods. The two things that changed after the financial crisis of 2007-08 were perceptions about the threat and the resurgence of competition for power. They were greatly responsible for accentuating the recovery of defense spending in the latter half of the decade by member states of NATO. It is highly likely that defense budgets might receive protection even during this widespread pandemic. But it seems that the discourse about defense and security over the globe will inexorably be affected.

First of all, the budgets for procurement and roles of the military might very well be reexamined. This would include the extent to which the military will consider the task of social resilience to be relevant and significant and there most certainly will also occur a shift in priorities of defense. Or is it possible that funding for defense could be shifted towards other more social resilience-based endeavors? Armed forces would certainly prefer to maintain their capability as being first responders to any catastrophe or situation where they are prominent for their malleability and reach. Still, it is possible that such mindset and pertinent pressures of the budget could culminate in hard decisions on platform-based priorities, at least in the proximate term. Also, efforts for modernization in meeting the larger needs for deterrence will be negatively impacted in the context of NATO.

After the financial crisis of 2007 to 2008, the total expenses for defense were borne by expenditures in the Middle East and rising new markets which also facilitated global manufacturers related to defense. This time, however, it is possible that this will not happen and will be applicable at least over a short-term period. The lag in the growth of the economy will be widespread as a ramification of the pandemic's impact. A testament to this can be provided by the fact that the OCED lowered the projections for economic growth in prominent economies of Asia like Japan, China, India, and South Korea in March of 2020. Similarly, the Middle East's defense expenditures for the period between 2012 to 2015 increased at a rate of 12% every year in real terms because the price for a single oil barrel exceeded $100. The resulting decline in prices of oil during the period between 2014 to 2016 entailed in most of the Arab states, seeking consolidation on a fiscal basis. Oil prices have now fallen to the lowest that they have ever been since the year of 2003. That is because major players like Saudi Arabia are still striving to bring balance to their budgets while the process of economic collapse continues around them. This will potentially lead to increased emphasis on frugality amongst the governments of states that produce oil.

Conclusion

It is premature to assume as to what the pandemic will entail unequivocally for ministries of defense. There is one thing that can be stated without a shred of doubt and that is that there will indeed be an impact and it will be monumental. It is inexorable that duress on funding will increase which in turn will further convolute various challenges. The greatest challenge that will be complicated by this pandemic's effects is the one related to assigning limited resources across a

threat spectrum that now expands from conflict between peers to a pandemic that can disrupt the fabric of whole societies (Barrie, 2020).

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Indo-Pak relations in Post-COVID-19 Era

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Abstract

Pakistan and India have a history of rivalry ever since their creation. Their antagonism even remains immune to COVID-19- a pandemic disease causing a great deal of economic, political, social and cultural damage to the entire world. On both sides, warmongers in the decision-making process have tried to change this natural calamity into an opportunity to incite masses towards hostility. COVID-19 has already haunted both countries economically, politically and culturally. The post-COVID-19 period would present a new outlook to international politics bringing economic and political woes. This paper will comprehensively analyse Indo-Pak relations in the post-COVID-19 period, shading lights on critics of realism theory being considered one of the most dominant theories in international politics.

Keywords: Indo-Pak rivalry, nuclear, interdependence, inter-state, hostility, non-traditional threats, constructivism, poverty, climate change.

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Introduction

India and Pakistan as successor states of British India emerged on the world's map in August 1947. Both states in the nascent stage espoused different trajectories in their nation-building. India moved towards secularism with Hindu majoritarianism, while Pakistan by overlooking ethno-nationalist diversity opted for an Islamic state. The emergence of India as a secular state and Pakistan as an Islamic state paved the way for Pakistan's securitization of its foreign policy vis-à-vis a "Hindu" enemy. The incompatible ideologies of both belligerent states triggered a war right after their independence over Jammu & Kashmir.[1]

Their conflict was not merely confined to two different ideologies, rather the distribution of colonial institutions and the financial legacy of the British played a catalyst role in the reinforcement of the hostility. The hostility remains to date. The issues remain the same. Even today, the relations between the two countries are marred by issues like territorial conflict (Kashmir and Sir Creek), terrorism, arms race, rivalry in Afghanistan and water resources.[2]

