

# Journal of Global Peace and Security Studies



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## The Prospects of Nuclear Terrorism

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### ABSTRACT

*This study highlights the creation of non-state Islamic militant organizations and the clash between US militarism and Islamic jihadists particularly Al-Qaeda. This study explains the use of terrorist activities by radical Islamic terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in pursuit of their ideological goals. However, the significance lies in how terrorists, particularly Al-Qaeda, seek guidance from regular armies handling nuclear forces to delegate launch to kill authority (empowered with the decision to use the nuclear device) to terrorists' foot soldiers? A brief section also discusses hypothetical scenarios of how Al-Qaeda may, take advantage of India's ignorance and join hands with insurgents to acquire nuclear material- from Indian nuclear plants. How Al-Qaeda can trigger nuclear war in South Asia? It also discusses the hypothetical scenario of terrorists' possession of nuclear weapons and their possible usage in various ways- against the US or its allies. The importance of the few aspects of hypothetical scenarios of nuclear terrorism has increased in the wake of bargaining between the US government and the Afghan Taliban for the release of the US detained soldiers. The study also focuses on lessons gained by Al-Qaeda from the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster.*

**Key Words:** *Ideology, Conflict, Terrorism, United States, Al-Qaeda*

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## **Introduction**

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the world has witnessed the rise of non-state terrorist organizations. These actors bear significance for two reasons, for example, i) these terrorist organizations have challenged teachings of the realist school of thought that only states are the primary actors in the international system. ii) Non-state actors are involved in carrying out terrorist activities across the globe therefore they have become part of strategic studies.

This study claims that terrorist organizations require attention because in certain ways their activities are similar to states. The first similarity stems from, for instance, these organizations maintain a propaganda wing similar to the ministry of information of any established government. Second terrorist organizations are generating revenue through drug trafficking, kidnappings for ransom collect extortion money and charity funds. Collected funds are utilized to sustain their resistance against the ruling government in their efforts to topple it. In organized states revenue collection is the duty of the ministry of finance. The genesis of these organizations and their activities can be best understood by Francis Fukuyama's famous writing, *The End of History*.<sup>1</sup> "Ideological evolution,"<sup>2</sup> asserts Fukuyama drives humans to continuously make efforts to create an ideal society free from internal challenges.

## **The Rise of Conservatives in Post 9/11 Era**

Modern era conflicts are mostly ideologically driven to transform the status quo. Ideology is also playing an important role in the US. This study claims that neo-conservatism has played a dominant role in US foreign policy.<sup>3</sup> Conservatives in the US want a world dominated by America. Conservatives want to implement an American variety of democracy across countries. After critically examining the conservatives' agenda this study claims that there are various types of conservatives including the traditional school, neo-conservatives and the neo-neo-conservatives with different policies, approaches and belief systems of the world. Conservatives remained

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<sup>1</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: 1992).

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in, Jacinta O'Hagan, *Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 138.

<sup>3</sup>Inder Jeet Parmar, "A Neo-Conservative-Dominated US Foreign Policy Establishment?" in *the United States Foreign Policy and National Identity in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, ed. Kenneth Christie (New York: Routledge, 2008), 37.

suppressed during the cold war because of the presence of the Soviet Union. Despite their presence in the time of various US governments, this group could not implement its agenda i.e. to spread democracy to Eastern European states and the Middle East. Group's ambitions were capped because of the Soviet Union. Neo-Conservatives gained prominence in the post cold war era because there was no country to put a limit to US foreign policies. Neo-conservatives gained prominence during President H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton's era, for instance, due to US involvement particularly in the Middle East and later in Balkans' region. Neo-neo-conservatives pursued a more unilateral and militarist approach in the post 9/11 era. In this era radical Islam has emerged as the main challenge to US national security, national values, and liberal democratic principles.

This group, during the President George W. Bush-era comprised of top US officials including Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Armitage.<sup>4</sup>This influential group has also been called a web of webs, circle within circles, this study claims that the group functioned as a government within the government. Its members shared a similar belief system- the US should remain at the top of world affairs. The elite group surrounded President G. W. Bush and therefore influenced his foreign policies to a larger extent. The Bush administration's foreign policies were backed and implemented with the support of US military might i.e. pre-emptive and preventive strikes. Bush administration waged wars against states and terrorist organizations posing a challenge to the US. Al-Qaeda gained prominence in US foreign policy. It provided justifications to the US to wage war against Afghanistan, in 2001, carry out drone attacks in Pakistani tribal areas and Yemen to wipe out Al-Qaeda top leadership. Bush administration, this study claims, relied upon military might to resolve problems concerning US foreign policy and to achieve American objectives or if necessary secure US national interests.

In the post 9/11 era, neo-neo-conservatives took steps by overstepping the US constitution because the US declared war against Al-Qaeda. In such circumstances, the US Constitution authorizes the American President to take extra-judicial steps. US government acquired the assistance of the American media (print, electronic- radio, and TV), think tanks i.e. The American Enterprise

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid, 42.

Institute and the Project for the New American Century, and universities to promote neo-neo-cons agenda.

### **Al-Qaeda's Objectives**

The concept to fight for the glory of religion gave birth to Muslim extremist groups. However, Al-Qaeda received worldwide attention due to its methods of recruitment and innovation in launching attacks. Al-Qaeda is opposed to the man-made laws and wants to implement its brand of Sharia. It is evident from the following statement issued by its slain leaders. i.e. In December 2004, Al-Qaeda slain chief Osama Bin Laden categorically stated that democracies and constitutional governments are equally unacceptable (to Al-Qaeda) as they are manmade setups rather than the "law of God." In January 2005 Al-Zarqawi, slain Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, declared "democracy as a rival religion to Islam."<sup>5</sup> In terms of Islamic terrorist organizations i.e. Al-Qaeda has emerged leading terrorist groups of radical Muslims. Its declared objectives include the expulsion of infidels from Holy Lands of Muslims. Its second stated objective is to link together Muslim radical groups across the globe.<sup>6</sup> Third, it aims to penetrate within Muslim populated areas to topple the central authority. Failure to fill the vacuum, according to Al-Qaeda leadership, would result in Un-Islamic groups' penetration which would undermine the cause of Muslim Ummah.<sup>7</sup>

### **Al-Qaeda in Pakistan**

Perhaps Pakistani tribal areas were inhibited by Al-Qaeda leaders due to the vacuum. Furthermore, there were reports that Al-Qaeda operatives entered Libya. Al-Qaeda's Al Nusra Front in Syria is known for different names including Jabhat Fatah al-Sham after July 2016 and Al-Qaeda in Syria or Levant. Al-Qaeda's franchise in Yemen, known as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, received a major setback in January 2020. It was claimed that its leader Qassim al-Rimi, was killed in a US

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<sup>5</sup>Christopher Blanchard, "Al-Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology," *Constitutional Research Service*, Washington, D.C, July 9, 2007, accessed April 19, 2014, [http://tracking.tfxiq.net/in.php?kwd=al+qaeda%3A+statements+and+evolving+ideology+by+christopher+blanchard%2C+pdf&ref1=726576697a6572&ref2=4300x1015xPK&ref3=5539a5a1ef2546958e6202d6879d7953&capn=rv\\_u\\_i\\_meta\\_0001&uid=7212P%2F4BvkEidOL4FA%2FFPxZb4JVIFpiDVXwxykfJlevnav01OMhMI%2F8Dpdw9wRJt9R6XuFYtYepqDGVsEzRP7w](http://tracking.tfxiq.net/in.php?kwd=al+qaeda%3A+statements+and+evolving+ideology+by+christopher+blanchard%2C+pdf&ref1=726576697a6572&ref2=4300x1015xPK&ref3=5539a5a1ef2546958e6202d6879d7953&capn=rv_u_i_meta_0001&uid=7212P%2F4BvkEidOL4FA%2FFPxZb4JVIFpiDVXwxykfJlevnav01OMhMI%2F8Dpdw9wRJt9R6XuFYtYepqDGVsEzRP7w).

<sup>6</sup>Gus Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies* (London: SAGE, 2014): 173.

<sup>7</sup>Ryan Clarke, *Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia: States, Security and Non-State Actors* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 155.



drone strike. Rimi received training in Afghanistan and tried to kill the American ambassador to Yemen. Al-Qaeda's franchise under Rimi has tried to attack the US and Europe and still wants to attack these areas.<sup>8</sup>

Al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations posed critical security threats to Pakistan in the post 9/11 era. It successfully recruited foot soldiers, planted terrorist groups and enhanced allies' operational capabilities to target Pakistani armed forces.<sup>9</sup>The organization's potent affiliated group in Pakistan included Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Various religious and criminal groups allied the banner of TTP. Moreover, they fought against the Pakistani government to implement, according to one of their stated goals, their brand of Sharia (Islamic version). Pakistan, as per their belief, would have become a safer place. Other terrorist groups of Muslims want restoration of the Caliphate system. It will also help them in achieving the objective of Ummah.

The Islamic concept of Ummah in the West may be compared to, as defined by Fukuyama, "Universal Community of Mankind."<sup>10</sup> Their strong belief is that their ideology has the inherited specialty to cure internal loopholes of the societies thus the world, after implementing their ideology, would become a better and safer place.

### **Nuclear Terrorism**

Herman Kahn warned the international community of the hazards of nuclear weapons uses by saying it had to "think of the unthinkable."<sup>11</sup>His threat perception can be further expanded by including the possible use of nuclear weapons particularly by non-state actors. Further, such use would have dire consequences for the victim state. Possibility of nuclear terrorism stems from the enormous resources (mention nuclear reactors spread across the globe) of highly enriched uranium,

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<sup>8</sup>Rukmini Callimachi, Eric Schmitt and Julian E. Barnes, "U.S. Strike at Leader of Qaeda in Yemen,"*The New York Times*, (January 31, 2010).

<sup>9</sup>Clarke, *Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia*, 158.

<sup>10</sup>O'Hagan, *Conceptualizing the West in International Relations*, 138.

<sup>11</sup>Anthony H. Cordesman, "Red Lines, Deadlines, and Thinking the Unthinkable: India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and China," *CSIS*, accessed April 19, 2014, [http://tracking.tfxiq.net/in.php?kwd=red+lines%2C+deadlines%2C+and+thinking+the+unthinkable%3A+india%2C+pakistan%2C+iran%2C+north+korea%2C+and+china%2C+pdf&ref1=726576697a6572&ref2=4300x1015xPK&ref3=5539a5a1ef2546958e6202d6879d7953&capn=rv\\_ui\\_meta\\_0001&uid=2e2bRmlXYGwAMoPG2pBjFG7bv9YPhS8YrJgvo7dmg%2FA1T6ATbiZzFoAsASso%2FeIfCD3%2FaYlouZEEEnKt7R%2FwkWQ](http://tracking.tfxiq.net/in.php?kwd=red+lines%2C+deadlines%2C+and+thinking+the+unthinkable%3A+india%2C+pakistan%2C+iran%2C+north+korea%2C+and+china%2C+pdf&ref1=726576697a6572&ref2=4300x1015xPK&ref3=5539a5a1ef2546958e6202d6879d7953&capn=rv_ui_meta_0001&uid=2e2bRmlXYGwAMoPG2pBjFG7bv9YPhS8YrJgvo7dmg%2FA1T6ATbiZzFoAsASso%2FeIfCD3%2FaYlouZEEEnKt7R%2FwkWQ).

plutonium, and other nuclear material and technology. Fears have been expressed over the poor security arrangement of nuclear facilities situated in former Soviet republics.<sup>12</sup> Non-state actors' quest to carryout nuclear terrorism leaves no doubt those traditional tools to curb nuclear proliferation need to be polished. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has adopted new techniques that require close support of the international community to effectively functions and deny the right to non-state actors from acquiring nuclear material. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a fundamental tool kit against the spread of nuclear weapons. It empowers sovereign states to search for any aircraft, ship or other means of transportation on suspicions to control illicit nuclear trade.<sup>13</sup> US is implanting effective tools with the support of local business fraternity, through Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, to halt the entry of illegal nuclear material in the US main homeland.<sup>14</sup>

### **Nuclear Terrorism threat to US National Security**

Nuclear terrorism is considered as one of the potent threats to US national security. Fear that terrorists may use nuclear material date back to the cold war era. Such fears are evident from the national intelligence estimates of 1986 stating that minute (terrorists) groups if they get hold of nuclear material or weapon, would use it.<sup>15</sup> Fear of nuclear terrorism was expressed by President George W. Bush and Presidential Candidate Senator John Kerry during their 2004 campaign for Presidential elections. Both feared that terrorists would use nuclear material or weapons if it falls in their hands.<sup>16</sup> Coercive measures were used to overthrow governments, in Iraq and Libya, to deter threats of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).<sup>17</sup> US National Security Strategy of 2002

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<sup>12</sup>Joseph Cirincione, "A New Non-Proliferation Strategy," *SAIS Review*, 25, No. 2, (Summer-Fall, 2005), 157.

<sup>13</sup>Tom Sauer, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime in Crisis," *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 18, No. 3, (2006), 335.

<sup>14</sup>Kenneth N. Luongo and Isabelle Williams, "The Nexus of Globalization and Next- Generation Nonproliferation," *The Nonproliferation Review*, 14, No. 3, (2007), 469.

<sup>15</sup>William Tobey, "Building A Better International Nuclear Security Standard," *US-Korea Institute*, (2012), 4.

<sup>16</sup>Transcript: First Presidential Debate, September 30, 2004, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debateferee/debate\\_0930.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debateferee/debate_0930.html).

<sup>17</sup>Sverre Lodgaard, *Nuclear Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free- World?* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 80.

updated in 2006 ascertained the proliferation of nuclear proliferation as a prime threat to America.<sup>18</sup> President Barrack Obama also expressed his resolve, in his speech delivered in Prague in May 2009, to make a nuclear-free world.<sup>19</sup> In 2010, Obama expressed fears of nuclear terrorism stating that "the single biggest threat to US security, both short-term, medium-term and long-term" emanates from nuclear terrorism.<sup>20</sup> However, this situation would occur only if terrorists acquire and transport WMD to the US mainland or develop WMD in the US. The second-tier commander may also decide to launch a nuclear strike as he would have been delegated with the authority to possess and use the nuclear device if the situation requires their use.

If Al-Qaeda leadership would not have been targeted in Afghanistan, as David Albright has highlighted, it may have developed limited expertise to manufacture WMD.<sup>21</sup> Perhaps the US visualized that Al-Qaeda from its bases in Afghanistan would launch a nuclear attack on US main homeland or its assets abroad. US forces' priority in Afghanistan had been to get hold of material obtained from Al-Qaeda sanctuaries and secure it. Data obtained was critically analyzed to access whether it contains information about possible development or attainment of nuclear weapons? i.e. General Tommy Franks, the then Commander of US Army in Afghanistan informed media that (US intelligence and armed forces) searched 100 sites including 50 suspected locations possibly utilized to produce WMD.<sup>22</sup> US officials obtained data from hardcopies, hand notes, videos, and other documents. However, limited data concerning US interest was acquired perhaps Al-Qaeda leaders and operatives may have destroyed the valuable information.<sup>23</sup> There had been reports that after US operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, SEAL Team Six officials took a large cache of laptops hard-drives and other notes maintained by Ossama Bin Laden. One can, therefore, speculate that US experts would have critically analyzed the data to access organisation's plans involving nuclear

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<sup>18</sup>Sauer, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime in Crisis," 335.

<sup>19</sup>David Cliff, Hassan Elbahtimy and Andreas Persbo, *Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament: Practical Steps against Nuclear Rearmament* (London: VERTIC, 2011), 10.

<sup>20</sup>"U.S. President Barack Obama Warns of Nuclear Terrorism," *BBC News*, accessed March 3, 2014, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8614695.stm>.

<sup>21</sup>David Albright, "Al-Qaeda's Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents," *Policy Forum Online*, November 6, 2002, [http://nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47\\_Albright.html#sect2](http://nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47_Albright.html#sect2).

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

terrorism. Since leftover data was secured by Pakistani authorities, possibly by intelligence officials, Americans would have possibly contacted top-ranking Pakistani intelligence officials in this regard.

### **Al-Qaeda's Protracted Strategy to Carryout Nuclear Terrorism**

In their attempt to highlight their complaints, agenda and achieve their goals, terrorists resort to using violence. One of the threats posed by these terrorists' to global peace is the possible use of nuclear weapons particularly by Al-Qaeda. Among terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda is one of the most enthusiastic terrorist groups which want to acquire nuclear weapons/ material to carryout nuclear terrorism. Al-Qaeda can adopt a strategy to acquire nuclear material, but it will have to perhaps wait for a long period. Al-Qaeda can plant sleeping cells in various countries, near nuclear power plants, across the planet. Sleeping cells will be assigned with a special task to wait for an appropriate time when any of the nuclear power plants will be hit with a natural calamity. Since the protection layer, of the devastated nuclear power plant, will also be weakened and local administration would be engaged in providing relief services to the masses in the area it will be easy for Al-Qaeda sleeping cells to operate and acquire nuclear material. The international community should analyze this scenario and remain prepare to deal with such a situation.

Measure or protection layer has been drawn to halt the spread of nuclear material from falling into wrong hands. Measures have been adopted to detect illegal trafficking of nuclear material and confiscate it.<sup>24</sup>Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) also enjoys a consensus that the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be stopped and effective measures, few mentioned above, should be utilized in this regard. Effective implementation of nuclear safeguards has helped the international community to timely detect the illicit nuclear activities and save itself from hazards of nuclear terrorism and blackmailing. Few instances of, state involvement in, cheating includes Libya, Iraq, Iran and North Korea. It is pertinent to mention that all these states, being members of the NPT carried out illegal activities in violation of the treaty's statutes. Article II of the treaty forbids Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) from acquiring nuclear assistance leading to the development of acquisition of strategic weapons.<sup>25</sup>It is in this background the international community is

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<sup>24</sup>Danielle Peterson et al., eds. "Export Controls and International Safeguards: Strengthening Nonproliferation through Interdisciplinary Integration," *Nonproliferation Review*, 15, No. 3, (November 2008), 515.

<sup>25</sup>Sauer, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime in Crisis," 334.

making efforts to avert non-state actors from gaining access to WMD or crude nuclear devices. Non-state actors are employing all possible efforts in their quest to make their dream come true, by carrying out nuclear terrorism.

### **Nuclear Weapons Cannot Deter Nuclear Terrorism**

During the entire course of Cold War nuclear weapons were used as a deterrent force.<sup>26</sup> However, the renewed threat of the possibility of falling nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorists is that nuclear weapons cannot deter terrorists from using these weapons<sup>27</sup> because terrorist's communication and command (nerve) centers remain unidentifiable. Further, they do not have established government setup,<sup>28</sup> which is an additional feature of their ability to act or operate against a well-established deterrent force. Sovereign states, on the other hand, would be in highly vulnerable situations vis-à-vis terrorists if, any of the terrorist groups or any splinter (terrorist) group, get control over WMD. Likely scenarios, of terrorist possession of nuclear devices, include the transfer of either nuclear device or fissile material by a nuclear state. Tom Sauer has highlighted this threat in his article. To shed light on such a scenario he has termed North Korea, Iran and Pakistan as politically unstable states and internationally not good citizens.<sup>29</sup> However, to save the world from nuclear terrorism nuclear material across the globe should be protected. Terrorists would try to acquire it, as asserted by Joseph Cirincione, wherever they find nuclear facilities as an easy target.<sup>30</sup>

### **Indian Nuclear Complexes Attracts Al-Qaeda**

Before proceeding further Hindu religious fundamentalists should also be glanced due to the activities of Hindu extremists targeted against the Indian-Pakistani Muslim population in India i.e. Hindu religious extremists demolished ancient Babri Masjid under the Umbrella of BJP, Indian

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<sup>26</sup>Dipankar Banerjee, "Addressing Nuclear Dangers: Confidence Building Between India-Pakistan," *India Review*, 9, No. 3, (July- September 2010), 359.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Tom Sauer, "A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 32, No. 5, (October 2009), 753.

<sup>30</sup>Cirincione, "A New Non-Proliferation Strategy," 158.

serving military Colonel was apprehended for his involvement in Samjhota Express Carnage, carrying Pakistani passengers to Pakistan. Indian religious fundamentalists consider sub-continent as a single entity, they do not believe in partition, and therefore want reunification. Colonel Prohit's involvement requires attention whether Hindu extremists can, with support of inside elements, acquire nuclear devices? Furthermore, whether they will use it against their arch-rivals Muslims living in Pakistan? Or they would use the strategic weapon to blackmail Pakistani state?

India is faced with counterinsurgency operations. Al-Qaeda terrorists may join hands with insurgent networks operating in Northern Indian. Attacks, on Indian nuclear facilities, can be planned and executed. The consequences of attacks on Indian nuclear facilities can hypothetically be explained in the following ways. Firstly, terrorists after acquiring nuclear material would use it to spread nuclear radiation. Second, as it is evident from past incidents i.e. Pakistan was held responsible for 2001 terrorists attack Indian parliament, 2008 Mumbai attacks and recent Pulwama suicide bombing in February 2019. Consequentially, Pakistan would be alleged for sponsoring terrorism against India. The case against Pakistan will be pleased to declare it as a rough state with international support. Third, India may operationalize its conventional force by launching the Land Warfare Doctrine orchestrated in December 2018. Fourth, after nuclear material usage by terrorists, India may launch a nuclear attack, in the light of its nuclear doctrine which calls for massive retaliation in response to chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, on Pakistan. Implementation of the third and fourth scenarios would result in India-Pakistan's total war.

Indian security planners, dealing with nuclear policies, should, therefore, decide to limit fissile material production. Likely effects of Indian decision to protect nuclear complexes and reduction in fissile material will be,

- (a) Chances of falling nuclear material into the hands of terrorists would be lower, India, therefore, can help itself to avert nuclear terrorism on Indian soil.
- (b) New Delhi's vertical proliferation and qualitative changes compel China and Pakistan to make qualitative and quantitative improvements in their nuclear forces.

(c) Indian decision to limit fissile material production would result in slowing the pace of arms expenditure,<sup>31</sup> both states can upgrade the lives of their poor masses.

(d) Likely chances that non-state actors would bring both India-Pakistan to the brink of war would also be reduced.

(e) Accidental nuclear attack, as a result of misperception or miscalculation, would also be lower.

(f) Indian reliance on nuclear forces dissuades China to implement Article VI of the nonproliferation regime (NPT) therefore the dream of NPT universalization is far from becoming a reality.

### **Nuclear Blackmail vs. Nuclear Terrorism**

Other possible reactions of terrorists, after either gaining control or developing a nuclear weapon, may be anticipated in the following three ways. The first response may be to demand the release of high-value terrorists detained by various governments-(It would be nuclear blackmail, as wrong hands would be imposing their ill-wills on their opponents. It is for this reason deemed necessary to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons). Some of the high-value terrorists include Abu Zubaydah, according to November 2013 reports he is detained at Guantanamo Bay. Zubaydah was captured in a joint operation carried by Pakistani and US authorities in March 2002 in Faisalabad, Pakistan.<sup>32</sup> He was operations chief of Al-Qaeda, an expert in using various explosive material, sophisticated weaponry, terrorists' recruiter and close aide of deceased Bin Laden. Abu Zubaydah is also alleged of supporting Khalid Sheikh Muhammad's planner of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US.<sup>33</sup> Abu Faraj al Libi was captured in 2005 he is currently detained at Guantanamo Bay. Abu

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<sup>31</sup>S. Paul Kapur, "More Posture than Review: Indian Reactions to the US Nuclear Posture Review," *Nonproliferation Review*, 18, No. 1, (March 2011), 71.

<sup>32</sup>Jamie Tarabay, "The Case Against Abu Zubaydah," *AlJazeera America*, November 7, 2013, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/11/5/the-case-againstabuzubaydah.html>.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*

Faraj has served as a close associate of deceased Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri. Furthermore, he served in the capacity of Al-Qaeda Operation's chief in Iraq.<sup>34</sup>

Second, launch to kill option, by a terrorist, can either be authorized by the top terrorists' leadership or second-tier commander. Herman Kahn has asserted that the dispute or conflict between two states (in this study non-state actor) would lead them to raise the escalation ladders if they share a recently hostile history.<sup>35</sup> If one applies this scenario to American- Al-Qaeda rivalry it can result in dangerous consequences. It is believed that Al-Qaeda operatives' would use WMD or crude nuclear weapons. Seeds of this rivalry, from Al-Qaeda's perspective, have already been rooted in President Bush's declaration of war against Al-Qaeda, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the US, and later killing top Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. The overall situation for escalation is ripe. Both share a recent hostile history and both are arch-rivals, therefore, nuclear weapons can be used against the United States.

The decision to pull the nuclear trigger can be made by terrorists due to the fear that their location has been traced by the challenged state-during the course of negotiation. Such use of nuclear weapons may be made due to the fear of countermeasures of the challenged government or traditional use it or lose it a phenomenon. It may be termed as "retaliatory action."<sup>36</sup> Retaliation will be aimed to punish the home government for launching an attack against terrorists to neutralize the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is pertinent to mention that the victim state, of nuclear terrorism, despite maintaining assured second-strike capability will be ineffective. The second strike assured nuclear forces will not work against terrorists .i.e. terrorists do not maintain a declared state and if non-state actors are religiously motivated they will prefer to die in achieving their cause.<sup>37</sup> The concept of martyrdom is not new i.e. Hasan bin al-Saba raised the army of organized assassins in the name of "radical Ismaili version of Islam." His followers infiltrated from the mountains of Northern Persia to urban centers of Persia, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine. To achieve their objectives

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<sup>34</sup>"The Guantanamo Docket,"*The New York Times*, accessed April 10, 2014,<http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/10017-abu-faraj-al-libi#>.

<sup>35</sup>Herman Kahn, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2010),52.

<sup>36</sup>Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations* (Hampshire: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987),135.

<sup>37</sup>Sauer, "A Second Nuclear Revolution," 755.



their methodology had been either to kill or be killed.<sup>38</sup> Their methodology has left a profound impact on religiously-motivated terrorist groups particularly Muslims.

Pakistan's nuclear and security establishments have learned several lessons from these incidents. It has beefed up the security of its nuclear installations. The recruitment process has been made foolproof to avoid possible induction of individuals keeping sympathies for a particular religious group. Strict scrutiny process will erode the possibility that rough elements may seek inside support concerning technical know-how or transfer of fissile material. Additional techniques to counterterrorism can be planting/ mushrooming of as many agents as possible. This technique was adopted by Israeli counterterrorism agency Shin Bet to eliminate terrorism. It was an impressive technique wherein the Israeli agency reduced the level of violence from 20 attacks per week to 1 per year.

