

Terrorism in Pakistan

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Abstract

Research on terrorism has long been criticized for its inability to overcome enduring methodological issues. These include an overreliance on secondary sources and the associated literature review methodology, a scarcity of statistical analyses, a tendency for authors to work alone rather than collaborate with colleagues, and the large number of one-time contributors to the field. However, the reviews that have brought these issues to light describe the field as it developed until 2007. This article investigates to what extent these issues have endured in the 2007–2016 period by constructing a database on all of the articles published in nine leading journals on terrorism (N = 3442). The results show that the use of primary data has increased considerably and is continuing to do so. Scholars have also begun to adapt a wider variety of data-gathering techniques, greatly diminishing the overreliance on literature reviews that was noted from the 1980s through to the early 2000s. These positive changes should not obscure enduring issues. Despite improvements, most scholars continue to work alone and most authors are one-time contributors. Overall, however, the field of terrorism studies appears to have made considerable steps towards addressing long-standing issues.

Background and Introduction:

Terrorism oppression in Pakistan as indicated by Ministry of Interior, represents a huge danger to the individuals of Pakistan. The present flood of fear based oppression is accepted to have begun in the year 2000. which topped during the year 2009. From that point forward it has definitely declined as consequence of military tasks directed by the Pakistan Army. As per South Asian Terrorism Portal. Psychological warfare in Pakistan has declined by 89% in 2017 since its pinnacle a very long time in 2009. Since 2001, Pakistan military propelled arrangement of military hostile against fear monger bunches in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The hostile acquired harmony those zones and rest of the nation. In addition, numerous psychological oppressor having a place with different fear monger bunches were additionally murdered. Nonetheless, a few activists figured out how to escape to Afghanistan. From Afghanistan, those aggressors keep on propelling assaults on Pakistan military posts situated close to the outskirts. In 2017, Afghanistan's Chief Executive Abdullah conceded that Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has toehold in Afghanistan. In 2019, United States Department of Defense asserted that there are around 3,000-5,000 psychological oppressor having a place with Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan. As per report by Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, 23,372 Pakistani regular people and 8,832 Pakistani security work force were murdered in war on fear mongering. Also, According to the administration of Pakistan, the immediate and roundabout financial expenses of psychological warfare from 2000–2010 complete \$68 billion. In 2018 Pakistani paper, Dawn news, revealed that the Pakistani economy endured a complete loss of \$126.79 billion because of war on dread since 2001. Pakistan authorities regularly accuse India

and Afghanistan for supporting psychological oppression in Pakistan. India has denied Pakistan's claims. In any case, Afghanistan has conceded offering help to psychological militant gatherings, for example, Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In 2013, United States led assault on Afghan pass on which was taking Latif Mehsud to Kabul. Latif was a senior leader of Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Afghan President's representative, Aimal Faizi, told correspondents that the National Directorate of Security (NDS) was working with Latif. Latif was conductor for subsidizing to TTP. A portion of the financing for TTP may have originated from NDS. Previous NDS head, Asadullah Khalid, presented a video having a place on TTP on his Twitter account where he asserted that Badaber Camp assault was one good turn deserves another.

The clear development of solitary wolf viciousness, joined with the expanded utilization of web-based social networking to enroll new individuals, adds to an obscuring of the line among residential and global psychological warfare. Where a moderately basic differentiation used to do the trick for researchers, we are seeing progressively visit assaults, customarily named local fear based oppression, however that get motivation from a remote belief system or worldwide development. This article analyzes a portion of these patterns identified with internet based life and solo culprits, and recommends the utilization of the expression "transnational psychological warfare", to represent the developing rate of fear based oppressor assaults that don't fit appropriately into either existing category. Research on political brutality frequently recognizes two classifications of fear based oppression: residential and global. For instance, the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) dataset centers only around universal assaults somewhere in the range of 1968 and 2015, while the Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) centers around household assaults in only one area, somewhere in the range of 1950 and 2004. Researchers utilize these, and comparative databases, to ponder connections among psychological oppression and an assortment of different variables, at times to clarify the reasons for fear mongering and different occasions to analyze its outcomes. Since local and worldwide fear mongering frequently include various sorts of entertainers, various inspirations and objectives, and even various strategies, it is critical to catch the qualities that are exceptional to every classification of psychological oppression. The issue is that while the idea of fear mongering stays persevering through, a few components are cooperating to modify its character, including how psychological militant gatherings select people and afterward use them to do assaults. In view of this change, the line among household and worldwide psychological warfare is getting blurrier, and it is deficient to consider fear based oppression just regarding this division. There is a risk for the two scholastics and law implementation in not perceiving changes in the division among local and worldwide fear mongering or the presence of a different, third classification. On the off chance that researchers neglect to catch the genuine divisions between classifications, explore that depends on those typologies will prompt defective outcomes. For law authorization, a few government organizations recognize residential and global psychological warfare, yet these qualifications may never again be substantial. Likewise, on the grounds that courts regularly treat savage acts contrastingly as per the culprit's citizenship, just as their pathway to radicalization, we have to see how these classes are advancing. The reason for this article is to create exchange on the difficulties related with the changing character of psychological warfare. Specifically, with the development of web-based social networking and the web, just as what some allude to as solitary

