A Liberal Approach towards Managing Plurality

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Abstract

Modern communication and globalization have brought the issues of minorities to the forefront of national and international concern. The notion of “Nation-State” is no longer a feasible criterion for stability in modern societies where states are composed of a variety of groups, nations, and minorities having different and sometimes contradictory conceptions of a good life. Scholarly exploration of the concepts of recognition and diversity of cultural groups proposes that a multicultural scheme must tackle histories of domination and exclusion. Now a question arises “what theoretical orientation is most hospitable to the ideals of multiculturalism?” and again “is liberalism an answer to the problems of multicultural societies and if ‘yes’ which version?” In this study, I will try to investigate the effectiveness of marriage between multiculturalism and political liberalism. The paper shows that it is the Kukathasian model of liberal society and toleration that is more hospitable with diversity.

Keywords: Multiculturalism, toleration, comprehensive liberalism, political liberalism, benign neglect, state neutrality.

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Introduction

“The human world is marked by such a diversity of cultures, traditions, and ways of life of moralities as to prompt one to wonder whether there is anything constant in human nature or human moral experience” (Chandran Kukathas, 2003: 74).

The politics of differences seem to give importance to at least three elements of liberalism: first, recognizing the significance of culture for the enjoyment of individual rights; second, defense of a variety of different perceptions of a good life for both the individuals and groups; and third, the idea of benign neglect. The modern liberal theory tries to address these elements by assuming a neutral public realm for the resolution of demands of justice, basic human rights that consider the significance of cultural attachment, and essential requirements for the assessment and search of different cultural goods.

The recent works of John Rawls Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas address some of the loopholes within contemporary liberal theories which are of crucial concern to multiculturalism. While Rawls's theory gives an understanding of the relation between ‘diversity’ and the ‘public sphere’, Kymlicka's theory establishes a firm relation between the individual and his/her cultural environment and Kukathas founds his theory on the essential individual’s right of association and disassociation based on toleration which is the result of the freedom of conscience.

The line of demarcation between private and public domain, between issues related to social welfare and policy, on one hand, and individual’s cultural loyalty, on the other, has always been an issue (Waldron, 2005: 89). Some cultures, religions, and languages in a plural society may seek to dominate. Some cultures or religions might have their own basic principles with distinct effects on the issues of social life and might compel its members to observe its particular obligations which might not be compatible with the broader societal arrangements or core principles. Law and policymaking for a plural society is, therefore, a bigger challenge than for a culturally homogeneous society. The members of the former are strongly devoted to diverse, sometimes divergent answers while the latter only works on one set of solutions and enforces them. How these problems could be solved? We have a great legacy of reflection on the ideals, principles and values that can be applied to describe a fair political and social order under conditions of diversity and freedom. Locke's defense of religious toleration has been constructed on a religious basis. Locke argues “The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light” (stated in Waldron, 2004: 90). This sort of argument has a Christian foundation, and there is no reason why people having different religions and perceptions of good for whom Locke sought toleration to be convinced to follow them. This raises the question of the compatibility of the version of liberalism (comprehensive or political) for a modern pluralist society for which liberal scholars envisage toleration.
Now, what is liberal toleration based on? One justification founds the defense of toleration on the pluralist character of human value, the belief that the sphere of value is irreducibly heterogeneous and pluralistic. According to this perception, different practices and ways should be tolerated as they are ways and means to the attainment of various human goods. Another justification founds the defense for toleration on a general cynicism about value. This means that we are unable to reach objective values or the perception of a good life, so we should tolerate different ways of life because we cannot for sure say that some practices or perceptions of good are superior to others, and consequently, there is no justifiable base for intolerance. An important case for defending liberal tolerance, according to Scheffler (1994) is Modus Vivendi, a planned and calculated compromise among competing and opposing cultural groups, none of which will enforce its chosen practices and lifestyles on others without unbearable cost, and where each accepts a strategy of mutual toleration that can best be achieved under the circumstances. In this situation, it is vital to agree on a clear understanding of the meaning and basis of liberal tolerance. Thus, liberal tradition needs to understand how to establish its relations with varied perceptions of a good life and a variety of cultures that describe modern societies.