Third, the possible reaction may be to use a nuclear device, without making demands or creating a hostage-like situation, as soon as it is possessed by the terrorists. The decision to carry out terrorist strikes, involving nuclear or fissile material, may be made in hesitate. Several factors can influence terrorist decision i.e. advancement of technology has enabled states to detect nuclear or fissile material, which therefore cannot be transferred without the state's support. If, terrorists somehow steal or take control of radioactive material it can, as mentioned earlier, be easily detected. Due to the psychological pressure, intense situations and heightened security terrorists may not be able to achieve their potential targets. However, the use of a crude nuclear device would or nuclear bomb would cause considerable damage it would also gain significant media attention. Perhaps, after the 9/11 attacks, terrorists will now never be able to cause huge destruction by using traditional conventional means. They have used all possible means to cause damage and gain the attention of the media. Al-Qaeda, under its new chief perhaps has not carried out significant achievement. The organization's silence may be interpreted as its leadership is on the run due to the disturbance created by the drone strikes. However, Al Zawahiri, the new commander of the organization perhaps may be planning a masterpiece, involving nuclear material, to catch the world by surprise and shock it.

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<sup>38</sup>Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism*, 141.

## **Conclusion**

Enormous material has been produced on nuclear terrorism and Al-Qaeda, which is regarded as a desperate non-state actor, attempting to acquire nuclear material. The agenda behind this quest is to implement its nefarious design, to hit its target with nuclear crude device or weapon. However, the landscape of probe, to avert the possible scenario of nuclear terrorism, should be broadened. The international community in its effort to avoid nuclear terrorism should keep strict check and balance on all terrorist groups irrespective of their religion, race, color, or creed, due to their technical expertise. Al-Qaeda analysts/ operatives can dig this vacuum and hire their services, to transport nuclear material/ technology at the target site, by offering monetary benefits.

Governments should also educate and train their masses to keep an eye on their surroundings as effective counterinsurgency can only be pursued with public support. Once public sympathies to terrorists are denied, as a result, terrorist recruitment will also be declined which will effectively reduce the chances of terrorism including the likely scenarios involving nuclear terrorism.

## The status of multiculturalism in Pakistan

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### ABSTRACT

*Modern states are plagued with the issues of diversity which require a political solution. Though there cannot be a universal solution fitting every state, every state strives for a contextual solution to face diversity. Pakistan, being dominantly a Muslim state, has cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious minorities none of which is in the position to demand self-government but accommodation and recognition by the dominant group. The blasphemy law and high degree of Islamization have aggravated the position of minorities which require modification. Muslim-Minority relations are also affected by international events. The present study is an attempt to highlight the status of multiculturalism and issues of minorities by projecting the political and constitutional structure of Pakistan with an emphasis on the blasphemy law. It will show the history and expression of ethnicity and the complaints of the religious minorities. In the end, it will dig out some recommendations to provide a favorable environment for minorities in Pakistan.*

**Key Words:** Multiculturalism, Pakistan, Ethnicity, Blasphemy law, Ulema.

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## **Introduction**

Pakistan got independence on August 14, 1947, and was territorially divided into two parts, separated by about 1,000 miles of India. One condition that facilitates unifying a new nation, namely territorial contiguity was absent. It was composed of five provinces; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP), Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan, and East Bengal and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Urdu became the national language of Pakistan, chosen to facilitate inter-provincial communication between the country's diverse linguistic populations. Although only about 7.5% of Pakistanis speak it as their first language, it is spoken as a second and often third language by nearly all Pakistanis. English became the official language of Pakistan. It is widely used within the government. Nearly all schools, colleges and universities use English as the medium of instruction. Amongst the more educated social circles of Pakistan, English is seen as the language of upward mobility and its use is becoming more prevalent in upper social circles often spoken alongside native Pakistani languages.

Around 93 % of the population of Pakistan is Muslims out of which 22% are Shia and 78% are Sunni. There are religious minorities dominant among which are Hindu, Christians, Ahmadiyya, Kalash, Parsis Sikh, and Jews. So far, Pakistan has got three constitutions (1956, 1962 and 1973) all of them have shades of Islam. The constitution of 1973 is more Islamic oriented. The name of the state is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Islam has been declared as the state religion (Article 2). The president (Article 41/2) and the prime minister (article 91/3) must be Muslims. Specific provisions have also been given for the protection of minorities.

Ethnic Punjabis make the majority of Pakistan's population. They are well represented in political, bureaucratic, and military establishments. For Punjabis, ethnicity is not as much a matter of public discourse as it is for others. Punjabi is largely a spoken language, while Urdu rules as the written medium. Pakhtuns, Balochs, Sindhis, and lately Muhajirs are relatively more conscious of their ethnicity as minority communities. They demand a fair share of political authority and economic development as well as the preservation of their cultural and linguistic heritage.

In the beginning, the provinces, particularly East Pakistan, demanded recognition of their cultural and linguistic distinctions and protection of their economic interests while refugees coming from India asserted their claim to citizenship based on Islamic bonds. The raising of all these voices alarmed the ruling

clique, driving it to perceive dissents as a threat to national unity. Jinnah's saying "Unity, Faith and Discipline" became its rallying cry for demanding conformity. National unity was often defined as homogenization. It was seldom conceived as unity built on diversity.

The question of the basis of Pakistan's nationhood resurfaced in the process of constitution-making. The *ulema* (religious scholars) pressed for what Ishtiaq Ahmed calls "the sacred state excluding human will" (Ahmad, 1987: 87). Sayyid Abul-A'la Maudoodi, the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami, for example, maintained: "The Shariah ... prescribes directives for the regulation of our individual as well as collective life ... (touching) such varied subjects as religious rituals, personal character, morals, habits, family relations ... laws of war and peace" (Ahmad, 1987: 95). The position of the *ulema* was self-serving and fundamentalist in conception. On the other hand, the intelligentsia wanted to give a liberal interpretation to the principles of Islam and was not prepared to give such wide powers over their personal life to *the ulema*. Yet any discourse about Islam was too sacred to be rejected altogether. There were more democratic versions of the Islamic order proposed during the constitutional debates, with wider space for individual freedom and choices of civic life. Ishtiaq Ahmed calls them, "The sacred state admitting human will" (Ahmad, 1987: 121).

The Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly on 12<sup>th</sup> of March 1949, as a statement of constitutional principles, sought to combine modern liberal ideas such as democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice with the desire of Muslims "to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with ... teachings and requirements... Quran and Sunnah" (Constituent Assembly, 1949:1–2). The Objectives Resolution represented a compromise between the Islamic promises of Pakistan and democratic liberal notions of individual freedom and social justice. Yet, as the subsequent history of Pakistan shows, it did not resolve the "identity crisis" of Pakistan. A nondenominational liberal-democratic state based on the Muslim majority's moral order was another option feebly in play for the national identity of Pakistan. Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan), in his inaugural speech to the newly formed Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947, laid out such an ideal as the unifying principle of the state. He proclaimed: "every one of you...is first and last a citizen of the state with equal rights...you may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state..." This speech seemed to change the whole rationale of Pakistan (Ahmad, 1987: 141). The secularists have often relied on this speech in support of their vision of Pakistan, although their voices have been steadily marginalized.

However, in 1971 the eastern wing of Pakistan (known as East Pakistan) separated from the western wing and became Bangladesh. This event left the rest of Pakistan with only four provinces and FATA, which are contiguous but has a multicultural status. Present Pakistan is a country of pluralist traditions. Each of its provinces has a distinct mix of languages and ethnic stocks. There are numerous dialects, changing almost every hundred miles (Qadeer, 2006: 40). Independence (August 14, 1947) brought refugees from India who were ethnically and linguistically different from the original residents of the receiving regions. This process further extended the diversity of population and patterns of living, particularly in Sindh and Punjab. It also laid bases for the ethnic strife in the competition for jobs, political power, and state patronage. Immigrants to Karachi transformed it from a Sindhi port city to an Urdu-speaking metropolis, triggering feelings of distrust between Sindhis and Muhajirs (the Urdu-speaking refugees from India). Sindh's ethnic and linguistic split has aligned along the urban-rural divide. Muhajirs have spread out in cities and Sindhis continue to dominate in villages and towns.

Baluchistan is a multicultural province divided into regions dominated by Balochs, Barohis, Pakhtuns, Jats, and small clusters of other ethnic minorities. Its dominant language is Baluchi which is spoken as the first language by about 3.5% of Pakistanis. In the 1980s, the province received a large number of Afghan refugees, tilting the demographic and social balance toward Pakhtun in northern and central districts.

Punjab's diversity of dialects, Saraiki and Pothohari contrasting with the heartland Punjabi, was striking at the time of independence. Since then, the increased mobility of the population and the absorption of refugees from India have stimulated homogenizing tendencies both linguistically and ethnically. The dominant language of Punjab is Punjabi which is spoken as a first language by more than 44% of Pakistanis.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP), although symbolically a Pakhtun region, is also a province of many ethnicities and languages, for example, Hindku-speaking people inhabits the Peshawar Valley and Hazara district, and Saraiki speakers are found in the Derajats. However, the dominant language is Pashto which is spoken as a first language by 15.5% of Pakistanis.

Sindh is more diverse than the rest of the provinces composed of the natives Sindhis, a dominant portion of the Hindu minority and the Muhajir from India at the time of independence. The Muhajir is largely concentrated in the urban areas while the native Sindhis are in the rural area. The dominant language is Sindhi which is spoken as a first language by 15.5% of Pakistanis.

The existence of a multiplicity of ideas about Pakistan is not a symptom of its ideological weakness. It is the misguided attempt to silence divergent voices with state authority and political intimidation that has not allowed the ideological contradictions to be resolved and a dynamic consensus to be formed. The unresolved ideological conflicts have created a persistent identity crisis in Pakistan (Isphani, 2003: 22–3).

This study is an attempt to analyze the status of the multiculturalism of Pakistan. After a brief introduction in section first, the second section presents the social history of the ethnicity of Pakistan. The third section focuses on the social expressions of ethnicity and says that ethnicity is visibly woven into the politics of Pakistan, but it also underlies social relations and affects the economic and social organization. The fourth section gives a brief picture of the position of the religious minorities in the various constitutional instruments and their constitutional safeguards while the fifth section gives a brief sketch of the various religious minorities in Pakistan. The sixth section concludes the paper along with forwarding some recommendations.

### **Social History of Ethnicity**

Pakistan is an ethno-national state. Its nationalism is based on the Muslims' claim of being a distinct religion-cultural nation. Yet soon after independence, the provincial ethnicities started to surface. Pakhtun nationalism was rampant in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP); Bengali students rioted for their language rights, and Refugees settled in Karachi became conscious of their ethno-linguistic identity. Struggling for an appropriate share in economic development, maintaining cultural and linguistic identity, and preserving a degree of self-rule were the motives that agitated ethnic interests. After the first flush of independence, the theme that stirred ethnic consciousness was the perceived disparity of opportunities for refugees and locals in Sindh. Sindhi leaders protested the resettlement of refugees on their lands. Punjabi and Bengali politicians resented the domination of those came from the United Province in the national power structure. Urdu-speaking public officials migrating from India had an edge in positions of authority in the new state (Waseem, 1994: 242). Stereotypically, they were assumed to be favoring their co-ethnics to the disadvantage of the locals. These were the first stirrings of provincialism, which is the sentiment of solidarity with people from the province of one's origin and ethnicity. The inequalities of access to jobs have been the most potent force of ethnic discontent in Pakistan. Bengalis' main grievance against the state of Pakistan was the disparity in civil and military appointments (Rizvi, 2000: 187). The anti-Ahmadi movement in Punjab in 1953 was inflamed with accusations of Ahmadiyyas appropriating 'high positions'. Muhajirs in Karachi were aroused by the shift in the civil service quotas. All small provinces

have long been aggrieved about Punjabis' domination in the military and civil administration. One could sum up the history of Pakistan's political crises and ethnic nationalism in terms of fights over job quotas (Qadeer, 2006: 69).

The next major threshold in the rise of ethnic consciousness was the merger of four western provinces into the One-Unit in 1955. This destruction of the historic provincial polities aroused regionalism and ignited distrust toward Punjabis. Restoration of the four provinces was a demand voiced in all parts of West Pakistan in the 1968 anti-Ayub protests. The dissolution of the One-Unit in 1969 was an acknowledgment that ethnicity and language were the defining realities of Pakistani society. Public authority continued to be concentrated in the federal government, although the 1973 constitution envisaged a high measure of provincial autonomy. Not all ethnic groups gained equally from Bhutto's (being a Sindhi) policy. Urdu speakers of Karachi were alienated by the reservation of jobs and educational opportunities for Sindhis. This alienation helped consolidate the Muhajir ethnicity both socially and politically. The suppression of the KP and Baluchistan provincial governments sparked protests in these provinces. Pakhtun leaders were persecuted to suppress demands for provincial autonomy. The Baloch tribal insurrection of the Bhutto era was defined by Mr. Bizenjo, the deposed governor and a *Sardar* of Baluchistan, and some Leninist theorists as the struggle for 'nationality rights', implying the rights of secession and self-determination for linguistic and cultural minorities (Ahmad, 1998: 1-11).

General Zia deployed Islam to override ethnic nationalism. When Sindhis' disaffection with the Zia regime turned into a sustained agitation under the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in the 1980s, his government leaned towards Muhajir to counterbalance MRD. Sociologically, these political maneuverings fostered interethnic strife, widening the gulf among ethnic communities living side by side in Karachi, Hyderabad, and other cities of Sindh. The mutual distrust between Sindhis and Muhajirs turned into endemic ethnic violence. Sindhi–Muhajir–Pakhtun riots flared repeatedly during the 1985–8 period (Qadeer, 2006: 283). Since then, the social distance between these groups has widened so much that violence can erupt almost any time on a rumor or traffic accident.

For Baluchistan and the KP Provinces, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its aftermath were the transforming events of the 1980s. These two border provinces were host to about three million Afghan refugees whose presence changed their demography and political culture. As a result, Baluchistan became a Pakhtun majority province. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Pakhtuns' ethnicity has been overlaid with Islamic conservatism of the Taliban variety. Islamic ideology itself is being Pakhtoonized with



the incorporation of tribal traditions as the authentic elements of Islam. Even the leadership of Islamic movements in Pakistan has passed on to Pakhtun heads of *madrassa* (seminaries) and political leaders.

### **Social Expressions of Ethnicity**

Ethnicity is visibly woven into the politics of Pakistan, but it also underlies social relations and affects the economic and social organization. Ethnicity represents 'roots' for an individual. Provincial ethnic communities are not organized as social structures, rather as solidarities that have a common heritage, language(s), values, beliefs, and myths but few, if any, institutions. They are moral communities. There are no province-wide institutions that link members together except some political and cultural associations which are the common expressions of ethnicity, particularly those of minority communities, in a multiethnic society. Ethnicity in Pakistan works from inside out beginning with family, clan, and kin and extending to the tribe, *biradari*, or caste and through them merging into Pakhtoon, Muhajir, or other cultural/territorial community. For example, a Punjabi is first a Qureshi, Butt or Choudhry, as is a Baloch first Brohi or a Bugti. *Biradari* in Punjab and clans and tribes in KP, Sindh, and Baluchistan are the groups whose identity, values or approval have a direct bearing on an individual's status, heritage, and identity. The prevailing provincial ethnicity is not the primary reference point for people's behavior. For example, marriages are not contracted freely among, say, Punjabis or Pakhtun, but within specific clans and *biradari* and even within these groups with cousins or other blood relatives. Kinship networks and clan identities plan the everyday life of a Pakistani. They are the channels through which the broader ethnic bonds are routed. But ethnic bonds and identities in Pakistan do not prevail in all situations. Social movements and religious or sectarian loyalties and political ideologies can trump them. Even within a tribe or *biradari*, Sunnis would not normally marry Shias, although they may unite in disputes with other clans or tribes. Jinnah, a Bohra from Bombay, Bhutto, a Sindhi, and even Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabi, could energize people across ethnic boundaries in support of their political programs (Qadeer, 2006: 70-1).

### **Religious Minorities and their Constitutional Safeguards**

Though the Objectives Resolution (March 12, 1949) guaranteed fundamental rights to religious minorities on equality basis with Muslim citizens, it was highly criticized by the minorities. It provided that adequate provision should be made for the minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures. In the first constitution promulgated in 1956, the office of President was reserved for Muslims only, though the Speaker of the National Assembly (who could act as the President in the absence or death

of the President) could be a non-Muslim. Similar was the case of the 1962 constitution. In the constitution of 1973 Islam has been declared as the state religion of Pakistan. Article 227 again stipulates that all laws should conform with Islamic principles (other than the personal laws of non-Muslims, i.e. in the matter such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance). The position of Prime Minister is also reserved exclusively for Muslims in addition to that of President (article 41/2). In 1977 Prime Minister Bhutto, himself, not a fundamentalist and supporting a secularist ideology, gave in to opposition's demands and announced the introduction of Shariah law and changed the weekly holiday from Sunday to Friday. Zia is said to have appropriated into the state the powers of religious institutions. Many *ulemas* became participants in policy-making and higher echelons of Zia's administration without going through a democratic process (Gabriel, 2007: 43).

However, minorities are equal citizens of Pakistan. A quota of 10 and 4 has been reserved for the non-Muslim in the National Assembly and Senate respectively. Article 25 of the 1973 constitution says that all citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law. Article 20 provides that every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion; and every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions. Article 21 provides safeguard against taxation for purposes of any particular religion. No person shall be compelled to pay any special tax the proceeds of which are to be spent on the propagation or maintenance of any religion other than his own. Article 22 provides safeguards to educational institutions in respect of religion, etc. It says that no person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own. In respect of any religious institution, there shall be no discrimination against any community in granting exemption or concession about taxation. Subject to law: no religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any educational institution maintained wholly by that community or denomination; and no citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution receiving aid from public revenues on the ground only of race, religion, caste or place of birth. Article 27 provides that no citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in the service of Pakistan shall be discriminated against in respect of any such appointment on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth. Similarly, article 36 says the state shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the federal and provincial services.

## **Religious Minorities in Pakistan**

**I. Christians:** Christians have a population of 1.59%. In a poll, 92% of Christians said that they are resolved to be a good Pakistani (Butler and Chagathai, 1994: 346). However, Christians in Pakistan complain that they are often looked down upon owing to their origins from the lower echelons of society such as the *chuhras* (sweepers). The majority community, in any case, will tend to look down upon them as inferior citizens such as the *Ahl al dhimma*. The Islamic State is ideological not a national state. Non-Muslims cannot participate in policy-making but only in administration (Butler and Chagathai, 1994: 338). Christians are not arguing for a separate autonomy or rights as a community but freedom to function as fully autonomous individuals in a liberal democratic nation with equal opportunities and with equal access to education, technology, employment, etc. (Gabriel, 2007: 45). However, many Muslims associate Christians with the colonial regime or the West.

Christians complain that the educational system in Pakistan is to some extent vitiated by religious bias and intolerance. This is certainly a consequence of the escalating Islamisation of the state that had its greatest momentum during the regime of Zia-ul-Haque. The Justice and Peace Commission of the Roman Catholic Church of Pakistan has pointed out that syllabi are not based on democratic values and are discriminatory to non-Muslim students (The Christian Voice, 25 July 2004). The Christian Voice (11 April 2004) also pointed out that educational materials are insensitive to religious minorities. Islamization has filtered into even other subjects such as History, Civics and Social Studies. Islamiyat spills over into other subjects, even into the study of English and Urdu. Gabriel (2006: 49) says that the depiction of Christianity at higher-level classes is negative. The Christian Voice (11 April 2004) alleges that textbooks contain hate material about the Hindus. Some texts define Pakistan as a Muslim country while India as a Hindu country. This depiction of religiously pluralistic nations is evidently erroneous and calculated to incite hatred of minorities and a neighboring nation.

**II. Hindus:** It is the biggest religious minority and constitutes about 1.83% (which is the 5<sup>th</sup> largest population of Hindu) of the population of 170 million. They live primarily in the urban areas of the province of Sindh in the lower Indus valley and over half of them are concentrated in the south-east district of Tharparkar which borders India (Report of Pakistan Hindu Council). The Pakistan Hindu Panchayat and the Pakistani Hindu Welfare Association are the primary civic organizations that represent and organize Hindu communities on social, economic, religious and political issues. Other minority commissions are dealing with specific issues concerning minorities.

The increasing Islamization of Pakistan and antagonism against India has been an influential factor in the grievances of Hindus. Hindus complain that the promulgation of *Shariah* has increased the marginalization of Hindus and other minorities. Following the Babri Mosque riots in India, riots, and attacks on Hindus in retaliation increased; Hindus in Pakistan are routinely affected by communal incidents in India and violent developments on the Kashmir conflict between the two nations. Hindu minorities, under Taliban rule in Swat district of KP, were forced to wear Red headgear such as turbans as a symbol of Dhimmi. In July 2010, around 60 members of the minority Hindus in Karachi were attacked and ethnically cleansed following an incident when a Hindu youth drank from a water tap near an Islamic mosque (Press Trust of India, July 12, 2010). Hindus say that for the upholders of the Ideology of Pakistan, the existence of Pakistan is defined only juxtaposition to Hindus, and hence the Hindus have to be painted as negatively as possible (Nayyar and Salim, 2003). A 2005 report by the National Commission for Justice and Peace, a nonprofit organization in Pakistan, found that Pakistan Studies textbooks in Pakistan have been used to articulate the hatred that Pakistani policy-makers have attempted to inculcate towards the Hindus. From the government-issued textbooks, students are taught that Hindus are backward and superstitious (The Daily Times (Pakistan), April 25, 2006).

**III. Kalash:** The Kalash or Kalasha is an ethnic group found in the Chitral district of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan. Although quite numerous before the 20<sup>th</sup> century, this non-Muslim group has been partially assimilated by the larger Muslim majority of Pakistan and seen its numbers decrease over the past century. Today, sheikhs, or converts to Islam, make up more than half of the total Kalasha-speaking population.

The culture of Kalash people is unique and differs drastically from the various ethnic groups surrounding them. They are polytheists and nature plays a highly significant and spiritual role in their daily life. As part of their religious tradition, sacrifices are offered and festivals held. Kalash mythology and folklore have been compared to that of ancient Greece. Some scholars have speculated that the Kalash might derive from the direct descendants of Greek settlers, or of members of the army of Alexander the Great (Sikander Khan, The News, May 15, 2007). Recently, the people of Kalash have been able to stop their demographic and cultural spiral towards extinction and have been on the rebound. Increased international awareness, a more tolerant government, and monetary assistance have allowed them to continue their way of life.

Allegations of immorality connected with their practices have led to the forcible conversion to Islam of several villages in the 1950s, which has led to heightened antagonism between the Kalash and the surrounding Muslims. Rehman and Ali (2001: 163) report that the pressure of radical Muslim organizations is on the increase: "Ardent Muslims on self-imposed missions to eradicate idolatry regularly attack those engaged in traditional Kalash religious rituals, smashing their idols.

Historically, a goat herding and subsistence farming people, the Kalash are moving towards a cash-based economy whereas previously wealth was measured in livestock and crops. Tourism now makes up a large portion of the economic activities of the Kalash. To cater to these new visitors, small stores and guest houses have been erected, providing new luxury for visitors of the valleys. People attempting to enter the valleys have to pay a toll to the Pakistani government, which is used to preserve and care for the Kalash people and their culture (Rehman and Ali, 2001: 163).

The language of the Kalash is Kalasha and Pashto. In contrast to the surrounding Pakistani culture, the Kalash do not in general separate males and females or frown on contact between the sexes. However, menstruating girls and women are sent to live in the "*bashaleni*," the village menstrual building, during their periods, until they regain their purity. They are also required to give birth in the *bashaleni*. There is also a ritual restoring purity to a woman after childbirth which must be performed before a woman can return to her husband (Parkes, 1990: 131).

Marriage by elopement is rather frequent, also involving women who are already married to another man. Indeed, wife-elopement is counted as one of the "great customs" together with the main festivals. Girls are usually married at an early age. If a woman wants to change husbands, she will write a letter to her prospective husband offering herself in marriage and informing the would-be groom how much her current husband paid for her. This is because the new husband must pay double if he wants her. For example, if the current husband paid one cow for her, then the new husband must pay two cows to the original husband if he wants her. Wife-elopement may lead in some rare cases to a quasi-feud between clans until peace is negotiated by mediators, in the form of the double bride-price paid by the new husband to the ex-husband (Aparna and Monika, 2000: 273). The dead are buried above ground in ornamented wooden coffins. Wooden effigies are erected at the graves of wealthy or honored people (Maggi, 2001: 159). The uniform school syllabus and emphasis on Urdu and Arabic in the official schools in the valleys are barriers to Kalasha maintaining their own religious-cultural identity.

**IV. Ahmadiyya:** The Ahmadi population is 3.1-4.2% of the total population of Pakistan (The Economist. 13 January 2010). Its founder was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. It accepts four of the five basic principles of Islam, namely prayer five times a day, the Ramadan fast, the Pilgrimage to Mecca (*Hajj*) and alms-giving. They do not accept the fifth principle, that of the *Jihad* or Holy War against non-believers. Many beliefs are controversial between the mainstream Muslims and the Ahmadiyyas like the return of Jesus, Jesus as the son of Mary, the status of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the definition of Muslim, the finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH) and Jihad.

Pakistan has officially declared the Ahmadiyyas as non-Muslims. Their freedom of religion has been curtailed by a series of ordinances, acts and constitutional amendments (Friedmann, 2003: 98). In 1974 Pakistan's parliament adopted a law declaring Ahmadiyyas to be non-Muslims. The 1973 constitution was amended to define a Muslim "as a person who believes in the finality of the Prophet Muhammad" (Kamran, 2008: 120). In 1984 General Zia-ul-Haque, the then military ruler of Pakistan issued Ordinance XX which forbids Ahmadiyyas to call themselves Muslim or to "pose as Muslims" (Khan, 2005: 178). This means that they are not allowed to profess the Islamic creed publicly or call their places of worship mosques (Heiner, 1995: 587). Ahmadiyyas in Pakistan are also barred by law from worshipping in non-Ahmadiyya mosques or public prayer rooms, performing the Muslim's call to prayer, using the traditional Islamic greeting in public, publicly quoting from the Quran, preaching in public, seeking converts, or producing, publishing, and disseminating their religious materials. These acts are punishable by imprisonment of up to three years (Khan, 2005: 183). In applying for a passport or a national identity card, all Pakistanis are required to sign an oath declaring Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to be an impostor prophet and all Ahmadiyyas to be non-Muslims (Khan, 2005: 187). Ahmadiyyas are considered to be the least deserving minority in terms of equal opportunities and civil rights (Rahman, January 2005).

**V. Jews:** A tiny Jewish community remains in Karachi, Pakistan. There are 15 independent communities in Pakistan. Efforts are being made to unite these into a larger Jewish Community of Pakistan and Kashmir. Jews demand the restoration of Jew synagogues, the right to exist as free individuals, respect for Jewish religious practices, and the right to vote and have separate representation in the Assembly. Jews have the following social and religious organizations:

1. Magain Shalome Synagogue, Karachi.
2. Young Man's Jewish Association, Karachi.
3. Karachi Bene Israel Relief Fund, Karachi and

4. Karachi Jewish Syndicate.

**VI. Sikhs:** Sikhs have a negligible population inhabited the largest cities in Punjab such as Lahore, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The Sikhs in Pakistan have good relations with the majority Muslim population.