wolf fear based oppression, the line among residential and global psychological warfare is developing more slender. In the event that the qualification is as yet pertinent, and proof recommends it is, researchers need to reevaluate how they characterize a household assault, and create different marks for assaults that are neither unmistakably local nor global. This article recommends "transnational fear based oppression" as a name to involve that hazy center ground. In a period of fear based oppression where belief systems show up progressively worldwide, where gatherings can select and people can radicalize on the web, and where an association is less significant for doing an assault, our comprehension of psychological warfare must develop to represent these evolving qualities. The rest of this article is composed into five areas. The first examines a portion of the current grant that utilizes the differentiation among residential and universal fear based oppression, featuring a portion of the issues with that straightforward methodology. The following two segments center around patterns that propose the character of psychological warfare is evolving. One of these patterns is the expansion of assaults by singular culprits; the other is the development of web based life use by fear monger gatherings. The following segment analyzes three delineations of these patterns that additionally feature the issues that emerge from utilizing a straightforward qualification among residential and global psychological oppression. The last segment gives a few ends and suggestions, for researchers and for policymakers.

Domestic versus International Terrorism

Typologies frequently help clarify varieties in a marvel, however not all typologies are similarly valuable. Joseph Young and Michael Findley present a defense for recognizing residential and universal fear mongering, by proposing these occasions are the aftereffect of two diverse processes. While household psychological oppression ought to be a component of factors inside the state where an assault happens, worldwide fear mongering can be the consequence of variables in both the objective state and the starting state. In the event that the two classifications of fear based oppression emerge for various reasons, that is significant for grant in its very own right. Moreover, on the off chance that the reasons for household and global fear mongering are extraordinary, at that point the best arrangements to counter every class ought to likewise differ. Indeed, even that understanding is a distortion of fear mongering, on the grounds that conditions outside the state where an assault occurred progressively rouse a large number of the demonstrations regularly marked as household psychological oppression. The weight is on researchers to have a total and exact comprehension of what establishes household versus worldwide psychological oppression. Something else, mislabeling assaults could prompt poor hypotheses, and to far more detestable approach proposals. A typical strategy to recognize residential from universal fear mongering depends on three factors: the nationality of the culprit; the nationality of the person in question; and the area of the assault. At the point when every one of the three of these factors are the equivalent, researchers commonly name that a residential assault. Every single other case, they group as universal. For instance, the Oklahoma City besieging in 1995, which Timothy McVeigh proposed to begin a war against the U.S. government, happened in the U.S., executed by U.S. residents, and coordinated against different U.S. residents. That is the prototypical residential psychological oppressor assault. On the off chance that the assailant isn't a resident of the nation where an assault occurred, yet the area and injured individual

nationality are the equivalent (for instance, the 9/11 assaults), sound judgment recommends that is a demonstration of global psychological oppression. On the off chance that the qualification among local and universal fear mongering is so significant, do those distinctions emerge essentially by changing the culprit's nationality, with no thought for their inspiration? Shouldn't something be said about assaults where every one of the three factors are unique, for example, when an individual from Germany's Bader Meinhoff Gang gotten together with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in December 1975, to assault an OPEC meeting in Vienna, Austria? That also is universal psychological oppression, however for what reason does variety over every one of the three factors not prompt its very own mark? These inquiries demonstrate the probability of a few distinct classes of fear mongering, past the straightforward polarity of local versus universal, and ought to be a piece of a bigger talk. This article centers principally around occurrences when every one of the three factors are the equivalent, proposing residential fear mongering, yet the inspiration for the assault depends on an objective or inspiration that is worldwide instead of national. These kinds of assaults, which researchers normally name residential fear based oppression, are remote propelled thus, they speak to something unmistakable from household psychological warfare. One model is the 7 July 2005 London assaults. Three of the four culprits were British-conceived, while the fourth was conceived in Jamaica, however was a British resident since the age of five. Given the nationality of the aggressors, most databases would recognize it as a residential occasion—British residents assaulting other British residents, in London. However the inspiration for the assault shares more for all intents and purpose with 9/11 than it does with household episodes, similar to Oklahoma City. Recognizing local and worldwide psychological warfare practically speaking is less direct than it may show up. The ITERATE and TWEED datasets vary on their meaning of residential psychological oppression. TWEED characterizes it as far as the culprit's nationality, as long as the demonstration happened in Western Europe, making injured individual nationality less pertinent than in ITERATE and in different databases. Therefore, a portion of the occurrences recorded in TWEED as local psychological warfare, show up in ITERATE as worldwide fear based oppression, a considerable lot of which may be all the more precisely incorporated into a different, third class, alluded to here as transnational fear based oppression. On account of these difficulties in characterizing the classifications and the way that numerous databases just spotlight on one class, perhaps the greatest shortcoming of factual grant on psychological oppression is when researchers utilize just a single class in testing their speculations, without controlling for the potential impacts of the other class. Jacob Ravndal utilizes TWEED to build up a typology of conservative fear based oppression in Western Europe. Utilizing TWEED confines his discoveries to just household on-screen characters, yet since conservative causes are commonly national, this is probably not going to be a critical issue for his outcomes. An increasingly noteworthy issue for researchers utilizing TWEED is that a few occasions in the database are not really residential psychological oppression in the event that they are remote motivated. Other factual thinks about endeavor to connect fear mongering to political factors, however depend solely on either residential or universal psychological warfare, without controlling for the impacts of both. Tony Addison and Syed Murshed attach universal fear mongering to inside clash. Brian Lai proposes that a state's powerlessness to control its very own region prompts fear mongering abroad, yet depends only on worldwide occasions. Also, Quan Li joins global psychological warfare to residential monetary and political frameworks. One may