Now “how to establish a just and stable society of equal and free citizens who remain deeply divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?” Different scholars give different answers. One of the answers to this question, according to Rawls (1993), is that the fundamental structure of such a stable society should be governed by a political concept of justice which the ‘overlapping consensus’ of reasonable comprehensive (ethical) doctrines of citizens must keep in mind; Kymlicka seeks the answer in providing groups rights to minorities and Kukathas says that the answer lies in toleration, freedom of conscience and association and disassociation. In Kukathas’s case, the liberal and illiberal groups will live together. His is the policy of live and let live.

To present a full picture of the argument the next section discusses the two versions of liberalism (Comprehensive and Political). Section third focuses on the work of the three prominent scholars i.e. John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, and Chandran Kukathas, and their remedies for the problems of multiculturality. Section fourth gives my estimation of whose work can do justice with the problems of pluralist society while section fifth concludes the paper.

**Political and Comprehensive Liberalism**

According to Waldron (2005: 91) “Political liberalism insists that the articulation and defense of a given set of liberal commitments for society should not depend on any particular theory of what gives value or meaning to a human life. Political liberalism refuses to take sides in the moral and religious controversies that arise from comprehensive doctrines.” According to Şahin (2010: 85) “A political liberal argues that the general principles and ideals that shape a liberal social order’s political framework should not be based on a commitment to deeper values that give meaning to the lives of human beings who reside within that framework”.

Political liberal doctrine should be free-standing and capable of stable statements which must be independent of any individual comprehensive doctrine. If liberal doctrine is not free-standing, then it is presented as an integral part of a particular comprehensive viewpoint and other groups could not be expected to accept a doctrine offered in such a sectarian way. Political liberals might disagree about the justificatory plans and strategies which they adopt as political liberals. For example, one group may stress the concept of ‘overlapping consensuses’, a range of justificatory ways from different philosophical foundations to a point of liberal principles (for example, Rawls). Another may choose a “lowest common denominator” approach, stressing justificatory premises that are presumed to be recognized by all the members of a pluralistic society (for example, Kukathas).

As against political liberalism, comprehensive liberalism founds liberal political arrangements on particular ethical ideals, such as individuality or autonomy or self-reliance. According to Şahin (2010: 86) “A comprehensive liberal opines that we cannot possibly build a liberal social order without a commitment to deeper values that give meaning to the lives of human beings who reside within a liberal social order’s political framework”. The liberal visions of John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant are examples of comprehensive liberalism. The form of liberalism adopted in Rawls in his book *A Theory of Justice* (1971) is also comprehensive. Comprehensive liberalism is based on the premise that liberal commitments cannot be defended except by appealing to deeper values and commitments linked with some comprehensive doctrine. Comprehensive liberals also differ among themselves. Some comprehensive liberals may be left liberals while other libertarians. They may also differ about the contents and fundamentals of the comprehensive understanding on which they base their liberal views and commitments. John Locke’s (1983) Christian based liberalism is different from Kant’s autonomy based liberalism (1991), which is again different from Jeremy Bentham’s (1982) hedonistic basis of utilitarianism. However, as Waldron (2005: 91) says “They all have this in common: they relate liberal commitments in political philosophy to some vision or conception of what matters in life and of the human person and its place in the world.”

Thus, comprehensive liberalism presumes that there is only one main view of a good life. Groups and individuals may be different from each other but in the end, they all must believe in one basic principle. This basic principle is different from scholar to scholar. For example, Kant’s (1991: 56) theory is based on “right” which stipulates that an act is right if it reconciles with everyone’s liberty according to universal law. Mill emphasizes the individuality and autonomy of the individual. He (2009: 18) says that power can only be lawfully exercised against a member of a civilized society, against his consent, if it avoids harm to others. Mill (2009: 101) very nicely argues “A person whose desires and impulses are his own, is the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture, is said to have a character while one whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character.” Whether an act is right or wrong, for Mill, depends on how much it increases or decreases the individuality (autonomy) of the individual. Gaus (2004) argues that much of liberal philosophy, after Mill, has
been founded on a specific notion of human distinction and excellence. Mill closely links individuality to the progress of human nature which is a perfectionist theory of the good life.