Minority rights in law have been seriously compromised by the introduction of measures involving enforcement of the *Shariah* during Zia-ul-Haque's regime. The rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic state are that conferred by the *Shariah*. The Blasphemy Law in the Pakistan Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code is a significant factor in non-Muslim-Muslim relations. The issue of the Blasphemy Law in Pakistan came to the limelight during the regime of General Zia (1977-1988). In 1985 he added clauses 295 B and 295 C which *inter alia* stipulated the death penalty for defaming the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Article 295 deals with injuring or defiling a place of worship to wound religious sensibilities of any faith. The penalty prescribed is two years in prison or fine or both. Article 295A pertains to deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any group by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. The punishment is ten years in prison or fine or both. Article 295B relates to the defiling of a copy of the Holy Quran. The penalty is life imprisonment. Finally, the most controversial of the laws, 295 C, relates to derogatory remarks in respect of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). This offense entails capital punishment or life imprisonment. In 1990 the religious parties took the matter to the Federal Shariah Court, stating that there should be a mandatory death sentence for this offense, and the Shariah court acquiesced. Thus the alternative life imprisonment clause was deleted from 295 C (Gabriel, 2006: 60).

The Ahmadiyya considers itself to be a Muslim sect considered to be extremely heretical by Orthodox Muslims, and therefore, there are provisions in the Blasphemy Law that relate to it specifically. In addition to the earlier provisions more elaborate regulations were also put in place by General Zia which include questioning of the finality of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). This is no doubt a challenge to the Ahmadiyya who believe that the institution of prophets by God carried on after Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the sect, as the Prophet of the twentieth century. A serious deficiency in the Blasphemy Law as it stands is that it relates to the religious sensibilities of the Muslims alone.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Pakistan is a plural country where equal citizenship based on unfettered human rights could lead to many improvements. This can only happen if the country's leaders and opinion-makers act more responsibly and avoid inciting hatred by preaching tolerance and coexistence. The Pakistani ruling elite must revisit Jinnah's vision of a tolerant, plural and democratic Pakistan, anchored on the principles of equal citizenship and other rights, irrespective of caste, creed or gender. Such an idea was the original creed of the movement for Pakistan and forms a point of consensus for a vast majority of the population even today.

Pakistan is a multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic and multi-ethnic society. A major part of the minority population is poor, illiterate, thus socially and economically marginalized. Despite all these adverse circumstances, there have been attempts to improve inter-religious relations. The Ministry of Religious and Minority Affairs is a body that has been instituted to safeguard the constitutional rights and welfare of minorities. The Federal Advisory Council for Minority Affairs is another organization with minority representatives. District Minority Committees also exist. In 1985 a non-lapsable special fund for the uplift and welfare of minorities has also been created. One of its remits is to assist individuals and families financially in dire straits. The National Commission for Minorities established in 1993 is another body constituted for safeguarding the interests of minorities. These bodies should be strengthened institutionally and economically.

The constitution guarantees the right to freedom of belief; every religious denomination has the right to maintain its religious institutions and is exempted from payment of any special tax raised in the interest of a religion other than its own. No one can be required to receive instruction in a religion, or join a religious ceremony related to a belief other than his own but on the contrary, there are several laws and regulations, especially the articles and provisions of the constitution, which discriminate against religious minorities. While some provisions treat Muslim citizens preferentially, the others just ignore the fact that Pakistan is a multi-religious society.

There are several regulations and policies concerning; syllabus for education institutions, government-controlled media, a concession for the inmates in jail, admissions and filling vacancies that are based on biases for religious minorities. The minorities' lives and properties are threatened as a reaction to events abroad. When the Babri Mosque was demolished in India many temples and churches were demolished



in Pakistan. The institutions of the Christian community came under intense attacks after the September 2001 events.

Fundamentalist activities, among other factors, are encouraged by poverty and disillusion. As admitted by the government, every third Pakistani is living below the poverty line. The economic and political empowerment of the people on an equal basis through a system of joint electorates with some special incentives, seats, and safeguards for minorities can help Pakistan to achieve lasting social cohesion. The initiatives have to come from the government in areas including communication, constitution, education, electoral politics, employment, and general law and order. Further, a greater awareness of the obligations and attributes of pluralism is an urgent need. Pakistani nationalism must symbolize the plural realities of society rather than demanding or imposing unitary nationhood.

To harmonize the majority-minorities relationship in Pakistan the following recommendations should be given a practical hearing.

- I. Independent commissions for racial, religious and gender equality, or similar institutions, should be set up, to receive and investigate complaints, to offer advice to victims of discrimination and to undertake awareness-raising activities to promote the principles of non-discrimination and understanding between different communities. The government should undertake measures to promote awareness of the value of diversity, minority rights, and the contribution of various communities to the culture and history of Pakistan, for example, by introducing new elements into school curricula.
- II. The authorities should ensure that religious and other minorities can participate in all aspects of public life. They may consider a wide range of mechanisms for ensuring participation of minorities in decision-making, including reserved seats in government and consultative bodies on the national and local level covering matters of concern to minorities, and forms of cultural or territorial autonomy.
- III. Measures should be undertaken to ensure that minorities can participate in economic and public life without discrimination, including monitoring of recruitment practices and punitive measures against those found to be discriminating against minority applicants.
- IV. Pakistan should ensure that all laws, policies, and practices comply with its obligations under international law and conventions. It should take immediate steps to ratify and implement all of the remaining major human rights instruments, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

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## Impact of Afghan War on the Radicalization

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### ABSTRACT

*Religious radicalization has emerged as a tangible threat in the Post-Soviet Union global milieu. The term used as radicalization has mainly been attributed to Islamic fundamentalism, linked with brewing militancy in the Muslim countries. Afghanistan and Pakistan have been serious victims of violence initiated by religious zealots, especially after the eventful day of 11 September when Al-Qaeda affiliated militants carried out terrorist attacks on the American mainland. The US responded with the invasion of Afghanistan, removing the Taliban Regime from Kabul and initiating a global hunt against its once allies during Afghan Jihad. During the American led war against Muslim militants, Afghanistan was yet again thrown in endemic violence, while neighboring Pakistan those once hosted Jihadists from all over the world for resistance against the Red Army also faced serious security challenges. The radicalization process in Pakistan has been a direct outcome of violence in Afghanistan where Jihadi forces, once trained, equipped and sustained by the US now started fighting with its mentor. Islamabad faced a serious challenge from militancy but initiated a well deliberated as well as executed strategy to not only defeat the terrorism but de-radicalize the society also. Pakistan had relatively better gains in its de-radicalization drive and the strategy employed during the process can be adopted by other effected nations as well.*

**Key Words:** Buffer State, Global Power Politics, Soviet Invasion, Jihad, Afghan Resistance, President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, CIA, Mujahedeen, Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Radicalization, Al-Qaida and Taliban, Islamic Extremism, 9/11 Terrorist Attacks, De-radicalization, Punitive Measures, Preventive Measures, National Action Plan.

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## **Background**

The post-cold war international arena is confronting numerous challenges ranging from the effects of globalization that inextricably intertwines the peace and stability of the whole world, to the radicalization of the masses which potentially leads to extremism. The phenomenon of radicalization gained currency in the aftermath of American led war against terror and, now the menace has proliferated to an extent that most of the world considers it a tangible threat. The predominantly al-Qaida and Taliban linked terrorism emanating from Afghanistan is no more the lone concern; a congregation of extremist outfits has mushroomed over the years, which has been threatening to swarm the entire globe. Notwithstanding the global rejection of terrorism, the narrative continues to expand as the dogma is attracting the masses in many areas, while large swathes of territories remain breeding places for the extremist ideologies.

There are numerous academic debates as well as a day in and day out seminars in most parts of the world to comprehend what the challenge is, and how to address this issue; however, development of a consensus insight regarding the actual threat and formulation of a shared vision on way forward remains elusive. The prospects of public radicalization at mass scales in many parts of the South Asian region and the ultimate transition of this trend into violent political movements are as viable as ever. The talk of Islamic terrorism is no more restricted to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region alone; the emergence of outfits like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and their reach into the areas previously considered safe, has added a new dimension of radicalization challenge to the contemporary world. Besides debating the implications of terrorism, there is a need to find out its motives and also the external factors due to global power struggle that have contributed to brewing the radicalization phenomenon. With available literary work mainly promoting a one-sided narrative, it becomes even more challenging to accumulate neutral as well as unbiased references on a sensitive subject like radicalization.

## **The Menace of Radicalization**

Radicalization may be regarded as the tendency of possessing obstinate views on any issue and intolerant response towards diverging opinions; the word "radical" has always been an exceedingly vast term, reflecting all shades of fanatic human behaviors. Notwithstanding that the threat being deliberated here is primarily linked with the religious extremism that promotes militancy; the prevailing radicalization hypothesis steers us away from the real causes of terrorism. Moreover,

Islam happened to exist extensively on the wrong side of the global divide needs no great effort to prove; with few exceptions, the Islamic world is almost entirely within the boundaries of the South (Elnur, 2003, p. 63). Religious intolerance in the region where Pakistan is located has never been an eternal motivation of the masses; nevertheless, the rise of Islamic militancy can be attributed to several internal as well as external intricacies. Like Communism before it, "Islamic fundamentalism" evokes images of a deadly virus spread by revolutionary regimes, such as Iran and Sudan, whose alleged aim is to develop a Pan-Islamic bloc rich in resources and potentially armed with an "Islamic bomb" to wage jihad against the West (Niva, 1998, p. 26).

The narrative of Islamic extremism and projection of its links with militancy does not appear to be a retaliatory strategy against a rationally perceived threat; it seems rather a judiciously crafted endeavor to device a rallying point for the Western /US populace against a common challenge. However, when a political ideology becomes monistic, irrational and uncompromising, and when political conflicts are subjected to violent solutions, then political ideology will have assumed the character of religious fanaticism (Naidu, 2001, p. 6). Moreover, the phenomenon of Islamic extremism is often projected beyond rationality to instill a sense of insecurity among Western masses through a well-deliberated media campaign. Films and television programs routinely vilify Islam as a debased religion and Muslims as little more than hostage-taking terrorists seeking to avenge themselves on innocent Americans; official US policy statements regularly embraced alarmist representations of the "Islamic threat" (Niva, 1998, p. 26).

While narrowing the focus on Pakistan, it would be prudent to assert that there have been various accelerators expediting public radicalization in the country. Notwithstanding the impact of numerous domestic socio-economic attributes of extremist tendencies in the country, the external factor has far more influence and role in the radicalization of the society. In this regard, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and events related to it, have significantly shaped the social construct of Pakistan as the country opted to side with US/ Western camp against Russian forces. Throughout the 1980s the Afghan mujahedeen were, in effect, America's surrogate soldiers in the brutal guerrilla war that became the Soviet Union's Vietnam, a defeat that helped trigger the subsequent collapse of the Communist Empire (Crile, 2003). How far Islamabad has been able to contain this phenomenon and whether the inferences drawn from Pakistan's savvies can be relevant to the others, is essentially what would be discussed in the ensuing paragraphs. It would be imperative

to first determine the motives of public radicalization by evaluating the root-cause of the menace due to external factor, before suggesting the viable cure of this ruinous proclivity.

## **Radicalization in Pakistan**

### **The Influence of Afghan Dynamics**

Pakistan has been confronted with the rising public radicalization as is the case with many of the other regional countries. Ostensibly, the phenomenon may appear as the byproduct of the prevailing domestic environments of the country; however, there are valid arguments to insinuate the overriding influence of external factors that have been shaping the internal dynamics of Pakistan. It would be valid to argue that owing to the existential threats to the state from outside, the political horizon of the country has been overly marred with security challenges while it also did not allow Islamabad to duly concentrate on the socio-economic matrix. Though Pakistan was forced to divert a significant portion of national resources to confront security challenges from its inception; socio-economic milieu never fell below the tolerable threshold.

The South Asian region where Pakistan is located, has immense strategic eminence and it has always remained the focus of international geopolitical as well as geo-economic contests. Historically, the classical notion of Afghanistan as a buffer state consisted principally in the maintenance of a shaking balance, which usually engaged the entire statecraft of the Afghan government, between the two great powers in the region: Britain and Russia (Hauer, 1982). The status quo acquired by imperialist powers through ensuring the neutrality of Afghanistan was hence termed as the 'Great Game'. Afghan territory has since been vital for the national interests of contending powers in the strategically vital South Asian region and thus subject to external meddling in various contexts. The end of the colonial era resulted in the emergence of independent states on the one-time British Indian territory, however, strategic prominence of Afghan lands stayed intact.

After coming into existence as an independent state, Pakistan has mainly been concerned with the developments along its eastern border, however, the events elsewhere in the South Asian region did influence Islamabad's security calculus. Pakistan had to confront a hostile Afghanistan which laid claims on the Pashtun territories of the newly born state; the tussle between Islamabad and Kabul continued with both opting to strengthen dissident groups against each other. Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto formulated a strategy in the 1970s to use Islamist opponents to Kabul to divert Afghan pressure while General Zia-ul-Haq (in power between 1978 and 1988) had accentuated this policy during the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, beginning in 1979 (Chaudet, 2010). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought a serious challenge to Pakistan's doorstep, forcing the country not only to manage refugee exodus but get in the thick of international power politics.

### **Afghan Resistance against the Soviet Invasion**

As the state had remained fervently embedded with its Islamic identity, Pakistan enticed Muslim zealous from all over the world during Afghan resistance. The US opted to rally all such forces that were ideologically averse to communism to wipe out the Soviet influence in Afghanistan; Pakistan, in its turn, became a hub to recruit different Mujahedeen groups as holy warriors and Saudi Arabia financed this religious extremist or radical Islamist groupings (Harshe, 2008, p. 69). The Afghan war invited geopolitical contest between cold war superpowers on the doorsteps of Pakistan, embroiling the country in a situation where siding with the free world almost became inevitable for the ruling hierarchy at Islamabad. While the resistance against the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan was viewed in the National Interest by Pakistani leadership, the Afghan war nevertheless has primarily been a continuation of superpower rivalry in the region.

Consequently, Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter states:

“According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahedeen began during 1980, that is to say after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on Dec 24, 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise. Indeed, it was July 3, 1979, that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion, this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention. That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter. We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War” (as cited by Amineh & Houweling, 2005, p. 52).

Prados (2002) further elaborates American involvement in Afghan dynamics well before the Soviet invasion of the country: -



“While some sources claim the American effort began very early, more concrete evidence of US feelers to the Muslim guerrillas emerges only from early 1979, about the time of the kidnapping and murder of the American ambassador in Kabul, Adolph Dubs. President Jimmy Carter's National Security Council (NSC) considered options for a CIA operation in March and April, and the president approved a proposal forwarded by Zbigniew Brzezinski that July. A decision to expand the project followed a meeting of the NSC Special Coordinating Committee on December 17, 1979. Thus, the inception of the CIA project in Afghanistan preceded the Soviet intervention, with three motorized and airborne divisions and other units, that came on December 25, 1979” (Prados, 2002, p. 467).

The resistance against Soviet forces in Afghanistan essentially transformed into a war between Godless Communist forces and ideologically motivated Islamists assembled from all over the world. In this entire Afghan Jihad, US-led West played a dominant role in mustering the support for Mujahedeen in terms of finances, organization, training, and passage to war theatre from various parts of the Islamic world, especially Arab countries. Ironically, if the US construed the Soviet Union as a state fanatically associated with communism, it chose to fight one kind of fanaticism with another as represented by the Islamic radicals; the US moral and material support for thousands of Mujahedeen who gathered under the flag of jihad to oust the communist presence in Afghanistan began to render legitimacy to religious extremism (Harshe, 2008, p. 69). The highly radicalized Jihadists in Afghanistan were equaled with American forefathers, while resistance against the Soviets was romanticized by the Western media as the just war.

At the time of the Afghan war, the predominant interest of the US and other pro-Mujahedeen countries was the defeat of the Soviet Union with no apparent concern about the potential repercussions of a religiously motivated and externally supported asymmetric war in a politically volatile region. According to American analysts, there were many reasons for giving weapons to the Afghans, even if none of them had anything to do with liberating the country: it was a useful warning to the Soviets not to make any further moves toward the Persian Gulf or into Pakistan; it was a signal that the United States was ready to escalate a covert killing war aimed at Russian soldiers; and because it involved aid to Muslim fundamentalists, it was an extraordinary opportunity to make friends with the Islamic nations that had treated the United States as a virtual enemy because of its support of Israel and the Shah of Iran (Crile, 2003, p. 23).

George Crile while discussing the CIA's involvement in the Afghan war states: -

“At the time, it was viewed as a noble cause, and when the last Soviet soldier walked out of Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, the leaders of the CIA celebrated what they hailed as the Agency’s greatest victory. The cable from the CIA station in Islamabad that day read simply “We won.” But the billions spent arming and training the primitive tribesmen of Afghanistan turned out to have an unintended consequence. In a secret war, the funders take no credit-and any doubt that's why the mujahedeen and their Muslim admirers around the world never viewed US support as a decisive factor in their victory. As they saw it, that honor went to Allah, the only superpower they acknowledge. But for the few who know the extent of the CIA’s involvement, it’s impossible to ignore the central role that America played in this great modern jihad, one that continues to this day” (Crile, 2003, p. 15).

### **Influence of Jihadist Culture**

While Pakistan emerged as a front-line state in the war against Soviets in Afghanistan, in the same period, the Islamic world had also been in a transition mode. The events in Afghanistan coincided with the Iranian Islamic revolution, adding the sectarian dimension into the Pakistani society which was getting increasingly radicalized in the areas mainly adjacent to Afghanistan amid Mujahedeen influx. Tribal Areas located along the Pak-Afghan border turned into small garrison towns, inhabiting religious zealous from all over the Islamic world; most of these foreign jihadists were Arab nationals and the followers of hardliner Sunni Salafist school of thought. On the other hand, the successful Iranian revolution and desire of Iranian leadership to export revolutionary ideology, motivated Shia population, adding sectarian flavor in the radicalization process of the Pakistani society.

The Sectarian divide exacerbated in the Islamic world, resulting in a power tussle between Sunni Arab states and Shia clergy-led Iran. Consequently, Pakistan was an important prize in the struggle for the control of the Persian Gulf, as well as for erecting the 'Sunni wall' around Iran; Saudi Arabia and Iraq, therefore, developed a vested interest in preserving the Sunni character of Pakistan's Islamization (Nasr, 2000, p. 157). The continuous influx of radicalized Sunni Jihadists in Pakistan for Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union and the growing sway of Arab states of Gulf instilled serious concerns among the Pakistani Shia community. Consequently, the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Pakistan's internal affairs through supporting respective sectarian proxies resulted in the radicalization of the society.

The success in the Afghan war avenged American military humiliation in the Soviet-backed Vietnamese guerillas, albeit its ultimate price has been and continues to be paid by the populations of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. It was the biggest secret war in history, but somehow it never registered on the American consciousness; when viewed through the prism of 9/11, the scale of that American support for an army of Muslim fundamentalists seems almost incomprehensible (Crile, 2003). Later, during the course of the Afghan civil war, the international community largely remained indifferent to the regional developments; radicalism kept proliferating. The sole global superpower and the eventual beneficiary of the Afghan war, the US abandoned the region and stayed largely oblivious of the events taking place in Afghanistan. However, a good deal of post-11 September discourse focused on the Islamic factor in the global divides; as Blank (2001) noted “Since the end of the cold war, Muslim fundamentalism seems to have replaced Soviet communism as the West's bugbear of choice” (as cited by Elnur, 2003, p. 62).

### **September 11 Terrorist Attacks & US Response**

The global policies, as well as regional dynamics during anti-Soviet Jihad, had a snowballing effect on the radicalization phenomenon, which ultimately culminated in the incident of 9/11. The US authorities had been pointing out that the Islamic terrorists belonging to al-Qaeda organization and working under Osama bin Laden were responsible for waging a war against the US and for causing the tragedies of 11 September (Naidu, 2001, p. 4). The events of 9/11 prompted many scholars to evaluate the impact of the CIA's secret Afghan war; besides Osama bin Laden, there had been many foreign fighters who after successful Afghan Jihad, turned their attention to other parts of the world. Consequently, in many incidents termed today as terrorist acts around the globe, the involvement of the Afghan war veterans has been evident; the predominant target has now been former mentor America's interests.

As the first of the CIA's project leaders for the Afghan program, Charles G. Cogan, later put it, “The hypothesis that the Mujahedeen would come to the United States and commit terrorist actions did not enter into our universe of thinking at the time” (Prados, 2002, pp. 470-471). Whatever the motive of attacks in the US, the war on terrorism essentially appeared as the anti-Muslim campaign due to the dictums often used by Americans as well as terrorists who once executed Washington's anti-Soviet military strategy in Afghanistan. Pakistan yet again found itself amid the latest imbroglio, compelling the rulers to align the country against its former allies in Afghan Jihad to

avert the wrath of the global hegemon the US. Islamabad's decision to side with the American led global war on terror against the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants resulted in the further radicalization of the society, leading to a long phase of violence in the country.

While Pakistani policymakers were aiming at downplaying the religious dimension of the US-led war against the Taliban led Islamist radical forces in Afghanistan, the American administration was on exactly the other extreme. In preparing the nation for retaliation against Islamic terrorists, the American leaders have appealed to religious sentiments and beliefs of Judaism and Christianity; they sought church and synagogue pulpits, have labeled the terrorists "evil," have declared a "crusade," and have sought God's blessings for America (Naidu, 2001, p. 4). The strategy of inciting public sentiments against terrorist attacks through religious motivation was a very dangerous ploy by the American administration; the initiative may have helped in getting domestic backing of the war but it did have its repercussions, as the events later proved.

Resultantly, greater media involvement in the war events during the American invasion of Afghanistan as well as Iraq did fuel radical sentiments in the entire Muslim world; Pakistan being no exception. The American invasion of two Muslim states was projected as a campaign initiated against Islamist forces on the wrong premise of terrorism, implanting a sense of resentment among the Muslim youth all over the world. Richard Clarke, the senior counter-terrorism official in both the Clinton and the George W. Bush administrations, contends: "the war as seen on television in Islamic countries has dangerously increased the level of frustration, anger, and hatred directed at the US; seeds of future terrorism have been sown" (Byman, 2003, p. 83). The war on terror thus contributed significantly towards further radicalization of not only Afghan society, where Taliban resistance continues even after nearly two decades of 9/11 but Pakistan as well, which had endured bloodied struggle against extremist forces.

While the attack on American mainland by the Al-Qaeda linked militants can never be vindicated, it has, however, been a crime committed by those once patronized and trained by the US as a resistance force against the Red Army. Washington's decision to abandon the region immediately after the Soviet demise manifested classic knee jerk action where potential implications of such a strategy were presumably not debated. Post-Cold War American policies were viewed as anti-Muslim by Afghan war veterans in the Islamic world; consequently, the implication of al-Qaida for the 9/11 attack and the US invasion of Afghanistan was considered as part of the conspiracy.

In response to crusade call, resorting to similar religious appeals the Muslim Mujahedeen and Osama bin Laden declared jihad against the infidel West and have demonized Americans as the enemies of Allah (Naidu, 2001, p. 4).

The Bush administration never paid any heed towards brewing concerns of victimization among Muslim masses and without stabilizing Afghanistan, the US embarked upon another military venture. Hence, the American decision to invade Iraq unilaterally without the United Nation's approval on the clumsy premise of 'weapons of mass destruction' further infuriated the Muslim world; the high handedness of Bush administration further intensified anti-US sentiments. Scholars at Egypt's Al-Azhar University, declared US attack on Iraq to be a "crusade" and called for jihad in response; these were not the voices in the wilderness, but rather the core of the Sunni Muslim religious establishment (Byman, 2003, p. 83). In essence, American military adventurism to eliminate the Islamic extremist elements did little in eradicating this menace and instead strengthened the receptivity of radicalization.

Today, after nearly two-decade of American initiated war against terrorism, Iraq is virtually divided in Shia, Kurd and Sunni parts with perpetual violence while Afghanistan continues to bleed. The scores of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq, the destruction of countries like Syria and Libya, and the targeting of innocents during drone strikes have added up hatred in the Islamic world against American policies. Consequently, American led global war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11 has not only failed to contain Islamic militancy but added fuel to the process of radicalization in the region. The US is believed by many to be opposed to the settlement for its ends; feelings of resentment are generated because of the suspicion that America wants to keep the Afghan conflict alive (Kizilbash, 1988, p. 63). The threat of radicalization is no more limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan alone, the menace is now frightening the entire region in even more intimidating forms.

## **The De-radicalization Process**

### **Pakistan's De-Radicalization Strategy**

There is no denying the fact that compared to radicalization, the process of de-radicalization is far more painstaking, demanding a sustained endeavor at both, the state as well as social levels and implying an all-encompassing approach. The de-radicalization process may evolve various

initiatives and measures; nevertheless, the drive essentially comprises two phases i.e. eradication of prevailing radicalization and prevention of its further proliferation. Consequently, de-radicalization warrants punitive measures to render it as an unattainable proposition and preventive means through incentive-based luring away of those amenable to the radical appeal. Pakistan's de-radicalization strategy essentially revolves around these two approaches, which practically manifest the policies devised and implemented in the quest against extremist tendencies. The de-radicalization strategy has intertwining phases as a punitive policy is not sufficient as long as the prevention of its proliferation is not an integral part of the overall plan.

Pakistan is one of the most affected of extremist tendencies, has pursued multi-pronged strategies to confront radicalization and reaped worthwhile success in the process. The achievements of Pakistani Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) against the extremist forces and successful manifestation of deradicalization strategy is appreciable, containing numerous lessons. At the operational level, the security forces have effectively punished rank and file of the extremists through the use of military means, dismantling the infrastructure of the militant groups and constricting their functional capacity by physically occupying spaces once considered their strongholds. At the strategic level, the state has formulated an all-inclusive National Action Plan (NAP) to deal with the menace comprehensively. Both these policies are envisaged to go along side by side, complementing each other in the attainment of the ultimate goal of de-radicalization. Though it would be fair to claim that Pakistan has hitherto achieved reasonable success in its efforts against extremism and terrorist elements are on the run; the gains are still fragile, susceptible to reverses and warrant a sustained approach.

The perpetuity of the struggle against radicalization should not be lost since religiously motivated extremism has always a very strong ideological basis while international environments influencing the whole process also remain far from ideal. The all-encompassing deradicalization strategy employed by Pakistan essentially contains two phases as mentioned above and comprise of 'Punitive and Preventive' phases: -

**The Punitive Phase.** The operational or tactical level strategy being pursued by Pakistan revolves around the concept of clear, hold, build and transfer; a model being globally appreciated after successful manifestation by Pakistan Army. The clear and hold phases are essentially the regaining of space from terrorists, abolishing their sanctuaries,

destroying the available material resources with these radicals and hampering their capacity to plan and organize anti-state activities. Over the years, Pakistan's security forces have undertaken numerous successful operations, including much acclaimed Zarb-e-Azb, and Rad-ul-Fisadto clear vast swathes of the territories in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA); punishing the rank and file of the terrorists and continue to hold cleared areas for the implementation of subsequent phases of the strategy as well as constricting terrorists' liberty of action. The containment of the radicalization in the cleared and held areas is inbuilt in the strategy through the build and transfer phases. The military thus implements the development envisaged in the national strategy to improve the socio-economic outlook of the target areas by building schools, dams, health facilities and roads on a massive scale in the entire FATA region. The last part of the military strategy envisages the transfer of the cleared and built-up areas to civilian administration, accomplishing the preliminary phase of de-radicalization in a selected but comparatively limited area. The operational level implementation of the de-radicalization module then sets in motion broader national campaign, involving far larger areas, resources and parts of the strategy through NAP. The Tribal Areas have undergone reforms and now included in the national stream through the merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province

**The Preventive Phase.** The 16th December 2014 barbaric attack on Army Public School (APS), Peshawar, by the terrorists proved to be the watershed moment in Pakistan's long fight against radical elements in the society. The tragedy highlighted the gravity of the challenge in hand, and brought the entire nation on board against terrorism, resulting in the formulation of NAP. Besides contemplating a comprehensive national strategy against terrorism, the NAP envisages de-radicalization campaign through various measures, which include: -

- Implementation of the death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism.
- Special trial courts under the supervision of the Army. The duration of these courts would be two years.
- Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.
- NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened.
- Strict action against the literature, newspapers, and magazines promoting hatred, decapitation, extremism, sectarianism, and intolerance.