reason such issues when there were no dependable datasets on residential psychological warfare, similar to the case before 1996. Scholars presently have that information. We simply need a superior comprehension of the various classes of fear mongering that exist, and to represent the plausibility of extra classifications. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) lists all episodes from 1970 to 2017, however doesn't unmistakably recognize household from worldwide attacks. To represent, of the 77,312 assaults in GTD somewhere in the range of 1970 and 2010, 65,591 required at any rate one unfortunate casualty who was a resident of the nation where the assault occurred. Preferably, we would likewise know the nationality of the culprit (or possibly the nation of origin of the assaulting gathering) just as the motivation behind the assault (insignificantly whether it has neighborhood or worldwide goal). In any case, no such data exists in the present adaptation of GTD. Walter Enders, Todd Sandler, and Khusrav Gaibullov propose a technique to isolate GTD information into household and global occasions. They at that point make this a stride more distant and utilize the differentiation to draw connections between the two classifications. They find that there are three to multiple times more household than universal occasions in GTD, and that residential psychological warfare can overflow into global fear mongering. The issue is that an expanding number of those residential occasions are the consequence of a worldwide belief system, a pattern that is disregarded utilizing the basic household versus universal qualification. There are different instances of researchers attempting to recognize the two classifications. Gary Lafree, Sue-Ming Yang, and Martha Crenshaw center around 53 gatherings somewhere in the range of 1970 and 2004 considered hazardous for the U.S., yet find that by far most of assaults were outside U.S. region, and overwhelmingly against residential as opposed to U.S. targets. Sandler, Daniel Arce, and Enders recommend local fear based oppression ought to be free of remote association or sponsorship, yet then their work doesn't address the job of outside inspirations. Just in those instances of an area, culprit nationality, and unfortunate casualty nationality being the equivalent, and the demonstration being done for national reasons for existing, is it simply household fear based oppression. In any event, when area, culprit nationality, and unfortunate casualty nationality are the equivalent, on the off chance that an outside reason or worldwide development moves the assault, at that point that is an option that is other than residential psychological warfare. Truth be told, I fight that the inspiration for an assault is more basic than the citizenship of the culprit, for distinguishing an assault as household, worldwide, or something different. As indicated by GTD, somewhere in the range of 1970 and 2010, a U.S. injured individual was assaulted on U.S. soil multiple times. Of these, 664 were completed by either obscure culprits or those whose inspirations are vague. For the staying 1,297, GTD doesn't give the citizenship of the culprits, however by my evaluations, the assaults with remote inspirations incorporate, moderately: 80 out of 461 assaults by progressive gatherings, 20 out of 279 assaults by national-rebel gatherings, 7 out of 106 assaults by reactionary gatherings, and 17 out of 84 assaults by strict gatherings. In rundown, around 123 of the 1,297 assaults are an option that is other than simply residential fear mongering, given their connection to an outside reason or a worldwide development. That implies in any event 6.27% of assaults in the U.S., that would be coded as local fear based oppression, either share more for all intents and purpose with worldwide psychological oppression or are a different kind of psychological warfare through and through. On the off chance that that number holds crosswise over nations, at that point of the 65,591 assaults in GTD from 1970 to 2010, at any rate 4,114 occurrences, customarily thought to be local

psychological warfare, are not so much residential on the off chance that we represent worldwide inspirations. One other issue is that researchers regularly utilize the terms transnational and global synonymously, even inside the equivalent work, but there is a distinction between the terms. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye allude to "transnational connections" as those not including state entertainers or specialists of the state (e.g., NGOs and worldwide corporations). It bodes well, at that point, that we would allude to worldwide belief systems crossing outskirts and radicalizing generally residential on-screen characters as transnational. Just in situations where the culprit, unfortunate casualty, and area are of a similar nation, and where the inspiration of the assault is national, would we have absolutely residential fear mongering. The above issues identify with the bigger issue that there is no endless supply of terrorism. Many researchers quit attempting to.