This image of a good life is too particular and contentious to serve as a foundation of liberal politics. Many in liberal communities are not committed to the promotion of individual excellence. Although Mill supported a strong anti-paternalistic principle, his principle seems to be as specific and challenging as to open door to interventions in liberty. So, a person’s decision to develop her capacities is not important, what is vital is his/her decision whether to develop and promote her capacities and how to lead her life. Even Locke’s arguments that “All the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master”–God–sent into the world by his order, and about his business, and that they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure is based on one principle ‘the belief in God” (stated in Waldron, 2005: 92) has a clear comprehensive disposition because what about those who do not believe in the individuality or autonomy of the individual or in God or in freedom.

Kantian liberalism which says that a society comprised of a variety of individuals, each with his own interests, objectives, and perception of good, is arranged best when governed by principles and rules that do not follow any particular perception of good and that each person chooses her own aims in life, and respect for others requires that we abstain from enforcing our concept of a good life on them (stated in Sandel, 1982: 1-7) also seems to be a comprehensive one because it is based on the fundamental principle of right (Kant, 1991: 56). However, Gaus (2004) argues that the tag ‘comprehensive’ liberalism is ambiguous because it incorporates everything from proper comprehensive liberalism as a variety of secular doctrines to Kantian theories of political justice which are thought as consistent with varied notions about social knowledge, value, and selfhood. In what follows I will elaborate on the work of Rawls, Kymlicka and Kukathas and will assess whose work is more hospitable with plurality.

The Political Liberalism of John Rawls

John Rawls in his earlier book the “Theory of Justice” (1971) suggested two main principles of justice and said that the political structure should be based on them. The first principle says that “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others” and the second says that “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all” (Rawls, 1971: 60). This theorizing shows that Rawls was originally supporting comprehensive liberalism because he reduced all the interactions and working relationships to one principle–principle of justice. However, he distanced himself from this position in his later work and supported the concept of political liberalism in order to make his theory tolerable to diversity and to accommodate diverse perceptions. While supporting political liberalism, Rawls argues that in the political sphere the idea of justice must be independent of the conflicting religious and philosophical doctrines of the citizens. Comprehensive religious, moral and philosophical doctrines may not be recognized and
supported generally by all the citizens and may not function as the accepted foundation of society. For Rawls, political liberalism seeks a political concept of justice which may get the espousal of an “overlapping consensus” of reasonable philosophical, moral and religious doctrines of a society governed by the principle of justice. This is an answer to the question “How citizens deeply divided on the religious, philosophical and moral basis can sustain a just and stable democratic society?” However, the political realm and its notion of justice should be so spelled out that its institutions and structure may achieve the support of an “overlapping consensus”. In this case, the citizen, exercising their freedom of thought and conscience and pursuing their comprehensive doctrines, view the political concept of justice as compatible with or derived from, or not in conflict with their other values and ideals (Rawls, 1993: 9-11).

This shows that all differences are not thought of as reasonable. Some differences are fanatical, irrational or unreasonable and cannot be reasonably accommodated. So, according to Rawls, a society may prohibit beliefs and practices that are considered irrational and unreasonable. They should be controlled and restricted so that they may not jeopardize the stability and justice of society. His move towards political liberalism, according to Waldron (2005), was suggested by some liberal scholars that social existence and arrangements must be justifiable to each person who lives under those arrangements. This suggestion is based on the fundamental liberal view that the government must be based on the will of the ruled, i.e. the use of power will be justifiable only when accepted and consented by the ruled. These are the principles that everyone accepts. However, if political justifications are based on principles derived from moral or religious beliefs practiced by some citizens but rejected by others, then they will not meet even the thin version of this condition of justifiability to all. This was the premise in Rawls’s mind when he presented his theory of political liberalism. Rawls presents the following three major ideas of political liberalism.