- All funding sources of terrorists and terrorist outfits will be frozen.
- The defunct outfits will not be allowed to operate under any other name.
- Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force.
- End to religious extremism and protection of minorities will be ensured.
- Registration and regulation of religious seminaries.
- Ban on the glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and electronic media.
- Administrative and development reforms in FATA with an immediate focus on the repatriation of IDPs.
- The communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely.
- Concrete measures against the promotion of terrorism through the internet and social media.
- No room will be left for the extremism in any part of the country.
- Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end.
- Baluchistan's government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.
- Action against elements spreading sectarianism.
- Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.
- Reforms in the criminal courts' system to strengthen the anti-terrorism institutions including provincial CIDs (as cited by Government of Pakistan, p. 46).

## **Conclusion**

The radicalization of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the region around these countries has been significantly influenced by global power politics as well as the hegemonic interests of some of the regional players. Consequently, the radical elements very conveniently secure external patronages for their terrorist activities, rendering national strategies often ineffective over a longer duration. Additionally, the prevailing international anarchic system and the perception among deprived masses of the discriminatory policies being pursued by the powerful global actors, also fuel



radicalization. The militancy and religious extremism have been a consistent challenge in the post-Soviet Union global milieu and kept on proliferating due to international power politics. The radicalization of Islamic societies has mainly been influenced by the inability of major powers in addressing their legitimate concerns besides the socio-economic failures of the domestic regimes. Pakistan's existing de-radicalization strategy is primarily aimed at addressing the domestic facets of the process and therefore, may appear as a momentary initiative. As radicalization and terrorism are a global phenomenon, the prospects of the success of any national strategy against the menace in isolation remain frail and thus may not accrue desired effects. While internally Pakistan has displayed an unflinching commitment to eradicate extremism in all its manifestations; externally the political, military and intelligence hierarchy of the country has backed all initiatives aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan. Pakistan believes that sustainable de-radicalization in the region is linked with the process of successful Afghan reconciliation and compelling the fighting factions to become part of the political process. Consequently, Islamabad has unconditionally supported as well as facilitated the peace process in Afghanistan, which has been duly acknowledged by the Trump Administration.

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## CPEC: A Discourse on Space, Security, and Development in Balochistan

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### ABSTRACT

*After seven decades of armed rebellion and systematic violence, Balochistan, the largest province of Pakistan, has become so vulnerable today that any phenomenon –be it resource extraction, megaprojects, influx of migrant workers, real estate development, a parliamentary session, or a bus of pilgrims passing through- or any other regular human activity can spark violence. How this level of vulnerability can be explained or resolved?*

*In an attempt to explain what has gone wrong, this article is an exploratory research on building a multidisciplinary discourse on Balochistan in concurrence with the concepts of space, dispossession and communist geography. The study initially provides the major narratives and overviews of theoretical approaches that place the Baloch problem in the purview of spatial studies, and then puts forth determinants of vulnerability. Thematic findings include that: (a) Balochistan has become a geography of resistance –which is defined here as a space struggling to find its meaning in resistance; (b) its problems are rooted in the structural manipulation of space and the politics of spatial development; (c) the future of CPEC is wedged with the future domestic policies toward Balochistan. This discourse attempts at introducing two new concepts: the Dialectics of Asymmetric Force and Cyclical Radicalism.*

**Keywords:** Balochistan, CPEC, space, spatial discourse, dialectical radicalism

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## Introduction

Baluchistan, the southwestern frontier province of Pakistan bordering Iran and Afghanistan, is a hotbed of conflicts. It has been a cesspool of identity politics, ethnic persecution, state-sponsored sectarianism, human rights violation and gross injustice for far longer than a geographical space and its human components can endure. For every human space, there is a limit of endurance and mishandling of affairs; after that limit has been reached, spaces become hostile, rebellious and self-destructive. It is in this context that Balochistan is being discussed as its overall space is caught in a fragility trap (Hasan, 2013). According to this study, Balochistan is a multidimensional space: a Baloch space, a federal space, a space of insecurities, and a broken space; and, the contemporary conflict of Balochistan is a struggle for space.

The majority of inhabitants of the province are ethnic Baloch and this paper would discuss the past, present, and future of their relationship with their space; their long-held fears of the resource curse, military intervention, and demographic engineering among other fears.

## Major Narratives

In Pakistan, there are four major narratives about the Balochistan problem: the local narrative, the military narrative, the official narrative, and the human rights narrative.

**The Local Narrative.** The local narrative is divided into indigenous and settler accounts. The indigenous Baloch consider themselves protagonists of the tragedy in which Pakistan annexed their princely state in 1948 and has been controlling their territory by sending Punjabi<sup>1</sup> troops, mercenaries and proxy sectarian radicals since then; and the Pashtun and other non-Baloch settlers intend to downsize them to a minority in their land. The settlers are non-Baloch permanent and temporary residents ranging from laborers and travelers (Shah, 2017)—who think Baloch insurgents kill them unjustifiably—to Afghan refugees, Pashtun politicians, Punjabi bureaucrats, and members of state-sponsored sectarian outfits like Lashkar-e-Jhanghvi—which justifies its persecution of the indigenous Baloch as “defensive actions against people supported by foreign intelligence services” (Hasan, 2012).

**The Military Narrative.** This considers Baluchistan as a third front—other two being India and the Taliban—and advocates elimination of the Baloch nationalists, insurgents and their supporters by military operations and perpetual presence of the *khaki*<sup>2</sup> in Balochistan. It takes the insurgency as a foreign instigated phenomenon funded by RAW<sup>3</sup> and NDS<sup>4</sup> (Mann, 2015; Ahmed, 2017; Fatimi, 2017; Jalalzai, 2017) or, quoting a Pakistan Army Lt. General, “elements sitting in London and Geneva hatching conspiracies against the stability of Pakistan” (Jalalzai, 2017, p.65). This narrative doesn’t believe in holding negotiations with Baloch leaders.

**The Official Narrative.** It holds that the natural resources of Balochistan are indispensable for Pakistan and the Baloch are as much Pakistanis as any other ethnic group. Every civilian government that comes to power blames Balochistan’s underdevelopment and marginalization on the outgoing incumbents. This narrative believes in negotiating a peaceful solution with insurgents,

bringing moderate nationalist leaders into mainstream politics, and redressing grievances of the Baloch masses by creating jobs and student allowances.

**Human Rights Narrative.** The human rights narrative is expounded mainly by the liberal middle-class urbanites of Karachi and Lahore, the provincial capitals of Sindh and Punjab respectively. It is vocal against the atrocities committed by Pakistan Army against the Baloch people and paramilitary corruption of the FC which, combined, becomes a formula for human rights violation in Balochistan –including forced disappearances, the kidnapping of dissidents, Habeas Corpus, torture, extrajudicial killings, and the brutal kill-and-dump operations which are being carried out since 2009 (Grare, 2013). Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) has been voicing the case of those “thousands” of missing persons with help from liberal university activists under the larger campaign of Unsilencing Balochistan (Malkani and Rajani, 2017) –numbers vary from 55 to 21,000 according to different estimates and Pakistan’s security and intelligence agencies have been declared responsible (Human Rights Watch, 2011; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan [HRCP], 2012; UNHRC & UNPO, 2016).

### **Theoretical Framework and Methodology: Towards the Fifth Narrative**

Beginning with Foucault(1984, p.253), who said that “Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power”, this study provides a framework to build a fifth narrative that situates Balochistan in a matrix of spatiality and expands it further in the trialectics of spatiality-historicity-sociality (Soja, 1996; Soja, 2008). The framework will feature ideas and themes related to space including the organicist view of social order (Williams, 1989; Harvey, 2016); application of David Harvey’s Black Mountain analysis on Balochistan – which interprets the history of any particular space as a story of wave after wave of migratory influences and colonization and its spatiality constituted by the flows and movements pulsing across local and regional milieus (Harvey, 2016); and understanding Balochistan as geography of terror and resistance that induces an assortment of fears among the residents.

Another feature is the interpretation of post-1947 events in Balochistan as a flow of situations in a given interval of time and the resultant socio-psychological implications (Toffler, 1970) –which includes the recent “shock” of fishermen at the sudden transformation of their fishing village into an economic hub. The economic environment of Balochistan is to be discussed under the politics of spatial development with a focus on Gwadar.<sup>5</sup>

The secondary discussion on vulnerabilities has been supplemented by interviews/personal communication with the natives over the past year. The discourse on security has been expanded on the overall insecurity dilemma of the province including the threats to CPEC-related labor; and afterward, it is surmised that spatial development will lead to human development and security for both the locals and the Chinese working in Balochistan. Finally, the framework provides a practical guide for China (CPEC) to gain a diplomatic foothold in Balochistan by filling in the current power vacuum in that pivotal province while providing much needed public works and infrastructural plus economic development.

Further elaboration on methodology will be made in each section as the application of the framework progresses throughout the article.

### **A Baloch Space**

When the late Nawab Akbar Bugti, *Tumandar* of the Bugti tribe, proclaimed that, “I have been a Baloch for several centuries. I have been a Muslim for 1400 years. I have been a Pakistani for just over fifty” (Jones, 2002, p.109), was he just making clear his priorities in the matters of identity or was it a declaration of war with the state? A state itself ideologically and arbitrarily created in the name of Islam and identity politics wasn’t comfortable with his statement of ideological and ethnic superiority; and so, the struggle that had begun with Khan of Kalat and Prince Karim in 1948, ended with the Tiger of Balochistan in 2006—leaving behind the debris of leaderless separatists (Bansal, 2006).

What exactly means to be a Baloch for thousands of years? Hitherto this question was answered by the aforementioned four narratives. The fifth narrative examines this question in geographical and tribal spatiality as a specialized elaboration of culture.

### **Terrain, Tribalism, and Space**

Geographical space is a combination of culture and nature (Harvey, 2004; Harvey, 2016). The geography and ecology are directly related to the settlement pattern, which affects political development and prospects of outside influence. Balochistan has had a rough mountainous terrain and a stratified tribal society (Spooner, 1988; Matheson, 1997). Being a Balochistan for centuries implies a principled existence in a space that, over the years, became one with its inhabitants: the Baloch became Balochistan and Balochistan became the Baloch. This metamorphosis matured into ideas of ownership of territory, undying love of homeland for which human life could be sacrificed or taken, and space that had to be defended against outsiders. A tribal space has fragmented geography with boundaries drawn between the lands of various tribes; feuds occurred whenever boundaries were breached or blood was spilled—and so the defense had become two-pronged: securing the greater space and securing sovereign tribal spaces. Gradually, the greater space became an ideology and sovereign spaces emerged as 'realities' or identities in the Baloch social space. These socio-spatial identities can be equated with Foucault's "heterotopias" or "singular spaces whose functions are different or even the opposite of others" (Foucault, 1984, p.253). This evolution transformed Balochistan’s spatiality into a Third Space or a Representative Space: “space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols” (Lefebvre, 1991).

Traditionally, every Baloch has had revered the decrees of the Baloch moral/tribal code which include: (a) the relationship of the Baloch to his land is that his territory is the ideal country; (b) unquestioning loyalty to his *Sardar*; (c) honor; (d) to avenge blood with blood (Spooner, 1988; Matheson, 1997).

After an epoch of principled existence and spatial sovereignty, when the Baloch space was forcefully integrated into Pakistan (Harrison, 1981), the Baloch rebelled. Since then Balochistan

has been a turbulent place. In 2005, the fifth and current conflict erupted when a lady doctor Shazia Khalid was allegedly raped by a military man in the Baloch town of Sui (Grare, 2013; Kumar, 2012). The alleged cover-up of the rape by military establishment resulted in attacks on security personnel by the Bugti tribesmen. The army forced Akbar Bugti, the chieftain, into the mountains and eliminated him. This assassination sparked an internecine series of insurgency (Bansal, 2006) and counter-insurgency measures that gave Balochistan such shocks that were beyond its spatial capacity to absorb.

The emergence of sovereign spaces within the Baloch social space also gave wind to the rivalries inherent in the tribal structure. There are about 18 tribes in Balochistan with three major tribes: Marri, Mengal, and Bugti. Leaders of these tribes have rarely been on the same page in matters of struggle with the state as a few tribal elites were co-opted by the military (Lieven, 2016). But the issue is not in the hands of patriarchs anymore as the struggle has been devolved from sardars to society (Chima, 2015).

### **A Federal Space**

Political spaces are organized into units mainly in two patterns: federal and unitary. A federal setup is generally considered more prone to unit-center and unit-unit conflicts on matters of redistribution, resources, revenue, national and local jurisdiction, marginalization, separation of powers, emergency provisions etcetera (Sharma, 2015; Sharma & Swenden, 2017). This section rethinks a federation's vulnerability: Conflicts erupt in a federal space due to the contradictory pressures from spatial integration and differentiation (Harvey, 1990/2016), and spatial underdevelopment (Allen, 1997).

A nation occupies a certain space and a nation-state emerges; afterward, the state overshadows and controls every aspect of that space. It is fascinating how space turns into the state. Take space as the *base* and the state, the government, people and power relations as *superstructure*. In this superstructure, the more influential groups of people either align their interests with the state or find that they have conflicts of interest with the state and turn into separatists, rebels, anarchists or ethno-nationalists. According to Grare (2013), the state of Pakistan has been compressing the Baloch national space for seven decades now. Within the federal space, this province is, borrowing from Fanon, a compartmentalized world marked by racial segregation and architectures of control and surveillance.

### **Federal Space Problems**

A federal space often finds itself exhausted in the struggle between diverging heterotopias –which in Pakistan's case are a multitude of competing for ideological and physical spaces. In the backdrop of the Balochistan problem is the Partition of 1947 (Siddiqi & Kakar, 2010). When the affairs of partition were being settled and Pakistan was to emerge as a hybrid of communalism and federalism, the princely state of Kalat (now central Balochistan) declared its independence as a bluff for gaining maximum autonomy (Grare, 2013). In response, the Baloch space was annexed

to Pakistan and troops were deployed to counter the budding separatists. Once the Baloch was seen as against the imploding federation, like East Bengalis after them, the federal-military elite left them struggling in underrepresentation and their space underdeveloped.

**Denial of Rights and Rejection of Autonomy.** The natural gas resources of Balochistan are the property of the Baloch people and the federation has been exploiting these resources located in Sui and near Dera Bugti without giving the due royalty to the original owners. Almost the entire country uses Sui gas for cooking and heating purposes; yet, Balochistan in general and those areas from where gas is extracted are particularly the most underdeveloped spaces within the federal space (Figure 1). There is not a single hospital in Dera Bugti, no clean drinking water, and NGOs are not allowed to work there.<sup>6</sup> The majority of the population is living in multidimensional poverty and infrastructural development has only been concentrated around resource extraction sites; this spatial underdevelopment has had augmented the sense of right to space among the natives. Additionally, the Baloch demands for autonomy are considered as separatism at large and overridden by the use of unnecessary force –and demands for more autonomy, if left unattended, lead to demands of secession which results in violence against the national government (Ezcurra, 2017).

**Separatism and Use of Force.** Balochistan movement has two factions: the nationalists and the separatists. Nationalism came primordially to the Baloch as per their reverence of culture and tribal code; separatists are the militant avatars of nationalism –both factions demand the right to space but tactics are different (Wirsing, 2008). Separatism emerged only after considerable and recurring use of force by the federation which resulted in massive human loss and deepening of ethnic crises (Atarodi, 2011). With violence being perpetrated by both the separatists and security forces, the whole space has been perpetually radicalized and militarized. Currently, more personnel are being deployed for the security of Chinese nationals working on CPEC –a project between China and the Federal Government- which means the Baloch space is being federalized to the maximum. Without curbing the undue use of force the battle for space will continue with federal infringement into the Baloch space and the Baloch space resisting hostility. It can be termed as the *dialectics of asymmetric force* that makes a space resistant to any kind of symmetry or normalcy. Any development within the Baloch space done without taking the locals into confidence would then bring, if not secession, more alienation (Wani, 2016). It is not therefore only a matter of alienation of the Baloch space from the federal space; but, also of the Baloch from the Baloch space –this adds up to this asymmetry.

**Structural Governance Problems and Asymmetry.** Balochistan is at the crossroads of governance problems which leads to civil-military strife, center-provincial discord, selective development, and paramilitary corruption on each side. The structure of governance is flawed due to ad hoc culture and overlapping of powers. Due to a general lack of initiative by the national government and the military establishment's power to overthrow a civilian regime, the military is in charge of strategic decision making.



In addition to controlling tax-payer money, as the highest budgetary allocation goes to the defense sector every year, the military dominates the foreign policy process for India and Afghanistan–Balochistan portrayed as a third front, is virtually governed by the army. It controls large swathes of developed and undeveloped land throughout the country where it has been involved in real estate business, making golf-and-country clubs, and building vast cantonments. The federation has yielded peripheral spaces to Pakistan Army so it can secure the borders but despite having absolute control in conflict zones, those spaces are showing no signs of sustainable peace. Frontier districts in northwest and Balochistan are infested with Taliban and sectarian outfits which are used to radicalize secular spaces (Kumar, 2017a).

Civilians have no power in conflict zones. Military directly or indirectly controls the opportunistic provincial politicians and there is a nexus of military-bureaucracy-militancy that is responsible for ongoing corruption, target killings and contraband trafficking (Hasan, 2016). There is also the issue of manipulation of the electoral process (Kumar, 2017b). If all these problems are structural flaws then how to explain the role of agents who are manipulating both space and society (the base and superstructure)? This very manipulation has kept the Baloch space fragile and the civil society in infancy (Changezi & Tareen, 2018). When both the base and the superstructure become fragile, asymmetry or "temporariness in the structure of public and individual value systems" (Toffler, 1970) and volatility come into motion (Harvey, 2016); which in turn hinders long-term planning (Harvey, 1989/1999) and without long-term planning, complemented by judicial intervention, all the militarized spaces, including Balochistan, would continue to backfire because spaces rebel upon reaching their breaking point.

In the face of this chronic asymmetry, does CPEC –a federal government project that would increase military control- have a chance of success in Balochistan? The military establishment is expanding its role of security provision into project management; China has welcomed this expansion to secure project delivery (Syed, 2016) and this will further accentuate the contours of asymmetry as the Baloch wants the security forces to leave the Baloch space–but ultimately the army's preferences dominate (Fair 2017).

## **A Space of Insecurities**

### **The infrastructure of Insurgency and Geography of Resistance**

The spatiality of a conflict zone can be divided into the infrastructure (agency, actors, and dynamics) and the geography (effects on space). Previously, in the Federal Space section, space was taken as the base and the actors as superstructure. Reversing it: the infrastructure of conflict is the base and geography of conflict is the superstructure –production of space determined by the drivers/agents of conflict. The flow of events in the Baloch insurgency has turned the infrastructure of insurgency into the geography of resistance<sup>7</sup> which is continuously generating resentment and radicalism. Both the agents and space have lost control over the conflict and insurgency, as Kupecz (2017) suggests, has become autonomous of its traditional and modern drivers.

## **A Mosaic of Insecurities**

When space becomes a mosaic of insecurities, it turns self-destructive. Since long the State of Pakistan has turned against the Baloch people. Initially, the targets of force were the separatists and insurgents, then Baloch nationalists and their supporters, and now, the urban upper-middle-class human rights activists and dissidents who voice their concerns about the Baloch missing persons. Due to the absence of problem resolution mechanisms, the federation has left the province under military control as it sees no other way to keep Balochistan from seceding and staying in line with national security; as, the federal space depends upon the Baloch space for natural, mineral and strategic resources. Oppression by the State and resultant civil war has made life in the Baloch space highly insecure and the inauguration of CPEC is adding to it.

**Labor Killings and Recent Attacks.** There has been a reign of terror in Balochistan for more than a decade now and things are becoming worse as Chinese nationals are being targeted along every other local and non-Baloch connected to the CPEC construction. A few labor killings and recent attacks, recorded mostly through the local correspondents of Dawn, the largest independent English daily in Pakistan, were as follows:

- 3 May 2004: 3 Chinese engineers were killed and eleven injured when a remote-controlled car bomb hit their van on their way to Gwadar<sup>8</sup> (Haider, 2005). The attack was carried out by the Baloch Liberation Front [BLF] (Ramachandran, 2018).
- April 2015: 20 laborers were killed while working for a private construction company near Turbat.
- April 24, 2017: Security forces were attacked in Pasni near Gwadar.
- May 2017: 4 Sindhi laborers were gunned down in Balochistan's Kharan district.
- May 13, 2017: 10 laborers were killed in Balochistan's Gwadar district (Shah, 2017).
- May 19, 2017: 3 laborers working on a major highway in the Hoshab area of Turbat, which links the port city of Gwadar to Quetta (Shah, 2017).
- May 25, 2017: 2 Chinese were abducted from Quetta (Shah, 2017).
- May 2017: Mastung bombing killed 28 (Shah&Sheerani, 2017; Shah, 2017).
- June 2017: The Chinese missionary couple, abducted in May, was killed in Balochistan (Masood, 2017).
- October 19, 2017: Twin grenade attacks in Mastung and Gwadar injured 38 (Ahmad 2017).
- January 9, 2018: 7 killed and several injured in a blast near Balochistan Assembly, Quetta (Zafar, 2018)
- July 13, 2018: At least 200 people, including Siraj Raisani, Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) candidate for PB-35 (Mastung), were killed and nearly 200 injured

in a deadly suicide blast in Mastung. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack.

There has been a tactical shift in the shape of attacks. The insurgents have shifted focus from military targets to civilian targets –it is a trickledown effect of the State's targeting of the civilian population in Balochistan. What Pakistan has been doing to the Baloch, the Baloch are doing the same to Pakistan; this is where insurgency becomes domestic terrorism (Ghatak and Prins, 2016; Ezcura, 2017).

**Human Rights Violation.** Human rights have been systematically violated in Balochistan by the security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2011; HRCP, 2012; UNHRC; UNPO, 2016; Malkani and Rajani, 2017) and Pakistan's intelligence agencies (Kumar, 2012; Grare, 2013). The violations include forced disappearances or the missing persons (VBM; Kumar, 2012; S. Baloch, 2014; Bhattacharjee, 2015) abduction and killing of activists and dissidents (Waghmar, 2017; Malkani & Rajani, 2017) torture, extrajudicial executions, and the kill-and-dump –which leaves mutilated corpses at random locations to generate fear in public and to weaken the resilience of the targeted community (Kumar, 2012; Grare, 2013; UNPO, 2016; Kumar, 2017b). The establishment of military courts in Pakistan by the 21<sup>st</sup> constitutional amendment (preceded by the 20<sup>th</sup> that had lifted the moratorium on the death penalty) had evoked fears that private trials would be used to hang the Baloch separatists under the pretext of terrorism (Wolf, 2015).

**The radicalization of Space and Cyclical violence.** Time, military operations and repressive tactics have eroded any social structures there were in Balochistan capable of containing the rise of radicalism (Grare, 2013). In 1977, General Zia released the Baloch leaders and political prisoners (arrested in 1973 on charges of conspiracy to create an independent Balochistan) that lead to a decade of peace in the province. Meanwhile, under his deranged but subtle Islamization policy, he began injecting radicalism in Balochistan around 1979 through jihadi organizations and hardcore sectarian outfits –since then these outfits have been protected by the State and used as leverage against Afghanistan, India, and the secular Baloch nationalists (Akbar, 2009; Alam, 2018). Radicals were sent to counter secularists which turned them into separatists and insurgents; and further on terrorists were sent to battle insurgents and also the death squads (including Baloch guns-for-hire) have been unleashed on moderate Baloch nationalists to create confusion within the nationalist movement (Akbar, 2009; Riikonen, 2012; Kumar, 2017). Using radicalism against nationalism resulted in a process of radicalization of Baloch nationalism and space and now this radicalized space is breeding more radicalism. This fragility<sup>9</sup> trap and cyclical violence can be termed as *Cyclical or Dialectical Radicalism*.

Every aspect of human life is either radicalized or terrorized. Beyond the original core-periphery tension or federal space problems, the Balochistan conflict has grown into pure chaos, devoid of any ideological struggles.

**Fear.** Exposure to violence can be direct and indirect –experiencing and witnessing in public, through media, or oral narration. The Baloch space, being a mosaic of insecurities and

geography of terror, has been under a state of continuous fear and people have been traumatized. The security agencies drag people from public places; on suspicion of association with insurgents, the locals are arrested from their homes without any warrant and the families have no knowledge where they are being taken; police officers who make arrests deny having made any arrests and people just disappear, and mostly the dead bodies of the disappeared are found in grain sacks, tortured and mutilated. The pain and fear of the relatives of the missing persons warrant a separate study.

Violence is a matter of routine for the Baloch space and daily life for its people who have no channel to express their fears. Adult men have the option to join insurgent ranks and avenge the state crimes (although not all adult Baloch men want to end up militants) but the women, children, and the old have to live with their fears. This information has not been gathered only from human rights organizations or activists but also from the locals. Separatists and insurgents live in remote places or mountains; then why security forces are raiding residential areas? Either to hunt the nationalists or to create an environment of fear, terror, and silence (S. Baloch, 2014).

### **CPEC and the Politics of Spatial Development in Balochistan**

Most of China's neighboring countries have either been turbulent or economically weak and that makes them dependent on the regional hegemon. China's one-size-fits-all message to the neighbors is: whatever are your problems, Chinese investment is the solution. For China, it is methodical geopolitics and "a spatial fix to its surplus problem" (Harvey, 2016) but it may exacerbate sociopolitical problems in the recipient countries. The host national governments benefit politically, as delivering infrastructural and energy megaprojects improve their developmental rhetoric, but real socioeconomic benefits are debatable (Jacob, 2018; Xiangming, Joseph, & Tariq, 2018). Geopolitics is beyond the scope of this article but political geography is relevant as it is a link between the social space and the economic space. The above discussion on Balochistan explained sociopolitical dimensions of space concerning geography; the following is a discussion on the economic dynamics of CPEC and the phases of spatial development in Balochistan.

### **A Broken Space**

Balochistan is a tri-state space with porous borders (Figure 1). It is the biggest and most sparsely populated province of Pakistan within hospitable deserts and dark granite mountains which make the terrain naturally rough and hostile. There are large swathes of ungoverned and undeveloped space which, other than topographical constraints to development, is due to decades of economic marginalization, and insurgency.