Literature Review:

As an initial step, data for the quantity of occurrences, wounds, and fatalities were gathered for 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005 for whatever number nations and regions as could be allowed from data accessible in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) kept up by the University of Maryland. The GTD data is very nitty gritty. It contains data for the nation in which psychological oppressor assaults happened. It was along these lines conceivable to total information on a yearly premise at the nation level on the quantity of episodes, the quantity of fatalities, and the number harmed. The quantity of occurrences was a genuinely direct figure. Numerous psychological militant episodes don't include any fatalities or wounds, and others, for example, ambushes and deaths (or death endeavors) just include one injured individual. It is in reality just a minority of episodes where there are different setbacks. The quantity of wounds announced is less dependable since there are contrasting meanings of what comprises damage and in a minority of cases the number harmed is just recorded as obscure. Obviously, the assaults with the biggest number of fatalities are ordinarily the ones that have the best mental impacts. There are a couple of situations where the quantity of fatalities noted is recorded as obscure yet that circumstance is uncommon. These passages must be coded as zero fatalities or wounds separately despite the fact that it was likely in a considerable lot of these cases that obscure figures mirrored an absence of exact numbers instead of the way that there had been no passages or wounds. It was additionally important to gather information on populace. The populace sums were drawn from the World Bank, which varies by and large from the official figures dependent on national registration figures that are gathered and announced in the UN Statistical Yearbook. The utilization of the World Bank populace figures had the benefit of a typical estimation strategy for all nations and domains instead of various national counts. The utilization of the World Bank figures likewise standardized the figurings of populace aggregates for periods that fell between genuine enumeration years. The populace aggregates additionally allowed the figuring of per capita episodes, setbacks, and fatalities for the various nations and regions. Since the absence of fear based oppressor exercises in a more crowded nation would have more prominent significance than the nonattendance of occurrences or setbacks in a less crowded nation, each zero section for episodes fatalities, or wounds was really coded as 0.01 rather than 0.00 for reasons for extra institutionalization before the division by the base populace figures. This technique, which gave somewhat more noteworthy load to the nonappearance of movement in the more crowded nations, has been utilized in past investigations of fear based oppression. With the data on psychological oppression and populace it was conceivable to determine relationship

coefficients between the fear mongering measures and the supreme populace figures and afterward a correlation of populace levels and per capita fear mongering measures. Total populace, be that as it may, would not be relied upon to be an ideal indicator of higher psychological oppression levels. There were contrasts between nations free of size. For instance, China with a billion or more occupants has had a lot of lower levels of psychological oppression than India with a comparably enormous populace. All things considered, be that as it may, bigger nations were required to have more significant levels. The connection coefficients determined between supreme populace size and psychological oppression demonstrated that bigger nations every now and again had more elevated levels of fear mongering at a critical level (see Table 1). Albeit supreme populace was frequently connected to more psychological warfare, the relationship was absent for 1985, demonstrating that such linkages were not reliably present. It is conceivable that there were years or even potentially timeframes when abnormal results will be conceivable. It is important that the connections were all the more reliably present for 1995 and 2005, recommending that in the later periods when fear monger exercises had expanded it was conceivable that either examples of psychological militant action changed or maybe that there was better revealing of the brutality that occurred. The coefficients for per capita degrees of psychological warfare with the outright populace were significantly more predictable. There was no proof that bigger nations experienced more fear based oppressor movement corresponding to their size in any of the years or for any of the measures. This first investigation proposes that past discoveries interfacing populace size to psychological militant brutality was an ancient rarity of the dependence on size and not a sign that bigger nations are in reality increasingly inclined to such viciousness.

Research Question:

What is terrorism its effects on society and reasons behind terrorism in Pakistan (2007-2016)?

Objectives:

In objective take some precautions as objective that we follow to control terrorism.

- ix. How to control terrorism with in country
- x. Stop Supporting the Dictators Who Fund Terrorists
- xi. In emergency situation call the inform the security

- xii. In crowded areas everybody alert

Significance:

Its importance to counter terrorism because of terrorism everyone live the world of terror. Eradication of terrorism is create peace and harmony the state and people live happily without fear. Terrorism free state progress and get successes in all fields.

Limitations:

As outlined in the methodology section, several guidelines were established to standardize data collection and make it as objective as possible. Inevitably, however, the choices made inject a

degree of subjectivity into the results and their interpretation. In particular, some readers might object that only articles including first-hand information on terrorists should have qualified for the “primary data” designation. Indeed, if the data were to be recoded with such a much more stringent guideline, the results would undoubtedly paint a very different picture of the field. Yet, such a narrow perspective on primary sources would do a disservice to the many authors who have labored to advance our understanding of the social, political, and economic causes and consequences of both terrorism and counterterrorism.