However, the COVID-19 outbreak, the first time that emerged in Wuhan City of China at the end of December 2019, has altered the complexion of geo-politics and geo-economics of the world. States during the pandemic have realized the significance of non-traditional threats like deadly COVID-19. Global and regional powers are likely to ponder over the post-COVID-19 scenario in tackling the unforeseen challenges in the future. Surprisingly, Indo-Pak rivalry even remains immune to pandemic disease. Warmongers in both states at the helm of affairs have been trying to convert natural calamity into an opportunity to galvanize their antagonism. Arguably, for both states, the perpetuation of hostility at the expense of human developments in the post-COVID-19 era proves to be detrimental. COVID-19 ought to be a wake-up call for the statecrafts of both states, prioritizing non-traditional threats over traditional/imaginary threats, by all means, would bear fruitful results.[3] The question remains, how should the relationships between the two hostile neighboring states be shaped in the post-COVID-19 era?

Non-traditional vs. Traditional Threats

Seeing relationships of India and Pakistan primarily in realist school, that overemphasize traditional threats over non- traditional threats, appears to be dangerous for both states in the post-COVID-19 era. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India is the world's largest arms importer, accounting for approximately 12% of the total global imports for the period 2013-17.[4]Indian military expenditure, on the other hand, has significantly been accelerating. India for the first time has emerged among the top three nations after the US and

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[1]Hussain, Ejaz (2019). 'India-Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities' Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs (6)1: 82-95. https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797018823964 (Accessed on June 15, 2020)

[2] Ibid.

[3]Dost Muhammad Barrech, Post -COVID-19: Indo-Pak Relations, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/04/18/post-COVID-19-indo-pak-relations/ (Accessed on June 30, 2020)

[4]India must focus on non-traditional security threats, https://asiatimes.com/2018/11/india-must-focus-more-on-non-traditional-security-threats/ (Accessed on July 01,2020)

China, as for military expenditure is concerned. The latest data unveiled by (SIPRI) says that the world's total global military expenditure enhanced to $1,917 billion in 2019. The data further says that "the five biggest spenders were the US ($732 billion), China ($261 billion) India ($71.1 billion), Russia ($65.1 billion) and Saudi Arabia ($61.9 billion) together accounting for 62% of the global military expenditure."[5].

Meanwhile, Pakistan by espousing the trajectory of India of not learning from deadly COVID-19 has accelerated 11.9 percent in the defense budget of 2020. During 2009-2019 Pakistan's military expenditure has increasingly been surged by 70 percent. An annual report of (SIPRI) reveals that the country's military expenditure constitutes approximately 4 percent of its Gross Domestic Product GDP.[6] Both archrivals' military expenditure has exponentially been increasing. Indian military expenditure "grew by 259 percent over the 30 years 1990–2019 and by 37 percent over the decade 2010–19"[7] that brings Pakistan into strategic insecurity.

Instead of squandering a whopping amount on imaginary threats, both states will soon realize non-traditional threats posing a bigger threat than a traditional threat. A renowned social constructivist Alexander Wendt rightly explains traditional or imaginary threats by saying that "Anarchy is what states make of it". To examine Indo-Pak rivalry in the social constructivist school of thought, it can easily be ascertained that their hostility is manmade; to follow social constructivism theory, enmity could easily be converted into friendship.[8]

Inter-State vs. Intra-State Conflict

To be fair, intra-state conflict is more detrimental than the inter-state conflict to both India and Pakistan, enfeebling their national integration and political system. Both states are involved in furtive support to the intra-state conflict to obtain their geostrategic gains.[9]India accuses Pakistan of supporting the Khalistan Movement in Indian Punjab which had emerged in the early 1950s when India adopted the reorganization of its states resulting in threatening the religious identity of Sikhs. While Pakistan blames India for assisting insurgency in Balochistan. Though Pakistan denies any involvement Khalistan Movement in Indian, the late General Hamid Gul, the former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, while giving an interview to a local channel, confessed that Sikh separatists had to buy arms from their contractors based in Pakistan.[10]

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[5] India now 3rd-biggest military spender in world: Think-tank, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-emerges-among-the-top-three-in-military-expenditure-around-the-globe-behind-the-us-and-china/articleshow/75403529.cms (Accessed on July 02,2020)

[6] Pakistan's Military Expenditure Increased by 70 % percent in the Past Decade, https://propakistani.pk/2020/04/29/pakistans-military-expenditure-increased-by-70-in-the-past-decade/ (Accessed on July 03, 2020)

[7] Ibid.