Making room for geopolitical applicability in the Broken Windows theory of criminology, as in Mitchell's (2010) work on political geography, it is plausible to surmise that Balochistan's neglected and unmonitored spaces breed insecurity; as the insurgents are familiar with that rough terrain and use the topographical features to the advantage of their guerilla tactics as Willem Marx

(2007), a journalist who had field meetings with Baloch insurgents, observed, "Five hours' hike up a narrow ravine, they live with their donkeys and their aging rifles, occasionally venturing out of their craggy maze to attack military checkpoints." Up to a few years back, Baloch insurgents rode camels into the mountains and became outlaws wanted by the security forces; currently, the use of motorcycles in ambush is being reported. As already mentioned that a tactical shift from military to civilian targets has occurred and now infrastructural projects and workers are under attack so the terrain has strategic implications for the operations of CPEC.

### **Economic Problems of Balochistan**

**Resource Exploitation and Underdevelopment.** It has been a long-held fear of the Baloch people that investors may take their resources away (Haider, 2005) –and this apprehension is not unwarranted. Since the 1950s natural resources have been extracted from Balochistan and domestic sectors plus local markets throughout the country have become dependent on Sui gas – the massive natural gas deposits located in the province (Figure 1). It was only fair that in return Balochistan' sinfrastructure and economy had been developed; but, it is the poorest province of Pakistan (Dost, 2017; Notezai, 2018) and has been deprived of royalty on natural gas.

The economic perception of trickledown benefits has not worked for Balochistan. Gold and copper reserves at RekoDiq did not bring economic prosperity. Chinese companies have a hold on gold-copper mining in the province. Since 2002, the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) has been taking 50% of the profits and revenues from Saindak –mining almost 600 million tons of copper ore and annually yielding 25 tons of gold and 12-15000 tons of copper (Muhammad, 2013; Notezai, 2018); the Federal Government gets 48% while Balochistan, where Saindak is located in the Chaghi district, gets only 2% (Ahsan, 2015; Dost, 2017). If Balochistan is the most underdeveloped province in Pakistan, Chaghi is its most underdeveloped district and Saindak residents are the last to benefit from the sale of its minerals: copper ore bodies have been exhausted, development is nonexistent, native labor is in bad health, and water is contaminated with chemicals from the mines (Notezai, 2018).

Balochistan is facing infrastructural development disparity as:

- There is a dire shortage of water and none of the planned hydropower projects are operational;
- there is no drinking water even in the areas in the vicinity of natural gas deposits;
- Gwadar, the port town of CPEC, lacks drinking water (Ali, 2018; Nizar, 2018) and the crisis is worsening (Mahmood, 2017; Baqi, 2018);
- most districts lack hospitals and medical facilities and the locals have to travel a long way in case of medical emergencies (Yaqoob, 2018);
- the condition of roads is abysmal which hinders the progress of trade and communications (Yaqoob, 2018) and is a problem for locals (Notezai, 2018).

**Poverty and Unemployment.** Balochistan is the poorest province of Pakistan with the highest rate of child mortality (Sattar, 2018; Ahmed and Mumtaz, 2018). The majority of its population is living in multidimensional poverty due to economic deprivation, underdevelopment, and absence of job and business opportunities for the common people as contracts and bids are controlled by the civil-military elite –Balochistan has a top-down corruption pattern which can shift to bottom-up in case of military business. For example, a fertilizer depot in DeraBugti which is supposed to be subsidized for the locals is controlled by a low-rank army officer who oversees the depot and controls price/commodity in the name of his superior ranking officer.<sup>10</sup>

A popular assumption about tribalism in Pakistan is that the sardars (*waderas* in Sindh) have kept the masses from education so that they stay unemployed and in service of the chieftains, and the Baloch sardars have been resisting state interference for poverty alleviation to maintain financial control over locals and seek rent on natural resources from the national government. It is a misleading analysis as the tribal control of resources has long been replaced by redistribution – although influential sardars became a part of provincial governments to retain their lands and rule. If the state had coerced the sardars to a ceasefire, it sure could have forced them to apply state-sponsored reforms on education and development. A considerable educated middle class is present in Balochistan which has denounced Balochistan’s traditional rulers and also Pakistan’s national government (Chima, 2015) for no measures have ever been taken for poverty reduction.

### **CPEC and Economic Struggle in Balochistan**

In the projects planned under CPEC, Balochistan’s share is 0.5% (Shafqat, 2017). With the inauguration of CPEC, the creation of jobs for the Baloch was promised but the vacancies have been filled by non-Baloch candidates (Baloch, 2016). Due to a systematic marginalization of ethnic groups in Pakistan (Gazdar, 2007), there is a widespread apprehension among the Baloch that settlers will turn them into a minority. They accuse the center of demographic engineering and are troubled by non-Baloch labor as Akhtar Mengal, leader of the BNP-M party, has said (as cited in Hasan, 2017):

“We Balochs are few in number anyway and the other workers are being brought from everywhere, not to mention when the Chinese too would flock here in huge numbers. It will just make the indigenous people of Balochistan invisible.”

For the Baloch, sudden bursts of investment are signs of foreign invasion and more exploitation. “If Sui, RekoDiq and Saindak projects did not yield any benefits for them, then how a corridor can change their fates? It will make a handful of fat Baloch fatter but for the majority, this project will convert them into a minority; CPEC will change demographic realities.”<sup>11</sup> When China signed the CPEC, the identified strategic and economic benefits of cooperation with Pakistan overshadowed the risk perceptions. Bringing economic development through institution-building and infrastructure is a different process in Balochistan due to: (a) profound spatial disparity between national and provincial spaces; (b) without understanding the *politics of spatial development*

involved in the province, blanket economic development approaches will neither be effective nor sufficient.

**Gwadar: A Case of Dispossession.** Gwadar, a fishing village, is being reborn as the link between China's OBOR and Maritime Silk Road (Ali, 2018; Deng, Yeo and Du, 2018); Gwadar port is the growth pole around which industries and economic zones are proliferating. This reconstruction of Gwadar Port is estimated to generate millions in tariffs, duties, and revenue through China-Pakistan collaboration (Xiangming et al., 2018). What will be the share of indigenous people and fishing households in the profits to come?

The artisanal fishing economy is based on day-to-day catch and as the amount of fish has decreased due to environmental changes and security restrictions brought by port construction (Ali, 2018), the fishermen are either to migrate to far-off harbors (Mahmood, 2017) or to seek menial jobs. The natives sought engineering, construction and porter jobs at the port but no work was available as hundreds of Chinese workers were already constructing day and night and it was announced that China will bring thousands of more workers, engineers, and specialists to carry out the business of the corridor—this will further the alienation of the indigenous from their land (Ali, 2018). Following the official narrative, Xiangming et al. (2018) say that most construction workers are locals; but actually, locals get no jobs or facilities (Dilawar, 2018). The scarcity of clean drinking water is probably the biggest problem in the district (Govt. of Balochistan & IUCN, 2007).

Under CPEC a freshwater treatment facility, of 5 million gallons per day, is to be installed in Gwadar by the end of this year (Kiani, 2018); but if it would only cater to the needs of the port or be opened to the public, that remains to be seen.

**Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Spatial Overhaul.** A marginalized backwater has been transformed into an urbanized space with access to world markets. This rapid transformation, marked by asymmetric development interventions, has caused dislocation, resettlement, and resentment among the natives (Govt. of Balochistan & IUCN, 2007; Jamali, 2013). In 2007, the Gwadar Integrated Development Vision report recommended a broad-spectrum of short, medium, and long term solutions but nothing has been done to mitigate the crises in the past decade. Local villagers who sold their lands to real-estate sharks or were displaced by port construction (Haider, 2005; Malik, 2017) and had migrated to the hinterlands, have returned to the town in search of livelihood. Most recently, massive public/private investments have triggered a land rush in Gwadar which is a harbinger of increasing migrant influx and impending population explosion—estimated to rise from current 185,000 to 2 million over the next two decades (Malik, 2017). There is not enough developed space to accommodate this boom. Scarcity of water, environmental degradation, unemployment, informal settlements, rapid urbanization and motorization in Gwadar are rooted in land acquisition.

The steady process of land acquisition can be divided into three phases:

1. The first phase of the land acquisition began in 2002 for the construction of a deep seaport and an airport.
2. The second phase was for the allotment of land to the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) –but Pakistan Navy didn't vacate the allotted land (Yousaf, 2013)- and for building Kalimat Naval Base [30,000 acres] which would harm the local shrimp trade; hence the project is still in the pipeline due to its possible environmental consequences (Amin, 2010).
3. The third and current phase began in 2015 which seeks to expand the port into a massive transshipment and naval space for China; to develop the Gwadar Port Free Zone [2292 acres]; to build the New Gwadar Airport [4000 acres], and to occupy space for the Naval Air Station in Turbat –despite that Turbat is not on the ocean (Figure 1) and there already are three naval stations in the vicinity- and for a reported future Chinese military base in the Jiwani peninsula which will relocate residents to inland Balochistan (Gertz, 2018; Maza, 2018; Rajagopalan, 2018).

This overhaul of space is being supplemented by increased militarization to secure these new architectures “by establishing a cordon sanitaire around Gwadar Port and the town” (Jamali, 2013). Under the pretext of CPEC development, the military is expanding its power (Wolf, 2016). The locals, confused between hopes of prosperity and fears of control, are victims of “the structural violence of mega infrastructure projects” (Jamali, 2014).

### **Solutions and Recommendations**

When it came to light that China has been allegedly negotiating with the Baloch militants, the Chinese government immediately issued a disclaimer and the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan went further on to declare that those insurgents are not real Pakistanis. The reports of China building a military base in Balochistan were also rejected as rumors. These anxious disclaimers make the whole Chinese presence in Balochistan shady. Officially both the countries justify the militarization of Balochistan to secure CPEC projects; then, why any attempts at negotiating peace to achieve security be deemed inappropriate? If Pakistan could negotiate with the Taliban, why can't it with the Baloch insurgents? China has been there for almost two decades and now its citizens and massive investments are at stake in Balochistan. It is proposed that if China wishes to gain greater diplomatic advantage and sociopolitical security, it has to play a role larger than imagined by China and Pakistan until now.

The Baloch do not understand the language of megaprojects –and more so if it is in Mandarin. They understand the ever-increasing presence of armed forces and the Chinese as signs of control, violence and resource curse. They need to be spoken to in a different language –one that doesn't only promise but practically demonstrates the provision of freshwater, hospitals, schools, and humane labor conditions. China is a superpower that is using its resources and intends to develop its space in return –the locals need to see the helping hand reaching out to them without a military convoy. The military establishment of Pakistan won't like this new discourse of soft power but the situation has grown way bigger than civil-military power; it's about a subnational space being



contested by myriad domestic, regional, and international actors (Alam, 2018). This contest will either lead to socio-economic prosperity for the actors involved or end up being just another episode of power politics.

Balochistan is a broken society with structural problems of any conflict zone; and for structural problems, there are structural solutions like SDGs, SEZs, FDI, institutional building, national integration and infrastructural/architectural development, demilitarization, democratization and so on. But there is no point in recommending these run of the mill solutions because (a) the federal-multiethnic structure in Pakistan is flawed and rigid; (b) China is a rather new player in regional/global development so it can't push Pakistan for structural change; (c) a multitude of scholars are suggesting these same solutions (Khetran and Saeed, 2017; Shah & Ishaque, 2017; Shafqat, 2017; S. Ali and Abbas, 2018; Deng and Liu, 2018; Hirsh, Awan and Sarmah, 2018; Ali, 2018).

### **A New Approach**

It is proposed that if the structure can't be fixed, why not start with what can be fixed. A new human-security-centered approach for China to achieve security in which: (a) CBMs precede development; (b) hard architecture is supplemented by soft architecture, and (c) there is a way forward to build a parallel structure that is flexible and inclusive.

Under this approach a few of the quick-fixes are as follows:

**CBMs.** Confidence building measures are imperative for reconciliation. First of all, China has to announce and make it public that it is going to bring the Baloch natives into confidence before any further development in their land. Such proclamations are considered significant and spread quickly in Pakistani society. This can go controversial but this will end many other controversies surrounding CPEC.

**Diversion of CPEC funds.** A small diversion of a few hundred million dollars has to be devised for public works to facilitate locals all over the province –especially in the resource-rich highly underdeveloped areas like the towns of Sui, DeraBugti, Saindak, and Turbat, etc. According to local sources, China can immediately win the confidence of the natives by the following measures:

- Installation of tube wells for groundwater extraction.
- China-sponsored hospitals and rural medical centers.
- China-sponsored schools and scholarships designated for Baloch students. For example, the Gwadar-China Scholarship by HEC Pakistan is a welcome initiative for the natives (Higher Education Commission, Pakistan [HECP], 2018).
- Construction of in-roads that could link the remote towns to the main roads and main roads to the Western Alignment.<sup>12</sup>

**Decisive timeline for the construction of Western Alignment.** The people of Balochistan will only benefit from CPEC if the Western Alignment is constructed –which is not being done for now and the CPEC route controversy remains unaddressed. There should be a decisive timeline for its construction and China has to push Pakistan for it.

**Terrain.** Following the example of National Space Research and Development Agency (Nigeria), where Sadiya et al. (2017) designed a geospatial framework for counter-terrorism by projecting cover and concealment abilities of the topography, a geospatial terrain visualization project is required to get a fresh knowledge of the terrain, in collaboration with scholars from Balochistan, to map out the most vulnerable spaces and developing a strategy to make CPEC operations secure.

**Strategy for China to Popularize CPEC in Balochistan.** If China and CPEC are popularized in Balochistan, it would be mutually beneficial for both the natives and the Chinese nationals stationed in the province. Once the locals become aware of and accept what China has to offer, CPEC projects will become safe and the Baloch space would begin fixing itself –but for this process to begin a dedicated media policy is required to be operational in Pakistan.

**Advertisement.** China can use advertisements as a tool for generating widespread awareness about the CPEC projects in Balochistan. Massive-scale advertisement is recommended which includes: (a) paid primetime advertisement of projects to be broadcasted on all the major and minor news networks; (b) a TVC, preferably in regional languages, that shows a synergy of ethnic cultures and CPEC projects; (c) billboards along the Western route could be a unique method to project images of prosperity through development.

**CPEC as a Brand for Public Works.** CPEC should be associated with real development in Balochistan. Tube wells, sites for new hospitals, rural centers and schools could use plaques with bilateral donor messages translated into local dialects; for example: “A gift from the Chinese Government for the people of Balochistan” or “A Welfare Project of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.”

The above-given recommendations are simple and practical but these need to be acted upon by Chinese policy-makers without delay. While the national and provincial institutions of Pakistan are distracted in the wake of the upcoming general elections and ongoing demonstrations against the security forces –by the Pashtun Protection Movement- China can make use of the political environment and national media to announce these minor readjustments in the CPEC plan.

## **Conclusion**

After analyzing all aspects of the Balochistan conflict with a spatial lens, this article further draws the following conclusions:

- Balochistan has become a geography of terror and resistance; hence, resisting development and normalcy.

- Leaving the internal insecurities of space unmitigated to keep it safe from external threats would trap that space in a multidimensional insecurity situation.
- Troop deployment is ineffective towards creating peace in the province because (a) increased troops on the ground would not be enough as any professional army cannot win asymmetric warfare in inhospitable terrain; (b) increasing military presence to protect Chinese nationals from insurgents is giving the wrong message to the Baloch masses.
- If China does not use the Baloch space and society in a way that is mutually beneficial for Chinese enterprises and the locals, the situation will worsen.

A new approach for conflict resolution and the strategy laid out for its implementation might seem unprecedented but there is no other way to begin fixing Balochistan's space. It is hoped that this research will contribute to a reconceptualization of space in war zones and conflict studies.

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CPEC and Pakistan-India Economic Integration: Prospects and Challenges

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**ABSTRACT**

*The persisting economic advancements in Asia indicate Asia's rise in the middle of this century. In this connection, China's initiative about CPEC will play pivotal role to upsurge the economies in Asia and beyond. In South Asia, India and Pakistan are traditional rivals since their inception and are reluctant in establishing trade relations. However, CPEC offers them the concurrence for economic integration to upraise their economies. The two states might be convinced to trade by addressing their concerns i.e. high tariffs, trade bans, quota restrictions, customs clearance, issuance of visas, conducive financial services, opening new entry and exit points and by providing access to their markets on reciprocal basis. By providing transit trade facility to each other, both the states will exacerbate their trade activities within and outside the region. Pak-India economic integration will lead towards win-win position and will bring prosperity that will have a spill over impact in maintaining peace between them. This paper aims to highlight contours of Pak-India economic integration from the prism of CPEC along with perceived challenges.*

**Key Words:** CPEC, Economic Integration, Regional Integration, Pakistan-India Economic Integration,

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## Introduction

The enduring China's initiative for One Belt One Road (OBOR)<sup>39</sup> triggers the likelihoods of Asia's economic rise. Ban Ki Moon (former Secretary General of the UNO) articulated about the amplification of Asia's economic advancement as, 'global future is being built in Asia and that ours is a rising region of economic potential, innovation and dynamism'.<sup>40</sup> According to a report of Asian Development Bank, 'economic hub will shift to Asia by 2050'.<sup>41</sup> The OBOR comprises on the combination of multiple trade routes, i.e. China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridors, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC), a new Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Central Asia-West Asia, China-Mongolia-Russia, and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).<sup>42</sup> OBOR comprises around 60 percent of world population consisting 4.4 billion based on one third of the global wealth with the GDP of 21 trillion USD.<sup>43</sup> It connects three continents and involves more than 60 states which stretches from Pacific to Europe and is projected to create 4 trillion USD in investment within three decades that contains about 70 percent of global energy assets.<sup>44</sup> The OBOR encompasses two mega projects, a Maritime route in Southeast Asia and land route in Eurasia which would extend economic integration between Africa, Asia and Europe that would ultimately provoke incredible economic outputs.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> China's OBOR initiative is not a simple trade route but it is a comprehensive strategy as Chinese undertakes it as, 'an aspiring economic idea of the cooperation and opening up an organized project planned by the silk route spirit that pursues to establish a community of common interests, destiny and obligation'. National Development and Reform Commission 2015, downloaded from [www.en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/20150330\\_669367.html](http://www.en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/20150330_669367.html) on 11 Jan 2018. Tim Summers, 'Road to Wider Market' downloaded from [www.slideshare.net/gurconnector/what-exactly-is-one-belt-one-toad-summers](http://www.slideshare.net/gurconnector/what-exactly-is-one-belt-one-toad-summers) on 8 Jan 2018.

<sup>40</sup> Ban Ki Moon expressed during a speech at the fourth Conference on Interaction and CBMs in Asia (CICA) Summit in Shanghai on 20-21 May 2014 downloaded from [www.cica.china.org/eng/2nghd/yndscfh/T1151142.htm](http://www.cica.china.org/eng/2nghd/yndscfh/T1151142.htm) on 12 January 2018.

<sup>41</sup> 'ASIA 2050: Realizing the Asian Century', *Executive Summery*, downloaded from [www.adb.org/sites/default/publication/28608/asia2050-executive-summery.pdf](http://www.adb.org/sites/default/publication/28608/asia2050-executive-summery.pdf) on 29 April 2018. Also quoted Zafar Nawaz Jaspal in a seminar 'Security Trends in the Asia Pacific Region: Prospects and Challenges for Pakistan', Organized by Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence University Islamabad on 28 April 2015.

<sup>42</sup> Irina Lonela Pop, 'Strength and Challenges of China's "One Belt, One Road" Initiative', *Centre for Geopolitics and Security in Realism Studies London* (8 February 2016), p.2, downloaded from [www.cgsrs.org](http://www.cgsrs.org) on 14 June 2016. The OBOR seeks to bring together Central Asia, Baltic States, Russia and China; linking China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and Indian Ocean; joining China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central and West Asia, downloaded from [www.en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/20150330\\_669367.html](http://www.en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/20150330_669367.html) on 11 Jan 2018.

<sup>43</sup> Rolland N, 'China's New Silk Road', *National Bureau of Asian Research*, 12 Feb 2015, downloaded from [www.nbr.org/reserach/activity.aspx?id=531](http://www.nbr.org/reserach/activity.aspx?id=531) on 25 January 2018.

<sup>44</sup> Luft.G, 'China's Infrastructure Play: Why Washington Should Accept the New Silk Road' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 95, No.5 (Sep-Oct 2016).

<sup>45</sup> Sajjad Ashraf, 'The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: India's Dual Dilemma', downloaded from [www.chinausfocus.com/financeeconomy-economy/the-china-pakistan-economic-corrido-India's-dual-dilemma](http://www.chinausfocus.com/financeeconomy-economy/the-china-pakistan-economic-corrido-India's-dual-dilemma) on 17 February 2018.

In the South Asian region, CPEC has the potential to uplift economic integration not only between China and Pakistan but to exacerbate trade and investment within and outside the region. The economic and strategic significance of CPEC is ostensible for China and Pakistan but it would ultimately have enormous impact on all the remaining states of the region. Chinese President Jinping expressed in his speech to the Parliament in Pakistan, ‘the development and design of CPEC covers the other areas of Pakistan so that the benefits of its development must be within the range of all the people of Pakistan and the people residing around the region’.<sup>46</sup> Likewise, Mr. Nawaz Sharif (the former Prime Minister of Pakistan) presented similar views as, ‘it must be clear that CPEC is an economic initiative and has no geographical limitations and it must not be politicised’.<sup>47</sup>

CPEC fascinated the neighbouring states as Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan revealed their intents for joining CPEC.<sup>48</sup> Incongruently, India has the apprehensions about CPEC that the impetus behind the project is to establish Sino-Pak strategic relationship against India.<sup>49</sup> Likewise, many Indian scholars expressed their worries as China’s CPEC initiative is an attempt for its further extension in the Indo-Pacific region for India’s encirclement in the region.<sup>50</sup> Despite India’s disagreements, the enduring Indo-Pak enmity is the main source of distress between them. The main proposition of this paper is to explore the main inducements due to which CPEC would become mutually advantageous for both India and Pakistan that would ultimately have a spillover impact towards trust building, enhancing regional cooperation and in determining their political disputes in future.

### Theoretical Explanation

Beside establishing a physical infrastructure, the rationale behind OBOR is exceptional as Zhang Gaoli (the first China’s Vice Premier) highlighted four objectives of OBOR:<sup>51</sup>

1. Economic Integration.
2. Accumulating policy coordination within Asian Continent.
3. Liberalizing the trade.

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<sup>46</sup> Text of President Jinping’s speech to the Parliament in Pakistan on 12 April 2015, downloaded from [www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Pak-China-Year-of-Friendly\\_exchange\\_Doc/1/docx.pdf](http://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Pak-China-Year-of-Friendly_exchange_Doc/1/docx.pdf) on 16 February 2018.

<sup>47</sup> Nawaz Sharif expressed during address to B&RI Summit in Beijing on 15 May 2015, downloaded from [www.pmo.gov.pk/pm-speech-details.php?speech\\_id=87](http://www.pmo.gov.pk/pm-speech-details.php?speech_id=87) on 20 January 2018.

<sup>48</sup> Akbar Ali, ‘China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Prospects and Challenges for Regional Integration’, *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies*, Vol.7, No.1 (2015), pp.4-7.

<sup>49</sup> Harsh V.Pant, ‘The China-Pakistan Axis Gathers Momentum’, *The Japan Times* (18 April 2016).

<sup>50</sup> Sibal Kanwal, ‘Silk Route to Tie India in Knots’, *Ministry of External Affairs* (Government of India), 25 February 2014, downloaded from [www.mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm.7dt/22999/silk-route-tie-india-inknots](http://www.mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm.7dt/22999/silk-route-tie-india-inknots) on 15 January 2018. Shahi Tharor, ‘China’s Silk Road Revival....and the Fears it Stirs Are Deeply Rooted in Country’s History’, *The Huffington Post* (14 October 2014), downloaded from [www.huffingtonpost.com/shahi-tharor/chinas-silk-road-rivival-history-h-5983456-html?=&india](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shahi-tharor/chinas-silk-road-rivival-history-h-5983456-html?=&india) on 12 January 2018.

<sup>51</sup> Zhang Gaoli is quoted by Saran. S, ‘What China’s One Belt and One Road Strategy Means for India, Asia and the World’, *The Wire* (9 October 2015).

4. Enhancing people to people links, connectivity.

The main derivative behind these objectives is theory of economic integration and Balassa explains this theory as, 'it is a process that incorporates measures to eradicate discriminations i.e. qualitative limitations and limitations on factor movement between diverse national economies and states'.<sup>52</sup> Economic integration proceeds towards consolidation of scattered economies into a wider free trade region.<sup>53</sup> Economic integration decreases the limitations of national borders for steady mobility and provokes the self-strained process by restraining the trade deficits as close borders worsen market size.<sup>54</sup> The elimination of economic limitations aggravates multiple dynamics for grasping foreign markets and intensifies import competition.<sup>55</sup> For amassing global economy, economic integration refers to regional connectivity through regional integration by developing communication infrastructure, interdependence, coordination and regional cooperation.<sup>56</sup> The impetus behind regional integration is to address political and economic issues simultaneously while political motives are placed in first priority, and if the economic gains have obtained center stage, then the political objects would be conferred subsequently.<sup>57</sup>

In the post-Cold War scenario, economic gains are the main objective of regional integration but the process of decision making between the states refers to political elite that can be overwhelmed by manipulating the advantages of economic integration. CPEC is included in the comprehensive plan of OBOR and the contribution of CPEC in the process of economic integration between India and Pakistan is evaluated in the succeeding sections of this paper.

The regions of Central Asia, Western China and South Asia are experiencing multiple socio-politico-economic developments and security challenges i.e. under-development, corruption and terrorism. To comprehend these issues, a region-specific approach provides understanding to deal with security issues, to grasp the restraints of prosperity and identify the opportunities of economic rise for the whole region. These complications are linked with regional integration, cooperation and coordination for the promotion of regional peace and prosperity and these are the main objectives of regional economic integration.

As for liberalizing the trade is concerned, neighboring states provide cost-effective access on various tradable items as trade expenses are '*cetiris paribus*', low-cost due to short

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<sup>52</sup> Bela Balassa, 'The Theory of Economic Integration: An Introduction, p.174, downloaded from [www.ieie.itam.mx/Alumuos2008/Theory20%of20%Economic20%Integration](http://www.ieie.itam.mx/Alumuos2008/Theory20%of20%Economic20%Integration) on 15 January 2018.

<sup>53</sup> El-Agra, *European Union-Economics and Policies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.75-90.

<sup>54</sup> Niebuhr. A and Sittler.S, 'Integration Effects in Border Region: A Survey of Economic Theory and Empirical Studies' *HWWA Discussion Paper 179*, (Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics, 2002), pp.5-12.

<sup>55</sup> Bruhart. M, Crozet M. and Koenig-Soubeyarn, 'Enlargement and the E.U Periphery: The Impact of Changing Market Potential', *The World Economy*, Vo.27, No.6 (2004), p.75.