Another limitation is that the nine journals surveyed here clearly do not encompass the entire field of academic publications on terrorism. There are dozens of journals that publish such research, and many of the most cited articles on the subject have not appeared in primarily terrorism-focused ones. Additionally, there is a very sizeable number of books and an extensive grey literature that includes, for instance, reports by influential think tanks as well as government agencies. Still, the nine journals studied here are argued to constitute the core sites of the production and discussion of scholarly knowledge on the subject. Their selection was based on the author’s assessment of what constitute the most important journals in the field, and their prominence on Google Scholar’s h-factor overview for terrorism-related journals. Most importantly, by broadening the analysis beyond the field’s two core journals, a robust overview of the trends that are shaping research on terrorism became possible.

Methodology:

The goal of this article is to provide a contemporary overview of the field of terrorism studies that is detailed, extensive in its coverage, and able to chart developments over time. To do so, data was gathered on all of the 3442 articles published between 2007 and 2016 in nine journals on terrorism. This timeframe not only provides insights into how the field has fared in the decade since Silke last reviewed it, but coincides with the creation of seven new journals. Whereas previous reviews could focus on the field’s two core journals, TPV (1989–present) and SCT (1977–present), an assessment of the current state of affairs requires broadening the analytical scope to these seven newcomers: *Perspectives on Terrorism* (POT, 2007–present), the *Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel* (SNT, 2007–present), *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (CST, 2008–present), *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Toward Terrorism and Genocide* (DAC, 2008–present), *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* (BSTPA, 2009–present), *Journal of Terrorism Research* (JTR, 2011–present) and *Journal for Deradicalization* .

Data collection and analysis

A dataset on all publications in these journals was created using Microsoft Access. Data collection was geared towards assessing the degree to which the various methodological concerns noted by authors like Silke are still present in the literature on terrorism, and whether a trend can be observed in their development over time. The following data was recorded per article: title, author(s), publication year, publication type, method of data collection, whether any primary data was utilized, if and what type of statistical analysis was carried out, and a unique URL or DOI identifier. In order to enable a comparison with earlier research, Silke's categorizations for the types of research methods and the types of statistical analyses were maintained. Data collection began in late 2015 and was completed in September 2017.

The author conducted the bulk of the data collection but was aided by five research assistants and interns over the course of the project. Their work was checked by the author during regularly held meetings, by recoding random samples for accuracy, and by asking them to highlight any articles they had questions about in a "comments" field specifically included in the database for this purpose. The author used regular discussions with coders and randomized checks to ensure reliability.

The first step in the data collection process was to enter an article's name, year of publication, DOI/URL, and type into the dataset. The various article types were condensed into "research article," "research note," "book review," "other resources" (e.g., interview transcripts), "opinion piece," "editorial introduction," "editorial news/information" (e.g., list of contributors, conference announcements), "bibliography," "conference proceedings/summary," and "erratum/retraction notice." Next, each article's title, abstract, and keywords were read. Sometimes this yielded all relevant data, but in the vast majority of cases it was necessary to scroll through the article for a methods section and to see whether tables or graphs were present, which would increase the likeliness of statistics being used. Unless this step proved conclusive, a search for specific keywords was conducted ("interview," "field work"/"fieldwork," "archive," "court," "database," "dataset," "data," "%"). If this failed to yield conclusive results, the references were read to ascertain the types of sources utilized.


Once data collection was complete, the dataset was analyzed using the Microsoft Access and Microsoft Excel software packages. Access "queries" were created to enable specific types of information to be drawn from the dataset, such as the number of articles using primary sources published per year. This yielded data-subsets that were then imported into Excel for straightforward descriptive statistics to be applied to them, yielding such information as the average number of articles using primary sources, how this differed between journals, and whether trends in such usage could be seen over the decade under investigation.

Results

Figure 1 illustrates the total output over the period 2007–2016. The introduction of seven new journals dedicated to the study of terrorism heralded a marked increase in output; up from 143 articles in 2007 to a yearly average of 367 between 2008 and 2016. Total output levels appear relatively stable after 2008, with research articles and research notes constituting a steadily


increasing majority of the items published, and book reviews occupying third place. With regard to “market share,” it is notable that four of the nine journals account for 74.4% of all the articles published. These are the field’s established “classics” TPV (21.2%) and SCT (17.1%), and newcomers POT (14.7%) and SNT (21.5%), both of which began publication in 2007.

Figure 1. Total output across nine terrorism journals (N = 3442).



To assess the percentage of articles that use primary data, only the article types “research articles,” “research notes,” and “other resources” were analyzed. This avoids skewing the results by the inclusion of types of output such as books reviews and editorial news that are highly unlikely to include any first-hand information. Of the 2552 articles comprising this selection, 1372, or 53.8%, used some kind of primary sources. [Figure 2](#) indicates a trend towards an increasing use of such data in the decade under investigation; from 48.1% in 2007 to 59.5% in 2016.

Figure 2. Primary sources usage (N = 2552).



As can be seen in Table 1, there are marked differences in the degree to which the various journals publish primary sources-based research. With an average of 66.3% over the 10-year period, SNT leads the pack. This appears to reflect, at least in part, its emphasis on publishing work by counterterrorism and counterinsurgency practitioners with field experience. But even if SNT were to be seen as an outlier, a positive trend can still be observed; albeit up from 36.8% in 2007 to 55.1% in 2016.