1. The Concept of Overlapping Consensus: In overlapping consensus the reasonable comprehensive doctrines, from their own standpoint, back the political conceptions. The notion of “overlapping consensus” of reasonable comprehensive (ethical) doctrines is essential for the integrity and stability of a “well-ordered society”. Social unity results from an agreement on the political conception while stability results when the doctrines forming the agreement are acknowledged by the politically active members of the society and the requirements of justice do not clash with citizens’ essential interests as shaped and supported by their social arrangements (Rawls, 1993: 134). The consensus arrived at by the comprehensive doctrines is likely to remain over time within a just structure. The use of political power is justifiable only when exercised according to the constitution the fundamentals of which all the citizens may logically support according to the principles acceptable to their universal human reason. Thus, only a political notion of justice which all citizens may sensibly support can serve the foundation of justification and public reason (Rawls, 1993: 137). Overlapping consensus is different from modus vivendi as it is not simply an agreement on accepting some authorities or some constitutional arrangement established or found by a convergence of group or self interests. Those who support the political conception begin from their own comprehensive (ethical) doctrine and draw on the philosophical, moral and religious grounds it provides. And those who support a variety of views affirming the
political conception will support it even if their view in society eventually becomes dominant. This stability in society due to overlapping consensus distinguishes it from *modus vivendi* where a party may violate the terms of a treaty if it becomes dominant. Overlapping consensus does not repudiate any of the comprehensive doctrines. It appeals to the political concept of justice to differentiate between the issues that can be rationally removed from the political program and those that cannot be. The depth of overlapping consensus is based on the fact that its political ideals are founded on a political concept of justice using the basic ideas of person and society illustrated by justice as fairness. Its width goes beyond political ideals and standards establishing democratic procedure to include ideals and principles covering the essential structure as a whole. Its ideals also establish certain substantive rights such as freedom of thought and conscience, equal opportunities and principles covering some essential needs (Rawls, 1993: 164). Rawls argues that ethical doctrines of majority of people are not completely comprehensive and this gives room for the development of an independent obedience and adherence to the political conception which results in consensus (Rawls, 1993: 168).

2. The Concept of the Priority of Right and Good: Priority of right means that the rules of political justice put limits on tolerable ways of life. This means that citizens’ practices and ends which transgress those limits have no value. As political liberalism has a political notion of justice for the key institutions of social and political life, not of the whole life, it should have the contents we associate with liberalism. For example, it must affirm some basic rights and liberties and give them a certain priority. As right is related to good, a political conception must describe different ideas of the good. The ideas of good must be political i.e. they must relate to a reasonable political notion of justice so that we may presume that (a) they are shared by free and equal citizens; and (b) they do not support fully or partially any particular comprehensive doctrine (Rawls, 1993: 176). This constraint is expressed by the priority of right which means that permissible ideas of good must honor the limits of the political notion of justice. We have five ideas of goods.

(i) **Goodness as Rationality:** It means that the citizens of a democratic state have a rational plan of life. They schedule their more important business in the light of that plan and allocate their different resources (of body, mind, time and energy) in order to pursue their perceptions of good throughout their life, if not in a completely rational way, then at least in a satisfactory and sensible way. So ‘political’ must consider human life and basic human needs and take rationality as an essential principle of political and social organization;

(ii) **The Idea of Primary Goods:** A political concept of justice also incorporates a political understanding of publicly recognized citizens’ needs considered as advantageous for all;

(iii) **The Idea of Permissible Comprehensive Conception of Good:** Though political liberalism looks for common grounds and is neutral in aims, it may still assert the supremacy of certain form of moral values and support certain moral virtues;

(iv) **The Idea of Political Virtue:** Justice as fairness incorporates certain political virtues, for example, the virtues of fair social co-operation, of civility and tolerance, and the sense of
fairness and reasonableness. The important point is that permitting these virtues into a political conception does not result in a perfectionist state of a comprehensive doctrine; and

(v) The Idea of the Good of Well-ordered Society: The political society is not a good in itself, but a means to an individual or associational good.

3. The Concept of Public Reason: Public reason means the reason for the equal members of society as such, the reason for the public. Its focus is the good of the public and issues of basic justice; and its contents and nature are public, given by principles articulated by society’s concept of political justice (Rawls, 1993: 213). Public reason is applied only to the questions of basic justice. However, it does not incorporate our deliberations and reflections about political questions. It is applied when someone acts in his public capacity. It has moral and discursive imperatives, for besides incorporating a political concept of justice, it is controlled by rules of inquiry that indicate forms of reasoning and framework for the types of information suitable for political questions. The public reason must be consistent with the pre-established rules of inference, evidence and reason (Rawls, 1993. 223-26).