<sup>56</sup> Shabir Ahmad Khan and Zahid Ali Khan Marwat, 'CPEC: Role in Regional Integration and Peace', *South Asian Studies*, Vol.31, No.2 (July-December 2016), p.501.

<sup>57</sup> Bela Balassa. P.175.

distances.<sup>58</sup> Additionally, in the persistence of economic disparity among the states, their trade relations become mutually beneficial as wealthy states offer wide range of products bearing superior quality and poorer states offer lesser prices and business oriented locations.<sup>59</sup> Nevertheless, the neighboring states enjoy numerous benefits of trade i.e. cultural similarities and low transport costs, but the trade relations of India and Pakistan are hostages of political hostilities. With the imposition of WTO regime, it is anticipated that the trade relations between both the states would intensify significantly.<sup>60</sup> Likewise, the optimists of both the states are confident that Indo-Pak trade relations will assist in resolving their political disputes.<sup>61</sup>

Pakistan's geographical location provides the opportunity to serve as energy corridor coupled with regional trade and transit hub. CPEC is termed as harbinger of prosperity for Pakistan and the remaining region as well. According to Peter Frankopan, 'Pakistan is becoming the central trade route between East-West and North-South because it will interconnect all transportation and trade links in Asia'.<sup>62</sup> Similarly, CPEC has the potential to contribute to India's regional trade.

Despite engendering bilateral benefits, CPEC has the potential to connect the entire region that will ultimately exacerbate economic activities and promote people to people contact among the neighboring states around CPEC. According to Senator Mushahid Hussain, 'CPEC will contribute in regional connectivity for "Greater South Asia" that comprises Iran, Afghanistan, China and all the way to Myanmar'.<sup>63</sup> Likewise, Hua Chumying (spokesperson to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) expressed, 'CPEC will promote connectivity between South Asia and East Asia'.<sup>64</sup> India's participation is preeminent in joining South Asia with East Asia, nevertheless, it would be hardly feasible due to India's concurrent political posture rather reluctance towards CPEC. The succeeding sections of this research explore the temptations due to which India will be inclined to join CPEC and to become bridge between South Asia and East Asia.

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<sup>58</sup> Leamer E., and J. Levinsohn, 'International Trade Theory: The Evidence', *NBER Working Paper 4940*, Cambridge, (November 1994), pp.44-49.

<sup>59</sup> Anthony J. Venables and Nuno Limao, 'Policy Research Working Paper 2256', The World Bank, (December 1999), pp.22-23, downloaded from [www.core.ac.uk/downloadable/pdf/6615587.pdf](http://www.core.ac.uk/downloadable/pdf/6615587.pdf) on 12 February 2018.

<sup>60</sup> Anjali Sahay and Jalil Roshaudel, 'The Iran-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline: Implications and Challenges for Regional Security', *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.34, No.1, (January 2010), p.86.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. Sobhash Narayan, 'Trade Events to Further Indo-Pak Bond,' *Asian Age* (7 July 2003). Khalid Manzoor Butt and Anum Abid Butt, 'Impact of CPEC on Regional and Extra Regional Actors', *The Journal of Political Science, G.C. University Lahore*, No.xxxiii (2015), p.42.

<sup>62</sup> Peter Frankopan, 'Pakistan at Crossroads', *The Daily Dawn* (18 April 2016).

<sup>63</sup> Mushahid Hussain was quoted by Shannon Teizi, 'China and Pakistan Flesh Out New Economic Corridor', *The Diplomat* (20 February 2014), downloaded from [www.thediplomate.com/2014/02/china-pakistan-flesh-out-new-economic-corridor](http://www.thediplomate.com/2014/02/china-pakistan-flesh-out-new-economic-corridor) on 15 January 2018.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.



### CPEC: An Overview

The idea of CPEC was floated by Chinese Prime Minister in May 2013 during his visit to Pakistan, as he expressed, ‘CPEC will provide link with new Maritime Silk Route (MSR) and will connect the 3 billion people of Africa, Asia and Europe’.<sup>65</sup> Pakistan appreciated Premier Li’s proposition and signed a long-term plan on CPEC.<sup>66</sup> For materializing CPEC, both the states planned to constitute a cooperation committee and its first meeting was held in Islamabad on August 17, 2013.<sup>67</sup> During the visit of Mamnoon Hussain (then President of Pakistan) to China in February 2014, China invigorated Pakistan’s support in shaping CPEC for the mutual benefits of both the states.<sup>68</sup> In April 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan and both the states signed 51 agreements including 5 mega energy projects and Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs).<sup>69</sup> Initially, the estimated cost of the projects was US\$ 46 billion, but later the investment raised up to US\$ 62 billion.<sup>70</sup>

CPEC is mainly a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and China and entirely based in Pakistan. Projects under CPEC are planned to be completed in three phases, first phase is assessed to be accomplished by 2017, second phase 2025 and third phase by 2030.<sup>71</sup> CPEC encompasses four areas of investment: energy, Gwadar Port, industry and infrastructure. Pakistan has experienced a heavy power shortfall in near past. Pakistan’s power demand is 18000 Mega Watt (MW), while its power general potential is around 12000 MW and power short fall creates space for China’s investment.<sup>72</sup> According to agreement, China will invest up to US\$ 37 billion on power production based on wind, coal, solar and hydropower with the capacity of 16400 MW along with the construction of transmission lines.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Ayub Sumbal, ‘Chinese Premier Li’s Visit to Pakistan: Hope Meets Reality’, downloaded from [www.thediplomate.com/2013/05/chinese-premier-lis-visit-to-pakistan-hope-meets-reality/](http://www.thediplomate.com/2013/05/chinese-premier-lis-visit-to-pakistan-hope-meets-reality/) on 10 March 2018.

<sup>66</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, ‘New Silk Roads to Boost Regional Economic Cooperation’, *News from China*, Vol.xxvi, No.6 (6 June 2014), downloaded from [www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cein/chn/xwfw/zgxcw/P020140715024040992156.pdf](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cein/chn/xwfw/zgxcw/P020140715024040992156.pdf) on 10 March 2018.

<sup>67</sup> Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Government of Pakistan. 2014, ‘Meeting of Cooperation Committee (Pakistan and China), downloaded from [www.pc.gov.pk/?=2742](http://www.pc.gov.pk/?=2742) on 11 March 2018.

<sup>68</sup> Joint Statement between The People’s Republic of China and The Islamic Republic of Pakistan on ‘Deepening China-Pakistan Strategic and Economic Cooperation’, downloaded from [www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt-665385/2649\\_665393/t1130297.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt-665385/2649_665393/t1130297.shtml) on 11 March 2018.

<sup>69</sup> Khalid Manzoor Butt and Anam Abid Butt, ‘Impact of CPEC on Regional and Extra-Regional Actors’, *Journal of Political Science, GC University, Lahore*, Vol. xxxiii (2015), p.26.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. Salman Sadiq, ‘CPEC Investment Pushed from \$55 b to \$62’, *Express Tribune* (12 April 2017).


<sup>71</sup> ‘Third Meeting of JCC on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Held’, *The News* (28 August 2014).

<sup>72</sup> Chien-Peng (C.P) Chung, ‘What are the strategic and economic implications for South Asia of China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative?’, *The Pacific Review*, (2017), p.5, downloaded from [www.tandfonline.com/action/journal-information?Journal-code=rpre20](http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journal-information?Journal-code=rpre20) on 10 March 2018.

<sup>73</sup> Umbreen Javaid, ‘Assessing CPEC: Potential Threats and Prospects’, *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, Lahore*, Vol.53, No.2 (2016), p.262.

Gwadar port is a lynchpin that has numerous imperatives for the states located around this region especially for uplifting China’s enduring economic sustainability. Strategically, Gwadar port will play a pivotal role for widening China’s geopolitical influence in the region. Strategically, Gwadar Port would become the cross junction for oil trade routes and international shipping lanes and will connect Pakistan with three regions, Middle East, Central Asia and Africa.<sup>74</sup>

Map:1  
Gwadar Port Regional Reach



Source: ‘Gwadar and Its Multiple Destinations’, downloaded from [www.images.serch.yahoo.com/yhs/Search?P=Gwadar%2Band%2Bmultiple%2Bdestinations%2Fimages&fr=yhs=adk-adk\\_sbyhp&hspart](http://www.images.serch.yahoo.com/yhs/Search?P=Gwadar%2Band%2Bmultiple%2Bdestinations%2Fimages&fr=yhs=adk-adk_sbyhp&hspart) on 15 March 2018.

Gwadar Port would engender an incredible opportunity for Baluchistan which is the least developed province of Pakistan. Likewise, with the establishment of economic zone, the port will create employment opportunities and will boost economic development through foreign exchange and transit fee. Furthermore, Gwadar will provide shortest excess from Persian Gulf to China’s western province of Xingjian because the distance between Xingjian and Gwadar is just 2500 km while 4500 km from China’s east coast.<sup>75</sup> Presently, China’s 60 percent oil supply is from Middle East and its 80 percent transportation is done through an

<sup>74</sup> Uma Farwa and Arhama Siddiq, ‘CPEC: Prospects of OBOR and South-South Cooperation’, *Strategic Studies*, Vol.37, No.3 (Autumn 2017), p.87.

<sup>75</sup> Waheeda Rana and Hasan Mahmood, ‘Changing Dynamics of Pak-China Relations: Policy Recommendations for Pakistan’, *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, Vol.5, No.2 (April 2015), p.99.



expensive, long, piracy-rife and Strait of Malacca.<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, for assuring its smooth energy supply, China might become capable to control the Straits of Hormuz through Gwadar Port.<sup>77</sup>

China has planned to increase the holding capacity of Gwadar Port up to 100,000 dead weight tonnage (dwt) for dry cargo and 200,000 (dwt) for oil tankers.<sup>78</sup> For the construction of Gwadar, a master plan is projected in two phases: short term and long term. The short-term plan (2005-2020) is designed to handle around 42-65 million tons and long-term (2021-2055) is estimated to grasp around 321-345 million tones with gas, oil and dry cargo as the main commodities.<sup>79</sup> Construction of Gwadar Port is the symbol of mutual trust between Pakistan and China that will become the hub of logistic, tourism and trade between both the states.

For the development of industry under the umbrella of CPEC, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are planned in all the provinces of Pakistan. Special tax exemptions and economic reforms will be introduced for the areas under SEZs. With the coordination of China and Pakistan, around 46 sites are identified for making SEZs and 9 sites are declared as Priority Zones.<sup>80</sup> For providing constitutional safeguards, SEZ Act 2012 was passed to frame the administrative structure in support of Federal and Provincial governments of Pakistan.<sup>81</sup>

CPEC infrastructure is based upon the construction of multiple roads and railway projects encompassing from Gwadar to Kashgar which run around 2500/3000 km. Mr. Ahsan Iqbal, (Former Minister for Planning and Development) elaborated three main land routes in an interview as:<sup>82</sup>

- I. **Western Route:** Kashgar to Gwadar via Khunjerab, Peshawar, D. I. Khan, Zhob and Quetta.
- II. **Central Route:** Khunjerab, Peshawar, Kohat, D. I. Khan, D. G. Khan and Ratodero.
- III. **Eastern Route:** Khunjerab to Gwadar via Islamabad, Lahore, Sukkar, and Karachi.

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<sup>76</sup> Khalid Manzoor Butt and Anam Abid Butt, p.28. Malika Joseph, 'India-China Strategic Partnership: Implications for US and Pakistan, downloaded from [www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-china-strategic-partnership-implications-for-us-and-pakistan-1711.html](http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-china-strategic-partnership-implications-for-us-and-pakistan-1711.html) on 6 March 2018.

<sup>77</sup> Dr. Subhash Kapila, 'Pakistan and China Relations, Post-September 2001: Analysis' *Paper 505*, downloaded from [www.southasiananalysis.org/paper-505](http://www.southasiananalysis.org/paper-505) on 6 March 2018.

<sup>78</sup> Waseem Ishaque, 'China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects, Challenges and Way Forward', *NDU Journal*, (2016), p.128.

<sup>79</sup> 'Gwadar Port Master Plan: Implication for Energy Sector Development', *Report Presented by Arthur D. Little Company*, (25-26 April 2006), downloaded from [www.shani.med.com/destra/courses/1387397437-arthur%20d%20little%20Gwadar.pdf](http://www.shani.med.com/destra/courses/1387397437-arthur%20d%20little%20Gwadar.pdf) on 15 March 2018.


<sup>80</sup> '46 Special Economic Zones Being Setup in under CPEC', *The Nation*, (31 July 2017).

<sup>81</sup> Amin Ahmad, 'SEZ Act to Boost Investment', *Dawn*, (15 July 2017).

<sup>82</sup> Ahsan Iqbal, Minister of Planning and Development explained during an interview with Khurram Shahzad on 8 March 2015, downloaded from [www.dawn.com/news/1168081/sound-bytes-economic-corridor-will-have-multiple-routes](http://www.dawn.com/news/1168081/sound-bytes-economic-corridor-will-have-multiple-routes) on 17 March 2018.

The estimated cost of aforesaid project is about \$ 5330 million<sup>83</sup> and the remaining regions of Pakistan are planned to connect with corridor through express ways and motorways subsequently.

Map:2  
CPEC Road Network in Pakistan



Source: Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan 2018.


Additionally, five routes of Asian Highway are also designated through Pakistan as;

1. Asian Highway 1 (AH.1): From Wagha (India) to Torkham via Lahore, Islamabad and Peshawar (585 km). AH.1 overlaps motorway M.2 (Lahore-Islamabad) and M.1 (Islamabad-Peshawar) and these sections are operational.

<sup>83</sup> Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan, downloaded from [www.cpec.gov.pk/infrastructure](http://www.cpec.gov.pk/infrastructure) on 17 March 2018.

2. Asian Highway 2 (AH.2): From Wagha (India) to Taftan (Iran) via Lahore, Multan, Sukkur and Quetta (1823 km). This route overlaps with N.5 of Lahore-Karachi section from Lahore to Sukkur. This route is operational for the mobility of heavy vehicles.
3. Asian Highway 4 (AH.4): From Khunjerab to Karachi via Abbottabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan and Sukkar (2185 km). It connects Karachi port with China through N.5 (Karachi-Torkham Highway) and N.35 (Karakorum Highway) and both N.5 and N.35 are part of CPEC. The road condition of N.5 is good while the remaining sections need repair and upgradation.
4. Asian Highway (AH.51): It connects AH.1 and AH.7 from Peshawar to Quetta via Dera Ismail Khan and Zhob (870 km) and is the Western part of CPEC. Presently, it's Dera Ismail Khan-Zhob section is under construction.
5. Asian Highway (AH.7): From Karachi to Spinboldak (Afghanistan) via Quetta (852 km) and overlaps Western part of CPEC from Sorab to Quetta. The road condition is good for transportation.

Map:3  
Asian Highway Routes in Pakistan



Source: Asian Highway Database, December 30, 2015 downloaded from [www.unscap.org/sites/default/files/pakistan%20AH%20map.pdf](http://www.unscap.org/sites/default/files/pakistan%20AH%20map.pdf) on 18 March 2018.

Likewise, Pakistan Railways has planned to establish Gwadar-Khunjerab rail link along-with various alignments with the collaboration of Chinese Consortium at an estimated cost of \$ 2.3 billion.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore, China is planning to construct a 3,300-kilometer-long oil pipeline

<sup>84</sup> Riffat Hussain, *Sino-Pakistan Ties: Trust, Cooperation, and Consolidation* (Islamabad: NUST Global Think Tank Network, 2014), p.21.

with 30-inch diameter from Gwadar to Khunjrab with the capacity to handle 12 million tons of oil per year and the estimated cost of pipeline is about \$ 4.5 billion.<sup>85</sup>

The above-mentioned developments under CPEC are inter-reliant with each other as the adequate energy supply is prerequisite for the establishment of industry. Similarly, the development in infrastructure and Gwadar port will provide as easy and speedy access for the products at both regional and global level. Both China and Pakistan are enjoying ‘all weather friendship’ since 1962 and the enduring developments will further augment economic integration between them. These projects will exacerbate trade and transit links to the neighbouring states of CPEC which will ultimately provoke economic integration within and outside the region.

### India’s Concerns and Options about CPEC

India has reservations about CPEC project as it passes through Azad Jammu and Kashmir that might generate ‘geopolitical concern’ between India and Pakistan.<sup>86</sup> Through CPEC, China will get open access to Indian Ocean that will undermine India’s hegemonic presence in the Indian Ocean.<sup>87</sup> In Arabian Sea, India is sponsoring Chahbahar Port with the collaboration of Iran for attaining trade access Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics (CARs) via Iran. Similarly, India’s main oil supply route is Arabian Sea through Strait of Hormuz and China’s presence in Gwadar may pose challenges to India’s trade and oil supply route.<sup>88</sup>

In response, China negated Indian concerns and explicated that CPEC, through Pakistan administered Kashmir, is not planned to take Pakistan’s side on the Kashmir issue or to target India.<sup>89</sup> China anticipated the Kashmir dispute as a ‘historical problem’ between India and Pakistan and suggested that both the states should settle the issue through dialogues.<sup>90</sup> About India’s anxiety relating to China’s presence in Gwadar, China contends that its various ports projects including Gwadar in Indian Ocean are explicitly commercial in nature.<sup>91</sup> Besides,

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<sup>85</sup> Fazal-ur-Rehman, ‘Traditional and emerging areas of strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China’, *Strategic Studies*, Vol.xxix, No.2&3 (Summer and Autumn 2009), pp.60-61.

<sup>86</sup> Showkat Ahmad and Arif Hussain Malik, ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Impact on Regional Stability of South Asia’, *International Journal of Political Science and Development*, Vol.5, No.6 (October 2017), p.195.

<sup>87</sup> Khalid Manzoor Butt and Anam Abid Butt, p.36.

<sup>88</sup> David Brewster, ‘Beyond the String of Pearls: is there really Sino-Indian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?’, *Journal of Indian Ocean Region*, Vol.10, No.2, (2014), p.140. ‘Is China-Pakistan Economic Corridor really a game changer?’, *Pakistan Today* (15 November 2015), downloaded from [www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/06/13/comment/is-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-really-a-game-changer/](http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/06/13/comment/is-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-really-a-game-changer/) on 19 March 2018.

<sup>89</sup> ‘Beijing says China-Pakistan Economic Corridor not against India’, *Hindustan Times* (26 September 2016), downloaded from [www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/beijing-says-china-pak-economic-corridor-not-against-india/story-a9zouDC4NJFeYBQPAnzjrds.htm](http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/beijing-says-china-pak-economic-corridor-not-against-india/story-a9zouDC4NJFeYBQPAnzjrds.htm) on 20 March 2018.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> David Brewster, ‘An Indian Ocean dilemma: Sino-Indian rivalry and China’s strategic vulnerability in Indian Ocean’, *Journal of Indian Ocean Region*, Vol.11, No.1 (2015), p.52.

China argues that its naval presence in the Indian Ocean is to contain piracy in Arabian Sea and is vigilant about any overt naval presence in the region and flatly rejected its aspiration to establish Naval bases in the Indian Ocean.<sup>92</sup>

Despite China's assertions, India's suspicions still exist and ongoing developments about CPEC have formed two options for India as whether to launch protest against CPEC or to adopt constructive approach by joining the corridor. India's obstruction may interrupt the construction of CPEC but could not stop it.<sup>93</sup> On the contrary, it would be more realistic approach for India to join CPEC with the collaboration of China and Pakistan for boosting its trade. Moreover, both Pakistan and China also want India to join the CPEC project sooner or later.<sup>94</sup> The areas due to which economic integration through CPEC between India and Pakistan might be endorsed are evaluated in succeeding subsections.

### **Restoration of Old Road-Rail Links and their Implications**

For provoking Pak-India economic integration, road and rail links between both the states are prerequisites especially for India's admittance in CPEC. Both the states share a long border around 3000 km including the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir without the presence of physical features that separate their border. Before partition, the existence of several road and rail links provided trade friendly environment for the adjoining areas which were divided between India and Pakistan. At the time of partition, the two states had strong trade relations as Pakistan's 75% trade was with India and India's 63% exports were to Pakistan.<sup>95</sup> Since partition in 1947, the two states are the victims of their political and territorial rivalries and these had adversarial impact on their trade relations. The existing India's trade share with Pakistan is less than 3% and Pakistan's trade share to India is below 2%.<sup>96</sup> Despite Pak-India hostilities, the main proponent for the reduction of trade deficit was the blockade of most of the enduring road and rail links between both the states. The revival of these links will not only intensify bilateral trade but to expand economic integration within and outside the region.

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<sup>92</sup> 'China has no plan for Indian Ocean military bases', *The Hindu* (4 September 2012), downloaded from [www.thehindu.com/openion/interview/china-has-no-plan-for-indian-ocean-military-bases/article385](http://www.thehindu.com/openion/interview/china-has-no-plan-for-indian-ocean-military-bases/article385) on 27 March 2018.

<sup>93</sup> C. Raja Mohan, 'The Great Game Folio', *The Indian Express* (10 July 2013), downloaded from [www.carnegieendowment.org/2013/07/10/greae-game-folio/ge5v](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2013/07/10/greae-game-folio/ge5v) on 29 March 2018.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. 'China offered India to join CPEC on various occasions', expressed Ananth Krishna, 'China wants India to play key role in silk road plan', *The Hindu* (10 August 2014) downloaded from [www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/china-wants-india-to-play-key-role-in-silk-road-plan/article301227.ece](http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/china-wants-india-to-play-key-role-in-silk-road-plan/article301227.ece) on 29 March 2018. Likewise, Nawaz Sharif (former Prime Minister of Pakistan) also stated that the CPEC would be beneficial not only for Pakistan but for the entire region including India, cited Mingxin. Bi, 'Transcript: Pakistani Prime Minister gives exclusive interview to Xinhua' *Xinhua* (6 July 2013), downloaded from [www.news.xinhuanet.com/english/chuna/2013-07-06/c\\_132516529.htm](http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/english/chuna/2013-07-06/c_132516529.htm) on 29 March 2018.

<sup>95</sup> Vivek Kumar Srivastava and Bhavtosh Kumar, 'Changing Trade Relations of India and Pakistan: An Evolution', *Journal of Commerce and Trade*, Vol.vi, No.2 (October 2011), p.7.

<sup>96</sup> Muhammad Ali, Noreen Mujtaba and Aziz ur Rehman, 'Pakistan-India Relations: Peace Through Bilateral Trade', *European Scientific Journal*, Vol.11, No.4 (February 2015), p.363.



Presently, Wagha/Attari border is functional providing road and rail links between India and Pakistan. Besides, some other links may be restored on both sides are:

- **Route I:** Ferozpur-Kasur via Hussainiwala-Ganda Singh border. This trade route was functional till 1970 and was known for the supply of fruits and edible products from Pakistan and Afghanistan to India. This trade route disappeared due to demolition of a bridge on Sutlej River during Pak-India war 1971 and was shifted to Wagha. The bridge was reconstructed and reopened in 2013.<sup>97</sup> Likewise, this trade route has the potential for the trade of leather goods and petroleum products because Kasur is the hub of leather industry in Pakistan, while, Bhatinda oil refinery in India is located just 100 km from Hussainiwala.
- **Route II:** Fazilka-Ambruka-Bahawalpur via Sulaimanki border. This trade route was popular with the name of ‘Golden Trade Route’, because it was the shortest route between Ludhiana and Karachi before 1947.<sup>98</sup> A 1000 km rail link was also setup along this route for the transportation of Indian raw material to the Middle East and Europe through Karachi port.<sup>99</sup> Presently, the trade from Ludhiana is conducted through Mumbai which is 2600 km away as compared to Karachi port which is just 1000 km from Ludhiana. This trade route may be practicable for the export of wool from India and cotton from Pakistan.<sup>100</sup>
- **Route III:** Munabao-Khokhrapar route that connects Rajasthan and Sindh and the rail link of this route is already functional.<sup>101</sup> This route might be extended up to Gujrat (India) which was economically and culturally very much integrated with Sindh before partition. A famous trade route existed before 1947 between Ahmadabad (Gujrat) to Hyderabad (Sindh) via Mirpurkhas-Khokhrapar-Munabao-Marwar and Palanpur.<sup>102</sup> This route passes through the least backward areas of both states and with the revival of

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<sup>97</sup> Dinesh K. Sharma, ‘40 Years of War, Bridge Opens near Hussainiwala Border’, *The Times of India*, (5 December 2013), downloaded from [www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/40-years-after-war-bridge-opens-near-hussainiwala-border/articleshow/26872284-cms](http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/40-years-after-war-bridge-opens-near-hussainiwala-border/articleshow/26872284-cms) on 5 April 2018.

<sup>98</sup> Both Ludhiana and Karachi were industrial cities even before partition. Shanon Teizi, ‘China and Pakistan Flesh out New Economic Corridor’, *The Diplomat*, (20 February 2014), downloaded from [www.thediplomate.com/2014/02/china-pakistan-flesh-out-new-economic-corridor/](http://www.thediplomate.com/2014/02/china-pakistan-flesh-out-new-economic-corridor/) on April 6, 2018. Dinesh K. Sharma, ‘Trade Brings Hope for Golden Track’, *The Times of India*, (14 April 2012), downloaded from [www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india-talk-brings-hope-for-Golden-Track/articleshow/12656854.cms](http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india-talk-brings-hope-for-Golden-Track/articleshow/12656854.cms) on 6 April 2018.

<sup>99</sup> Dinesh K. Sharma, ‘Trade Brings Hope for Golden Track’.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> ‘Joint Statement: India-Pakistan Talks on Munabao-Khokhrapar Train Service’, *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*, (6 January 2006), downloaded from [www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dt/5957/joint+statement+IndiaPakistan+talks+on+Munabao++Khokhrapar+train+service](http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dt/5957/joint+statement+IndiaPakistan+talks+on+Munabao++Khokhrapar+train+service) on 6 April 2018.

<sup>102</sup> Kenneth Hugh Staynor, ‘Railway Travel in the Raj’, downloaded from [www.indiaofthepast.org/contribute-memories/read-contributions/life-back-then/341-railway-trave-in-the-raj](http://www.indiaofthepast.org/contribute-memories/read-contributions/life-back-then/341-railway-trave-in-the-raj) on 7 April 2018.

this route, enormous economic implications will generate employment opportunities for the residents of the adjacent areas.

- **Route IV:** Along LoC, two trade routes take place between India and Pakistan, Poonch-Rawlakot and Muzaffarabad-Uri, but many of the crossing points along LoC might be reopened for trade. These are Leh-Turtuk-Khaplu-Skardu, Kargil-Skardu, Poonch-Hazirpir-Bagh-Uri, Mendhar-Tatapani-Kotli, Nowshera-Jhggar-Mirpur, Palanwala-Chamb-Bhimber, Gurez-Astore-Gilgit, Titwal-Chila.<sup>103</sup>

These routes have significance for the uninterrupted supply of consumer items in Kashmir and for the export of fruits outside the valley.<sup>104</sup> Trade with Pakistan would be more beneficial for Kashmiris as compared to India because from Srinagar to Delhi it takes around 36 hours while for Islamabad, it takes hardly 6 to 8 hours.<sup>105</sup> Jammu and Kashmir is the most troubled region between India and Pakistan and the launching of new trade links along LoC will have spillover impact on Kashmir issue that will ultimately engross peace and stability in the region. The stated trade links will endorse Pak-India economic integration, and will be advantageous for both the states especially providing connectivity to India to the CPEC for attaining access to Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asian Republics (CARs) and for reaching to region's ample natural resources. The forthcoming sections evaluate the likelihoods of Pak-India economic integration with the India's appearance in CPEC.