The increased use of primary sources coincides with a slight but steady decrease in a methodological reliance on the literature review method, or what Silke termed “documentary analysis/review.” Looking at research articles, research notes, and other resources (N = 2552), the overall use of literature review as the only method of data collection and analysis dropped from 42.3% in 2007 to 32.5% in 2016. Still, as Table 2 shows, this method remained predominant in the decade under review, with an average of 39.2% of articles relying entirely upon it. The second most common form of data collection was a combination of literature review with interviews (15.8%), followed by the use of databases (8.0%), drawing upon multiple forms of primary data (8.0%) and the study of terrorist primary sources (7.8%), such as speeches and writings. A variety of other types of (primary) data collection were encountered, but only in 0.1–3% of articles.

Methods of data collection for research articles, research notes, and other resources.

On the use of statistical analyses in research articles, research notes, and other resources, [Figure 3](#) shows a slow but steady upward trend; from 16.6% in 2007 to 28.0% in 2016. The figure also illustrates that descriptive statistics are used most often overall. Of the 2552 articles selected for analysis, 14.7% used descriptive statistics, 5.8% used a combination of descriptive and inferential statistics, and 1.3% used inferential statistics only. Overall, however, 78.1% of the articles studied did not use any kind of statistical analyses. Looking at the use of statistics per journal over the decade under investigation, some clear differences stand out. Three journals

publish articles with statistical analyses much more frequently; SCT (27.1%), TPV (24.0%), and POT (21.3%), versus 2.0 to 7.0% for the others (Table 1).

Figure 3. Use of statistical analyses (N = 2552).




On the question of authorship, the results indicate that 72.6% of research articles, research notes, and other resources were written by a single author, 17.8% by two authors, 6.8% by three or more authors, and 2.9% without attribution to an author. While the majority of terrorism scholars work alone, a trend towards greater collaboration was evident. Whereas 77.1% of research-based articles were the work of a single author in 2007, this dropped steadily to 68.7% in 2016.

A total of 2307 authors were identified, 2097 of whom made at least one research-based contribution. Looking at all authors first, 72.2% made one contribution (1665 authors), 13.4% made two contributions (309 authors), 5.5% published thrice (126 authors), 2.4% wrote 4 pieces (55 authors), and 6.6% authored five or more publications (152 authors). Narrowing this down to research-based output only (research articles, research notes, or other resources), these figures change to show that 74.8% were one-time contributors (1569 authors), 13.3% wrote two pieces (279 authors), 4.6% contributed thrice (96 authors), 2.7% made four contributions (56 authors), and 4.6% authored five or more articles (97 authors). In short, the majority of authors publishing on terrorism are one-time contributors.

For each journal, the percentage of authors who also published in one of the other 8 journals was calculated. Stacking these numbers yields the overall percentage of authors per journal that publish in the broader field (Figure 4). For instance, 79.4% of authors who published in TPV also wrote for one of the field's other journals at least once. This underlines the importance of taking the field as a whole into account when calculating the average number of contributions per author. It also shows that TPV, POT, and SCT attract the largest number of authors who make multiple contributions to the field as a whole. In contrast, JDR and JTR especially are relatively "isolated" in that their authors only publish in the other terrorism journals to a limited degree. These disparities may also reflect the status of TPV and SCT in particular as established outlets for research on terrorism, which are thereby able to attract more (returning) contributors.

Figure 4. Journal integration into the wider field.



Discussion

The findings and longitudinal trends revealed by this study provide several clear indicators of positive developments in the academic study of terrorism. At the very least, they should serve to problematize the sense of enduring pessimism about the methodological issues besetting such work; a position, incidentally, that this author also held in the past. In terms of the use of primary data, statistics, methods of data collection other than the literature review, and the degree of collaboration, there are signs of gradual and continuing improvement. Silke's assessments in the early 2000s found that more than 80% of articles on terrorism used secondary sources only, that 62% were based exclusively on a literature review methodology, and that interviews and databases were utilized in only 10 and 7% of articles respectively. Between 2007 and 2016, these numbers rose considerably; 53.8% of articles used some kind of first-hand data, only 39.2% were based exclusively on literature review, 15.8% utilized interviews, and 8.0% incorporated databases.

Particularly in terms of the use of primary sources, these figures indicate that considerable progress has been made. From a field of study in which experts mostly talked amongst themselves, endlessly referencing books, articles, and media reports, the study of terrorism has developed to a point where a (slim) majority of articles *do* use primary data. Moreover, there is a steady upward trend in the use of such data. The lack of research based on primary sources, one of the most enduring and detrimental problems to face the field, finally appears to be abating. Of course, this does not mean that all associated issues are similarly being resolved; the empirical verification of explanations for involvement in terrorism, for instance, still seems a long way off. Still, the increased use of first-hand information places the development of a stronger empirical foundation for understanding terrorism and counterterrorism within scholars' grasp.