Thus, the political liberalism of Rawls is like a firmly sealed condition of discussion and deliberation that permits only rationality to rule and excludes historical grievances and various languages of complaints from public councils. Rawlsian reason cannot make sense and can function less within a situation of serious conflicts, whether political, economic, or doctrinal, and even sharp cultural and religious plurality. Rawls suggests a ‘reasonable pluralism’. According to Wolin (1996) “Reasonable pluralism changes differences from a threat to an accomplice of stability, co-opting them so that in the end they are removed or absorbed into a consensus that requires smoothing off the rough, possibly irrational edges of differences”. The critical point is where Rawls positions differences and how he deals with them. He says that if there are irrational and unreasonable doctrines, the recommended answer is to restrain them so that they do not jeopardize the unity, integrity and justice of society. His ‘well-ordered society’ also recommends that “The most divisive issues, serious contention which must undermine the basis of social cooperation will not be included in the public agenda” (Rawls, 1993: 157).

Here, contra Kukathas, his theory cannot appeal to the accommodation of illiberal groups which must be assimilated into the Rawlsian rationality. This does not consider the demands and issues related to multiculturalism too seriously. His consensus rests on ethical beliefs (comprehensive philosophical and religious doctrines) and not based on a civic or political ideology. Similarly, according to the ideal of public reason, members of the society may not legally discuss basic constitutional and political questions from their religious and moral point of view. But this is a severe limitation which may weaken the political discourse and exclude important aspects of public discussion and deliberation.

Will Kymlicka’s Treatment of Plurality
Kymlicka’s theory is also depicting a comprehensive version of liberalism. He (1995: 52) argues that individual liberty is linked in a significant way to membership in one’s cultural group and bases his theory on “Societal Culture” which he defines as a “Culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated and based on a shared language” (Kymlicka, 1995: 76). The societal culture, for Kymlicka, not only gives full autonomy to us but also perfection and complete perception of a good life. It provides its adherents with meaningful ways of life across a variety of human actions from the economic to the educational and religious.

According to Kymlicka (1995: 152), liberalism affirms an individual’s liberty and his/her capacity to question, criticize and possibly revise the customary practices of their communities if they find them not worthy of their allegiance. Now if certain groups of the community do not grant such types of rights to their members, then those groups should be liberalized. If this interpretation is taken, then the larger society will impose its vision of good life on the illiberal groups which will be equivalent to the imposing of a comprehensive view on the minorities. Kymlicka says that the minorities can put forward two types of demands (a) Internal restrictions which will allow the group to curb internal dissents thus, will violate the freedom its members, and (b) External protections which will defend minorities from the adverse decisions of the larger society. However, this must not be a means for a group to dominate, oppress and exploit other groups. Thus, a liberal view supports freedom within the minority groups and equality between the minority groups. Liberal principles, according to Kymlicka (1995: 166), support the second demand but not the first one. Though his version is comprehensive; he supports group rights for minorities in the form of self-government, poly-ethnic and representation rights to his defined national and ethnic minorities. But his theory is inhospitable to illiberal groups within the state and says that the liberals must do something to liberalize the illiberal societies. However, he is against the coercive methods used for the liberalization of those groups (Kymlicka, 1995: 167).

Thus, Kymlicka’s theory also cannot reasonably eradicate the problems facing the modern pluralist society. His version is comprehensive and is quite incompatible with the requirements of multiculturalism as Şahin (2010: 90-91) has also pointed out that “The stance of Kymlicka stems from his belief that individual happiness can be attained only in an environment…fostering individual autonomy. A liberal state is one that fosters such a cultural environment. Such a state should be neutral toward different understandings of good life all of which endorse the value of autonomy. However, it cannot remain neutral in the face of non-autonomous lifestyles…The particular societies within the broader society must also be liberal ones that respect the principle of autonomy...in this sense, Kymlicka defends orthodoxy, albeit a liberal one”.