### India's Initiatives for the Regional Connectivity vis-a-vis CPEC

India aspires to get transit route to Afghanistan and CARs via Pakistan but could not materialize it due to enduring Pak-India rivalries. Thus, India planned to establish Chabahar Port with the collaboration of Iran for the transit access to Afghanistan and CARs and is investing around \$ 500 million in the development of Port along with the construction of road and rail links to Afghanistan.<sup>106</sup> Besides establishing trade route, India aspires to compete Gwadar port by developing Chabahar port which is just 72 km away from Gwadar. But Chabahar would not disturb Gwadar's importance because it is located close to the Strait of Hormuz that has constrains due to shallow water.<sup>107</sup>

The worsening Iran-US ties due to Iran's launching of nuclear capable missile exacerbate uncertainties about the imposition of UN sanctions against Iran that would have negative

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<sup>103</sup> Sandeep Singh, 'Bridging Divisions- The Role of New Cross Line of Control', *Discussion Papers*, (December 2010), pp.44-46, downloaded from [www.c-r.org/downloads/jammuandkashmir\\_discussionpapers\\_201012-ENG.pdf](http://www.c-r.org/downloads/jammuandkashmir_discussionpapers_201012-ENG.pdf) on 7 April 2018.

<sup>104</sup> Shaheen Akhtar, 'Expanding Cross-LoC Interactions: Perspectives from Pakistan', *IPCS Issue Brief 130*, p.2, downloaded from [www.ipcs.org/pdf-file/issue/IB130-ploughshares-shaheen.pdf](http://www.ipcs.org/pdf-file/issue/IB130-ploughshares-shaheen.pdf) on 7 April 2018.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Akbar Ali, p.5. 'India to Invest Iran in Rupees', *Financial Tribune*, (17 February 2018), downloaded from [www.financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/81997/india-to-invest-in-rupees](http://www.financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/81997/india-to-invest-in-rupees) on 7 April 2018.

<sup>107</sup> Shabir Ahmad Khan, 'Geo-Economic Importance of Gwadar Sea Port and Kashgar Economic Zone for Pakistan and China', *IPRI Journal*, Vol.xiii, No.2 (Summer 2013), p.94.

impact on Iran-India deal on Chabahar. While, Pakistan and China are time tested allies and their relations are free from any uncertainty and dispute which will have positive impact on Gwadar port. Likewise, Gwadar port has the potential to become an alternate of Dubai port due to its closeness to the Strait of Hormuz (chock point) and has the potential to handle ‘S’ class larger cargo ships and tankers<sup>108</sup> whereas Chabahar port is incapable to deal with such heavy shipments due to shallow water.<sup>109</sup> In the near future, Gwadar port will offer passage to the marketplaces around East to West, North to South and would become a hub of international trade for China and regional trade for Pakistan. So, Chabahar port is not considered as competitor for Gwadar port. That is why Iran has admitted the worth of Gwadar port and has offered Pakistan the road and rail access of Gwadar Port.<sup>110</sup>

Moreover, India’s proposed route to Afghanistan and Central Asia through Chahbahar port is expensive and time consuming due to adopting both sea and land routes.

Map:4  
India’s Proposed Route to Afghanistan



Source: ‘India’s projected trade link from Mumbai to Kabul’, downloaded from [www.iasabhiyan.com/gwadar-port-chabahar-port](http://www.iasabhiyan.com/gwadar-port-chabahar-port) on 8 April 2018.

The estimated distance from Mumbai to Kabul via Chabahar is around 3300 km including the sea route from Mumbai to Chahahr.<sup>111</sup> Whereas, India may get a shortest access (810 km ) from Wagah to Kabul within 10 to 11 hours via Asian Highway AH1 and the eastern route

<sup>108</sup> ‘S’ class cargo ships are considered latest Freighters and known bulk carriers due to having largest capacity for holding cargo as compared to the remaining cargo ships, downloaded from [www.nomanssky.gamepedia.com/Startship\\_Catalogue\\_Freighter](http://www.nomanssky.gamepedia.com/Startship_Catalogue_Freighter) on 28 October 2018.

<sup>109</sup> Hassan Yasir Malik, ‘Strategic Importance of Gwadar Port’, *Political Studies*, Vol. 19, No.2 (2012), p.61.

<sup>110</sup> Akbrer Ali, p.5

<sup>111</sup> Researcher’s calculations.



of CPEC.<sup>112</sup> Moreover, this route might be extended to Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) with the additional travelling of 1500 km from Kabul.<sup>113</sup>

Another short trade route exists from Wagha to Spinboldak (Afghanistan) via Rohri-Quetta-Chaman with a distance of 1330 km consisting of Asian Highways AH 2 and AH 7.<sup>114</sup> This route might be adapted from Wagha to Karachi Port (1268 km) through Asian Highways AH2 and AH4.<sup>115</sup> Likewise, for India's access to Iran through CPEC, Asian Highway AH 2 provides a short route from Wagha to Taftan (1823 km) via Lahore-Multan-Sukkur-Quetta.<sup>116</sup> Also, another land route from Fazilka to Chahbahar port (1750 km) might be followed via Fazilka-Bahawalpur-Karachi-Gwadar.<sup>117</sup>

### **CPEC vis-a-vis BCIMEC: Benefits for Pakistan**

In response, Pakistan may also get access to Indian markets and beyond on reciprocal bases. Pakistan may be linked with Amritsar-Kolkata industrial corridor (1924 km) that comprises seven Indian states (Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal) including the main cities of Delhi, Lucknow and Jharkhand.<sup>118</sup> This corridor also provides connectivity with Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor (1418 km) that passes through six states (Uttar Pradesh, National Capital Region of Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan, Gujrat and Maharashtra).<sup>119</sup> Moreover, Amritsar-Kolkata corridor is the part of SAARC Highway Corridor 1 that connects Pakistan, India and Bangladesh (2375 km) which includes Lahore, New Delhi, Kolkata, Dhaka and Agartala.<sup>120</sup> So, Pakistan may avail the opportunity of road access to Bangladesh through SAARC Highway Corridor 1.

Another prospect of Amritsar-Kolkata corridor has its connection with BCIMEC that is the China's initiative under OBOR. BCIMEC connects India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China (2800 km), and starts from Kunming (China) to Kolkata.

#### Map:5 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid. Asian Highways network in Pakistan is already be discussed which overlaps with the routes of CPEC at various places.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid. According to India's planned route to Central Asia, the estimated distance from Mumbai to Ashgabat via Chahbahar is 3300 km, while from Wagha to Ashgabat via Kabul is 2200 km.

<sup>114</sup> Researcher's calculations.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> 'Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2013', downloaded from [www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.asp?relid=96473](http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.asp?relid=96473) on 9 April 2018.

<sup>119</sup> 'The Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor', downloaded from [www.dmicdc.com](http://www.dmicdc.com) on 9 April 2018.

<sup>120</sup> Muhammad Moinuddin, 'Strengthening Transport Connectivity Through Road Corridors in Bangladesh', downloaded from [www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Moinuddin-Bangladesh-RPDSTCSA-19nov2014.pdf](http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Moinuddin-Bangladesh-RPDSTCSA-19nov2014.pdf) on 9 April 2018.



Source: BCIM Economic Corridor downloaded from [www.google.com/search=Maps52FBCIM+Economic+Corridor](http://www.google.com/search=Maps52FBCIM+Economic+Corridor) on 10 April 2018.

India's Amritsar-Kolkata corridor has the potential to connect both CPEC and BCIMEC that would be the source of Pak-India economic integration. According to Geng Shuang, spokesman for Ministry of Foreign Affairs China, 'the joint projects of CPEC and BCIMEC under OBOR have the potential to bring welfare and benefits to the local people'.<sup>121</sup> Likewise, by connecting Chabahar port and Gwadar port (discussed earlier) with CPEC and BCIMEC via Amritsar-Kolkata corridor, there would be a new beginning to foster trade route from East Asia to West, and from South to Central Asia.

### Challenges and Implications

Pak-India trade relations may have far-reaching impact for obtaining the desired outcomes from CPEC and uplifting economic integration not only within two states but for the South Asian region and beyond. The trade share of India and Pakistan after partition was comparatively higher in the succeeding history of their trade relations. In 1948-49, India's global export and import share with Pakistan was 23.6 and 50.6 per cent separately which gradually decayed around 0.04 per cent in 2012-2013.<sup>122</sup> Likewise, in 1951-52, Pakistan's global export and import share with India was 2.2 per cent and 1.1 per cent separately, that remained 0.006 per cent to 0.0006 per cent in 2012-2013.<sup>123</sup>

Several studies have analyzed the multiple factors that have direct impacts on the bilateral ties, future plans for enhancing economic relations and emerging trends of trade relations

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<sup>121</sup> Geng Shuang was quoted in 'Linking CPEC with Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor Will Benefit People: China', *FIRSTPOST* (27 June 2017), downloaded from [www.firstpost.com/business/linking-cpec-with-bangladesh-china-india-myanmar-corridor-will-benefit-people-china-3749181.html](http://www.firstpost.com/business/linking-cpec-with-bangladesh-china-india-myanmar-corridor-will-benefit-people-china-3749181.html) on 10 April 2018.

<sup>122</sup> Sandeep Kumar, 'Bilateral Trade Relations Between India and Pakistan: Recent Experience and Future Prospects', *Journal of Indian Research* (ISSN: 2321-4155), Vol.3, No.3 (July-September 2015), p.2.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

between India and Pakistan.<sup>124</sup> Most of the studies itemized that lack of trust between political elite of both the states is the main impediment for uplifting their trade relations.<sup>125</sup> Due to such state of affairs, their existing trade share is inadequate. Currently, Pakistan-India trade takes place by two ways: formal trade and informal trade. Formal trade persists through official means while, informal trade occurs through porous India-Pakistan borders, smuggling and via third countries i.e. Dubai and Singapore.

The formal trade is quite meager bearing around \$ 2.7 billion while the informal trade is estimated around \$ 8-10 billion.<sup>126</sup> The volume of informal trade indicates incredible trade potential between both the states and they may earn substantial revenue by promoting formal trade. There are certain barriers for intensifying formal trade i.e. high tariff, non-tariff barriers, trade bans, quota restrictions and political opposition. Presently, both the states are focusing on geographically distant markets despite trading with each other.<sup>127</sup> According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessment, 'Pakistan may save up to \$ 400-900 million by increasing imports from India besides importing from other markets'.<sup>128</sup> According to Nisha Tanija, 'India's untapped export potential to Pakistan is around \$ 9.5 billion and Pakistan to India is approximately \$ 2.2 billion'.<sup>129</sup> Moreover, around 55% export potential of Pakistan to India lies in textile sector and 90% India's export potential to Pakistan includes non-textile items.<sup>130</sup>

By intensifying formal trade, the business community of both the states will access to wider markets and grasp cheaper raw material due to lower transport charges. The transport charges from Mumbai to Karachi via Dubai are 1.4 to 1.7 times more as compared to direct Mumbai-

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<sup>124</sup> Amita Batra, 'India's Global Trade Potential: Gravity Model Approach', *Working Paper Report N.51*, Indian Council for Research on Economic Relation (ICRIER), New Delhi, (November 2005), p.17. Srinivasan. T.N, 'Preferential Trade Agreements with Special Reference to Asia', (1995), downloaded from [www.econ.yale.edu/~srivanas/prefeTradeAgreement.pdf](http://www.econ.yale.edu/~srivanas/prefeTradeAgreement.pdf) on 6 May 2018. Qamar Abid, 'Trade Between India and Pakistan: Potential Items and MFN Status', *Research Bulletin, State Bank of Pakistan*, Vol.1, No.1 (2005), p.47. M. Iqbal Tahir and Mujeeb Ahmad Khan, 'Indo-Pakistan Economic Cooperation: Harnessing India -Pakistan Trade Potential', SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry. P.13 downloaded from [www.saarcstat.org/sites/default/files/publications/tfreports/India-Pakistan-Economic-Cooperation.pdf](http://www.saarcstat.org/sites/default/files/publications/tfreports/India-Pakistan-Economic-Cooperation.pdf) on 6 May 2018. Mohsin Khan, 'India-Pakistan Trade Relations: A New Beginning,' *New America Foundation*, (January 2013), downloaded from [www.indiapakistantrade.org/resources/Khan-Inda-PakistanTrade-NAF2.pdf](http://www.indiapakistantrade.org/resources/Khan-Inda-PakistanTrade-NAF2.pdf) on 6 May 2018.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Muhammad Ali, Noreen Mujahid Khalid and Aziz ur Rehman, 'Pakistan-India Relations: Peace Through Bilateral Trade', *European Scientific Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (February 2015), p. 368.

<sup>127</sup> Qamar Abid, pp.45-47.

<sup>128</sup> IMF as quoted by Qamar Abid, p.56.

<sup>129</sup> Nisha Tanija, 'India Pakistan Trade: Possibilities and Non-Tariff Barriers,' *Working Paper No.200*, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, (October 2007), p. ii, downloaded from [www.icrier.org/pdf/working%20paper%20200.pdf](http://www.icrier.org/pdf/working%20paper%20200.pdf) on 7 May 2018.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid, p.4.

Karachi route.<sup>131</sup> The main barrier to Pak-India economic integration is Pakistan's denial to grant India the status of Most Favored Nation (MFN).<sup>132</sup> One main argument for Pakistan's reluctance for granting MFN status to India is the risk of Pakistani business community being overawed by Indian imports.<sup>133</sup> Furthermore, India has upheld comparatively high tariffs which exceed at both regional and global standards and have deleterious impact on trade. According to a study of Pakistan-India business forums in 2005, Pakistani business community identified numerous restrictions and Pakistan-specific barriers imposed by India to discourage the exports from Pakistan.<sup>134</sup> The US National Trade also pointed out India's non-tariff barriers i.e. customs valuation procedures, certification requirements and overly restrictive standards including non-automatic import licensing that violate WTO rules.<sup>135</sup> Despite disapproving MFN status, Pakistan seeks to enhance trade and declared 6800 banned areas to open up trade for India.<sup>136</sup> For intensifying trust deficit, both the states must adopt flexible response and establish trade relations taking cue from other nations with unstable relations. For instance, China and Japan stabilized their unstable political relations by developing strong economic relations.<sup>137</sup> Likewise some remaining states also initiated trade relations by shelving their enduring political conflicts i.e. China-Taiwan, India-China, US-Russia, US-China, and determine that economic integration is an operative tool in refining their bilateral relations.

For elevating Pak-India trade relations, the Planning Commission of Pakistan pointed out the lacks of strategic focus and recommended to project comprehensive reforms.<sup>138</sup> For engrossing the productive outcomes of regional economic integration, Pakistan must develop a strategy for promoting transit trade corridors, and besides upgrading road/railway infrastructure, the incentives for trade facilitation (warehousing, customs clearance and conducive financial services) must be taken on entry/exit points. Likewise, for grasping the benefits of trade, an inclusive plan for elevating trade must be initiated between Iran, Central Asia, China and Iran. For establishing the mechanism relating to Pak-India trade, a regional trade forum encompassing on various sectors including private, media and academics, must be developed. The forum will point out the main snags on the way to Pak-India economic

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid, p.9.

<sup>132</sup> Both India and Pakistan are the members of World Trade Organization (WTO) and are signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The two states could not fulfill GATT obligations due to their political rivalries and border disputes. India granted MFN status to Pakistan in 1996, but Pakistan refused to reciprocate due to territorial conflict on Kashmir. Imam A.H, 'What the MFN Mean', *DAWN*, (7 November 2011). Nisha Tanija, pp.11-2. Muhammad Ali, Noreen Mujahid Khalid and Aziz ur Rehman, p.370.

<sup>133</sup> 'Pakistan-India Trade to Benefit Consumer', *The New York Times* (3 November 2011).

<sup>134</sup> Zareen Fatima Naqvi and Philip Schuler (eds), *The World Bank* (June 2007), p. 173.

<sup>135</sup> 'Survey Report: Challenges of Doing Business in India', *The Economist* (1 June 2006).

<sup>136</sup> Muhammad Ali, Noreen Mujahid Khalid and Aziz ur Rehman, p.370.

<sup>137</sup> Mohanty B and Hazary S.C, *Political Economy of India: Retrospects and Prospects* (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, 1997), p.37.

<sup>138</sup> Garry Pursell, Ashraf Khan and Saad Gulzar, 'Pakistan's Trade Policies: Future Directions', *International Growth Centre*, report prepared for Planning Commission of Pakistan, downloaded from [www.theigc.org/Wp-content/uploads/2014/9/Pursell-Et-Al-2011-Policy-Brief.pdf](http://www.theigc.org/Wp-content/uploads/2014/9/Pursell-Et-Al-2011-Policy-Brief.pdf) on 18 September 2018.

integration, suggest the ways to compensate and will formulate the strategy for the promotion of regional trade.

Moreover, Pakistan's success in war against terror and improvement in law and order situation are not appreciated by India which are prerequisites for the promotion of Pak-India politico-economic relations and these will have domino effect in resolving their core issues especially Kashmir.

### **Conclusion**

Both India and Pakistan are hostage to their fateful past since their inception that generated mistrusts between them. Moreover, the two states are bearing a massive number of chronically poor populations as more than one third of it is surviving under acute poverty conditions.<sup>139</sup> Currently, their economies are unable to overcome poverty and China's initiative about OBOR has the potential in boosting their economies that will eliminate poverty and bring prosperity. Both India and Pakistan have ambiguities on the issues about trade relations but CPEC will provide the environment for building confidence towards economic integration that will lead towards win-win situation for both the states. Additionally, the persisting political and territorial disputes are the main hurdles to Pak-India economic integration but through CPEC the two states will boost their economies that may generate conducive environment in resolving their disputes and will ultimately bring prosperity and peace in the region.

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<sup>139</sup> 'Understanding Chronic Poverty in South Asia', downloaded from [www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication\\_files/CPRI\\_chap7.pdf](http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/CPRI_chap7.pdf) on 02 October 2018.

## Visuals and Ethics: Framing the Karachi Airport Attack

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**ABSTRACT:**

*Pakistani media has come under severe criticism for its immaturity in reporting, oversimplification, lack of investigative reporting, and sensationalism. Thus criticism extends particularly to the unfolding events of terrorism as well. This paper will see if this criticism has any shred of truth to it by doing the visual and content analysis of the electronic media during the Karachi airport attack. The paper argues that the media coverage of the tragic terror incident was unethical, unprofessional and helped terrorists in creating fear and terror.*

**Keywords:** Agenda setting, framing, terrorism, discourse, Karachi Airport attack, journalism

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## **Introduction**

Pakistan is fighting its war on terror since 2002, the same year when it opened its airspace for private electronic media. Thus, the discourse about Pakistan's war on terror could not be monopolized by the government as these independent electronic media channels also entertained alternative discourses. Thus, the government did not always find support for its narrative. Pakistani media has, thus, been blamed for immaturity, lack of ethics and professionalism and even harming the core national interests especially vis-à-vis its coverage of the war on terror.

This paper is an attempt to find out whether the electronic media has been up to its professional and ethical standards, neutrality and responsibility while doing its duty of watchdog. However, this paper in no way suggests any curbs on the media and the researchers firmly believe in the freedom of the media for the growth of a healthy society. However, by identifying the problem areas it would suggest introspection for the media houses.

To analyze the electronic media, the researchers have opted for the event of Karachi Airport attack by terrorists on June 8, 2014. The Jinnah International Airport was cleared after five hours of operation by the Army, Rangers, Police and Airport Security Force (ASF). The attack brought a major question on the media's responsibility as well. The Karachi incident was one of the most criticized media coverage, where media overstepped its line of duty. Unfortunately, no serious research has been conducted so far on the topic. That was the prime motivation for the researchers of this paper to properly investigate this incident with proper research tools.

For the study, the live coverage of the incident was thoroughly observed. Most repeated tickers as breaking news, exclusiveness claims, tone of the anchor and the reporters, most repeated words, supporting visual, information delivered about several terrorists, casualties and the fire in planes was taken as frames for the study for ARY News, Dawn News, Dunya TV, and Samma TV. The information provided by the channels throughout that night will be analyzed to find different frames.

## **Research Questions & Hypothesis**

The paper would seek to answer the following research questions:

1. How did the electronic media respond to the Karachi airport attack?
2. What frames were used for the coverage?
3. Did the media show professionalism and observed journalistic ethics?
4. What was the fallout of the coverage?

After the preliminary observation of the news coverage, the researchers deduced the following hypothesis which this paper will try to prove.

“The extensive coverage by the electronic media of the Karachi Airport attack trumped the ethics of journalism and professionalism and thus created confusion, terror and fear in the audience helping the agenda and propaganda of terrorists.”

## **Theory and Method**

The analysis of media coverage is best explained within the theoretical framework of the Agenda Setting. The theory has been developed by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw.<sup>140</sup> This theory espouses that the media is the power to set the agenda of the news for public discussion. It not only tells the audience what to think about but also how to think about it. This provides the news media with huge political power. Within this theoretical approach, Framing is of the utmost importance when the news is portrayed, reported or chiseled before targeting the audience. This theory was first presented by Goffman, under the title of Frame Analysis.<sup>141</sup> According to theory, the media sets the agenda for public discussion. In essence, framing theory suggests how some information is presented to the audience in the form of influences the choices people make about how to process that information. Frames are abstractions that work to organize or structure message meaning.

Fairhurst and Sarr defined that the following techniques of framing possibly can be used by media. They can be in the form of metaphors, stories, traditions, rituals, and ceremonies, slogans, jargon, contrast and the last but not least by spinning.<sup>142</sup> Spinning means presenting a concept to convey a value judgment both positive and negative that might not be immediately apparent just to create an inherent bias by definition.

Framing is in many ways very close to the Agenda Setting theory. For instance, both focus on how media draws the public's eye to specific topics – in this way they set the agenda. But Framing takes this a step further in the way in which the news is presented creates a frame for that information. This is usually a conscious choice by journalists – in this case, a frame refers to the way media as gatekeepers organize and present the ideas, events, and topics they cover.

The proper tool to study frames is the use of visual and content analysis. Having set the theoretical foundation of the study, this paper, thus, would make use of the content analysis method and would find different frames in the coverage of electronic media. The electronic media content will be discussed on its breaking news race, tickers phenomenon, live coverage of terrorist attacks, live coverage of Karachi airport attack, tone of the anchor and reporters, promotion of terrorists, lack of authenticity and other factors from 11:25 pm June 8 to 05:00 am June 9. The selected TV channels are Dunya News, Dawn News, Samma TV, and ARY News. Although the event was covered by other channels as well, yet the researcher found it hard to get the visuals of the event of other channels. Plus, these channels are widely watched.

## **Findings**

### **Dunya News Reporting**

Tickers flashed from 11:30 PM to 4:30 AM

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<sup>140</sup>McCombs, M.E, &Shaw, D.L The Agenda-Setting Function of mass media.Public opinion quarterly, 36, (1986), 178-187.

<sup>141</sup> Goffman Ervin. Frame Analysis: an essay on the organization of experience, Boston MA Northeastern university press 1986, 21-39.

<sup>142</sup> Fairhurst, G. & Sarr, R.The art of Framing. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 1996. 19, 59.



1. *Karachi airport k qareeb dhamaka* (Blast near Karachi airport).
2. *Jinnah terminal pr hamla, shadeed firing, hand grenade bhi phainaka gya* (Attack on Jinnah terminal, severe firing, hand grenade fired).
3. *Old terminal par jane wale raste band* (Road to old terminal blocked).
4. *Terrorists Fokker gate se dakhil hue* (Terrorists entered from Fokkar gate).
5. *Hamla awron ki tadad panch se che he* (Terrorists are five or six in number).
6. *Hamla awron aur forces ke darmiyan firing ka tabadla jari.* (Firing continues between forces and terrorists).
7. *Tamam airports par red alert* (Red alert on airport).
8. *Aik dehshat gard mara gya* (One terrorist killed).
9. *Dakhili aur kharji raston par Ranjers depute* (Rangers deputed on entrance and exit).
10. *Musalsal dhmake, Isfahani hanger aur custom clearing gate par musalsal dhmake* (Blasts continue unabated, continuous firing on Isfahani hanger and custom clearing gate).
11. *Karachi airport par hamla, manazir sirf dunya channel par* (Karachi airport attack, exclusive visuals on Dunya News).
12. *Security ehalkaron ki mazeed nafri mangwa li gyi* (More security personals called).
13. *Runway par aath(8) dehshatgard hone ki itla* (Rumors about presence of 8 terrorists on runway).
14. *ASF ke 4 ehalkar Shaheed* (four ASF security personals were martyred).
15. *Airport par waqfe waqfe se dhmake* (Blasts on airport with intervals).
16. *Aath (8) dhmake sune gye* (8 blasts heard).
17. *Commandoes gate number 4 se airport me dakhil* (Commandoes entering from gate No. 4).
18. *Malir cantt se Pak foj ke daste airport ki taraf rawana* (Pak army troops left from Malir for airport).
19. *Baktar band gariyan airport mei dakhil* (Police vans entering in airport).
20. *Aik tyare (plane) ko aag lag gyi he* (One plane got fire).
21. *Teen tyaron ko goliyan mari gyien, 5 ko juzwi nuqsan pohcha* (Bullets fired at five planes, three got partly damaged).
22. *Pak Foj ki daste airport pohch gye* (Army troops reached airport).
23. *Army chief ka DG Rangers aur Corps Commander se rabta* (Army chief in contact with DG Rangers and Cops Commander).
24. *Jinnah hasptal me paanch lashen layi gyien* (Five bodies brought to Jinnah Hospital).
25. *Jinnah hasptal me aik aur lash* (One more body brought to Jinnah Hospital).
26. *2 tyaron ko aag lag gyi he* (Two planes got fire).
27. *Aik tyare ko hijake krne ki itla* (News of a plane being hijacked).
28. *Pak foj k mazeed daste airport talab* (More troops of Pak Army called).

Last 20-minutes coverage:

1. *Kisi tayare ko nuqsan pohcha na koi musafir zakhmi hua (ISPR).* (None of the plane got damaged, nor any passenger got injured-ISPR).
2. *Koi tyara hijack nahi hua (ISPR).* (None of the planes were hijacked-ISPR).
3. *10 dhehshtgardo ko mar diya gya he (ISPR).* (Ten terrorists killed-ISPR).

4. *Tamam dehshatgard mar diye gye hen (ISPR)*. (All of the terrorists killed-ISPR).
5. *Pak Foj ne dehshatgardon ke azzaim khak me mila diye*. (Pak army crushed notorious plans of terrorists).
6. *Dehshatgard RPG, Rockets aur bhari asle se laise the (ISPR)*. ( Killed Terrorists were loaded with RPGs, Rockets and heavy weapons-ISPR).
7. *Dehshatgard Uzbek the (ISPR)*. (Terrorists were Uzbek-ISPR).
8. *Dehshatgardon ko dou ilaqaon me mehsoor kar ke mara gya*. (Terrorists were killed by entrapping them in two places).