Unfortunately, progress towards addressing other areas of concern in research on terrorism has been less intrepid. To begin with, the use of databases remains relatively low at 8.0% and virtually unchanged from the 7% that Silke noted more than a decade ago. Strikingly, only 0.6% of articles used an experimental research design and a mere 0.08% (2 articles) were based on clinical assessment. The scarcity of this latter methodological approach is particularly problematic, as

questions surrounding terrorists' psychology and the degree to which mental health issues can offer an explanation for this form of political violence remain highly salient in the literature. Here is one particular area of research that is urgently in need of a more extensive and robust empirical basis.

Another area of concern is the use of statistics. While the percentage of articles that incorporates such analyses has steadily increased, from 16.6% in 2007 to 28.0% in 2016, an average of 78.1% of pieces published in this period did not use statistics at all. This is actually a higher average than the 74% of articles without statistics that Silke noted in 2007. Research on terrorism still favors qualitative research designs. While scholars have broadened their data collection methodologies within that spectrum, going a long way towards addressing the overreliance on literature reviews, quantitative research arguably remains underdeveloped. If the trend found in this study continues, however, this issue may be addressed within the next several years.

Arguably most problematic is the ongoing scarcity of collaboration between researchers and the high number of one-time contributors. Between 2007 and 2016, 74.7% of research-based papers were the work of a single author and 74.8% of authors made only one such contribution to the field. Both figures are an improvement on the metrics uncovered by Silke in the early 2000s, when 80% of papers were the work of a single author and 83% of research on terrorism was by one-time contributors. The trend therefore suggests gradual improvement, but the pace of progress is slow. Teams of researchers will generally have more time, finances, and intellectual capital than single authors. With most scholars on terrorism continuing to work alone, the size and scope of the projects that can be undertaken will remain relatively modest and hamper the development of new insights. Similarly, the large number of transient scholars, many of whom are unlikely to have truly in-depth knowledge of ongoing debates and the state of the art, poses a serious obstacle to developing a committed core of researchers able to move the field forward.

In terms of output, terrorism studies has undergone significant growth. This is primarily due to the addition of seven new journals in the 2007–2014 period that have expanded the core outlets for scholarly research beyond the mainstays TPV and SCT. Although quantity alone says little about the quality of the research being conducted, the addition of these new journals does speak to the ongoing ability of terrorism to attract academic attention. The rise of specialist journals, such as those focused on deradicalization or a “critical” perspective on terrorism, reflect the field's ongoing maturation in that it has been able to attract academics from specific backgrounds and with specific interests. Perhaps unfortunately, this has also led to considerable stratification, with authors in some journals preferring to publish only in that particular outlet. Going forward, it will be important to ensure that these research communities do not become islands and that scholars not only remain aware of developments in the broader field, but actively engage with those they may consider to be outside of their primary academic audience.

Another important point of discussion is that the findings presented in this article should not be taken as straightforward indicators of the quality of particular articles or authors. The emphasis on how a lack of primary sources in particular has had a detrimental influence on the field for decades, is not a dismissal of the value of non-empirical work. Many authors who base themselves on the secondary literature have made stellar contributions by bringing together insights from a diverse range of scholarly, governmental, journalistic, and NGO-based works. Others have analyzed existing data in novel ways, presented findings from the non-English literature, or drawn attention

to countries, case studies, and historical periods that have been undeservedly neglected. Similarly, the use of primary data is not a guarantee for high-quality work; some articles use only the barest of such sources or fail to study them in depth. The use of secondary or primary data should not be assessed at the level of individual authors, but at that of the field of study. It is here that an overreliance on secondary sources has been well-documented and it is here that the present study notes considerable improvements.

Finally, there is a question of methodology that deserves to be underlined. Some previous assessments of the field of terrorism studies have relied at least in part on the study of abstracts or methodology sections. While carrying out the data collection for this study, it quickly became apparent that most authors do not state their methodology and sources in the abstract and that a clearly marked “methods” section is often absent. To reliably ascertain whether a particular article used primary data, for instance, it was almost always necessary to read the references or bibliography. Although time consuming, this approach should be kept in mind when carrying out future evaluations of the field.

Conclusion

Terrorism has touched every aspect of national life in Pakistan. Critically observed, the entire spectrum of violence has been multi-faceted and multilateral in nature, graduating from lower to upper rungs on the ladder of escalation in a calculated, calibrated and efficient manner. The targets included humans (ordinary people and key functionaries) as well as institutional, organizational, infrastructural and material assets. The levels touched reaches from sub-tactical (citizenry) to tactical (infrastructure), from operational (police, FC, army) to strategic (leadership, defence assets, strategic organizations, state organs). In temporal domains, an unrestrained impetus is visible in the series of recorded violent incidents. The observed trends authoritatively contextualize these manifestations. While varied in its structure, operational system and rallying themes, both state and society of Pakistan have been the terrorists’ ultimate objective, posing an existential threat to their survival. The typology suggested at the beginning of this article turned out to be a valid heuristic tool. In conceptual terms, terrorism can be expressed through eight narratives:

- as expression of religious constructions
- as a protest and rallying symbol (ideological)
- as instrument of policy (political)
- as violent criminal behavior (organized crime)
- as a warfare implement (spatiotemporal swathe)
- as propaganda tool (visual warfare through media)
- as vengeance (norm) and
- as vigilantism (state functionalism).