Chandran Kukathas’s Treatment of Plurality

Kukathas gives an idea of a free society as an open society with the principles admitting not fixed but a variability of human arrangements; the freedom of association (dissociation) and mutual
toleration of associations. The principles of a free society depict not a hierarchy of superior and subordinate authorities but an archipelago of opposing, competing and overlapping jurisdictions. In such a society there will be a multiplicity of authorities, each independent of the others, which are maintained by the consent of its members. A liberal society, according to him, respects the independence of other authorities and is reluctant to interfere in their affairs. His theory repudiates two things: first, that any group, class or community should be given special recognition; and second, that there is an authoritative position from which such recognition may finally be granted. He depicts a model of a free society having many authorities and many associations, but in which none is privileged (Kukathas, 2003: 4). The theory of free society shows that different ways coexist rather than cohere (Kukathas, 2003: 5).

As against Kymlicka who says that liberal society should encourage the incorporation of groups into the mainstream culture (through policies on education, language and citizenship), and stipulate the principles guiding policy-making, Kukathas rejects cultural integration as a policy of the state and does not support the plan of making the symbols, the boundaries, and the cultural characters of the state as elements of justice. He advocates the principle of “Benign Neglect”. A free society is not a stable social union of shared doctrine. It is a group of communities, societies and authorities (all authority resting on the consent of their members rather than on justice) associated under laws which accept individuals’ freedom to join with whom they wish (Kukathas, 2003: 19). Against the work of John Rawls, it is the idea which does not give much importance to social unity.

For Kukathas (2003: 24) the fundamental value of liberalism is toleration. The more a group tolerates differences, the more liberal the group is and vice versa. Tolerations, for Kukathas, guarantees the freedom of conscience which is at the heart of his theory as he says (2003: 25) “It is the value of liberty of conscience which lies at the core of the liberal ideal of toleration… A society is a liberal one if individuals are at liberty to reject the authority of one association [even of the larger society] in order to place themselves under the authority of another.”

The essential principle of a free society, for Kukathas, is the freedom of association. The first product of this principle is the freedom of dissociation which upholds liberty of conscience. This is a society in which differences and dissents are tolerated. Thus, what is important is that people should not be compelled to live in a way they think wrong, or to take part in practices which they cannot morally abide. People should be free to live according to their conscience (Kukathas, 2003: 94). The second result of the principle is mutual toleration of associations. In fact, society is free if it tolerates its internal groups which dissent from its practices and standards (Kukathas, 2003: 75).

Kukathas criticizes Rawls’s political liberalism for it does not quite renounce its dependence on comprehensive moral ideals which might conflict with the values and practices of some groups in society. In case of conflict, his comprehensive moral position is simply to be asserted and enforced. For example, in case of imparting liberal education which promotes critical thinking, the children
of unwilling parents can be subjected to the requirements of the comprehensive view of good life which some groups within the heterogeneous society might reject.

Kukathas is also strongly opposed to Kymlicka’s recognition of special rights for minority groups against the larger society to guarantee equality of circumstances among them. However, his liberalism does not provide (except under intense circumstances) special rights to a group against its own members to restrict their autonomy. Liberalism provides the individuals the freedom and capacity to question, criticize and revise the established practices of their groups if they are no more worthy of their allegiance. Restricting freedom of religion or denying education to women is against these liberal principles.

**Which Version addresses the Issues of Plurality Well?**

Now all the preceding theories except that of Kukathas assume the existence of a common established moral standpoint. Here toleration emerges as an issue, because of the likelihood of dissents from values contained in the common standpoint. Tolerance is not accorded when minority practices go against the values inherent in the public realm. Minority practices are tolerated only if they abide by the basic ethical principles of the larger society; otherwise, minority cultures are restructured following majority practices. However, for Kukathas, toleration is not based on any particular perception. It is valued independently and is afforded to minorities (liberal or illiberal) on equal footings. It guarantees the freedom of conscience which is the basic individual right (all other rights derive from it). Rawls presents his theory of “free-floating, overlapping consensus” which describes what and how should be talked about, and the level of understanding that should be achieved in liberal public discourse. He provides some grounds for unity among the various cultures of society. Rawls’s overlapping consensus narrows the range of differences among different cultures that support different visions of the good. But he does not abolish or reduce differences by identifying some deeper commonalities which may reduce the negative effects of differences. The problem with Rawls and Kymlicka is that they assume that there is a commonly established standpoint which becomes a standard for treating differing views as dissenting or non-dissenting. Here toleration is impracticable since relations with dissenters are regulated based on the principles contained in the established comprehensive doctrine.