### **Dawn TV News Coverage**

Tickers flashed from 11:30 PM to 4:30 AM

1. *Karachi airport hajj terminal par dehshatgardon ka hamla* (Karachi airport's Hajj terminal attacked by terrorists).
2. *Karachi airport ke kareeb shadeed firing*. (Heavy firing near Karachi Airport).
3. *Karachi airport par hamle ki itla, police, Ranjers moqa par pohnc gaye*. (News about Karachi airport attack, police and Rangers arrived at the sight).
4. *Karachi airport, shadeed firing aur dhamake*. (Karachi airport, heavy firing and blasts).
5. *2 ASF ehalkar zakhmi*. (Two ASF personnel injured).
6. *Char ASF ehalkar zakhmi*. (Four ASF personnel wounded).
7. *Old terminal ke aane jane wale raste band*. (Entrance and exit to old terminal sealed).
8. *Amad o raft muatal*. (All type of traffic stopped).
9. *Karachi airport seal*. (Karachi Airport sealed).
10. *Dehshatgard bamon se lace*. (Terrorists loaded with bombs).
11. *Char ASF ehalkar Shaheed*. (Four ASF workers martyred).
12. *Karachi airport se dhuan uth rha he*. (Smoke emerging from Karachi airport).
13. *Taftan me khudkush hamla, 6 zaireen Shaheed*. (Suicide attack in Taftan, 6 pilgrims martyred).
14. *6 dehshatgard VIP gate se dakhil hue*. (Six terrorists entered from VIP gate).
15. *Aik dehshatgard halaq hon ki itla*. (One terrorist killed).
16. *Dehshatgardon ki umren 20 se 22 saal ke darmiyan hen*. (All terrorists are 20 to 22 years old).
17. *Andha dhund firing ka silsila jari*. (Continuous heavy firing witnessed).
18. *Malir cantt se Pak Foj ke daste rwana*. (Pak army troops left for airport from Malir.).
19. *Dehshatgard tyare ke andr se firing kar rahe hein*. (Terrorists firing from inside the plane).
20. *2 dhshatgard tayare me dakhil hone me kamyab*. (Two terrorists succeeded to entre in a plane).
21. *ASF ke 6 ehalkar Shaheed*. (Six ASF personals martyred).
22. *PIA, AIR Blue aur international jahaz ko nuqsan pohncha he*. (Planes of PIA, Air Blue and international company are damaged).
23. *3 se 4 dehshatgard airport ke andr mojud hein*. (Three to four terrorists are present inside airport).
24. *Dehshatgardon ke hamle se 3 jahazon ko nuqsan pohcha*. (Three planes damaged in terrorist attack).

25. *Air port par firing ka tabadla.* (Fire exchange at airport).
26. *Pak foj ne runway clear karwa liya.* (Pak army clears runway).
27. *Karachi airport par 7 se 8 dehshatgard mojud hein.* (Eight to nine terrorists present inside Karachi airport).
28. *Jinnah hospital me 5 lashen muntaqil kar di gyien.* (Five dead bodies brought to Jinnah hospital).
29. *Taftan hamla, 23 zaireen janbahq.* (Taftan suicide attack, 23 pilgrims died).

4:30am- 4:50 am June 9, coverage:

1. *Karachi airport ka 90 % hisa clear karwa liya gya.* (90% Karachi airport cleared).
2. *Koi tayara hijack hua na kisi tyare ko nuqsan hua* (ISPR). (None of the plane hijacked, nor damaged-ISPR).
3. *Dehshatgardon ke khilaf operation aakhri marahil me* (ISPR). (Operation against terrorists proceeding to logical end successfully-ISPR).
4. *SSG ka dasta airport me dakhil*(ISPR). (SSG troops enters the airport-ISPR).
5. *Tamam 10 dehshatgardon ko halaq kr diya gya*(ISPR). (All terrorists killed-ISPR).
6. *Tamam ehm asase mehfooz hen*(ISPR). (All important assets are secured).
7. *Karachi airport par searching ka aml jari.* (Search operation at Karachi airport is underway).
8. *Aag tyare me nahi amarat me lagi thi* (ISPR). (Fire was in the building, not in plane-ISPR).
9. *Dehshatgardon se RPG, Rocket baramad.* (RPG and rockets recovered from terrorists).
10. *Dehshatgardon ko dou ilaqon me mehdood kr ke mara gya.* (Terrorists were trapped in two places and then killed).

### **SAMMA TV News Coverage**

**11:30 to 1:30 tickers:**

1. *Karachi airport ke qareeb firing.* (Firing near Karachi airport).
2. *Airport ke isfahani hanger par dehshatgardon ka hamla.* (Attack on Isphahani hanger of Karachi airport).
3. *12 se 15 dehshatgard hein.* (Terrorists are 12 to 15 in number).
4. *ASF ke 4 ehalkar zakhmi.* (Four ASF personals got wounds).
5. *Dehshatgardon ne dasti bomb bhi phainke.* (Terrorists also attacked with hand grenades).
6. *Police aur RRF ki mazed nafri talab.* (More troops of policy and RFF called for help).
7. *Karachi airport aur runway ki tamam lights ko band kar diya gya.* (All lights at the airport and runway switched off).
8. *Flight operation muatal.* (Flight operations stopped).
9. *Dou maqamat par aag bharak uthi he.* (Fire flames emerging from two points).
10. *Shadeed firing ka tabadla ho rha he.* (Heavy cross fires).
11. *Fuel ke zakheeron ke kreeb larai jari.* (Fight near fuel reserves).
12. *Dou tyaron me aag lag gyi he.* (Two planes caught fire).

13. *Army chief ka DG rangers aur corps commander Karachi ko phone.* (Army chief calls DG Rangers and Corps Commander).
14. *Aik dehshatgard halaq.* (One terrorist killed).
15. *Dehshatgard gari smait runway me ghus gye.* (Terrorists entered runway in their car).
16. *Karachi airport par flight operation rok diya gya.* (Flight operation suspended at Karachi airport).
17. *Dehshatgard 20 se ziada maloom hote hen.* (Terrorists probably are more than twenty in number).
18. *Karwayi me char dehshatgard mare gaye.* (Four terrorists killed in operation).
19. *Dehshatgardon aur forces me firing jari.* (Continuous heavy crossfires at Karachi airport).
20. *Chaghi, Taftan me dehshatgardon ka hmala , 30 halaq.* (Terrorist attack in Taftan, 30 killed).
21. *Pak foj ki response force ko bhi bula liya gya.* (Pak army response force called too).
22. *Samma exclusive: Dusra hamla custom clearing gate pe hua.* (The second attack came from custom clearing gate).
23. *Pehla hamla isfahani hanger aur dusra custom clearing gate pe hua.* (First attack was on Isphahani hanger and second, was on custom clearing gate).
24. *Aath dehshatgard high roof gari me sawar ho kar aaye aur andha dhund firing kar di.* (Eight terrorist came in high roof jeep and opened indiscriminate fire).

#### **Tickers during 4:30-4:50 AM:**

1. *Security forces ki karwayi se aath dehshatgard halaq.* (Eight terrorists killed in operation by Pak forces).
2. *Corps commander aur DG rangers bhi jawano k sath mojud hein.* (DG rangers and Corps Commander along with troops at airport).
3. *Teen se char dehshatgardon ki talash jari he.* (Search underway for three to four terrorists).
4. *Tamam area clear karwa liya gya he.* (All area has been cleared).
5. *Hamle me kisi jahaz ko koi nuqsan nhi pohcha.* (None of the plane damaged in the attack).
6. *Aag tyare me nhi amarat me lagi hui thi.* (Fire flames were rising from a building in airport, not from plane).
7. *Tamam ehm asase mehfooz hein.* (All valuable assets are safe).
8. *Dehshatgardon ko dou ilaqon tak mehdood kar ke mara gya.* (Terrorists were trapped in two places and killed).
9. *Operation 5 ghanton me complete.* (Operation completed in five hours).
10. *Azan fajr k sath hi dehshatgardon ka khatma.* (Terrorists killed at the time of Fajar prayer's call).
11. *Pak foj ka kamyabi ka elan.* (Pak army announces victory).

#### **ARY News Coverage**

##### **(11:30PM-1:30AM):**

1. *Karachi airport terminal one par firing.* (Firing at Karachi airport's terminal one).
2. *Musalah afrad ne firing ki, dasti bomb bhi phanka.* (Armed people opened fire, attacked with hand grenades as well).

3. *Hamle me ASF k edou ehalkar zakhmi.* (Two ASF personals got wounds in the attack).
4. *Airport jane wale tamam raste band.* (All roads leading to airport blocked).
5. *Karachi airport se aag ke shole aur dhuen k badal uth rhe hen.* (Heavy smoke and huge fire flames rising from Karachi airport).
6. *Tamam perwazen rok di gyi hen.* (Flight operation suspended at Karachi airport).
7. *Hamla karne wale naqab posh hen.* (Attackers have covered faces).
8. *Parking me khare jahazon ko aag lagne ka khadsha.* (Planes in parking may catch fire).
9. *Jahazon ki parking ke ilaqe se musalsal firing ki awazen.* (Continuous fire sounds from planes' parking area).
10. *Jahazon ki parking ke area me aag lagi he, fire brigade na pohncch saka.* (Fire in planes parking area, fire brigade could not reach).
11. *Hamla awar firing karte hue airport me dakhil hue.* (Terrorists entered airport while firing).
12. *Firing ka silsila 45 minut se jari.* (Continuous firing for the last 45 minutes).
13. *Char ASF ehalkar zakhmi.* (Four ASF personals got injuries).
14. *Hamla awron ki tayare me dakhil hone ki itla.* (News of attackers entering the plane).
15. *Jahaz ki parking ke ilaqe se musalsal firing ki awazen.* (Continuous fire sounds from plane parking area).
16. *Fokker gate se firing hui, golian andr aa kar gir rahi hein.* (Firing started from Fokker gate while bullets are landing inside).
17. *Karachi airport tamam parwazon ko rok diya gya.* (Flight operation suspended at Karachi airport).
18. *ASF ke 4 ehalkar Shaheed.* (Four ASF personals martyred).
19. *Aik tyare ke tabah hone ki itla.* (News of one plane being destroyed).
20. *4 lashen aur aik zakhmi hospital laye gye hein.* (Four dead bodies and one injured are brought to hospital).
21. *Airport ke mukhtalif hison se firing ki awazen.* (Firing sounds from different parts of airport).
22. *10 se 15 afracd dewar tor ke ander dakhil hue.* (Ten to fifteen terrorists entered in airport by breaking the wall).
23. *Aik waqt aye ga ke dehshatgar ham par qabiz hon ge: Rehman Malik.* (One day terrorists will conquer us: Rehman Malik).
24. *Dehshatgard main runway par pohncch gaye.* (Terrorists reached main runway).
25. *Tayara jalne ke live manazir. ARY exclusive.* (Live visual of plane on fire: ARY exclusive).
26. *Aag ne 2 tayaron ko lapait me le liya.* (Two planes caught fire).
27. *Firing se mutasir tayara ghair mulki kargo he.* (The plane damaged with fire belongs to international cargo).
28. *Dehshatgardon ne shadeed firing ki jis ki waja se bhagdar mach gyi.* (Heavy firing from terrorists created stampede).
29. *Corps commander Karachi operation ki nigrani kar rahe hein.* (Corps Commander Karachi monitoring operation).
30. *Pak foj ke jawano ne positionen smbhal leen.* (Pak forces troops took positions).
31. *Security forces ki karwayi se aik dehshatgard halak.* (One terrorist killed in operation).

**Tickers from 4:30AM-4:50AM:**

1. *SSG ne airport par hatmi operation shuru kr diya.* (SSG launched final operation in airport).
2. *Baktar band gariyon ne tayaron ko ghere me liya hua he.* (Armored vehicles encircled planes).
3. *Pak foj nay runway ka control sanbhal leya.* (Pak army took over runway control).
4. *SSG ka commando elaeka key talashe la raha hain.* (SSG commandoes searching area).
5. *Runway per kharay jhazon key talashi li ja rahe ha.* (Planes on runway are being searched).
6. *Maray gae dhasdgurdon key tadad 10 ho gae.* (Ten terrorists being killed).
7. *Kisi tayara ko nuksan nahe phoncha.* (None of the plane is damaged).
8. *Taswer may nazar aana wale aag tayara may nahe aamarat may ha.* (The fire in visual was in building, not in plane).
9. *Dhashadgadon sa asla aur roket mela.* (Rockets and weapons were recovered from terrorists).
10. *Dhashatgadon sa khajor aur dry fruit mela hey.* (Dry fruits and dates were recovered from terrorists).
11. *Dhashatghard airport ka aqbi rasta key dewar gira kar andar dakhel hoe.* (Terrorists entered airport by breaking back gate).
12. *PIA ka mulazmen ko police na tahvel may la leya.* (PIA employees being taken by police).

### **Supporting Visuals**

Some of the common features of visuals presented on all of the TV channels had following mentionable features:

- Most of the visuals on all channels were of the night and there was hardly anything visible. Bullets and blast sounds were complementing darkness to create more terror.
- Updated scenes: hotel outside the terminal entrance, empty chairs by ARY News.
- Blast sounds and fire visuals. Four blasts repeated eleven times, reporter shouting in panic “blasts”.
- Plane on fire, high flames, anchor confirmed the news on ARY as well.
- Dark smoke rising from the terminal.

### **Repeated Frames**

Most repeated words used by all channels as frames include:

- *Dehshatgard* (Terrorists)
- *Khof o hiras* (Fear and terror)
- *Muslasal firing* (Continuous firing)
- *Shadeed firing* (Heavy firing)
- *Firing ka tabadla jari* (Cross firing continues)
- *Dubara firing shuru.* (Firing started again)
- *Waqfa waqfa se firing* (Firing continues with intervals)
- *Ghumsan ki jang* (furious battle)
- *Dhamakon ki awazen* (Blasts' sound)

- *Zordar dhmake* (Heavy blasts)
- *Kale dhuen k badil* (Thick smoke clouds)

### **Unanimity of News**

On ARY News, one ticker flashed 31 times in first ten minutes of the attack alternating with Breaking News flash: “*Karachi airport terminal one par firing, Dasti bomb hamla*”(Firing at Karachi airport terminal one, hand grenade attack). Tone of the anchor person was fast, hasty, scared, creating sensation and they were repeatedly saying the same sentence flashing in ticker.

- The anchor repeated sentence “*Abhi confirm nahi ho ska he*” (No confirmed yet) five times.
- Four reporters were taken on telephone beeper. Same questions asked and the same answers received because all were reporting from the same point just to fill airtime.
- Reporter Shah Nawaz Shah reported quoting “unreliable sources informed”.<sup>143</sup>
- A possibility is that airplanes can get fire.
- After the terrorist attack on the airport terminal, the anchor took a witness live and asked the questions as to how many people were they and were they armed or not?
- Additional forces called, which roads are being blocked, which forces to be deployed for the operation,
- “*Police ne shayed kisi suspected ko pakra he*” (Police probably have arrested a suspect).
- From 12 O’clock onward, The Dawn, ARY News were reporting two planes had been damaged and were on fire.
- Every channel reported a different number of terrorists involved in the attack: ARY reported a large number of terrorists, ten to fifteen; Dawn News reporter told six entered from VIP gate and fifteen entered from the backside to give them cover. Dawn, however, sensibly reported that the whole siege was going on the old airport while the international airport was all safe.<sup>144</sup>
- A terrorist would be happy to see Dawn News screen showing upper flash Taftan suicide bomb attack killing pilgrims, lower slot Karachi airport terminal one under attack, severe firing exchange continuously witnessed, and the middles screen showing terrorists attack on Karachi airport, four ASF people killed, reporters telling there is a threat to airplanes.<sup>145</sup>
- Samma TV was the most curious channel throughout the coverage. They discovered the attack on the airport was on two sides from Isfahani hanger and Fokker gate. Interviews of the survivors of the attack were also shown who were still in shock.

### **Discussion and Analysis**

As opinionated by media analysts, “media in Pakistan is hormonally-driven, youthful and real time-pressured and is struggling to control its primal urges to over-simplify, over-exaggerate,

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<sup>143</sup>Karachi operation ARY News 8<sup>th</sup> June 2014 11:26 pm -11:36 pm

<sup>144</sup> The Dawn News, 9<sup>th</sup> June 2014, live coverage, 12:10 am.

<sup>145</sup> The Dawn News, 9<sup>th</sup> June 2014 Karachi airport attack, live coverage 12:06 am.

under-analyze and under-contextualize everything resulting in chaos.”<sup>146</sup> The coverage of Karachi Airport was a big question on media professionalism and ethics which were nowhere to be seen. Considering the reporting crews channels parked themselves within a few minutes of the news of the attack outside the airport. For hours the only “information” in general that most of them peddled were rumors that kept being converted into news items in their hourly bulletins apart from live opinions repeated. Barely anyone offered confirmed information or identified sources. Most sourced their information to be “reliable” but unidentified sources, or to plain “unconfirmed sources”. Some even kept offering declared unconfirmed information. It was not only unreasonable but also unprofessional. When the reporter himself says information he has is unconfirmed or without a good source, it is against journalistic principles to share it with citizens who take it as truth, especially when it is about an unfolding terror event of visibly significant proportions.

As soon as there was even a rumor of airport attack all channels started "breaking news" flash with airport attack possibility. Anchorperson on ARY News was fighting with her nerves while reporting the attack. She was continuously repeating airport attack single sentence which was on screen as breaking news and running as ticker as well. And sources were nowhere to be quoted, neither any news was confirmed. The characteristics of the coverage are discussed in detail below.

### **Violation of Ethics**

Five to six-hour live coverage of the terrorist attack on Karachi airport Isphahani hanger followed by security forces operation was like a full show of sensation, valor and well planning of well-equipped terrorists. The security forces were appreciated in the last twenty to thirty minutes of the coverage when the operation was complete and the airport was declared clear by ISPR. Initial two-hour information delivered by all news channels under observation was the attack on airport, fierce and extensive firing, the number of attackers which were altogether different on all channels, deaths of ASF soldiers. There was a rush noticed on all channels. People sitting at their homes could feel the attack on their home. The way reporters on the spot were reporting and the anchorpersons were questioning was all just magnifying the terror. Secondly, some of the channels were even reporting entrance of security forces from specific gates to counter terrorists. As per their routine, the reporters converged on the scene and started transmitting amateur footage with the watermark of it being exclusive. How can a public event being covered by dozens of channels be exclusive is a mystery as usual.

The live coverage of the Karachi incident just like the attack on Mehran base and many other examples highlighted the ugly side of Pakistani broadcast media when it comes to reporting unfolding terrorist attacks: it was also hysterical, was not focused, not based on facts, highly opinionated. It also offered supposition and assumption as fact (way before basic facts can be available) and, of course, sensationalism to attract the audience and keep them captivated. The reporters rarely stopped to think and analyze before passing on raw information at least during the first two-three hours of live coverage. The incident was big and of course, needed to be reported.

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<sup>146</sup>Adnan Rehmat 2010, “Reporting conflict: media’s primal urge”  
<http://www.viewpointonline.net/component/content/article?id=124:reporting-conflict-medias-primal-urge>.  
Accessed: Sep 30, 2014.



But at the same time, there was an attack on the pilgrim's bus at Taftan and many killings happen. That ticker flashed twice or thrice on all TV channels and the news was conveyed just because there were no media in Taftan to create all the mess and terror.

### **Unauthentic Reports**

All of the four channels had no reliable or confirmed sources to quote. For filling airtime, which seems a big challenge for the electronic media there were just statements. There was information about the number of terrorists and the number was different in all channels, for instance, Dunya TV reported 8, Dawn News 6, 7 and 81, SAMMA TV reported 12 to 15 terrorists and ARY reported 10 to fifteen terrorists. Apart from that, the reporters who were covering the incident were more than one in number with all channels and everyone had a different point of view about the attack and attackers at the same time. If one reported that a plane was on fire, the other denied saying it cannot be said till now.

The second issue was about the burning of planes. At least one thing was unanimous about all channels. All reported that fire has caught planes in the parking area of the airport. Number of the planes, however, was again different. If one reported two planes other reported five or three. So again and the main reason was again reliability of sources. There was no confirming source of news while reporting the Karachi airport attack,

### **Compromising the Operation**

- *Commandoes gate number 4 se airport me dakhil.* (Commandoes entering from gate number 4).
- *Malir cant se Pak foj k daste airport ki taraf rawana* (Forces left for airport from malir).
- *Dakhili aur kharji raston pr ranjers depute.* (Rangers deputed on exit and entry points).

This information in tickers of Dunya TV was not for the general public at least. Neither anyone needed to know. If the reporter on duty is delivering everything whatever is coming to him. Then there should have been some editorial policy, some filter, check on the news to be broadcasted. But there was nothing to see. That night witnessed all possible non-professionalism and the complete absence of something can be called a sense of nationalism. The information in these two tickers was useful of course for the attackers and those who were watching TV to further guide them in the direction of security forces entrance.

### **Focus on Hospital**

It has become general practice in the media to rush to the hospitals whenever there is some terrorist activity. And generally, the hospital environment is spoiled by bringing cameras, and so many irrelevant people. The same was the case in Jinnah hospital during the live coverage of Karachi airport attack. Media flooded hospital to win the race of breaking news by giving the number of dead bodies and wounded in the hospital. That was also unethical. The whole scene of hand grenade sounds, blasts, bullets firing, dead bodies, ambulances, deaths of ASF security personals was quite enough to make people awake and caught by TV screens all night.

### **Race for Exclusive Footage**

There was a clear race among all channels for exclusiveness as ever. There are two noticeable coverage incidents from Dunya News and Samma TV. Dunya News cameraman entered into the inner clearance area where terrorists killed security personals to enter into the parking area of the airport. And the news channel took pride in showing that visual on TV screens exclusively. There could be a life threat for the cameraman. But that was neither policy of channels nor there was training. That is the reason all the media experts are emphasizing more and more towards the ethical reporting and safety of journalists at the same time. The second was Samma TV reporter who broke the news that the attack was from two sides. First terrorists attacked the custom clearing gate and then went on the opposite side at Isfahaini hanger. Apart from these two incidents, every channel was exclusively showing the same dark visuals with thick smoke rising to the sky and some fire which was said to be burning planes in the parking or some building behind that.

### **Information Required to Be Reported**

1. *Kisi tayare ko nuqsan pohcha na koi musafir zakhmi hua (ISPR)*. (None of the planes is damaged).
2. *Koi tyara hijake nhi hua (ISPR)*, (No plane was hijacked)
3. *10 dheishtgardo ko mar diya gya he (ISPR)* (Ten terrorists killed)
4. *Tamam dehshatgard mar diye gye hen (ISPR)*. (All terrorist killed in operation).
5. *Pak Foj ne dehshatgardon k azzaim khak me mila diye*. (Pak army defeated terrorists).
6. *Dehshatgard RBG, Rokets aur bhari asle se lace the (ISPR)*. (Terrorists equipped with heavy ammunition).
7. *Dehshatgard UZBEK the (ISPR)*. (Terrorists were Uzbeks).
8. *Dehshatgadon ko dou ilaqon me mehsoor kr k mara gya*. (Terrorists were trapped from two sides).

Having a quick look at the tickers of the last twenty minutes of operation coverage, the following information can be observed that security forces have cleared the area from terrorists and all state property including buildings, planes and passengers were safe. There were ten terrorists and the arms and ammunition they had were Indian made. The terrorists were Uzbek. And every ticker had a confirmed source which was ISPR. So the long stories of the burning of planes all night, planes being hijacked, the airport are in terrorist control, theories about numbers of the terrorist were gone with the wind at the end of the live broadcast saga.

Now the question the simple argument is what was required and what was reported by the media. What does a concerned citizen needed to know when some airport is under attack? First, about the safety of passengers, second about the diversion of flights and third about the diversion of routs going towards airport are required information. That can follow the successful operation and further details which all channels gave during last twenty minutes of coverage. The remaining four hours of media coverage of the Karachi airport operation seemed to fulfill three main purposes. Firstly, it was encouraging the promotion of political gains of terrorists; secondly, it was as usual fodder for channels; and thirdly, for TRPs and the business of the media.

The coverage of the operation was extensive. It gave more time to the terrorists. Discussing their count, their good planning, their hold on the airport, setting planes on fire, their ages, get-ups,

blasts, firing, etc. and that was not the limit. When the operation was completed and all area was declared clear by the security forces and it was told through media that the terrorists were Uzbeks, the arms they had were Indian made, the media left these two things on the side and all TV channels broadcasted special reports on the claims of responsibility for the attack by TTP<sup>147</sup>. A photograph was used by all channels repeatedly in which a group of terrorist was standing. It was also reported that TTP had claimed responsibility for the airport attack as the revenge of a drone attack on its leader Hakeemullah Mehsood.

## **Conclusion**

The visual and content analysis of the news coverage of the Karachi airport attack by four Pakistani channels: Dunya News, ARY News, Dawn News, and Samma TV, reveal a dreary picture of journalism. It was found in the study that the live coverage of the incident for 5-6 hours overstepped the journalistic ethics and professional standards. The news was unauthentic, oversimplified, exaggerated and based on unreliable and unconfirmed sources. The visuals were gloomy and the whole coverage created a farce of lies and melodrama of terrorist act. There was neither editorial check nor any self-regulation. The coverage was so immature that the journalists could not grasp that they were fulfilling the agenda of the terrorists by creating panic and spreading the terror to every house of the country. Some of the information like the details of the troops' movement could have even helped the terrorists. In the end, in the last twenty minutes of the coverage only confirmed news emerged. And the channels repudiated themselves by showing this new information. It can be safely said that immature media has a lot to learn and observe professional journalist ethics.

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<sup>1</sup>Dominant ethnic group in Pakistan which controls the army.

<sup>2</sup>Pakistan Army and the paramilitary Frontier Constabulary.

<sup>3</sup> Research and Analysis Wing (Indian Army).

<sup>4</sup> National Directorate of Security, the Afghan intelligence agency.

<sup>5</sup> Gwadar is the southernmost district of Balochistan and the terminus for CPEC that widens into the Arabian Sea via the deep-sea Gwadar Port.

<sup>6</sup>Interview with a resident of DeraBugti, Balochistan, May 2017.

<sup>7</sup> can be defined as a space that is trying to find it's meaning in resistance.

<sup>8</sup> After this incident the Chinese were provided military/paramilitary escorts to travel in Balochistan.

<sup>9</sup> Fragility: Periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence (World Bank, 2011).

<sup>10</sup>Interview with a resident of DeraBugti, Balochistan, May 2017.

<sup>11</sup>Interview with a resident of DeraBugti.

<sup>12</sup> Western Alignment is the offshoot road of OBOR-CPEC that passes through Balochistan and ends in Gwadar.

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<sup>147</sup> "TTP Claims attack on Karachi Airport", <http://www.dawn.com/news/1111397>, updated on 9<sup>th</sup> June 2014. Accessed on September 30, 2014.