[8]Adam R Brown, Wendt: Anarchy is what states make of it, https://adambrown.info/p/notes/wendt_anarchy_is_what_states_make_of_it (Accessed on July 03, 2020)

[9]Dost Muhammad Barrech, Post-COVID-19: Indo-Pak Relations Daily Times ,https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/04/18/post-COVID-19-indo-pak-relations/ (Accessed on July 04, 2020)

[10]Zeeba T Hashmi , Pakistan's Involvement in Khalistan Movement, Daily Times (Accessed on July 04, 2020)

The blame game continues on both sides. Foreign Minister of Pakistan Shah Mahmood Qureshi categorically says that India has been involved in sabotaging peace not only in Balochistan but also in Afghanistan. He further reiterates that "Modi had also lost popularity on the political front and it was another reason that he wanted to regain the people's attention by launching subversive activities in Pakistan".[11] Recently, the Majid Brigade of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) carried out an armed assault on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE). Prime minister of Pakistan Imran Khan, while addressing the parliament regarding the PSE attack said that there was no doubt that India was behind the attack.[12]

The hostility of two archrivals is not only confined to these two states; rather the entire region has been engulfed by their enduring rivalry. Afghanistan particularly remains a battlefield between India and Pakistan. Both states have constantly been trying to accelerate their influence in Afghanistan. Consequently, their proxy-war also poses a grave threat to post-US Afghanistan.

Michael Kugelman, the Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Wilson Center in Washington argues that "One of the biggest concerns about a post-US Afghanistan is that regional players will seek to pursue their respective - and often competing - interests and agendas through the use of proxies. Pakistan has already done this in the past with the Taliban,"[13]Kugelman further reiterates that "India's interests stand to suffer in a big way after the withdrawal of US troops. For New Delhi, which doesn't want a militarily strong and politically powerful Taliban, this would be a dangerous state of affairs," Presumably, there is a great deal of likelihood that Afghan peace talks would be unlikely to reach to the desired goal.[14]Supporting intra-state conflict and proxy wars in neighboring states in the post-COVID-19 era would prove a naïve approach.

Fight against Poverty and Hunger

It is a fait accompli that the post-COVID-19 era would bring a different outlook to the regional and global politics. States by all means are in introspection, seeing emerging changes in the post-COVID-19 era. Pakistan and India are developing countries where poverty and hunger are in full swing. Those who are at the helms of affairs are utterly incognizant of growing poverty. 800 million people in India are conceived to be poor. Resultantly, poverty in India has been haunting in different ways through malnutrition, high infant mortality, lack of education, child labour, and child marriage, HIV / AIDS. Two-thirds of people in India have been living in extreme poverty,

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[11]India Involved In Sabotaging Peace In Balochistan, Afghanistan: Qureshi, https://www.urdupoint.com/en/pakistan/india-involved-in-sabotaging-peace-in-balochi-962151.html, (Accessed on July 06,2020)

[12]Pakistan's Imran Khan blames India for stock exchange attack, https://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-imran-khan-blames-india-for-stock-exchange-attack/a-53998863, (Accessed on July 05, 2020)

[13]Syed Fazl-e-Haider, India-Pakistan proxy war a real threat in post-US Afghanistan, The Arab News (Accessed on July 05, 2020)

[14] Ibid.

68.8% of Indians earn less than \$2 a day. The aforementioned bleak figures make India one of the poorest countries in the world. [15]

COVID-19 has badly damaged India's economy. International Labor Organization (ILO) maintains that "about 400 million workers from India's informal sector are likely to be pushed deeper into poverty due to COVID-19."[16] Poverty in India would be deadlier than COVID-19. Declining in remittances of India and Pakistan will further surge poverty because millions of workers who have been working abroad and dispatching remittances to their home countries are out of jobs now. "At least 50,000 Indian workers have come back home since early May. Workers from India and Pakistan sent home more than \$100bn last year"[17].