Thus, comprehensive liberalism fails because it advances its own doctrine as a source of political legitimacy under the conditions of modern pluralism. No such doctrine, even if true and powerful arguments available in its defense, can receive the assent of all reasonable citizens in a diverse society. Therefore, once the public justification of state actions invokes such doctrine, those who hold opposing views are compelled to obey political authority on grounds they reasonably reject. This will violate the freedom of conscience (a fundamental right of the individual) and will keep him/her in a very depressed position. This outcome undermines liberalism which appeals to reasons that citizens can share, rather than reasons that divide some against others and permits the oppression of those who differ. Thus, as Şahin (2010: 88) mentions “Autonomy-based (comprehensive) liberalism does not seem to meet its promise of providing a plural and tolerant
This stance involves requiring all individuals and groups to respect individual autonomy…The liberal state that takes autonomy to be the liberal value and builds its political framework on it cannot tolerate individuals and groups who do not respect individual autonomy”.

Political authority exercised in the name of comprehensive moral doctrine not merely violates the dignity of the citizens who differ reasonably but also jeopardize the unity and stability of the polity. According to Callan (1996), the threat of disintegration in societies that cannot be forced into unity around a shared religious doctrine has obsessed liberalism since its inception, and ethical liberalism may exacerbate the danger where it attempts to position legitimacy in a divisive secular analogue to religious doctrine. Kukathasian version of political liberalism intends to avoid the apparent liabilities of its ethical counterpart. A deliberative framework is constructed that intends to endorse the traditional verities of liberal politics which enables the formation of rational consensus on new and contentious political problems. But unlike comprehensive liberalism, the perception marked out does not articulate any single comprehensive doctrine because it is compatible with a variety of values that citizens reasonably support. That is to say, the viewpoint is freestanding in that it can be expounded apart from the various doctrines, citizens embrace as moral agents outside their civic roles.

Thus, it is the Kukathasian version of political liberalism which is a panacea to the problems of the pluralist society. It is the society which has multiple groups and communities which differ on the basic conception of a good life even on virtues such as justice, equality and morality. If the society is homogeneous, the optimum option might be a version of comprehensive liberalism but not for a pluralistic society for which the solution lies in adopting political liberalism. For a multicultural society, the state must be neutral among the different perceptions of a good life and according to Kukathas must adopt the notion of benign neglect. What the idea of benign neglect suggests is that, in the process of searching for a compromise, special weight should not be given to the idea of securing an outcome that honors the ideal of equality for groups. What is important, however, is how to make the potential for conflict over issues such as language less troubling and damaging. One important way of doing this is by permitting those who use minority language to exit from the dominant structure if they so wish and to establish their own newspapers and broadcast media, run their own schools, and conduct their affairs generally in their own languages. Public holidays, uniforms, and state symbols should be redesigned to accommodate minority claims. But it is unjust to think that solution can be found that treats all groups equally. Benign neglect suggests that when decisions are made about such matters, it may be better to present these things as the result of accident and history, and not policy and justice. The difference should not be suppressed, but neither should it be elevated. The state should be neutral and dedicated to the maintenance of peace. It should neither favor nor disfavor any group and should not adopt any substantive view of a good life. Thus, state must not take any position on issues like abortion. Let each woman decides what is best for herself. Political liberalism insists that views about the morality of abortion or the wearing of a scarp or bearing a beard should not play a role in public debates about rights and justice. The state should be impartial to them. This means that those who dislike abortion or wearing a beard should not try to incorporate their vision and opinion in law.
From the perspective of political liberalism, imposing one’s view on others would incorrectly base the right on some perception of good and would fail to respect the pluralism about comprehensive doctrines.