Trend persistency depends on extra-systemic interventions or dynamics such as policy initiatives by government to mitigate and manage the conflict or lack of it, or changed scenarios in Afghanistan and Iran. With minimal variations and adjustments, all trends are likely to endure for the present except Trend II which has considerably lost its original steam, and Trend V which is still evolving. Randomness than certainty, is the hallmark of spate of violence in Pakistan. Time

patterns i.e., trends, cycles and, seasonality do not offer themselves to linear determinism. Precepts of good weather and longer hours in general and week days' sequential pattern of terrorism has not been established, warranting further enquiry. Auto regression in ideal sense thus is handicapped given fluid nature of violence. Suggestion made at the outset about inapplicability of routine theory is largely supported by cited evidence. What has, however, emerged is a widespread alienation of the masses of people from the Taliban. There is a discernable unanimity with regard to the fight against terrorism among polity and public alike, something that was missing under the dictatorship. This has legitimized the use of the military instrument under civilian control, has created its popular ownership, checked its undemocratic use and has brought non-military stakeholders into conflict resolution deliberations. However, a historical review will be required to generalize with regard to military versus democratic rule in terms of its impact on terrorism. That apart, the institutionalized franchise formation of terrorism identified in this article portends a response dilemma for policy and decision-making hierarchies. While all above forms of terrorism are comprehensible to an extent, the trend (VIII) about the destruction of vital national assets is perplexing. Ideologues like Ayman al-Zawahiri regard the strategic assets of Pakistan important to furthering their own vision. He dreams of a future jihad encompassing the southern Russian Republics, Iran, Turkey, and wants to unite a nuclear Pakistan with the gas-rich Caspian region to form a powerful base serving jihad. The America-Israel and Indian nexus figures prominently in Zawahiri's discourse titled "Knights under the Prophet's Banner". In addition to Chechnya and Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan with its nuclear programme occupy key places in his narratives as they can serve as counterweight to the US-Israel nexus. Paradoxically however, the attack on Pakistan's naval air base was construed by many as a punitive strike to avenge death of Osama bin Laden by AlQaida. This setting projects three possibilities. First, TTP has outsourced its expertise to a state inimical to Pakistan which is evident from the type of target selection, degradation of which is least beneficial to Taliban. Secondly, it is probable (and more likely) that the present leadership of TTP having lost its organizational sting, is discreetly colluding with elements within Al Qaeda. For it to materialize, it is imperative that Zawahiri should no more be in effective command of Al Qaeda, and its leadership lay into multiple power centres consisting of foreign elements sympathetic to those who lost their lives in FATA as a result of US drone strikes. It is also possible that it signals a shifting in the agenda of Al Qaeda— a shift away from South and Central Asia to the Arab world and North Africa where the current turmoil caused by the Arab Awakening can be exploited. Almost all statements by Ayman al-Zawahiri since 2011 focused on the Arab Spring and he is urging volunteers to fight in Syria. As a result, TTP has become totally autonomous in articulating violence. A third and less likely possibility is that Gul Bahadur, commander of the Taliban in North Waziristan has jumped in since he will be the most affected party in case of new military campaign. That said, all of these possibilities are debatable. This article has tried to demonstrate that some traditional modes of addressing the issue of terrorism are outdated. Due to the advent of a new generation of ideologues, militant leadership and a variety of terrorist organizations and networks, the security landscape of Pakistan is unlikely to change for the better in the near future. An innovative and context-sensitive response to national security challenges in Pakistan is called for. The strengthening of democratic institutions, good governance as well as the development of a home-grown epistemology of terrorism analysis are imperative to bring the country closer to a secure peace from within and without.

Between 2007 and 2016, the field of terrorism studies has undergone significant developments with regard to many of the methodological issues that have plagued it for decades. Above all, the use of primary data has increased considerably and appears to be continuing to do so. Concurrently, scholars have begun to adapt a wider variety of data-gathering techniques, greatly diminishing the overreliance on literature reviews that was noted from the 1980s through to the early 2000s. These positive changes should not obscure enduring issues. Despite improvements, most scholars continue to work alone and most authors are one-time contributors. Moreover, the field remains predominantly qualitative in orientation with the use of statistics remaining relatively low. Clearly, there remain numerous grounds for concern that will require ongoing and concerted effort to address. Yet, in reaching an overall conclusion there is considerable empirical support for an optimistic assessment. Research on terrorism has not stagnated; it has begun to flourish.

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