Pakistan, on the other hand, confronts the same challenge of growing poverty. Poverty has been inflicting a large segment of the society, moving the country towards quagmire. Dr. Hafiz A. Pasha, the country's renowned economist, warns that 18 million people are expected to plunge into abject poverty. Pasha further says, "The national poverty ratio, which was 31.3% in June 2018, would sharply jump to over 40% by June 2020."[18] The negative impact of COVID-19 is yet to be gauged in Pakistan. People living below the poverty line are likely to get doubled reaching 125 million from the prevailing figure of 50 to 60 million.[19]Dr. Nadeem Ul-Haq, Vice-Chancellor of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PHIDE), a think-tank of Planning Commission, argues that "Pakistan's 50 to 60 million people were already below the poverty line and the figure was expected to touch 125 million due to the COVID-19, while 19 to 20 million were expected to lose their jobs."[20]

Even Pakistani Prime Minster during the pandemic, despite surging cases of COVID-19, categorically said that Pakistan could not go for complete lockdown under its fragile economy and growing poverty. Khan confesses that Pakistan is a poor nation and cannot afford complete lockdown and views that Pakistan at a time faces two challenges: saving lives and shoring up the enfeebled economy. To bear in mind, a country that cannot endure a constant lockdown could bear perpetuating enmity with India?[21]

Growing Threats to Global Warming

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[15]Poverty in India: Facts and Figures on the Daily Struggle for Survival,
https://www.soschildrensvillages.ca/news/poverty-in-india-602 (Accessed on July 06,2020)
[16]Shweta Saini, COVID-19 may double poverty in India, (Accessed on July 09 2020)
[17]Elizabeth Puranam, South Asia faces a remittances crisis amid COVID-19 pandemic News/India (Accessed on July 10 , 2020)

[18]Shahbaz Rana, In Pakistan, millions more to fall below poverty line, the Express Tribune. (Accessed on July 11, 2020)
[19]MehtabHaider, Economic fallout of COVID-19 in Pakistan: People under poverty line may double to 125 million, the News International (Accessed on July 12,2020)
[20] Ibid.
[21]Imran Khan Says Pakistan Will Lift Lockdown Gradually as Coronavirus Cases Cross 20,000-mark,
https://www.india.com/news/world/imran-khan-says-pakistan-will-lift-lockdown-gradually-as-coronavirus-cases-cross-20000-mark-4019758/ (Accessed on July 12, 2020)

Growing obsession of India and Pakistan with traditional and imaginary security threats has remained unchanged, resulting in overshadowing the devastating impacts of climate change. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its report warns India of foreseen threats of climate change. The report discloses that the "impact of a 1.5C increase in global temperatures will disproportionately affect disadvantaged and vulnerable populations through food insecurity, higher food prices, income losses, lost livelihood opportunities, adverse health impacts, and population displacements".[22]

Rising of sea level would pose a threat to Indian inhabitants living adjacent to the coastline, who solely depend on the sea for their bread and butter. Deadly heatwaves that occurred in 2015 killed thousands of people in the Indian city of Calcutta and Pakistani city Karachi. There is a likelihood that the trend would become a norm in the future in these cities.[23]

According to the Global Climate Risk Index, Pakistan has been ranked 5th most vulnerable country to climate change. The report says Pakistan has lost nearly 9,989 lives, worth $ 3.8 billion economic losses, and has witnessed scorching weather events from 1999 to 2018. The think-tank concluded that the country's vulnerability to climate change has constantly been expediting, claiming that the government of Pakistan does not take stringent measures in curbing climate change.[24] The report further maintains that Pakistan is among those countries that are "recurrently affected by catastrophes [and] continuously rank among the most affected countries both in the long-term index and in the index for the respective year".[25]

Water and Food Security

The preoccupation of both countries with traditional security has made them overlook human development and water and food security. Both states, in this regard, are a lucid example, spending huge account on traditional security but are reluctant to resolve water and food security. India, by 2050 is expected to be home to 1.6 billion people enhancing the demand for water and food. The threat of climate change will reduce water availability in the country. India, currently, has merely four percent world's total usable water resources. Since the 1960s, millions of Indians have inadequate access to clean water, food, and sanitation.