The liberal model of neutral treatment permits the toleration of different perceptions of a good life. Liberals admit that modern states are composed of diverse groups with different perceptions of good life, which are competing, sometimes conflicting and incomparable. Hence, a public agreement concerning the good is not required. Instead, liberal theorists try to provide foundation legitimating state power in mediating conflicting and incompatible interests. The project of legitimization is understood in terms of rules for participation in public discussions where legitimate and justifiable political decisions are taken.

The liberal society, as Kukathas supports, should adopt the policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the illiberal groups and should not compel them to give various forms of rights as supported by Kymlicka (the right of the members of a group to question and revise the traditional procedures of the community) to the members of that group. Similarly, unlike Kymlicka (external protection), support, or protection should not be given to the groups. It is not the group which has the right but the individual which is of paramount importance. The group, as Kukathas mentions, is not a permanent entity but a changing one which shapes itself in compliance with the political and economic circumstances.

Now the common arrangement of various groups in a state will be somewhat like a *modus vivendi* which is not merely a balance of power. It describes something much more like the rules of the commons which have arisen and developed over time to deal with interaction among communities in areas where property rights do not exist and there may be conflicts over the use of common resources. The public realm is the product of a convergence which produces a type of stability and social unity that falls short of the permanence or durability many thinkers seek. What we have here is a form of a social order whose underlying characteristic is toleration.

However, regarding religion, a question the political liberals need to answer is “Can any exclusion of religion from the public square be defended by showing that it is neither unreasonable nor unfair?” In this case, Audi’s two principles can provide help. The weaker principle of secular rationale (1993) says that “One should not advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer, the adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support. The stronger principle of secular motivation says that "One should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one not only has and is willing to offer but is also motivated by, adequate secular reason, where this reason is motivationally sufficient for the conduct in question". According to Audi, these principles are counsels of prudence for religious believers if they hope to persuade or form alliances with their non-religious fellow citizens. Audi’s principles resemble those of Bhikkhu Parekh (2000: 176-77) when he says that a culture should be respected and supported only when the members of culture justify the practices and beliefs of the culture otherwise every culture is not entitled to equal
respect. These are the arguments that cannot be authentic for the resolution of the deep diversity prevailing in a society where the perceptions of good life are not only different but also contradictory, where there are different definitions of such virtues as justice or morality. In such a case the solution lies in Kukathasian toleration which is independent of any other scheme or virtue.

Conclusion

The severity of the rising demands of the various cultural, linguistic and religious groups in pluralist societies have compelled social scientists to find viable solutions to the issues of multiculturality. In a pluralist society, the minorities resist the attempt of the dominant groups to assimilate them which have triggered varieties of problems. Much of the nationalist conflicts around the world are the result of attempts by majority nations coercively to assimilate national minorities. To adequately cope with the issues of minorities in pluralist societies the theories offered by such prominent figures as Rawls, Kymlicka, Kukathas, Nathan Glazer, Walzer and several others have presented some solutions. But they are deficient in rationally dealing with the issues of diversity. In most cases, the remedy is sought in some substantive and comprehensive view like justice, autonomy, right and cultural adherence. The concept that each state is regarded as a self-contained system of like-thinking persons, whose institutions should preserve an order based on the agreed values of a more or less stable population must be rejected for a pluralist society.

The solution to the issues of multiculturality then lies in a Kukathasian version of political liberalism. His is the theory which questions the notion of justice, rejects social unity and equality as governing ideals and solutions for a pluralist society. As he says that in a social order in which diversity is to prevail rather than be suppressed, the most important thing that rules or institutions that govern it do is permit people to go their separate ways. Those institutions serve not to bind people together but to make it acceptable for them to unbind themselves if they so wish or, indeed, never to join with others at all. The crucial freedom is the freedom to dissent; and this requires freedom of exit if the dissenting party cannot persuade those who are unable to abide by the dissenting ideas or practices to find them less harmful or offensive. If reconciliation of differences is not possible the answer is that the differing parties must have a way out and the notion “the will of the stronger should prevail” must be rejected. Here lies the solution to the issues of multiculturality (a Kukathasian version of Political Liberalism).

References