Urbanization, population growth, climate change, debilitating water mismanagement, greater variability in precipitation contribute to speeding up poverty and hunger.[26]India has been using water for the irrigation of crops for the last 5000 years. On account of growing urbanization, rapid population and industrialization India faces severe water shortages.[27] Presently, 600 million

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[22] Why India needs to worry about climate change, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-45949323 (Accessed on July 12,2020)

[23] Ibid.

[24] Dawn, Pakistan's 5th most vulnerable country to climate change, reveals German watch report,https://www.dawn.com/news/1520402/pakistan-5th-most-vulnerable-country-to-climate-change-reveals-germanwatch-report (Accessed on July 13,2020)

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid

[27]Ibid

Indians suffer from drought as the country remains the largest user of groundwater in the world. By 2030, 40 percent of Indians would not have access to clean water. Most noticeably, every year 200,000 Indians perish on account of contaminated water.[28]

However, water scarcity in Pakistan is more severe than that of India. Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) has already cautioned policymakers regarding water scarcity in the country, saying that if authorities do not take aggressive measures, Pakistan by 2025 is likely to run dry. The report claims Pakistan in 1990 was a mere water stress line and become a water scarcity line in 2005. PCRWR's report shows a gloomy picture, saying if the same situation prevails there would be a drought-like situation in the country.[29]PCRWR was discontent with research work in the country and accentuated the significance of research to find out avenues in tackling water issues. Irfan Chowdhry, a water expert says that "It is alarming that our capacity to preserve water has shrunk over the years. We haven't built new dams since the 1960s, and the capacity of existing ones to store water is decreasing."[30]

United Nations Development Pregame UNDP experts also expressed their reservation over the water crisis in Pakistan articulating Pakistan policymakers are into oblivion to an impending water crisis. Shamsul Mulk, former chairman of the Water and Power Development Authority, while discussing the UNDP report argues, "water policy is simply non-existent in Pakistan. Policymakers act like "absentee landlords" of water, and "because of this absentee landlordism, water has become the property of the landlords and the poor are deprived of their share."[31]

In the post-COVID-19 era, non-traditional threats need to be prioritized. Suffice to say, post-COVID-19 would be an appropriate time for both states to resolve their outstanding issues including water issues. Pakistan has been blaming India for its water crisis saying that India does not comply with the Indus water treaty signed in 1960 brokered by the World Bank in 1960.[32]

Strengthening of Democracy

In prevailing circumstances, democracy in India and Pakistan is under attack. Both states need to understand, enfeebling of democracy in the post-COVID-19 era will further exacerbate the relations. The consolidation of democracy would be a prerequisite for them to resolve their outstanding issues. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has converted Nehru's secular democracy into fascist democracy. Indian democracy under Modi's regime does not reflect Nehru's ones. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Modi has been pursuing a Hindutva ideology

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[28]Dost Muhammad Barrech, Post-COVID-19, Indo-Pak Relations. Modern Diplomacy (Accessed on July 13,2020)
[29]Why water scarcity is bigger threat to Pakistan's security than militancy, https://www.dw.com/en/why-water-scarcity-is-a-bigger-threat-to-pakistans-security-than-militancy/a-19293470 (Accessed on July 13, 2020)
[30] Ibid.
[31]Water Scarcity in Pakistan – A Bigger Threat than Terrorism, https://www.worldwatersolar.com/water-scarcity-in-pakistan-a-bigger-threat-than-terrorism/ (Accessed on July 14, 2020)
[32] Ibid.

overemphasizing Indian culture in terms of Hindu values. Modi's democracy remains the antithesis of Indian secular democracy.[33]

Modi has been following a very destructive trajectory of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar who first time in 1923 codified the Hindu Nationalism ideology. Savarkar in his work emphasized the importance of Hinduism articulated that Hindu was someone who had inhabited Hindustan. Resultantly, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) came into being in 1925 to promote Hindu nationalist ideology. M S Golwalkar as chief of RSS in 1940 in his book "We or Our nationhood Defined" accentuated Hindu nationalist ideology and warned religious minorities to adhere to Hindu acculturation and its identity. Implementing RSS ideology by Modi will endanger not only India but also the entire region.[34]

Modi by revoking Kashmir's autonomy invariably changes the demographic composition of the disputed territory. He contemplates to fellow Israel's settlement in the West Bank. Annexing of Kashmir on August 5, 2019 simply means to allow Indians in Kashmir for the settlement, changing demography of Kashmir, converting Kashmiris into a minority. An Indian journalist Rana Ayyub argues that "Kashmir is now Westbank."[35]Ganguly, a political science professor at Indiana University at Bloomington argues that demographic changes in Kashmir bringing Hindus to Kashmir will consolidate Modi's party ascendency over the area.[36]

Meanwhile, Pakistan's democratic track record is exceedingly dismal that needs to be improved in the post-COVID-19 era to cement better ties with India. Civil-military relations in Pakistan have remained fragile since the inception of the country. Though civilian governments rule the country, they certainly need overt and covert support of the army. The army can topple the civilian government in no time if it sees it would damage its interest.[37] Army in Pakistan's politics remains the pivot of politics dictating democratic leaders on how to make decisions. The military is part of troika including the prime minister and president of Pakistan. The troika negotiates repeatedly, while senior officers are called to brief troika regarding hot issues of the country. Democratic leaders are powerless to disagree in troika negotiations. If civilian leaders dare to disagree with the army, they will consequently face the music.[38]

One can imagine the omnipotent power of the military in Pakistan, where so far, no prime mister has completed his and her tenure. Since 1947, 18 prime ministers have been appointed as premiers of the country. Surpassingly, no one has completed his and her tenure.[39]Political pundits in the

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[33]Dost Muhammad Barrech, Indian democracy from secularism to RSS, Pakistan Observer (Accessed on July 14, 2020)

[34] Ibid.

[35]Claire Parker, Kashmir's new status could bring demographic change, drawing comparisons to the West Bank, the Washington Post, (Accessed on July 14, 2020)

[36] Ibid.

[37]Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

[38]Hasan –Askari-Rizvi, Civil- Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan, vol 40,no, 2 summer, international institute for strategic studies,pg,96

[39] Humza Jilani, No One Has Ever Completed a Term as Pakistan's PM, Foreign Policy, (Accessed on July 14. 2020)

country conceive the current Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf PTI government as a selected government by the army. PTI's dismal performance amid COVID-19 giving space to the army to tighten its grip in domestic affairs, making it obvious that the army can maneuver internal affairs of the country without imposing martial law.[40]

The European Foundation for the South Asia Studies (EFSAS) in its recent report unveils that the PTI government is one of the lucid examples of how the army has reached to Federal cabinet. The EFSAS maintains that key portfolios such as interior, finance, defense, production, commerce, institutional reforms, and railways are held by individuals who belong to the military.[41]Military intervention is not only omnipresent in institutes rather ex-military personal of the four provinces of Pakistan also belongs to the military. It further reiterates that Pakistan is "arguably the only country in the world in which the jurisdiction of its armed forces is not restricted to guard its people and borders but includes involvement in business ventures".[42]

Interdependence of Economy

Post-COVID-19 era provides a massive opportunity for both archrivals to mend their fences by changing enmity into friendship through enhancing economic ties. The more they are economically intertwined, the lesser there will be the likelihood of war. COVID-19 has already done colossal damage to the world economy. India and Pakistan are not immune to the prevailing economic woes too. Ironically, the economic ties of both states have severely been affected by an enduring rivalry. In this regard, a prolific writer Stephen Cohen in his book "Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum" expresses pessimism over India and Pakistan's economic relations saying that South Asia is one of the least economically integrated regions in the world, the region has only 5 percent interregional trade.[43]

The lesser economic interdependence has perpetuated enmity for 72 years. Cohen argues that in international politics five percent conflicts are unlikely to be resolved and the India and Pakistan conflict is one of them. Alarmingly, both states have not felt the gravity of their hostility as yet.[44] .South Asia has immense economic potential but due to the rivalry of India and Pakistan Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has halted economic opportunities. Alice Wells the US diplomat once said that South Asia was one of the economically fastest-growing regions of the world, having nearly half of the young population, contributing massively to economic

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[40]Ayjaz Wani, Military further tightens grip over Imran administration, https://www.orfonline.org/research/military-further-tightens-grip-over-imran-administration-68329/ (Accessed on July 15, 2020)

[41]Military spreads tentacles deeper into governance in Pakistan, says European think tank https://www.aninews.in/news/world/europe/military-spreads-tentacles-deeper-into-governance-in-pakistan-says-european-think-tank20200516045348/ (Accessed on July 15,2020)

[42] ibid.

[43]Dost Muhammad Barrech, Kartarpur: A Corridor of Opportunities, COUNTER CURRENTS. ORG (Accssed on July 15, 2020)

[44] Ibid.

growth. "South Asia remains among the least economically integrated regions in the world and non-tariff barriers to trade are a major cause," Wells added.[45]

Way Forward

- Both states are supposed to reassess realpolitik in their foreign policies in the post-COVID-19 era that has caused irreparable damage to their relations.
- Arguably, the hostility of India and Pakistan is socially constructed that can be eliminated easily once each other perceives others as a friend instead of an enemy.
- Support of proxy wars by both states needs to stop.
- In the foreseeable future, non-traditional threats like COVID-19, climate change, food security, water scarcity, disease, drug trafficking will loom large over India and Pakistan. Thus, they ought to keep non-traditional threats in top priority.
- Modi fascist regime, undoubtedly, moves India towards religious fanaticism resulting in diminishing secularism in India, weakening one of the largest democracies of the world. India as a religious bigot state will downplay the possibility of friendship with Pakistan. A secular India guarantees friendship with Pakistan in the post-COVID-19 era.
- Pakistan also needs to strengthen its democracy, incompletion of tenures of eighteen prime ministers of the country raises many questions over its democracy.
- Realistically speaking, the military of Pakistan has to shun interference in the internal affairs of the country and should abide by the constitution of the country. Interference by the military in internal affairs and the toppling of democratic governments wash away the possibility of friendship with India.
- Economic interdependence needs to be enhanced. The more India and Pakistan are economically intertwined, the lesser the possibility of a war.
- Pakistan cannot match India economically, militarily, politically and geographically. It is in the national interest of Pakistan to bolster its economy, democracy, and political stability to compete with India.
- The opening of the Kartarpur corridor by Pakistan for religious harmony has promoted a positive image of the country across the world. In the post-COVID-19 era more corridors particularly on the Sindh border is supposed to be built for Mohenjo-Daro and shrines of Sindh for the Indian tourists. If the Kartarpur corridor is possible why not both states build an economic corridor connecting India with Afghanistan and Central Asia.
- Energy-hungry India needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs India. Pakistan can give easy access to India to reach the Middle East and Central Asia for natural resources. India must acknowledge the value of Pakistan.

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[45]South Asia remains among least economically integrated regions in the world: US, The Indian Express (Accessed on July 15, 2020)

- People to people contact needs to be enhanced. Sports activities ought to be resumed. Film industries of both countries need to grow together.

Conclusion

The rivalry between India and Pakistan has remained a buzzword in international politics. Both states are well-known for their unending hostility. Securitization of their foreign policies, squandering a colossal amount on militaries has badly exposed them during the COVID-19. Pandemic has also proved that spending a whopping amount on the military instead of the well-being of people proves to be counterproductive. COVID-19 has created an enormous opportunity for both nuclear states to reevaluate their policies to live peacefully, concentrating on human developments rather than on so-called imaginary threats. COVID-19 makes it crystal clear that prioritization of traditional threats over nontraditional threats is a futile exercise. The pandemic has also exposed their vulnerabilities to non-traditional threats, such unforeseen threats are expected to happen in the foreseeable future too. If both states in the future remain unprepared for non-traditional threats, there would certainly be more devastations, destructive than COVID-19. To sum up, in the post-COVID-19 period, they are required to prioritize non-traditional threats like COVID-19, climate change, food and water security, diseases, drug trafficking over traditional/ imaginary threats that invariably will pave the way for peaceful co-existence.